ANTONIO BENOLIRAO, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND EMMANUEL TIMBUNGCO, RESPONDENTS.

The petitioner is the
owner of an apartment in Pasay City which has been leased since 1968 to the
private respondent, who works with his wife in a factory nearby
and whose children study in the neighborhood. On April 29, 1985, the petitioner sued the private respondent for
ejectment on two grounds, viz., that he had subleased the property and that
he owned a house and lot in Las Piñas, Rizal, that he could use for his
residence. Judgment in favor of the
petitioner was rendered in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City^[1]
and affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City^[2] but
reversed by the Court of Appeals.^[3] This petition faults that reversal and
asks that the decision of the respondent court dated September 18, 1986 be set
aside.

The petition is based on BP 25, which was the law in force at the time the complaint was filed
before it was repealed by BP 877,^[4] BP 25
provided inter alia as follows:

SEC. 5. Grounds for Judicial Ejectment
– Ejectment shall be allowed on the
following grounds:

a.  Subleasing
or assignment of lease of residential units in whole or in part, without the
written consent of the owner/lessor: Provided, That in the case
of subleases or assignments executed prior to the approval of this Act, the
sublessor/assignor shall have sixty days from the effectivity of this Act
within which to obtain the written approval of the owner/lessor or terminate the sublease or
assignment.

x x x

d.  Ownership by the lessee of another residential
unit which he may use as his residence: Provided, That the lessee shall have been notified by the lessor of the
intended ejectment three months in advance.

The ownership of the house and lot in Las Piñas was vigorously
debated in the lower courts, but this issue need not detain us in this
petition. The reason is that such
ownership has been virtually conceded by the private respondent in his
memorandum, where he declared:

Contrary to the false claim
and pretention of petitioner, private respondent never resides at his
house at Canaynay Court at Las Piñas, Metro Manila x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)^[5]

It is also noteworthy that he did not even dispute the contention
that he and his wife go to the leased premises only during the noon break from
their work, implying that they are really residing at his house in Las Piñas.

There is also the evidence of the tax declarations in his name of
the property in Las Piñas,^[6]
which he has not controverted. As this
Court has held:

Declarations of land for taxation purposes are the most eloquent
indicia of a person’s intent to
possess a land under claim of title.^[7]

x x x

It is true that tax receipts and declarations of ownership for
taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, but they
constitute at least proof that the holder had a claim of title over the property.^[8]

In the “Salaysay” submitted to this Court, he and his
wife stated under oath that they reside at Las Piñas (“nakatira sa Las
Piñas“).^[9]
Actually, whether or not the private respondent resides in his property at Las
Piñas is immaterial because residence in the other place was not required by
Section 5 of BP 25. All the lessor had
to establish was that the lessee owned “another residential unit which he
may use as his residence.”

It is also noteworthy that by the private respondent’s own
admission, the property in Las Piñas was not on lease to a third person.^[10]
This was all the more reason why he could use it as his own residence, as he
has in fact expressly asserted in the affidavit.

We
reject the contention that mere ownership of such residential unit is
not enough ground for the ejectment of the lessee. The law clearly says it is. Also untenable is the private respondent’s submission that his ejectment
would cause him much inconvenience because of the distance of Las Piñas from
his place of work and the school where his children are studying. Such a circumstance, unfortunate as it may
be to him, does not constitute an exception to Section 5 of BP 25.

The private respondent also argues that BP 25 has since been
repealed and that the applicable law now is BP 877, which in Section 5 thereof
provides as a ground for the ejectment of the lessee his:

(d)    “Absolute ownership by the lessee of
another dwelling unit in the same City or Municipality which he may
lawfully use as
his residence. x x x” (Underlining supplied)

He points out that this ground is not
available against him because the other residential unit is in Las Piñas and
not in Pasay City, where the leased apartment is situated.

BP 877 is not controlling because it became effective only on
June 12, 1985, after the cause of action in the case at bar arose. The corresponding complaint was filed on
April 29, 1985. It is a well-settled
rule that the law in force at the time of the occurrence of the cause of action
is the applicable law notwithstanding its subsequent amendment or repeal.^[11]

The respondent court was correct in holding that the sublease of
the leased premises to the private respondent’s brother-in-law had not been
sufficiently established. That ground
has become irrelevant, however, because of the existence of the other ground
laid down in Section 5(d) of BP 25.

We
hold that under Section 5(d) of BP 25, which was the law in force at the time the
ejectment case arose, the private respondent could be validly ejected for being
the owner of another residential unit that he could use as his residence. It is true that this ground has since been
modified by BP 877. But BP 25 was the
law at the time the controversy arose and so must be obeyed and applied despite
its subsequent repeal.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the respondent court
is SET ASIDE. The dispositive portion
of the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City dated September
10, 1985, as affirmed by the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City dated May 5, 1986, is
REINSTATED. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Feliciano, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Decision penned by MTC Judge Ricardo
D. Conjares.

^[2]
Decision penned by RTC Judge Dionisio N. Capistrano.

^[3]
Aldecoa, Jr., J., ponente, with Campos and Puno, JJ.,
concurring

^[4]
BP 25 took effect on April 10, 1979 and expired five (5) years thereafter or on
April 10, 1984. By virtue of P.D. No. 1912, which took
effect on March 29, 1984, the effectivity of BP 25 was extended up to December
31, 1984. BP 877, which took effect on
December 28, 1984 further extended BP 25 up to June 30, 1985.

^[5]
Rollo, p. 93.

^[6]
Rollo, pp. 23-24.

^[7]
Querubin vs. Alconcel, 67 SCRA 105.

^[8]
Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177.

^[9]
Rollo, p. 127.

^[10]
Original Records, pp. 61-62.

^[11]
Joint Ministry of Health – MOLE Accreditation Committee for Medical Clinics vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78254, April 25, 1991; Buyco vs. PNB, 112
Phil. 588; In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil. 23.