SPOUSES DONATO RAMIREZ AND MARIA RAMIREZ, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PINAMALAYAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO AND IGMEDIO REYES, RESPONDENTS.

The land in question is a 1,200 meters long and 15 meters wide
strip of land denominated as the Malitbog-Naksib
Narra Road and situated
in Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro.  This was donated sometime in 1923 by the
predecessor-in-interest of herein private respondent Igmedio
Reyes to the government for the construction and utilization thereof as
provincial-municipal road.  However, the
government failed to construct a road or at least improve the land.  So on October
9, 1959, the donor in writing, revoked the donation on the ground
that the purpose for which the donation was made was
never pursued.

In 1960, the government appropriated another strip of land from
the titled property of the private respondent and thereupon, constructed the
present and existing Malitbog-Naksib
Narra Road.  Later, in government forms, the government
and private respondent executed Road Right of Way Agreements (Petition, Annex
“D” and Annex “F,” Rollo, pp.
27-30 and 39-42) whereby the originally donated strip of land was exchanged
with the strip of land where the Malitbog-Naksib
Narra Road was
constructed.

After the execution of the two (2) Road Right of Way Agreements,
private respondent tried to take possession of the exchanged area.  However, petitioners, together with others
were found in actual possession and cultivation thereof.  Thus, private respondent instituted Civil
Case No. R-184 for Recovery of Ownership and Possession at
the then Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro, Branch II at Pinamalayan.  Defendants therein, now petitioners,
interposed the defense that they are:

“3.  x x x in rightful possession and
occupation of the abandoned proposed road that adjoins their parcels of land
either as reparian (sic) owners or to compensate them
or a exchange for separate portions of their parcels of land which were
traversed by the Miaje Sigañgi
road constructed by the government x x x.” (Answer filed in Civil Case No. R-184, Annex
“3,” Rollo, p. 338)

In the course of the pre-trial proceedings in
Civil Case No. R-184, petitioners, with some of the other defendants,
manifested that they are no longer interested in the land subject matter of
this case so that they were indeed dropped from the case.  The decision of the court in that case
stated:

“That per conference with the defendants Isidoro
Amparo, Bonifacio Amparo, Marciano Casao, Donato Ramirez, Guillermo Brigido, Marina Salcedo and the
Highway District Engineer, they are no longer interested in the land subject
matter of this case so that he is agreeable that said defendants be dropped
from the case.” (p. 3, Decision, Civil Case No.
R-184, Rollo, p. 33)

This decision dated February
9, 1976 became final as no appeal by any of the parties thereto was
ever interposed.  In fact, it had been
fully executed complied with and satisfied. 
It cannot, however, be enforced against petitioner herein who were
dropped as parties as they promised to vacate. 
Hence, on November 8, 1978,
private respondent filed another suit for recovery of ownership and possession
against petitioners in Civil Case No. R-540.

After service of summons, petitioners filed their answer in court
but never furnished any copy of such answer to private respondent.  Moreover, on the scheduled pre-trial
conference, petitioner Donato Ramirez failed to
appear, although his wife, Maria Ramirez appeared and informed the trial court
that her husband is not available.  Thus,
by reason of the failure to furnish private respondent with a copy of an answer
and to appear during the pre-trial conference, private respondent moved for the
declaration of petitioners in default. 
The trial court resolved to grant the motion and declared petitioners in
default.  Despite receipt of a copy of
the order by petitioners on June 30,
1980, they did not ask to set aside the order of default nor did
they seek any relief from said order.

After presentation of evidence
ex parte, the trial court
rendered judgment on November 8, 1982
as follows:

“(a) Ordering the defendant to surrender the possession of the land
in question in favor of Igmedio Reyes, with a length
of 1,200 meters and with a width of 15 meters of the abandoned old Malitbog-Naksib Road pursuant to the Road Right of Way
Agreement for National Road, Exh. “A”;

“(b) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of P1,500 yearly from the year 1966 up to the present;

“(c) Ordering the defendant to pay the attorney’s fees in the
amount of P3,000.00; and

“(d) Ordering the defendant to pay the costs of
this suit.

“SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, p. 46-47)

From this judgment, petitioners filed an ordinary appeal before
the then Intermediate Appellate Court. 
This appeal docketed as AC G.R. CV No. 04164, however, was dismissed
when petitioners failed to file appellants’ brief.  The order dismissing the appeal became final
and entry of judgment was issued on April
2, 1985.

Upon motion of private respondent, a motion for writ of execution
was issued on May 13, 1985.  To prevent the implementation of the writ,
petitioners instituted on June 10, 1985 before the Regional Trial Court of
Oriental Mindoro, Civil Case No. 770 for annulment of
judgment.  This complaint was dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction.

On July 17, 1985,
the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court levied properties of petitioners and by
notice of sheriff’s sale dated August
7, 1985 published the said notice of auction sale for September 25, 1985.  The notice of sheriff’s sale was published in
a newspaper of general circulation on September 2, 9 and 16, 1985.

On September 12, 1985,
petitioners filed again before the then Intermediate Appellate Court another
annulment suit docketed as CA G.R. No. SP 07107.  In view of the pendency
of this annulment suit, petitioners filed before the trial court an urgent
motion for a stay of the implementation of the writ of execution.  Petitioners succeeded in securing on September 23, 1985 an order granting the motion to stay
the writ of execution.

However, on October 1,
1985, the trial court issued an amended order, worded as follows:

“In the interest of justice considering that Notice of Auction
Sale had already been published in the newspaper prescribed by law, the auction
sale of the levied properties of the defendant is hereby re-scheduled on
October 29, 1985, at 10:00 o’clock in the morning without the necessity of
republication since it was defendant who sought the postponement of said
auction sale on September 25, 1985. 
(Petition, Annex “K,” Rollo, p. 57)

The motion for reconsideration of the order rescheduling auction
sale without republication was denied by the trial court.  Hence, a notice of appeal from said orders as
well as an extension of time to file petition for review on certiorari
were filed by petitioners.  However, they
did not pursue further said remedies and inasmuch as no restraining order was
issued by the appellate court in the petition for annulment of judgment suit
(CA G.R. No. SP 07107), the auction sale of the levied properties of the
petitioners was held on October 29, 1985 and the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale
was executed on October 30, 1985 in favor of the winning bidder.

Thus, on September 23, 1986, when the decision of the respondent
appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 07107 was promulgated dismissing the
complaint for annulment of judgment, the auction sale implementing the judgment
sought to be annulled had already been held. 
Besides, within the one-year period after the date of the auction sale,
the execution of the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale and the registration thereof
on November 6, 1985,
petitioners never attempted to redeem the auctioned properties.  On November
17, 1986, the Sheriff executed the Officer’s Final Deed of Sale in
favor of the successful bidder and the same was duly registered.  On March
3, 1987, the possession of the sold properties
were delivered to the private respondent.

In dismissing the complaint for annulment of judgment, the
respondent appellate court held, to wit:

“The rule is well settled. 
A final judgment can be set aside only on grounds of (a) lack of
jurisdiction or lack of due process or (b) that the judgment was obtained by
means of extrinsic or collateral fraud (Gallanosa v. Arcangel, 83 SCRA 676). 
The extrinsic or collateral fraud which invalidates a final judgment
‘must be such as prevented the unsuccessful party from fully and fairly
presenting his case or defense; it must be such as prevented the losing party
from having an adversary trial of the issue.’ (Laxamana
v. Court of Appeals, 87 SCRA 48)

“These grounds are not present in the case at bar.  The jurisdiction of the court a quo is not
assailed by the plaintiff.  The alleged
errors in the Decision are mere errors of judgment and not errors of
jurisdiction.  Plaintiff cannot also
claim that he was prevented from presenting his defense in the court a
quo.  He did not answer the complaint and
was declared in default.  On appeal of
his case, he did not file his appellant’s brief and resultantly his appeal was
dismissed.” (Rollo, p. 72)

The questions presented now in this petition are as follows:

I

“THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN NOT ANNULLING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND
THE DEFAULT ORDER, BOTH HAVING BEEN ISSUED IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONERS’ RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS.

II

“THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DECLARING THE ROAD RIGHT OF
WAY AGREEMENT FOR NATIONAL ROAD VALID DESPITE ITS
DEFECTS IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE.

III

“THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT A PUBLIC ROAD
COULD BE AN OBJECT OF TRANSACTION.

IV

“THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RE-SCHEDULING AND HOLDING THE AUCTION SALE
WITHOUT REPUBLICATION.” (Rollo, p. 262)

It is notable that from the inception of this case before the
Regional Trial Court up to the time it reached the Court of Appeals in both
instances and then this Court, there was a virtual lack of diligent effort on
the part of petitioners to pursue their defense.  First, there was failure to furnish a copy of
the answer to the plaintiff, respondent herein. 
Then, there was failure to appear during pre-trial.  Hence, they were declared as in default.  Then, instead of seeking relief from the
judgment rendered by default, petitioners filed an ordinary appeal before the
Intermediate Appellate Court which was, however, dismissed for failure to file
appellants’ brief.  A suit for annulment
of judgment was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro but this was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.  In spite of the dismissal,
petitioners did nothing, only to awaken when the writ of possession was issued
against them by filing another suit for annulment.  Again, after receiving a copy of the
questioned Court of Appeals’ decision on September 25, 1987, petitioners filed a motion for
extension of time to file motion for reconsideration only on October 13, 1986, or exactly
eighteen (18) days from receipt of the copy of the decision.  Hence, the decision sought to be reviewed had
already became final as early as October 10, 1986 as decisions of any courts
become final after fifteen (15) days from receipt of the copy thereof.

Not only was the motion for extension of time filed out of time
but also equally barred by the mandatory injunction in Habaluyas
Enterprises Inc. v. Japson, et al., G.R. No. 70895,
August 5, 1985; 138 SCRA 46 against the filing of an extension of time to file
a motion for reconsideration.  The
petition thereafter filed with this Court likewise failed to comply with the
formal requirements as it was filed without a verified statement of material
dates to determine the timeliness of the filing of the petition and of the
payment of the docket and legal research fund fees and lacks proofs of service
to the Court of Appeals and to the adverse party.

Even after a judicious consideration of the arguments and
counter-arguments of the parties herein on the merits of the case, We find that respondent Court of Appeals did not commit any
reversible error in dismissing petitioners’ suit filed only on September 12, 1985 for annulment of a
judgment dated November 8, 1982.

There is no means whereby the defeated party may procure a final
and executory judgment to be set aside with a view to
the renewal of the litigation beyond the period for seeking relief from a final
order or judgment under Rule 38, Rules of Court, unless (a) the judgment
is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or (b) it
has been obtained by fraud (Anuran v. Aquino, 38
Phil. 29; Banco Español-­Filipino
v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; Garchitorena
v. Sotelo, 74 Phil. 25; Gallanoza
v. Arcangel; L-29300, June 21, 1978, 83 SCRA 676; Laxamana v. Court of Appeals, L-37317, November 24, 1978,
87 SCRA 48).

In the case at bar, petitioners do not question the jurisdiction
of the court over the parties and the subject matter of the controversy.  It is noteworthy that in petitioners’ answer
to the complaint in Civil Case No. 540, they never
questioned the due execution nor the genuineness of the Road Right of Way
Agreements.  They merely claimed in their
answer that they were the rightful possessors of the road that adjoins their
parcels of land, either as riparian owners or as compensation for their land
that has been taken over by the government in constructing the Miaje?Sigañgi Road.  Such an answer, by its nature raises no issue
against the jurisdiction of the trial court.

Petitioners now assert as
their first ground for allowance of the writ of certiorari that
they were denied due process of
law when petitioner Donato Ramirez was declared in
default not because he failed to answer but because he had failed to furnish
private respondent Igmedio Reyes a copy thereof and because he and his
lawyer had failed to appear at the pre-trial conference.  It should be noted that denial of due process was not one of the grounds
raised before the respondent Court of Appeals in seeking annulment of the
judgment in Civil Case No. R-540.  Petitioners
merely assigned three (3) errors below, viz:  (1) excess of P1,000.00
in the award of attorney’s fees; (2) doubtful
genuineness of the Road Right of Way Agreement, and (3) the strip of land is
cadastral road.  Verily, none of the
valid grounds prescribed for annulment of a final judgment was alleged.  Petitioners, at this late stage of the
conflict, cannot validly claim “deprivation of petitioners’ right to be
heard.” As deprivation of the right to be heard before the trial court was
never raised as an issue in the annulment suit filed before the Court of
Appeals, it cannot be raised as an issue in this petition for review as issues
now are limited to whether the respondent Court of Appeals committed error in
rendering the questioned judgment.  In Lianga Lumber Co. v. Lianga
Timber Co., Inc., G.R. No. 38685, March 31, 1977, this Court held that since
issues are limited to those presented in the principal pleading, they cannot be
raised on appeal, much more in a mere incidental pleading.

Moreover, there was no error in the trial court’s order declaring
petitioner Donato Ramirez in default.  The failure to furnish a copy of the answer
to the adverse party, in itself, is sufficient and valid basis for petitioners’
default.  The non-appearance of
petitioner Donato Ramirez during the scheduled
pre-trial for alleged injury, without presenting a medical certificate or any
proof for that injury, is not justified and also a
valid ground for declaration of default. 
Thus, petitioners’ complaint that they were deprived of their right to
be heard is stripped of legal and factual basis.

On the merits of the case, petitioners harped on the alleged
invalidity of the two (2) Road Right of Way Agreements claiming that the strip
of land covered by said agreements is a cadastral road and hence a property
belonging to public domain.  But the
Provincial Government and/or the Republic of the Philippines
never questioned the due execution or intrinsic validity of the two agreements.

Petitioners not being signatories to the documents or for whose
benefits such contracts were executed have no personality to question the
validity thereof.  Even under the guise
of pursuing a cause for public interest, petitioners’ argument would not merit
a scintilla of belief as their real intent to devote the land in question for
their own use and benefit as an agricultural land is very evident in their
pleadings.

Finally, petitioners impugned the validity of the auction sale
without republication.  The governing rules on notice of sale of real property on execution explicitly
ordains publication in a newspaper
of general circulation once a week within twenty (20) days before the sale
(par. C, Sec. 15, Rule 39, Revised Rules of Court).  There is no dispute that the first scheduled
auction sale on September 25, 1985
have complied with all the requirements imposed by the Rules.  The postponement of such sale was due to
petitioners’ motion for time to secure injunctive relief from the Intermediate
Appellate Court, which was granted ex-parte.  Petitioners should not be allowed to
impugn the result of their initiative for several reasons.  Firstly, the questioned auction sale on October 29, 1985 without
republication was never raised as an issue in CA-G.R. No. 07107, the annulment
suit despite the pendency thereof.  The objection that the publication preceeding the auction was insufficient cannot be
considered at this stage of the proceeding inasmuch as it was not raised in the
first instance and does not affect the jurisdiction of the court (Ramiro v. Graño, et al. 54 Phil. 744, citing Tan Machan
v. Gan Aya dela Trinidad, 3 Phil.
684; United States v. Inductivo, 40 Phil. 84).  Secondly, petitioners are estopped
or barred from impugning the validity of auction sale without republication
because they filed an extension of time to file a petition for review with the
Intermediate Appellate Court after the denial of their motion for
reconsideration of the trial court’s order rescheduling auction sale without
republication.  Despite grant of said
extension, petitioners did not
file said petition.  In effect, such
failure to file the petition is an acquiescence to the
validity of the trial court’s orders of October
1, 1985 and of October
29, 1985.  Thirdly, they
cannot attach reversible error on the said sale after the lapse of more than
one (1) year from the date of the auction sale and after the expiration of the
redemption period; more so, because a final deed of sale in favor of respondent
had already been executed in favor
of the private respondent.

ACCORDINGLY, for the foregoing reasons, this instant
petition for review is hereby DENIED and the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals dated September 23, 1986
dismissing the complaint for annulment and its resolution dated November 3,
1986 denying the motion for reconsideration are hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.