CASIANO S. SEDAYA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, SECOND DIVISION AND THE PHILIPPINE PACKING CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the resolution
of the National Labor Relations Commission dated June 30, 1986 which affirmed the decision of the labor
arbiter in NLRC RABX Case No. 2-0242, entitled “Casiano
Sedaya v. Philippine Packing Corporation”, the dispositive portion of which
states:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering respondent to issue a written memorandum to effect the transfer of
complainant from Misamis Oriental General Crops operations to pineapple plantation operation(s) in Bukidnon.

“Complainant is likewise directed to comply with the written
Memorandum within ten (10) days from receipt thereof otherwise he shall be
considered to have abandoned his employment.”^[1]

Petitioner Casiano S. Sedaya was hired by respondent Philippine Packing
Corporation on July 12, 1960
as an hourly-paid research field worker at its pineapple plantation operations
in Bukidnon. 
Sometime in 1970, Sedaya was transferred to
the general crops plantation operations in Misamis
Oriental.  Four years later or on January 16, 1974, he was promoted to
the position of a monthly-paid regular supervisor.  When research activity was however phased out
in March, 1982, Sedaya was verbally advised by
respondent company on March 29, 1982
of his re-assignment to the Bukidnon plantation.  He was to report there on April 1, 1982.

Instead of reporting to his new assignment, petitioner Sedaya filed successive leave applications, the last of
which was on April 17, 1982
for an indefinite period of time, allegedly “to settle land problem(s) in Surigao and Agusan“.^[2]
Respondent company disapproved this last application since Sedaya’s
leaves of absences had reached the maximum ceiling of forty-five (45) days.

While he was on leave, Sedaya tried to
persuade management to reconsider his transfer and if this was not possible, to
at least consider his position as redundant so that he could be entitled to
severance pay.  Respondent company
refused, stating that it was not terminating his services and that his position
as supervisor was still there for him to hold.

Sedaya persisted in his self-imposed
absences despite their being unauthorized. 
Consequently, on April 29, 1982,
respondent company charged him in writing with abandonment of work.  Sedaya did not answer
the charge within the five-day period allowed him.  Neither did he appear at the May 11, 1982 hearing scheduled for
him to ventilate his side.  Thereupon,
respondent company dismissed him from the service effective June 10, 1982 for abandonment.

Feeling aggrieved, Sedaya filed on February 21, 1983 a complaint for
illegal dismissal and prayed for separation pay with backwages,
if any.^[3]
He did not ask for reinstatement.

The labor arbiter, in his decision, found that Sedaya did not abandon his employment but concluded that
both parties were at fault:  petitioner Sedaya, for his refusal to work at his new place of
assignment after his application for an indefinite leave was disapproved, and
respondent company, for its failure to issue a written memorandum of
transfer.  Thus, the labor arbiter
ordered respondent company to prepare a written memorandum effecting
the transfer and gave petitioner a period of ten (10) days from receipt within
which to comply, or else he would be held liable for abandonment.

Respondent company did not contest the arbiter’s decision.  In compliance therewith, it issued the
required memorandum dated June 23,
1983 to petitioner, formally advising the latter of his
reassignment and giving him ten (10) days from receipt to report for work.^[4]

Petitioner received notice of the above memorandum on June 23, 1983.  He did not report for duty.  Instead, he appealed his case to the National
Labor Relations Commission contending that the memorandum order was oppressive.  He also questioned the reinstatement because
it did not provide for an award of backwages.  Petitioner demanded reinstatement with backwages, or in the alternative, separation pay.^[5]

As earlier mentioned, the labor tribunal sustained the decision
of the labor arbiter.  Hence, this
present petition which raises the main issue of whether or not petitioner could
be validly dismissed from his employment by reason of his refusal to accept his
new assignment.

The Court has, in a number of cases, recognized and upheld the
prerogative of management to transfer an employee from one office to another
within the business establishment, provided that it does not involve a demotion
in rank or a diminution of his salaries, benefits and other privileges.  This is a function associated with the employer’s
inherent right to control and manage effectively its enterprise.  Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare
of employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what
are clearly management prerogatives.  The
free will of management to conduct its business affairs to achieve its purpose
cannot be denied.^[6]

Petitioner’s reassignment to Bukidnon
was a legitimate exercise of managerial prerogatives.  His field research work in Misamis Oriental had been completely phased out for being
unnecessary.  But petitioner was
not.  So instead of terminating his
employment, respondent company decided to move him back to Bukidnon
where he had been originally assigned and where he could be more useful.  This would belie petitioner’s claim that there
was illegal constructive dismissal. 
Surely, respondent company could not be faulted for undertaking means to
maximize its existing labor force by deploying its employees to its various
areas of operations in order to achieve optimum results for the benefit of the
company.

On the other hand, there is nothing in the records to indicate
that the projected relocation of petitioner was motivated by considerations
other than the exigencies of the service. 
Indeed, the reasons adduced by petitioner to justify his non-acceptance
of the Bukidnon assignment, i.e. his land problems
and the anticipated dislocation of his family, appear unconvincing in the face
of the management’s inherent right to lay down policies and rules which the
employee must abide by.

Neither was the transfer a demotion because petitioner would be
maintaining his status as a supervisor and like all supervisors in the Bukidnon plantation, would likewise be entitled to free
housing with free light and water facilities.

If for any reason an employee finds himself in that intolerable
situation where he is unable to sacrifice his personal interests in favor of
the demands of the service, then he has no other option but to separate himself
from his employment.  And the company is
not duty-bound to grant him separation pay for the reason that his removal is
of his own choosing.

Verily, the transfer should be upheld.

Petitioner has sought reinstatement with backwages.  Reinstatement to his former post can no
longer be made since that had been abolished. 
At the same time, respondent company cannot be compelled to pay him backwages during the period when he was not actually
working.

The labor arbiter, in arriving at his decision, accorded much
weight to the fact that there was only a verbal and not a written instruction
of the transfer.  He also considered the
very significant fact that in petitioner’s twenty-two years of service with the
multinational firm, he has never been cited for any
disciplinary infraction.  The arbiter’s
directive requiring the written memorandum and giving petitioner a reasonable
period within which to comply appears to be the most fair and equitable
solution to break the impasse between petitioner and respondent company.  It should be reiterated if only to give both
parties a final opportunity to rectify their mistakes.

The Solicitor General has recommended the grant of separation pay
to which an employee “laid off due to retrenchment” is entitled under
the law should petitioner no longer wish to remain with the company.

The Court is not inclined to extract this last measure of
magnanimity from respondent company.  It
must be stressed that what was considered by the company as unnecessary was
petitioner’s research activity in Misamis Oriental,
and not petitioner’s services.  He was
not laid off.  He was moved to Bukidnon precisely because the company still needed his
services.

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent
Commission did not gravely abuse its discretion in sustaining the labor
arbiter.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.  The Court hereby directs respondent
Philippine Packing Corporation to issue within ten (10) days from notice
another written memorandum to petitioner Casiano S. Sedaya directing his transfer to its Bukidnon
pineapple plantation and to give petitioner a period of ten (10) days from
receipt within which to comply. 
Petitioner has the option to either accept the reassignment without backwages or face dismissal from employment without
severance pay, since termination from employment, at this point, shall be for
cause.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Annex H, Rollo, p. 35.

^[2]
Annex C, Rollo, p. 19.

^[3]
Annex F, Rollo, p. 29.

^[4]
Comment, Rollo, p. 61.

^[5]
Annex G, Rollo, p. 33.

^[6] Dangan v. NLRC and Tierra Factors Corp., G.R. Nos.
63127-28, February 20, 1984, 127 SCRA 706; Abbott Laboratories, Inc., et al. v.
NLRC and Bobadilla, G.R. No. 76959, October 12, 1987,
154 SCRA 713; Philippine Japan Active Carbon Corp., et al. v. NLRC and Quinanola, G.R. No. 83239, March 8, 1989).