VICTORIANO V. OROCIO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, SOFRONIO B. URSAL, MARCOS S. SEGARRA, LEON J. PILAR, JR., AND JOSE M. AGUSTIN, RESPONDENTS.

On 25 May 1982, an accident occurred at the Malaya Thermal Plant
of the National Power Corporation (NPC). Based on the accident report of Robinson D. Mapili and Ildefonso I. Barrera dated 27 May 1982,^[1]
tube leaks on HPH 5B were confirmed at 2:30 o’clock in the morning of 25 May
1982. From the time of such
confirmation until 8:00 o’clock that morning, the system was drained and
prepared for repair by mechanical maintenance personnel. By 8:45 o’clock, the system was declared
safe for repair. Work thus progressed
that same morning until 11:10 o’clock, when the plug from the leaking tube gave
way, thereby releasing steam and hot water which hit two (2) of the employees
working on the tube leak.

Ernesto Pumaloy, an NPC employee, suffered 1st and 2nd degree burns
on the lower part of his body while Domingo Abodizo, a casual employee of
O.P. Landrito’s General Services
(OPLGS), a janitorial contractor of the NPC, assigned to the Maintenance
Section, suffered 1st and 2nd degree burns on nearly seventy percent (70%) of
his body. The injured personnel were
brought to the Tanay General Hospital for treatment and were later transferred
to Meralco’s J.F. Cotton Hospital. Total hospitalization expenses for the treatment of Domingo Abodizo
reached P53,802.26.

The NPC initially advanced this amount by setting it up as an
account receivable from OPLGS deducted on a staggered basis from the latter’s
billings against NPC until the same was fully satisfied.

Subsequently, OPLGS, through its manager Ofelia Landrito, in a
letter to Mr. Larry S. Gaerlan, Vice-President, Human Resources & General
Services (VP-HRGS) NPC, dated 30 August 1982,^[2]
requested for a refund of the total amount deducted from their billings
representing payment of the advances made by the NPC. This request was reiterated in a follow-up letter dated 6
September 1982.^[3]
In his Memorandum to the VP-HRGS dated 14 September 1982, Atty. C.Q. Crucillo,
Assistant Chief Legal Counsel of the NPC, recommended favorable action on the
request of the contractor.^[4]
This was forwarded to the Acting Manager, Metro Manila Regional Center (MMRC)
of the NPC.^[5]
In turn, this opinion was referred to the General Counsel of the NPC for
comment.^[6]
At that time, petitioner, then Legal Services Chief D of the NPC, was
designated by the Manager of the Legal Counseling Division of the NPC, who was
to attend and participate in a Management Convocation scheduled for 30
September to 2 October 1992, as officer-in-charge of the Office of the General
Counsel for that period.^[7]
In a memorandum dated 1 October 1982, petitioner, as officer-in-charge,
recommended favorable action on OPLGS’ request, in support whereof he stated:

x x x

“In brief, it is posited in the Memorandum that under Article
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and pursuant to the doctrine of ‘res
ipsa loquitor’ (sic) (the thing speaks for itself) and citing the case of
Bernabe Africa, et al. vs. Caltex, et al., L-12986, March 31, 1966, it may be
reasonably inferred that the incident causing injuries to Mr. Abodizo happened for
want of care on the part of the Metro Manila Regional Center (MMRC) crew,
rendering NPC, as their employer and owner of the Malaya Thermal Plant liable
for damages sustained by Mr. Abodizo. It is further contended that under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code,
NPC may not be liable for such damages only if Mr. Abodizo’s own negligence was
the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, which is certainly not so in
the instant case.

After a review of the findings stated in the said memorandum
against the applicable laws and jurisprudence on the matter, we find the
request of OPLGS legally in order and should, therefore, be given due
course.”^[8]

x x x

Thereupon, the amount for the hospitalization expenses was
refunded to the contractor OPLGS. In
Certificate of Settlement and Balances (CSB) No. 01-04-83 prepared by
respondent Jose M. Agustin, Unit Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA)
assigned to the NPC-MRRC, on 30 July 1989,^[9]
the refund of the hospitalization expenses for Domingo Abodizo was disallowed
for “[u]nder the NPC-O.P. Landrito contract, there is no employer-employee
relationship between the Corporation and the latter’s employees.” Hence,
the NPC is not answerable for such expenses. The following employees were made liable for the disallowances: Mr. M.V.
Villafuerte (Approving Authority) — primarily liable; E. Camama and P. Gajasan
(Management’s examiners) — secondarily and jointly liable; L. Hermosura (Chief
Accountant) — primarily liable.

General Counsel Marcelino C. Ilao of the NPC, in his Memorandum
of 6 September 1984, asked for a reconsideration of the aforesaid disallowance,
stressing that:

x x x

“A review of the legal opinion (Memorandum dated October 1,
1982 of the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the General Counsel) for the
Officer-in-Charge, MMRC, which was the basis for the payment of the amount
being disallowed, admits the non-­existence of employer-employee relationship
between NPC and Mr. Abodizo, employee of O.P. Landrito. However, the legal opinion premises the legality
of the request for payment on the basis of quasi-delict, more
particularly, the negligence and/or want of care on the part of the MMRC crew
which resulted to the injuries sustained by Mr. Abodizo. Obligation arise (sic) not only from
contracts but also from quasi-delicts,.…”^[10]

x x x

In his memorandum dated 9 January 1985,^[11]
respondent Agustin informed General Counsel Ilao of the NPC that he is adopting
his stand contained in his memorandum to the COA Regional Director dated 9
October 1984 as the answer to the request for reconsideration. In the latter memorandum, he maintains that:

x x x

“… there being no pre-existing contractual relation between the
Corporation and the subject employee, the former is not liable for the damages
sustained by the latter. We maintain
that while quasi-delicts could be a source of obligation, the fault or
negligence of the party from whom damages is being recovered must first be
proven ….

The opinion rendered by the NPC Legal Office clearly concedes lack
of proof of negligence on the part of the NPC personnel undertaking the repair
work or on the part of the Corporation …. Moreover, the negligence of the crew does not make the Corporation
automatically and/or equally negligent.

We further contend that it is not for the NPC Legal Office to
declare the Corporation negligent and admit liability. It could have been a better decision if the
matter was left to a competent court to determine.”^[12]

x x x

The COA Regional Director, herein respondent Leon J. Pilar, Jr.,
in a Memorandum dated 3 December 1984, confirmed the disallowance and held that
the persons determined to be liable should be directed to immediately refund
the amount disallowed and/or the proper official be directed to retain any
money due them in satisfaction thereof.^[13]

General Counsel Ilao submitted a second request for
reconsideration on 14 February 1985.^[14]
This request justifies the legal opinion rendered based on Section 15-A of R.A.
No. 6395 (the NPC charter), as amended, which provides that “… all legal matters
shall be handled by the General Counsel of the Corporation ….”

In a first indorsement dated 22 March 1985,^[15]
respondent Agustin submitted the request to the Chairman of respondent COA with
the claim that his findings on the said disallowance have already been
confirmed by the Regional Director, NCR. In a second indorsement dated 2 April 1985,^[16]
respondent Sofronio B. Ursal, Manager of the Corporate Audit Office of
respondent COA, referred for comment and/or recommendation to the Auditor, NPC,
the request for reconsideration. In a
third indorsement dated 24 April 1985,^[17]
respondent Marcos Segarra, Corporate Auditor of COA, returned the second
indorsement to respondent Ursal informing the latter that he concurs with the
comment/opinion of respondent Agustin contained in the 1st indorsement of 22
March 1985. In his 4th indorsement
dated 30 May 1985,^[18]
respondent Ursal, expressing his concurrence with the disallowance, referred to
the COA’s General Counsel for an opinion the request for reconsideration. In his 5th indorsement dated 21 May 1986,^[19]
Ricardo G. Nepomuceno, Jr., General Counsel of the COA, acting “FOR THE
COMMISSION”, made a return to the Unit Auditor, herein respondent Agustin;
Nepomuceno expressed his concurrence with the views of said Unit Auditor
contained in the latter’s 1st indorsement of 22 March 1985.

Thereupon, on 30 June 1986, respondent, now in his capacity as
Regional Auditor, transmitted to the General Counsel of the NPC a copy of the
aforesaid 5th indorsement of COA’s General Counsel, which the former considers
as the Commission’s decision (hereinafter designated as “5th
Indorsement”), together with the pertinent papers, on the appeal made
relative to the disallowance;^[20]
on the same date, he also sent a memorandum to the VP-MMRC of the NPC wherein
he ordered that the subject disallowance “be booked” in the
petitioner’s name, “upon whose legal opinion the payment of the aforesaid
refund was made possible, jointly and severally with Mr. M.V. Villafuerte
(Approving official on the voucher), Ms. P. Gajasan (Examiner), and Ms. L.M.
Hermosura (Chief Accountant),” thereby amending previous findings as to
the persons liable.^[21]
On 22 July 1986, a Debit Memorandum^[22]
was issued in petitioner’s name debiting his account with the NPC for the
amount of the hospitalization expenses.

Petitioner, on 28 September 1986, filed the instant petition
seeking to annul and set aside the above-mentioned:

a)      
Memorandum of respondent Agustin dated 9 January 1985;

b)      
Memorandum of respondent Pilar dated 3 December 1984;

c)      
1st indorsement of respondent Agustin, dated 22 March 1985, to
the Chairman, COA;

d)      
3rd indorsement of respondent Segarra dated 24 April 1985;

e)      
4th indorsement of respondent Ursal, dated 30 May 1985, to the
General Counsel of the COA, conforming to the position of Jose M. Agustin; and

f)        
5th indorsement of the COA General Counsel Nepomuceno, Jr.
dated 21 May 1986.^[23]

and praying for a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin respondents from enforcing the same.

In support thereof, petitioner alleges that he prepared the
questioned legal opinion in the performance of his official functions as
mandated by law. At the time he
rendered it, he was the officer-in-charge of the NPC’s Office of the General
Counsel. Section 15-A of its charter^[24]
provides that all legal matters shall be handled by the General Counsel of the
Corporation. As such, he provides legal
advice and/or renders legal opinions on legal matters involving the NPC. Since this function is quasi-judicial in
nature, the discretion exercised in the discharge thereof is not subject to
re-examination or controversion by the respondents; when the latter did what
was proscribed, they in effect usurped the statutory function of the General
Counsel of the NPC. There is no law
which expressly authorizes the respondents to re-examine or controvert the
General Counsel’s opinion. Petitioner
additionally stresses that he is not personally liable for the amount
disallowed as he was merely performing his official functions. Besides, his questioned opinion is not
alleged to have been rendered with malice and bad faith.^[25]

In the Resolution of 6 October 1986, this Court dismissed the
petition “for having been filed out of time … and for late payment of the legal fees ….”^[26]

Acting on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, this Court, on
22 June 1987, granted the motion, reinstated the petition and required the
respondents to comment on the same.^[27]

Respondent’s, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed
their Comment on 9 October 1987.^[28]
They maintain that the questioned disbursement on the basis of the legal
opinion of the petitioner is within the scope of the auditing power of the
COA. The Constitution grants the COA
the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts
pertaining to the expenditures or uses of funds and property pertaining to the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.^[29]
The matter of allowing in audit a disbursement account is not a ministerial
function, but one which necessitates the exercise of discretion. Besides, the OPLGS, Abodizo’s employer,
admitted that the incident was purely accidental and that there is no showing
whatsoever in the accident report of any negligence on the part of the NPC or
its employees; this being the case, the liability of the NPC for quasi-delict
under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code cannot be sustained. Finally, respondents assert that it was
petitioner’s legal opinion which made possible the questioned disbursement;
accordingly, the 30 June 1986 request of respondent Agustin to book the
disallowance in the petitioner’s name, jointly and severally with the other
officials found responsible therefor, is in order as it was made pursuant to
Section 103 of the Government Auditing Code^[30]
which provides:

“Expenditures of government funds or uses of government
property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of
the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefor.”

On 18 April 1988, this Court resolved to give due course to the
petition and require both parties to submit their simultaneous Memoranda,^[31]
which they subsequently complied with.

The principal issues raised in this case are:

(1) Does the legal opinion of petitioner, which
was relied upon for the disbursement in question, preclude or bar the COA from
disallowing in post-audit such disbursement?

(2) Has the General Counsel
of the COA the authority to decide a motion to reconsider the disallowance in
question?

(3) Is the petitioner
personally liable for the disallowance on the theory that the disbursement was
made on the basis thereof?

1. As to the first, We
find petitioner’s proposition to be a bit outlandish; he overrates the power of
the General Counsel of the NPC and belittles the authority of the COA. While it may be true that Section 15-A of
R.A. No. 6395 (charter of the NPC) provides that all legal matters shall be
handled by the General Counsel of the Corporation, it by no means follows that
all legal opinions of the General Counsel are ex-cathedra and binding
upon all. In short, said provision does
not confer upon him any degree of infallibility. It would have been dangerous if it were otherwise for not only
would he be able to inextricably and unjustly bind the corporation or compel it
to abide by his legal opinion even if it were wrong, he would also subordinate
this Court to such opinion even if this Court is the final authority on how the
law should be read. Petitioner’s theory
destroys the very essence of the public trust character of a public
office. He should be reminded — just
as others in government service — of Section 1, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution which reads:

“Section 1. Public
office is a public trust. Public officers
and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.”

The NPC, as a government-owned corporation, is under the COA’s
audit power. Under the 1973
Constitution, which was the Constitution in force at the time the disallowance
in question was made, the COA had the power to, inter alia, examine,
audit, and settle, in accordance with law and regulations, all accounts
pertaining to the revenues and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds
and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or
any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations;^[32]
and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations including those
for the prevention of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant
expenditures or uses of funds or property.

The 1987 Constitution preserves this power and function and
grants the COA:

“x x x exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this
Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the
techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.”^[33]

Both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions conferred upon the COA a more
active role and invested it with broader and more extensive powers. These were not meant to make it a toothless
tiger, but a dynamic, effective, efficient and independent watchdog of the
Government.^[34]

In determining whether an expenditure of a Government agency or
instrumentality such as the NPC is irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable, the COA should not be bound by the opinion of
the legal counsel of said agency or instrumentality which may have been the
basis for the questioned disbursement; otherwise, it would indeed become a
toothless tiger and its auditing function would be a meaningless and futile
exercise. Its beacon lights then should
be nothing more than the pertinent laws and its rules and regulations.

In the instant case, on the basis of the pertinent documents
attached to the pleadings, the COA auditor had every reason to believe that the
disbursement of P53,802.26 by the NPC as a refund to the OPLGS for the hospitalization
expenses of Abodizo, on the theory that the NPC was actually liable under the
law on quasi-delict, as determined by the petitions, was irregular, if
not illegal. Other than the report of
Mapili and Barrera dated 27 May 1982,^[35]
there is no competent evidence to show that either the NPC or any of its
employees were responsible for the accident.

On the contrary, in its letter of 30 August 1982,^[36]
the OPLGS admitted that the “incident was purely accidental in
nature,” but that “considering that the accident took place within
the premises of the National Power Corporation and the cause of which was the
Tube leaks of HPH 5B, which was still undergoing repair, it is but proper that
cost of hospital bills and other expenses incurred by MR. DOMINGO ABODIZO be
shouldered by the National Power Corporation.” It further admits that it
will not “press our contention that the National Power Corporation should
pay” the hospital expenses, but appeals and requests that in the light of
the “relationship” between it and the NPC, and the services both
render to each other, the NPC nonetheless pay for the hospitalization expenses.

It is not disputed that petitioner conducted no further
investigation into the causes of the accident to determine for himself if
indeed the NPC’s or any of its employees’ negligence was the proximate cause of
the accident. Neither is it disputed
that petitioner was at that time merely an officer-in-charge of the Office of
the General Counsel. He remained such
only from 30 September to 2 October 1982. He rendered the questioned legal opinion on 1 October 1982,^[37]
on the second day of his short tenure and barely a day before it ended. There was hardly any time for him to inquire
further into the facts surrounding the incident, although he had all the time
to simply refer it to the regular General Counsel who was expected to report
back on 3 October 1982.

Finally, the OPLGS’ claim for reimbursement was not referred to
the NPC’s governing board or authorized officer for approval in the light of
the legal opinion. By itself, the
latter did not vest him with authority to approve the claim. It was nothing but a recommendation in favor
of the claim.

Respondent Agustin then cannot be faulted when in his Certificate
of Settlement and Balances No. 01-04-83,^[38]
he disallowed NPC’s questioned disbursement. However, in his notation as to the persons to be liable therefor, he
mentions only Mr. M.V. Villafuerte (the Approving Authority) whose liabilities
are primary; E. Gamama and P. Gajasan (Management’s Examiners) whose
liabilities are “secondary and joint”; and H.L. Hermosura (Chief
Accountant) whose liability is primary. Petitioner was not found to be liable. He was made jointly and severally liable with Villafuerte, Gajasan and
Hermosura only in the Memorandum of respondent Agustin dated 30 June 1986.^[39]
It may be noted that in his Memorandum he excluded Gamama. Considering that what was sustained up to
the level of the General Counsel of the COA was the disallowance made in the
aforementioned Certificate of Settlement and Balances and necessarily, his
ruling thereon as to who are the parties liable therefor, Agustin acted
arbitrarily and with grave abuse of discretion when, without prior notice to
petitioner, he made the latter liable for the disallowance and worse, he
directed, in the guise of a request, the Chief Accountant of the NPC, Metro
Manila Regional Center, to book the disallowance in the name of
petitioner. Petitioner was not made a
party to the motion for reconsideration which the General Counsel of the COA
acted upon. Respondent Agustin
effectively denied petitioner of his right to due process.

2. What is claimed in
this case to be the decision of the COA is actually the 5th Indorsement of
Ricardo G. Nepomuceno, Jr., General Counsel thereof, which reads:

x x x

“5th
Indorsement

May 21, 1986

Respectfully returned to the Auditor, National Power Corporation,
Quezon City, concurring with the views of the Unit Auditor, as contained in the
1st Indorsement, dated March 22, 1985, on the refund of hospitalization
expenses in favor of Domingo Abodizo.

FOR THE COMMISSION:

(S/T) RICARDO G. NEPOMUCENO, JR.

General Counsel”^[40]

It must be recalled that in his Memorandum of 14 February 1985,^[41]
General Counsel Ilao of the NPC asked for a reconsideration of the disallowance
and requested that the same be forwarded to the Chairman of the COA pursuant to
Item III-7 of COA Circular 81-156 dated 19 January 1981. Clearly, therefore, the motion for
reconsideration became a matter for the COA to resolve or decide. Under the provisions of the Constitution
then in force, the COA was bound to decide it within sixty (60) days from the
date of its submission for resolution. Section 2 of Article XII-D thereof reads:

“SEC. 2. The
Commission on Audit shall have the following powers and functions:

x x x

(2) Decide any case brought before it within
sixty days from the date of its submission for resolution. Unless otherwise provided by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his
receipt of a copy thereof.”

Section 7, Article IX-A of the present
Constitution also provides:

“SEC. 7. Each
Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. A case or
matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or
by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or
ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.”

The COA, both under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is a
collegial body. It must resolve cases
presented to it as such. Its General
Counsel cannot act for the Commission for he is not even a Commissioner
thereof. He can only offer legal advice
or render an opinion in order to aid the COA in the resolution of a case or a
legal question.

Thus, Nepomuceno’s 5th indorsement cannot, by any stretch of the
imagination, be considered as a “decision” of the COA. If the same were to be so considered, it
would be void ab initio for having been rendered by one who is not
possessed with any power or authority. In Mison vs. Commission on Audit,^[42]
this Court held that a so-called decision, denominated as Decision No.
77-142 by the Manager of the Technical Service Office of the COA, “by
authority of the acting chairman” is “substantively void
ab initio,” because it was rendered without
jurisdiction. “It had an
essential inherent defect that could not be cured or waived.”

What Mr. Nepomuceno should have done was to render the opinion
precisely sought for in the preceding 4th indorsement of respondent Ursal dated
30 May 1985,^[43]
and submit the same to the Commission for the latter’s guidance in resolving
the motion for reconsideration.

Respondent Agustin, therefore, acted prematurely and with undue
haste in implementing the disallowance against the parties allegedly liable
therefor on the basis of the favorable opinion of Mr. Nepomuceno who,
incidentally, merely concurred with his (Agustin’s) 22 March 1985 indorsement.

3. Even if We are to
assume that the disallowance was proper, there would still be no basis for
directly holding petitioner liable therefor together with those earlier found
to be responsible by Agustin in his Certificate of Settlement and Balances;
moreover, there would be no reason to debit immediately his account with the
NPC. In the first place, as earlier
stated, up to the level of the General Counsel of the COA who acted for the
Commission, it was never claimed that petitioner was personally liable for the
disallowed disbursement; only the approving authority, the management examiners
and the Chief Accountant of the NPC were deemed liable therefor. This seemed to be proper in the light of
Sections 103, 105(1) and 106 of P.D. No. 1445. Under said Section 103, expenditures of government funds or uses
of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal
liability of the official or employee found directly responsible
therefor. In the instant case,
while it may perhaps be true that the petitioner had rendered the opinion which
was relied upon for the disbursement, it cannot be said that he was directly
responsible therefor. His was only a
legal opinion which the governing board of the NPC or any of its authorized officials
could adopt or reject in the resolution of the request of OPLGS for
reimbursement. As earlier indicated,
there is no showing at all that such governing board or any authorized official
formally approved the request and granted the authority to make the
refund. Respondent then was originally
correct in excluding petitioner from the Certificate of Settlement and
Balances.

It does not necessarily follow, however, that in no case may the
petitioner be liable for his legal opinion. As the then officer-in-charge of the Office of the General Counsel of
NPC, he exercised quasi-judicial functions. He was empowered with discretion and authority to render an
opinion as to whether the claim for reimbursement by the OPLGS was proper and
ultimately, to determine if the NPC or any of its employees was responsible for
the accident and, therefore, liable for the injury suffered by Abodizo under
the law on quasi-delict. If he
rendered the opinion in the just performance of his official duties and within
the scope of his assigned tasks, he would not be personally liable for any
injury that may result therefrom.^[44]
Otherwise stated, a public official may be liable in his personal capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith
or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.^[45]
Paragraph (1), Section 38, Chapter 9, Book I, of the Administrative Code of
1987^[46]
expressly provides:

“SEC. 38. Liability
of superior officers. — (1) A
public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the performance of
his official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or
gross negligence.”

x x x

But whether petitioner acted with malice, bad faith or beyond the
scope of his authority or jurisdiction is a matter respondent Agustin cannot
dispose of unilaterally and summarily without infringing on the petitioner’s
right to due process.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged 5th indorsement of the
General Counsel of the respondent Commission on Audit, dated 21 May 1986, the
Memorandum of respondent Agustin of 30 June 1986, insofar as it holds
petitioner personally liable for the disallowed disbursement and the Debit
Memo, dated 22 July 1986, of the Manager of the Accounting Department of the
National Power Corporation, are hereby set aside for being null and void.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Bidin, and Romero, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on official
leave.

---

^[1]
Annex “I”; Rollo, 29.

^[2]
Annex “G”; Rollo, 27.

^[3]
Annex “F”; Id., 20.

^[4]
Annex “E”; Id., 23-24.

^[5]
Annex “D”; Rollo, 22.

^[6]
Annex “C”; Id., 21.

^[7]
Annex “A”; Id., 19.

^[8]
Annex “B”; Id., 20.

^[9]
Annex “K”; Rollo, 33-34.

^[10]
Annex “L”; Id., 35.

^[11]
Annex “M”; Rollo, 36.

^[12]
Annex “N”; Id., 38.

^[13]
Annex “O”; Id., 39-40.

^[14]
Annex “P”; Rollo, 41.

^[15]
Annex “Q”; Id., 43.

^[16]
Annex “R”; Id., 45.

^[17]
Annex “S”; Id., 46.

^[18]
Annex “T”; Id., 47-48.

^[19]
Annexes “U” and “V”; Id., 49-50.

^[20]
Annex “W”; Rollo, 51.

^[21]
Annexes “X” and “Y”; Id., 52-53.

^[22]
Annex “Y”; Id., 53.

^[23]
Rollo, 8-9.

^[24]
R.A. No. 6395.

^[25]
Chartered Bank vs. Government Auditing Office, 149 SCRA 58 [1987].

^[26]
Rollo, 54.

^[27]
Id., 80.

^[28]
Id., 95-102.

^[29]
Section 2(1), Article XII-D, 1973 Constitution; Section 2(1), Article IX-D,
1987 Constitution.

^[30]
P.D. No. 1445.

^[31]
Rollo, 130.

^[32]
Section 2(1), Article XII-D, 1973 Constitution.

^[33]
Section 2(2), Id.

^[34]
Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 92585, 8
March 1992.

^[35]
Rollo, 29.

^[36]
Annex “G”; Rollo, 27.

^[37]
Annex “B”; Id., 20.

^[38]
Annex “K”; Rollo, 33-34.

^[39]
Annex “W”; Id., 51.

^[40]
Annex “U”; Rollo, 49.

^[41]
Annex “P”; Id., 44.

^[42]
187 SCRA 445 [1990].

^[43]
Annex “T”; Rollo, 47.

^[44]
Zulueta vs. Nicolas, G.R. No. L-3251, 31 January 1959.

^[45]
Chartered Bank vs. National Government Auditing Office, 149 SCRA 58
[1987]; Dumlao vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 247 [1982]; Mindanao
Realty Corporation vs. Kintanar, 6 SCRA 814 [1962].

^[46]
Executive Order No. 292.