MIGUEL SEMIRA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND BUENAVENTURA AN, RESPONDENTS.

Juana Gutierrez owned a parcel of land, later designated as Lot
4221, situated in Sto. Niño, Taysan, Batangas which she sold to private
respondent Buenaventura An for P850.00 by means of a “Kasulatan ng Bilihan
ng Lupa” executed on 4 January 1961.^[1] Aside
from the estimated area of 822.5 square meters appearing in the deed of sale,
the following boundaries of the lot are also stated: on the north, by Taysan­-Lobo-Sto. Niño-Pinagbayanan and Sto.
Niño-Dagatan Road (Junction or Intersection road); on the east, by Sto. Niño-Pinagbayanan Road and Juana
Gutierrez; on the south, by Sto. Niño School site; and, on the west, by Sto.
Niño-Dagatan Road.

Thereafter, private respondent entered the premises observing
thereby the boundaries of the property and not the area given.^[2]

Subsequently, he acquired two (2) other parcels of land, Lot 4215
with an area of 8,606-square meters located on the east of Lot 4221 from the
spouses Pascual Hornilla and Gliceria Ilao on 30 June 1964, and another lot
with an area of 11,000-square meters from Santiago Asi. Pascual Hornilla is the son of Juana Gutierrez.

On 18 October 1972, private respondent sold Lot 4221 to his
nephew, Cipriano Ramirez, and spouse by means of another “Kasulatan ng
Bilihan ng Lupa” for P2,500.00,^[3] where
the lot was described with the same area and boundaries mentioned in the 4
January 1961 “Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa” with the exception of the
boundary on the east; which was changed from “Juana Gutierrez” to
“Buenaventura An” to reflect the acquisition by private respondent of
the adjoining Lot 4215.

Like his uncle before him, Cipriano Ramirez occupied the lot by
observing the boundaries stated in the document of sale. Subsequently, he applied for a new tax
declaration to replace the one in the name of his uncle but was denied in view
of an existing mortgage executed by Buenaventura An in favor of the Taysan
Rural Bank, which was only settled in 1979.

On 12 March 1979, Cipriano Ramirez sold the lot to petitioner
Miguel Semira for P20,000.00. However,
the area stated in the “Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa”^[4]
was 2,200 square meters and not 822.5 appearing in the previous document. As delimited by its boundaries, the lot is
actually much bigger than 822.5 square meters. This was confirmed by the Taysan Cadastral Mapping Survey conducted in
1974 where it is definitely stated that the area of Lot 4221 is 2,200 square meters; hence, the reason for the
change.

On 17 March 1979, Miguel Semira entered the very same premises
previously occupied by Ramirez and began the construction of a new
rice-mill. However, on 18 April 1979, a
complaint for forcible entry was filed against him by private respondent in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Taysan-Lobo.^[5] The
latter claimed that the area of Lot 4221 was 822.5 square meters only and that
the excess of 1,377 square meters
forcibly occupied by petitioner formed part of Lot 4215 which he acquired from
the Hornillas in 1964.

Petitioner admits having entered the disputed portion on 17 March
1979, but denies having illegally done so. In his answer, petitioner claims ownership over the property by invoking
the 1979 deed of sale in his favor by Cipriano Ramirez.

Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, private respondent
applied for and was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-12694 over the
lots he purchased from the Hornillas and that from Santiago Asi with a combined area of 19,606 square
meters. However, the title was issued
for 2 hectares, 8 ares and 33 centares or 20,833 square meters. No explanation was given for the difference.

The case was initially
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.^[6] The municipal court of Taysan-Lobo ruled
that since the issue of prior physical possession could not be resolved without
first deciding on the ownership, dismissal was proper since forcible entry
cases involve the sole issue of prior physical possession. However, upon motion, and in view of the
passage of B.P. Blg. 129, which took effect 14 August 1981, providing that
“[m]etropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, and municipal
circuit trial courts, without distinction, may try cases of forcible entry and
detainer even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings and
possession could not be resolved without deciding the ownership,”^[7] the trial court modified its earlier
resolution and adjudged petitioner the rightful and lawful owner and possessor
of the area in question and cannot therefore be ejected therefrom.^[8]

Private respondent
appealed to the Regional Trial Court which reversed the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, ruling that it was not necessary to delve on the issue of ownership
since the question of prior physical possession could be resolved
independently, and that since petitioner admitted having possessed the disputed
area on 12 March 1979 while the possession of private respondent began way back
in 1964, the latter clearly had prior possession.^[9] Since petitioner did not specifically deny
the allegation of forcible deprivation of property in his Answer, the averment
in that regard was deemed admitted under Sec. 1, Rule 9, of the Rules of Court.^[10] As a final word, the RTC held that “no
matter how righteous defendant’s claim of ownership over the property may be,
he has not the right to take the law into his own hands by forcibly depriving
plaintiff of his prior actual possession of the property.”^[11]

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but without success.^[12]
In its Decision of 22 April 1986,
respondent appellate court dismissed the petition for review and affirmed the
RTC decision in toto.^[13]

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in upholding his ejectment from the
disputed area despite the absence of clear and indubitable proof that private
respondent had prior physical possession and that he was deprived of the same
by force, intimidation, strategy or stealth; and, (2) in not holding that the
question of ownership is so necessarily involved that it would be impossible to
decide the question of bare possession
without first settling that of ownership.^[14]

We agree with the position of petitioner and sustain the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court in holding that in the case at bench the issue of
possession cannot be decided independently of the question of ownership. Hence, we reverse the Court of Appeals as
well as the Regional Trial Court.

In his complaint in the MCTC, private respondent claims
constructive possession of the disputed portion since 30 June 1964 when he
bought the same as part of Lot 4215 of the Hornilla spouses. Likewise, petitioner bases his occupancy of
the disputed portion on the 1979 sale of Lot 4221 in his favor, which he
contends is separate and distinct from Lot 4215 of private respondent. Clearly, the question of who has prior
possession hinges on the question of who the real owner of the disputed portion
is. And the latter, in turn, depends on
whether such portion is part of Lot 4215 of private respondent or of Lot 4221
of petitioner.

It is not disputed that
Lot 4221 of petitioner was once owned by private respondent; that the latter
sold the same to his nephew, Cipriano Ramirez, in 1972 for the lump sum of
P2,500.00; that the “Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa”
incorporated both the estimated area and the definite boundaries of the land;
and, that private respondent’s nephew in turn sold the lot to petitioner in
1979 with the very same boundaries mentioned in the deed of sale executed in
his favor by his uncle Buenaventura An.

Petitioner claims that he owns the entire 2,200 square meters
since it is the size of Lot 4221 following its established boundaries. On the other hand, private respondent
insists that he only sold 822.5 square meters, hence, his nephew could not have
transferred a bigger area to petitioner.

We sustain
petitioner as did the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. We have repeatedly ruled that where land is sold for a lump sum
and not so much per unit of measure or number, the boundaries of the land
stated in the contract determine the effects and scope of the sale, not the
area thereof.^[15]
Hence, the vendors are obligated to deliver all the land included within the
boundaries, regardless of whether the real area should be greater or smaller than
that recited in the deed. This is
particularly true where the area is described as “humigit kumulang,”
that is, more or less.^[16]
These conclusions are drawn from Art. 1542 of the Civil Code which states –

In the sale of real estate, made for a lump sum and not at the rate of a certain sum for a unit of measure or
number, there shall be no increase or decrease of the price, although there be
a greater or less area or number than that stated in the contract.

The same rule shall be applied when two or more immovables are sold
for a single price; but if, besides mentioning the boundaries, which is
indispensable in every conveyance of real estate, its area or number should be
designated in the contract, the vendor shall be bound to deliver all that is
included within said boundaries, even when it exceeds the area or number
specified in the contract; and, should he not be able to do so, he shall
suffer a reduction in the price, in proportion to what is lacking in the area
or number, unless the contract is rescinded because the vendee does not accede
to the failure to deliver what has been stipulated.

Hence, when private respondent Buenaventura An sold Lot 4221 to
his nephew Cipriano Ramirez by means of a “Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng
Lupa” which incorporated both the area and the definite boundaries of the
lot, the former transferred not merely the 822.5 square meters stated in their
document of sale but the entire area circumscribed within its boundaries.

The fact that the area turned out to be 2,200 square meters, instead
of only 822.5 square meters, is of no moment and does not entitle private
respondent to the difference because the definite object sold was Lot 4221 in
its entirety and not just any unit of measure or number.^[17]
That the sale resulted in a disadvantage to private respondent does not confer
on him any cause of action against petitioner.^[18]

Besides, we are hardly convinced that Buenaventura An entered
into the sale unaware that Lot 4221 actually had a much bigger area than it
purported to be. Even as early as the
sale between him and his nephew, private respondent was already aware of the difference between the stated area
of Lot 4221 and its actual size. His
nephew Cipriano Ramirez testified, and private respondent did not dispute, that
when asked why the area of Lot 4221 stated in their deed of sale was much
smaller than the actual size, private respondent explained that it was to
minimize taxes.^[19]
Private respondent likewise did not deny that his nephew merely transferred to
petitioner the very same area which he himself had acquired and possessed in
1961 when he bought the same from Juana Gutierrez, the original owner of the
lot.

Considering the foregoing, it is not difficult to sustain
petitioner over private respondent when the latter failed even to prove prior
possession in his favor. Absent such
element, it cannot be said that he was forcibly deprived of the disputed
portion. Hence, his action for forcible
entry must fail.

It should be emphasized, however, that the case before us is
merely an action for forcible entry and that the issue of ownership was decided
for the sole purpose of resolving priority of possession. Hence, any pronouncement made affecting
ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded merely as provisional,
hence, does not bar nor prejudice an action between the same parties involving
title to the land.^[20]

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court (now Court of Appeals) dated 22 April 1986 affirming that of the Regional
Trial Court of 13 January 1984 in
toto is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and another one entered REINSTATING,
AFFIRMING and REITERATING the Decision of 4 May 1983 of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Taysan-Lobo, Batangas, with costs against private
respondent Buenaventura An.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Exh. “I,” Original Records, pp. 181-182.

^[2]
See Decision dated 4 May 1983 penned by Acting Municipal Circuit Trial Court
Judge Francisco D. Sulit, p. 10; Original Records, p. 842.

^[3]
Exh. “C,” Original Records, p. 184-A.

^[4]
Exh. “A,” id., p. 938.

^[5]
Docketed as Civil Case No. 4-MCC-T.

^[6]
Decision dated 4 October 1982 penned by Acting Municipal Circuit Trial Judge
Francisco D. Sulit; Rollo, pp. 52-62.

^[7]
Sec. 33, par. (2).

^[8]
Decision dated 4 May 1983, Original Records, pp. 842-854.

^[9]
Decision dated 13 January 1984 was penned by Judge Gerano V. Catalan,
Regional Trial Court of Batangas, Branch VII, in Civil Case No. 2286; Original
Records, pp. 892-903.

^[10]
Sec. 1. Allegations not specifically
denied deemed admitted. – Material
averments in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of damage, shall
be deemed admitted when not specifically denied x x x x

^[11]
Id., p. 10; Original Records, p. 901.

^[12]
Docketed as AC-G.R. SP No. 03876, Semira
v. Hon. Catalan, et al.

^[13]
Penned by Associate Justice Alfredo M. Lazaro, concurred in by Associate
Justices Juan A. Sison, Santiago M. Kapunan and Alfredo V. Cruz, Jr.; Rollo,
pp. 124-131.

^[14]
Petition, p. 11; Rollo, p. 19.

^[15]
Pacia v. Lagman, 63 Phil. 361, 365 (1936), citing Loyola v.
Bartolome, 39 Phil. 544; Escudero v. Director of Lands, 44 Phil. 83;
Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abaja, 52 Phil. 261; Beltran v.
Reyes, 55 Phil. 1004.

^[16]
Sta. Ana v. Hernandez, 125 Phil. 61, 68 (1966), citing Goyena v.
Tambunting, 1 Phil. 490; Teran v. Villanueva, 56 Phil. 677; Azarraga v.
Gay, 52 Phil. 599; Mondragon v. Santos, 87 Phil. 471.

^[17]
See Ambrosio Padilla, Civil Code
Annotated, Vol. V, 7th ed. (1987), pp. 272-273.

^[18]
See Mata v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 87880, 7 April 1992, 207 SCRA
753, 759.

^[19]
TSN, 30 April 1980, p. 48; Original Records, p. 497.

^[20]
Sec. 7, Rule 70, Rules of Court; see
Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 81909, 5 September 1991, 201 SCRA
343, 354.