SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 18, RTC, BULACAN, RESPONDENT.

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court to set aside the Order dated November 19, 1986 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Bulacan presided by respondent Judge Zotico A.
Tolete, in Special Proceedings No. 1793-M.

We grant the petition.

II

Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez­-Cunanan, who
became American citizens, established a successful medical practice in New
York, U.S.A. The Cunanans lived at No.
2896 Citation Drive, Pompey, Syracuse, New York, with their children, Jocelyn,
18; Jacqueline, 16; and Josephine, 14.

On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and
testament, bequeathing to his wife “all the remainder” of his real
and personal property at the time of his death “wheresoever situated”
(Rollo, p. 35). In the event he would survive
his wife, he bequeathed all his property to his children and grandchildren with
Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and testament and
Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor. Article VIII of his will states:

“If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under such
circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of
our deaths, then it shall be presumed that I predeceased her, and my estate shall
be administered and distributed, in all respects, in accordance with such
presumption” (Rollo, p. 41).

Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her
own last will and testament containing the same provisions as that of the will
of her husband. Article VIII of her
will states:

“If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under such
circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of
our deaths, then it shall be presumed that he predeceased me, and my estate
shall be administered and distributed in all respects, in accordance with such
presumption” (Rollo, p. 31).

On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished
when they were trapped by fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as
trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings
for the probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New
York. On April 7, these two wills were admitted to probate and letters
testamentary were issued in his favor.

On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr.
Evelyn P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two wills ancillary to the
probate proceedings in New York. She
also asked that she be appointed the special administratrix of the estate of
the deceased couple consisting primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan.

On March 9, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Malolos,
Bulacan, presided by Judge Gualberto J. de la Llana, issued an order, directing
the issuance of letters of special administration in favor of petitioner upon
her filing of a P10,000.00 bond. The
following day, petitioner posted the bond and took her oath as special
administratrix.

As her first act of administration, petitioner filed a motion,
praying that the Philippine Life Insurance Company be directed to deliver the
proceeds in the amount of P50,000.00 of the life insurance policy taken by Dr.
Jose F. Cunanan with Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan and their daughter Jocelyn as
beneficiaries. The trial court granted
the motion.

Counsel for the Philippine American Life Insurance Company then
filed a manifestation, stating that said company had delivered to petitioner
the amount of P49,765.85, representing the proceeds of the life insurance
policy of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan.

In a motion dated May 19, 1983, petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael
Cunanan, Sr. be ordered to deliver to her a Philippine Trust Company passbook
with P25,594.00 in savings deposit, and the Family Savings Bank time deposit
certificates in the total amount of P12,412.52.

On May 31, Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of appearance as
counsel for the heirs of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, namely, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr.,
Priscilla Cunanan Bautista, Lydia Cunanan Ignacio, Felipe F. Cunanan and Loreto
Cunanan Concepcion (Cunanan heirs). He
also manifested that before receiving petitioner’s motion of May 19, 1983, his
clients were unaware of the filing of the testate estate case and therefore,
“in the interest of simple fair play,” they should be notified of the
proceedings (Records, p. 110). He
prayed for deferment of the hearing on the motion of May 19, 1983.

Petitioner then filed a counter manifestation dated June 13,
1983, asserting: (1) that the
“Cunanan collaterals are neither heirs nor creditors of the late Dr. Jose
F. Cunanan” and therefore, they had “no legal or proprietary
interests to protect” and “no right to intervene”; (2) that the wills of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr.
Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, being American citizens, were executed in accordance with
the solemnities and formalities of New York
laws, and produced “effects in this jurisdiction in accordance with Art. 16 in
relation to Art. 816 of the
Civil Code”; (3) that under Article VIII of the two wills, it was presumed
that the husband predeceased the wife; and (4) that “the Cunanan
collaterals are neither distributees, legatees or beneficiaries, much less,
heirs as heirship is only by institution” under a will or by operation of
the law of New York (Records, pp. 112-113).

On June 23, the probate
court granted petitioner’s motion of May 19, 1983. However, on July 21, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion to nullify
the proceedings and to set aside the appointment of, or to disqualify,
petitioner as special administratrix of the estates of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and
Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan. The motion
stated: (1) that being the
“brothers and sisters and the legal and surviving heirs” of Dr. Jose
F. Cunanan, they had been “deliberately excluded” in the petition for
the probate of the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses thereby misleading the
Bulacan court to believe that petitioner was the sole heir of the spouses; that
such “misrepresentation” deprived them of their right to “due
process in violation of Section 4, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court; (2)
that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr., the executor of the estate of the Cunanan
spouses, was likewise not notified of the hearings in the Bulacan court; (3)
that the “misrepresentation and concealment committed by” petitioner
rendered her unfit to be a special administratrix; (4) that Dr. Rafael G.
Cunanan, Jr. had, by virtue of a verified power of attorney, authorized his
father, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., to be his attorney-in-fact; and (5) that Dr.
Rafael Cunanan, Sr. is qualified to be a regular administrator “as
practically all of the subject estate in the Philippines belongs to their
brother, Dr. Jose F. Cunanan” (Records, pp. 118-122). Hence, they prayed: (1) that the proceedings in the case be
declared null and void; (2) that the appointment of petitioner as special
administratrix be set aside; and (3) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed
the regular administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses.

Thereafter, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion requiring petitioner
to submit an inventory or accounting of all monies received by her in trust for
the estate.

In her opposition, petitioner asserted: (1) that she was the “sole and only heir” of her
daughter, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan to the exclusion of the “Cunanan
collaterals”; hence they were complete strangers to the proceedings and
were not entitled to notice; (2) that she could not have “concealed”
the name and address of Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. because his name was
prominently mentioned not only in the two wills but also in the decrees of the
American surrogate court; (3) that the rule applicable to the case is Rule 77,
not Rule 76, because it involved the allowance of wills proved outside of the
Philippines and that nowhere in Section 2 of Rule 77 is there a mention of
notice being given to the executor who, by the same provision, should himself
file the necessary ancillary proceedings in this country; (4) that even if the
Bulacan estate came from the “capital” of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, he had
willed all his worldly goods to his wife and nothing to his brothers and
sisters; and (5) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had unlawfully disbursed
$215,000.00 to the Cunanan heirs, misappropriated $15,000.00 for himself and irregularly
assigned assets of the estates to his American lawyer (Records, pp. 151-160).

In their reply, the Cunanan heirs stressed that on November 24,
1982, petitioner and the Cunanan heirs had entered into an agreement in the
United States “to settle and divide equally the estates,” and that
under Section 2 of Rule 77 the “court shall fix a time and place for the
hearing and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will
presented for allowance” (Records, pp. 184-185).

Petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. be cited for
contempt of court for failure to comply with the Order of June 23, 1983 and for
appropriating money of the estate for his own benefit. She also alleged that she had impugned the
agreement of November 24, 1982 before the Surrogate Court of Onondaga, New York
which rendered a decision on April 13, 1983, finding that “all assets are
payable to Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan’s executor to be then distributed pursuant to
EPTL4-1.1 subd [a] par [4]” (Rollo, p. 52).

On their part, the Cunanan heirs replied that petitioner was
estopped from claiming that they were heirs by the agreement to divide equally
the estates. They asserted that by
virtue of Section 2 of Rule 77 of the Rules of Court, the provision of Sections
3, 4 and 5 of Rule 76 on the requirement of notice to all heirs, executors,
devisees and legatees must be complied with. They reiterated their prayer: (1) that the proceedings in the case be nullified; (2) that petitioner
be disqualified as special administratrix; (3) that she be ordered to submit an
inventory of all goods, chattels and monies which she had received and to
surrender the same to the court; and (4) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be
appointed the regular administrator.

Petitioner filed a rejoinder, stating that in violation of the
April 13, 1983 decision of the American court Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. made
“unauthorized disbursements from the estates as early as July 7,
1982” (Records, p. 231). Thereafter, petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings as
she had “to attend to the settlement proceedings” of the estate of
the Cunanan spouses in New York (Records, p. 242). The Cunanans heirs opposed this motion and filed a manifestation,
stating that petitioner had received $215,000.00 “from the Surrogate’s
Court as part of legacy” based on the aforesaid agreement of November 24,
1982 (Records, p. 248).

On February 21, 1984, Judge de la Llana issued an order,
disallowing the reprobate of the two wills, recalling the appointment of petitioner
as special administratrix, requiring the submission of petitioner of an
inventory of the property received by her as special administratrix and
declaring all pending incidents moot and academic. Judge de la Llana reasoned out that petitioner failed to prove
the law of New York on procedure and allowance of wills and the court had no
way of telling whether the wills were executed in accordance with the law of
New York. In the absence of such
evidence, the presumption is that the law of succession of the foreign country
is the same as the law of the Philippines. However, he noted, that there were only two witnesses to the wills of
the Cunanan spouses and the Philippine law requires three witnesses and that
the wills were not signed on each and every page, a requirement of the
Philippine law.

On August 27, 1985, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
of the Order dated February 21, 1984, where she had sufficiently proven the
applicable laws of New York
governing the execution of last wills and testaments.

On the same day, Judge de la Llana issued another order, denying
the motion of petitioner for the suspension of the proceedings but gave her 15
days upon arrival in the country within which to act on the other order issued
that same day. Contending that the
second portion of the second order left its finality to the discretion of
counsel for petitioner, the Cunanans filed a motion for the reconsideration of
the objectionable portion of the said order so that it would conform with the
pertinent provisions of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the
Interim Rules of Court.

On April 30, 1985,
the respondent Judge of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, to
which the reprobate case was reassigned, issued an order stating that “(W)hen
the last will and testament xxx was denied probate,” the case was
terminated and therefore all orders theretofore issued should be given
finality. The same Order amended the
February 21, 1984 Order by requiring petitioner to turn over to the estate the
inventoried property. It considered the
proceedings for all intents and purposes, closed (Records, p. 302).

On August 12, petitioner filed a motion to resume proceedings on
account of the final settlement and termination of the probate cases in New York. Three days later, petitioner filed a motion
praying for the reconsideration of the Order of April 30, 1985 on the strength
of the February 21, 1984 Order granting her a period of 15 days upon arrival in
the country within which to act on the denial of probate of the wills of the
Cunanan spouses. On August 19,
respondent Judge granted the motion and reconsidered the Order of April 30,
1985.

On August 29, counsel for petitioner, who happens to be her
daughter, Natividad, filed a motion praying that since petitioner was ailing in
Fort Lee, New Jersey, U.S.A. and therefore incapacitated to act as special
administratrix, she (the counsel) should be named substitute special
administratrix. She also filed a motion
for the reconsideration of the Order of February 21, 1984, denying probate to
the wills of the Cunanan spouses, alleging that respondent Judge “failed
to appreciate the significant probative value of the exhibits x x x which all
refer to the offer and admission to probate of the last wills of the Cunanan
spouses including all procedures undertaken and decrees issued in connection
with the said probate” (Records, pp. 313-323).

Thereafter, the Cunanans heirs filed a motion for reconsideration
of the Order of August 19, 1985, alleging lack of notice to their counsel.

On March 31, 1986, respondent Judge to which the case was
reassigned denied the motion for reconsideration holding that the documents
submitted by petitioner proved “that the wills of the testator domiciled
abroad were properly executed, genuine and sufficient to possess real and
personal property; that letters testamentary were issued; and that proceedings
were held on a foreign tribunal and proofs taken by a competent judge who
inquired into all the facts and circumstances and being satisfied with his
findings issued a decree admitting to probate the wills in question.”
However, respondent Judge said that the documents did not establish the law of
New York on the procedure and allowance of wills (Records, p. 381).

On April 9, 1986, petitioner filed a motion to allow her to
present further evidence on the foreign law. After the hearing of the motion on April 25, 1986, respondent Judge
issued an order wherein he conceded that insufficiency of evidence to prove the
foreign law was not a fatal defect and was curable by adducing additional
evidence. He granted petitioner 45 days
to submit the evidence to that effect.

However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce the additional
evidence, respondent Judge ruled in his order dated June 20, 1986 that he found
“no compelling reason to disturb its ruling of March 31, 1986” but
allowed petitioner to “file anew the appropriate probate proceedings for
each of the testator” (Records, p. 391).

The Order dated June 20, 1986 prompted petitioner to file a second
motion for reconsideration stating that she was “ready to submit further
evidence on the law obtaining in the State of New York” and praying that she be
granted “the opportunity to present evidence on what the law of the State
of New York has on the probate and allowance of wills” (Records, p. 393).

On July 18, respondent Judge denied the motion holding that to
allow the probate of two wills in a single proceeding “would be a
departure from the typical and established mode of probate where one petition
takes care of one will.” He pointed out that even in New York “where the
wills in question were first submitted for probate, they were dealt with in
separate proceedings” (Records, p. 395).

On August 13, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration
of the Order of July 18, 1986, citing Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court,
which provides that no party may institute more than one suit for a single
cause of action. She pointed out that
separate proceedings for the wills of the spouses which contain basically the
same provisions as they even named each other as a beneficiary in their
respective wills, would go against “the grain of inexpensive, just and speedy determination of the proceedings”
(Records, pp. 405-407).

On September 11, 1986, petitioner filed a supplement to the
motion for reconsideration, citing Benigno v. De La
Peña, 57 Phil. 305 (1932) (Records, p. 411), but respondent Judge found
that this pleading had been filed out of time and that the adverse party had
not been furnished with a copy thereof. In her compliance, petitioner stated that she had furnished a copy of
the motion to the counsel of the Cunanan heirs and reiterated her motion for a
“final ruling on her supplemental motion” (Records, p. 421).

On November 19, respondent Judge issued an order, denying the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner on the grounds that “the
probate of separate wills of two or more different persons even if they are
husband and wife cannot be undertaken in a single petition” (Records, pp.
376-378).

Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that
the evidence offered at the hearing of April 11, 1983 sufficiently proved the
laws of the State of New York on the allowance of wills, and that the separate
wills of the Cunanan spouses need not be probated in separate proceedings.

II

Petitioner contends that the following pieces of evidence she had
submitted before respondent Judge are sufficient to warrant the allowance of
the wills:

(a) two certificates of authentication of the respective
wills of Evelyn and Jose by the Consulate General of the Philippines
(Exhs. “F” and “G”);

(b) two certifications from the Secretary of
State of New York and Custodian of the Great Seal on the facts that Judge
Bernard L. Reagan is the Surrogate of the County of Onondaga which is a court
of record, that his signature and seal of office are genuine, and that the
Surrogate is duly authorized to grant copy of the respective wills of Evelyn
and Jose (Exhs. “F-1” and “G-1”);

(c) two certificates of Judge Reagan and Chief
Clerk Donald E. Moore stating that they have in their records and files the
said wills which were recorded on April 7, 1982 (Exhs. “F-2” and
“G-2”);

(d) the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose
(Exhs. “F-3”, “F-6” and Exh. “G-3” – “G-6”);

(e) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief
Clerk certifying to the genuineness and authenticity of the exemplified copies
of the two wills (Exhs. “F-7” and “F-7”);

(f) two certificates of authentication
from the Consulate General of the Philippines in New York (Exh. “H”
and “F”).

(g) certifications from the Secretary of State
that Judge Reagan is duly authorized to grant exemplified copies of the
decree of probate, letters testamentary and all proceedings had and proofs duly
taken (Exhs. “H-1” and “I-1”);

(h) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief
Clerk that letters testamentary were issued to Rafael G. Cunanan (Exhs.
“H-2” and “I-2”);

(i) certification to the effect that it was during
the term of Judge Reagan that a decree admitting the wills to probate had been
issued and appointing Rafael G. Cunanan as alternate executor (Exhs.
“H-3” and “I-10”);

(j) the decrees on probate
of the two wills specifying that proceedings were held and proofs duly taken
(Exhs. “H-4” and “I-5”);

(k) decrees on probate of the two wills stating
that they were properly executed, genuine and valid and that the said
instruments were admitted to probate and established as wills valid to pass real and personal property (Exhs.
“H-5” and “I-5”); and

(l) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief
Clerk on the genuineness and authenticity of each other’s signatures in the
exemplified copies of the decrees of probate, letters testamentary and
proceedings held in their court (Exhs. “H-6″ and “I-6″)” (Rollo, pp. 13-16).

Petitioner adds that the wills had been admitted to probate in
the Surrogate Court’s Decision of April 13, 1983 and that the proceedings were
terminated on November 29, 1984.

The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American
citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance with the
following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

“Art. 816. The will of
an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with
those which this Code prescribes.”

Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities
prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.

The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills
which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in
accordance with the foreign
laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the
Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country;
(4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of
a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries
on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500
[1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all
the needed evidence.

The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon
which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that
our courts cannot take judicial notice of them (Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 [1974]).

Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved
for more time to submit the pertinent procedural and substantive New York laws
but which request respondent Judge just glossed over. While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein
courts should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best
evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated
or denied probate (Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]).

There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills
of the Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly. Respondent Judge’s view that the Rules on allowance of wills is
couched in singular terms and therefore should be interpreted to mean that
there should be separate probate proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan
spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall be “liberally
construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.”

A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they
would only result in the delay in the administration of justice (Acain v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 100 [1987]; Roberts v. Leonidas, 129
SCRA 33 [1984]).

What the law expressly
prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testators’ reciprocal
benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines,
Article 818). In the case at bench, the
Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain
to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical
considerations dictate their joint probate. As this Court has held a number of times, it will always strive to
settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch
to bear the seeds of future litigation (Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187 SCRA 743
[1990]).

This petition cannot be
completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact – petitioner has
always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because
she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably
failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only
impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being
assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General,
215 SCRA 876 [1992]).

The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of
a will shall “cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original
will presented for allowance” (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2)
means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated
as if it were an “original will” or a will that is presented for
probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require
publication and notice by mail or personally to the “known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines” and to
the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.

The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to
petitioner’s claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving
the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76
of the Revised Rules of Court, the “court shall also cause copies of the
notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator,
xxx”.

WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner
reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of
the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent
to the probate proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., (Acting Chairman), Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., (Chairman), on leave.