🎧 Case Brief Lecture

PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY AND RODRIGO DE LOS REYES, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ARMANDO ANSALDO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, AND RAMON MONTILLA PATERNO…

G.R. No. 76452. July 26, 1994 July 26, 1994

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Philippine American Life Insurance Company versus Ansaldo

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, brought by the Philippine American Life Insurance Company and its president, Rodrigo de los Reyes, against the Insurance Commissioner, Armando Ansaldo, and the private complainant, Ramon Montilla Paterno, Jr. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to annul and set aside the Commissioner's order of November 6, 1986, and the entire proceedings taken in the special case before him, on the ground that the Commissioner acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. The case matters because it draws the outer boundary of the Insurance Commissioner's quasi-judicial power: it tells us that the Commissioner may adjudicate claims of the insured against the insurer, but not disputes between an insurance company and its own agents over the terms of their contract of agency.

Procedural History

The matter began not in a court but in the office of the Insurance Commissioner, upon a letter-complaint filed by private respondent Paterno in April 1986. After an exchange of letters and a hearing, the Commissioner issued the order of November 6, 1986 denying the motion to quash the subpoena and notice filed on behalf of Philamlife, and ruling that the case was an informal administrative litigation cognizable by the Commission. Rather than appeal, the petitioners went directly to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, with a prayer for a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order, to annul that order and the proceedings below. The Supreme Court gave due course to the petition and decided it in July 1994, granting the relief prayed for.

Facts

On April 17, 1986, private respondent Ramon Montilla Paterno, Jr. wrote the Insurance Commissioner a letter-complaint alleging certain problems encountered by agents, supervisors, managers, and public consumers of Philamlife as a result of certain practices of the company. The Commissioner asked petitioner Rodrigo de los Reyes, as Philamlife's president, to comment. De los Reyes asked that the complainant submit some sort of a bill of particulars, listing and citing actual cases, facts, dates, figures, provisions of law, rules and regulations, and all other pertinent data necessary to enable him to prepare an intelligent reply.

The complainant insisted that his letter was sufficient in form and substance and asked that a hearing be conducted. A hearing was held in July 1986, at which the Commissioner required the complainant to specify the provisions of the agency contract he claimed to be illegal. The complainant then submitted a letter of specification, praying that the provisions on charges and fees in the Contract of Agency between Philamlife and its agents, as well as the implementing provisions published in the agents' handbook, agency bulletins, and circulars, be declared null and void, and that the amounts already deducted and collected be reimbursed to the agents with interest.

Philamlife answered, insisting that the complaint contained none of the particulars it had sought and that, since the Commission's quasi-judicial power was being invoked, a verified formal complaint was required. The complainant later executed an affidavit verifying his letters. Philamlife then moved to quash the subpoena and notice, arguing that no complaint sufficient in form and content had been filed, that no summons had been issued, and that the Commission had no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties. The Commissioner denied the motion in the order of November 6, 1986, and the petitioners came to the Supreme Court.

Issues

  • Whether or not the resolution of the legality of the Contract of Agency between Philamlife and its agents falls within the jurisdiction of the Insurance Commissioner.
  • Whether or not the Insurance Commissioner may, in the exercise of his quasi-judicial powers under the Insurance Code, take cognizance of controversies between an insurance company and its agents.

Applicable Provisions

Section 414 of the Insurance Code describes the general regulatory authority of the Commissioner:

The Insurance Commissioner shall have the duty to see that all laws relating to insurance, insurance companies and other insurance matters, mutual benefit associations and trusts for charitable uses are faithfully executed and to perform the duties imposed upon him by this Code.

This is the general grant of regulatory power, which the Court reads as authority over the business of insurance, not over every contract an insurer may sign.

Section 415 of the Insurance Code provides:

In addition to the administrative sanctions provided elsewhere in this Code, the Insurance Commissioner is hereby authorized, at his discretion, to impose upon insurance companies, their directors and or officers and or agents, for any willful failure or refusal to comply with, or violation of any provision of this Code, or any order, instruction, regulation or ruling of the Insurance Commissioner, or any commission of irregularities, and or conducting business in an unsafe or unsound manner as may be determined by the Insurance Commissioner, the following: (a) fines not in excess of five hundred pesos a day; and (b) suspension, or after due hearing, removal of directors and or officers and or agents.

This provision supplies administrative sanctions only; it confers no power to adjudicate the private dispute over the agency contract.

Section 2 of the Insurance Code defines the business of insurance:

The term doing an insurance business or transacting an insurance business, within the meaning of this Code, shall include (a) making or proposing to make, as insurer, any insurance contract; (b) making, or proposing to make, as surety, any contract of suretyship as a vocation and not as merely incidental to any other legitimate business or activity of the surety; (c) doing any kind of business, including a reinsurance business, specifically recognized as constituting the doing of an insurance business within the meaning of this Code; (d) doing or proposing to do any business in substance equivalent to any of the foregoing in a manner designed to evade the provisions of this Code.

Because a contract of agency with agents is not among these acts, this definition cannot be stretched to confer jurisdiction over it.

Section 416 of the Insurance Code, in pertinent part, provides:

The Commissioner shall have the power to adjudicate claims and complaints involving any loss, damage or liability for which an insurer may be answerable under any kind of policy or contract of insurance, or for which such insurer may be liable under a contract of suretyship, or for which a reinsurer may be used under any contract or reinsurance it may have entered into, or for which a mutual benefit association may be held liable under the membership certificates it has issued to its members, where the amount of any such loss, damage or liability, excluding interest, costs and attorney's fees, being claimed or sued upon any kind of insurance, bond, reinsurance contract, or membership certificate does not exceed in any single claim one hundred thousand pesos.

This is the quasi-judicial power invoked by the complainant, and its text confines that power to claims of the insured against the insurer.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the legality of the Contract of Agency does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Insurance Commissioner. A plain reading of Sections 414 and 415 shows that the Commissioner's authority is to regulate the business of insurance. Since the contract of agency between Philamlife and its agents is not included within the meaning of an insurance business under Section 2, that definition cannot be invoked to give jurisdiction over it. The Court applied the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning that the express mention of the things included excludes those not mentioned.

On the second issue, the Court likewise ruled in the negative. The quasi-judicial power under Section 416 is limited by law to claims and complaints involving any loss, damage, or liability for which an insurer may be answerable under any kind of policy or contract of insurance. That power, the Court said, does not cover the relationship affecting the insurance company and its agents, but is limited to adjudicating claims and complaints filed by the insured against the insurance company. The Court noted that while insurance agents and brokers are discussed in the Insurance Code, those provisions speak only of licensing requirements and limitations, and the Code has no provisions governing the relations between insurance companies and their agents. It follows that the Commissioner cannot, in the exercise of his quasi-judicial powers, assume jurisdiction over controversies between insurance companies and their agents.

The Court added a practical distinction. An insurance company may have two classes of agents: salaried employees who keep definite hours and work under the control and supervision of the company, and registered representatives who work on a commission basis. For the first, the relationship is governed by the contract of employment and the Labor Code; for the second, it is governed by the contract of agency and the Civil Code provisions on agency, and disputes involving the latter are cognizable by the regular courts.

Doctrine

First, the Insurance Commissioner's regulatory authority under Sections 414 and 415 of the Insurance Code extends only to the business of insurance as defined in Section 2, and a contract of agency between an insurer and its agents is not an insurance business.

Second, the Commissioner's quasi-judicial power under Section 416 is confined to claims and complaints of the insured against the insurer for loss, damage, or liability under a policy or contract of insurance; it does not extend to disputes between an insurance company and its agents.

Third, disputes between an insurer and its commission-based agents are governed by the contract of agency and the Civil Code and are cognizable by the regular courts; disputes with salaried employee-agents are governed by the contract of employment and the Labor Code.

Disposition

The petition was granted, and the Order of the Insurance Commissioner dated November 6, 1986 was set aside.

Remember This

The line to memorize is that the Insurance Commissioner adjudicates claims of the insured against the insurer, not quarrels between an insurer and its agents. Examiners use this case to test the limits of the Commissioner's quasi-judicial jurisdiction under Section 416 and the distinction between salaried employee-agents and commission-based agents.