JULITA GO ONG, FOR HERSELF AND AS JUDICIAL GUARDIAN OF STEVEN GO ONG, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION AND THE CITY SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY,…

THIS IS A PETITION FOR
REVIEW ON CERTIORARI OF THE MARCH 21, 1986 DECISION* OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AC-G.R. CV
NO. 02635, “JULITA ONG ETC. VS.
ALLIED BANKING CORP. ET AL.” AFFIRMING, WITH MODIFICATION, THE JANUARY 5,
1984 DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-35230.

THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS
OF THIS CASE, AS FOUND BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, ARE AS FOLLOWS:

“X X X:  TWO (2) PARCELS OF LAND IN QUEZON
CITY IDENTIFIED AS LOT NO. 12, BLOCK 407, PSD 37326 WITH AN AREA OF 1960.6 SQ. M. AND LOT NO. 1, PSD 15021, WITH AN AREA OF 3,660.8 SQ. M., ARE COVERED BY
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 188705
IN THE NAME OF ‘ALFREDO ONG BIO HONG MARRIED TO JULITA GO ONG’ (EXH.
D).  ALFREDO ONG BIO HONG DIED ON JANUARY 18,
1975 AND JULITA
GO ONG WAS APPOINTED ADMINISTRATRIX OF HER HUSBAND’S ESTATE IN CIVIL CASE NO. 107089. 
THE LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS REGISTERED ON TCT NO. 188705 ON OCTOBER 23,
1979.  THEREAFTER, JULITA GO ONG SOLD LOT
NO. 12 TO LIM CHE BOON, AND TCT
NO. 188705 WAS PARTIALLY CANCELLED AND TCT NO. 262852 WAS ISSUED IN FAVOR OF LIM CHE
BOON COVERING LOT NO. 12 (EXH. D-4).  ON JUNE 8,
1981 JULITA
GO ONG THROUGH HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT JOVITA K. YEO (EXH. 1) MORTGAGED LOT NO. 1 TO THE ALLIED BANKING
CORPORATION TO SECURE A LOAN OF P900,000.00
OBTAINED BY JK EXPORTS,
INC.  THE MORTGAGE WAS REGISTERED ON TCT NO. 188705 ON THE
SAME DATE WITH THE FOLLOWING NOTATION: 
‘X X X MORTGAGEE’S CONSENT NECESSARY IN CASE
OF SUBSEQUENT ALIENATION OR ENCUMBRANCE OF THE PROPERTY OTHER CONDITIONS SET
FORTH IN DOC. NO. 340, PAGE NO. 69, BOOK NO. XIX, OF
THE NOT.  PUBLIC OF FELIXBERTO
ABAD’.  ON THE LOAN THERE WAS DUE THE SUM
OF P828,000.00 AND ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION TRIED TO COLLECT IT FROM JULITA
GO ONG, (EXH. E).  HENCE, THE COMPLAINT
ALLEGING NULLITY OF THE CONTRACT FOR LACK OF JUDICIAL APPROVAL WHICH THE BANK
HAD ALLEGEDLY PROMISED TO SECURE FROM THE COURT.  IN RESPONSE THERETO, THE BANK AVERRED THAT IT
WAS PLAINTIFF JULITA GO ONG WHO PROMISED TO SECURE THE COURT’S APPROVAL, ADDING
THAT JULITA GO ONG INFORMED THE DEFENDANT THAT SHE WAS PROMISED THE SUM OF
P300,000.00 BY THE JK EXPORTS, INC. WHICH WILL ALSO TAKE CHARGE OF THE INTEREST
OF THE LOAN.

“CONCLUDING, THE TRIAL COURT RULED:

‘ABSENT (OF) ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION IS THE
CAPITAL OF THE DECEASED HUSBAND BROUGHT INTO THE MARRIAGE, SAID PROPERTY SHOULD
BE PRESUMED AS ACQUIRED DURING THE MARRIAGE AND, THEREFORE, CONJUGAL PROPERTY.

‘AFTER THE DISSOLUTION OF THE MARRIAGE WITH THE DEATH OF
PLAINTIFF’S HUSBAND, THE PLAINTIFF ACQUIRED, BY LAW, HER CONJUGAL SHARE,
TOGETHER WITH THE HEREDITARY RIGHTS THEREON. 
(MARGATE VS. RABACAL,
L-14302, APRIL 30, 1963).  CONSEQUENTLY, THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED ON SAID
PROPERTY, UPON EXPRESS AUTHORITY OF PLAINTIFF, NOTWITHSTANDING THE LACK OF JUDICIAL
APPROVAL, IS VALID, WITH RESPECT TO HER CONJUGAL SHARE THEREON, TOGETHER WITH
HER HEREDITARY RIGHTS.’ ”

ON APPEAL BY PETITIONER,
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED, WITH MODIFICATION, THE APPEALED DECISION
(RECORD, PP. 19-22).  THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE APPELLATE
COURT’S DECISION READS:

“WHEREFORE, WITH THE MODIFICATION THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS INSTITUTED BY DEFENDANT AGAINST PLAINTIFF SHALL BE HELD
IN ABEYANCE TO AWAIT THE FINAL RESULT OF CIVIL CASE NO. 107089 OF THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, 6TH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT BRANCH XXXII, ENTITLED “IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE
ESTATE OF THE LATE ALFREDO ONG BIO: 
JULITA GO ONG, ADMINISTRATRIX’. 
IN PURSUANCE WITH WHICH THE RESTRAINING ORDER OF THE LOWER
COURT IN THIS CASE RESTRAINING THE SALE
OF THE PROPERTIES LEVIED UPON IS HEREBY ORDERED TO CONTINUE IN FULL FORCE AND
EFFECT COTERMINOUS WITH THE FINAL RESULT OF CIVIL CASE NO. 107089, THE DECISION
APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED.  COSTS
AGAINST PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.

SO ORDERED.”

ON APRIL 8, 1986,
PETITIONER MOVED FOR THE RECONSIDERATION OF THE SAID DECISION (IBID., PP. 24-29), BUT IN A
RESOLUTION DATED SEPTEMBER 11, 1986,
RESPONDENT COURT DENIED THE
MOTION FOR LACK OF MERIT (IBID., P. 23). 
HENCE, THE INSTANT PETITION (IBID., PP. 6-17).

THE SECOND DIVISION OF THIS COURT, IN A RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 19, 1986 (ROLLO, P. 30),
WITHOUT GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION, RESOLVED TO REQUIRE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT TO COMMENT THEREON AND IT DID ON FEBRUARY 19, 1987 (IBID., PP. 37-42).  THEREAFTER, IN A RESOLUTION DATED APRIL 6, 1987, THE PETITION WAS GIVEN
DUE COURSE AND THE PARTIES WERE REQUIRED TO FILE THEIR RESPECTIVE MEMORANDA (IBID., P. 43).

PETITIONER FILED HER
MEMORANDUM ON MAY 13, 1987 (IBID., PP. 45-56), WHILE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT FILED ITS MEMORANDUM ON MAY 20, 1987
(IBID., PP. 62-68).

THE SOLE ISSUE IN THIS
CASE IS ?

WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED OVER THE PARCEL OF LAND UNDER
PETITIONER’S ADMINISTRATION IS NULL AND VOID FOR WANT OF JUDICIAL APPROVAL.

THE INSTANT PETITION IS
DEVOID OF MERIT.

THE WELL-SETTLED RULE
THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE ENTITLED TO GREAT RESPECT,
CARRIES EVEN MORE WEIGHT WHEN AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS AS IN THE CASE
AT BAR.

IN BRIEF, THE LOWER COURT FOUND: 
(1) THAT THE PROPERTY UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION OF PETITIONER – THE WIFE
OF THE DECEASED, IS A COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND NOT THE SEPARATE PROPERTY OF THE
LATTER; (2) THAT THE MORTGAGE WAS CONSTITUTED IN THE WIFE’S PERSONAL CAPACITY
AND NOT IN HER CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATRIX; AND (3) THAT THE MORTGAGE AFFECTS
THE WIFE’S SHARE IN THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND HER INHERITANCE IN THE ESTATE OF
HER HUSBAND.

PETITIONER, ASSERTING THAT THE MORTGAGE IS VOID FOR WANT OF
JUDICIAL APPROVAL, QUOTED SECTION 7 OF
RULE 89 OF THE RULES OF COURT
AND CITED SEVERAL CASES WHEREIN THIS COURT RULED THAT THE REGULATIONS PROVIDED
IN THE SAID SECTION ARE MANDATORY.

WHILE PETITIONER’S ASSERTION MAY HAVE MERIT INSOFAR AS THE REST
OF THE ESTATE OF HER HUSBAND IS CONCERNED, THE SAME IS NOT TRUE AS REGARDS HER
CONJUGAL SHARE AND HER HEREDITARY RIGHTS IN THE ESTATE.  THE RECORDS SHOW THAT PETITIONER WILLINGLY
AND VOLUNTARILY MORTGAGED THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION BECAUSE SHE WAS PROMISED BY JK EXPORTS, INC. THE SUM OF P300,000.00 FROM THE PROCEEDS OF THE
LOAN; AND THAT AT THE TIME SHE EXECUTED THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE, THERE WAS NO
COURT ORDER AUTHORIZING THE MORTGAGE, SO SHE TOOK IT UPON HERSELF, TO SECURE AN ORDER.

THUS, IN CONFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT, AS SUPPORTED
BY LAW AND THE EVIDENCE, THE COURT OF APPEALS APTLY RULED THAT SECTION 7 OF RULE 89 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS NOT APPLICABLE, SINCE THE MORTGAGE
WAS CONSTITUTED IN HER PERSONAL CAPACITY AND NOT IN HER CAPACITY AS
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF HER HUSBAND.

NEVERTHELESS, PETITIONER, CITING THE CASES OF PICARDAL, ET AL.
VS. LLADAS (21 SCRA 1483) AND
FERNANDEZ, ET AL. VS. MARAVILLA (10
SCRA 589), FURTHER ARGUES THAT IN THE SETTLEMENT PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ESTATE OF THE DECEASED SPOUSE, THE ENTIRE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY OF THE
MARRIAGE IS UNDER ADMINISTRATION, WHILE SUCH MAY BE IN A SENSE TRUE, THAT FACT ALONE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO
INVALIDATE THE WHOLE MORTGAGE, WILLINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED INTO BY THE
PETITIONER.  AN OPPOSITE VIEW WOULD
RESULT IN AN INJUSTICE.  UNDER SIMILAR
CIRCUMSTANCES, THIS COURT APPLIED THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 493 OF THE CIVIL CODE, WHERE THE HEIRS
AS CO-OWNERS SHALL EACH HAVE THE FULL OWNERSHIP OF HIS PART AND THE FRUITS AND
BENEFITS PERTAINING THERETO, AND HE MAY THEREFORE ALIENATE, ASSIGN OR MORTGAGE
IT, AND EVEN SUBSTITUTE ANOTHER PERSON IN ITS ENJOYMENT, EXCEPT WHEN PERSONAL
RIGHTS ARE INVOLVED.  BUT THE EFFECT OF
THE ALIENATION OR MORTGAGE, WITH RESPECT TO THE CO-OWNERS, SHALL BE LIMITED TO
THE PORTION WHICH MAY BE ALLOTTED TO HIM IN THE DIVISION UPON THE TERMINATION
OF THE CO-OWNERSHIP (PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 98 SCRA 207 [1980]).

CONSEQUENTLY, IN THE CASE AT BAR, THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT
OF APPEALS CANNOT BE FAULTED IN RULING THAT THE QUESTIONED MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED
ON THE PROPERTY UNDER ADMINISTRATION, BY AUTHORITY OF THE PETITIONER, IS VALID,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE LACK OF JUDICIAL APPROVAL, WITH RESPECT TO HER CONJUGAL
SHARE AND TO HER HEREDITARY RIGHTS.  THE
FACT THAT WHAT HAD BEEN MORTGAGED WAS IN CUSTODIA LEGIS IS IMMATERIAL,
INSOFAR AS HER CONJUGAL SHARE AND HEREDITARY SHARE IN THE PROPERTY IS CONCERNED,
FOR AFTER ALL, SHE WAS THE ABSOLUTE
OWNER THEREOF.  THIS OWNERSHIP BY
HERS IS NOT DISPUTED, NOR IS THERE
ANY CLAIM THAT THE RIGHTS OF THE GOVERNMENT (WITH REFERENCE TO TAXES) NOR THE
RIGHTS OF ANY HEIR OR ANYBODY ELSE HAVE
BEEN PREJUDICED OR IMPAIRED.  AS STATED
BY ASSOCIATE JUSTICE (LATER CHIEF JUSTICE) MANUEL MORAN IN JAKOSALEM VS.
RAFOLS, ET AL., 73 PHIL. 618 –

“THE LAND IN QUESTION, DESCRIBED IN THE APPEALED DECISION,
ORIGINALLY BELONGED TO JUAN MELGAR.  THE
LATTER DIED AND THE JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION OF HIS ESTATE WAS COMMENCED IN 1915 AND CAME TO A CLOSE ON DECEMBER 2,
1924, ONLY.  DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE SAID
ADMINISTRATION, THAT IS, ON JULY 5, 1917,
SUSANA MELGAR, DAUGHTER OF THE DECEASED JUAN MELGAR, SOLD THE LAND WITH THE
RIGHT OF REPURCHASE TO PEDRO CUI, SUBJECT TO THE STIPULATION THAT DURING THE
PERIOD FOR THE REPURCHASE SHE WOULD CONTINUE IN POSSESSION OF THE LAND AS
LESSEE OF THE PURCHASE.  ON DECEMBER 12,
1920, THE PARTITION OF THE ESTATE LEFT BY THE DECEASED JUAN
MELGAR WAS MADE, AND THE LAND IN QUESTION WAS ADJUDICATED TO SUSANA
MELGAR.  IN 1921, SHE CONVEYED, IN PAYMENT OF PROFESSIONAL FEES, ONE-HALF OF
THE LAND IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEE NICOLAS RAFOLS, WHO ENTERED UPON
THE PORTION THUS CONVEYED AND HAS BEEN IN POSSESSION THEREOF UP TO THE
PRESENT.  ON JULY 23, 1921, PEDRO CUI BROUGHT AN ACTION TO RECOVER SAID HALF OF
THE LAND FROM NICOLAS RAFOLS AND THE OTHER HALF FROM THE OTHER DEFENDANTS, AND
WHILE THAT CASE WAS PENDING, OR ABOUT AUGUST 4, 1925, PEDRO CUI DONATED
THE WHOLE LAND IN QUESTION TO GENEROSA TEVES, THE HEREIN
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.  AFTER TRIAL, THE LOWER
COURT RENDERED A DECISION ABSOLVING NICOLAS RAFOLS
AS TO THE ONE-HALF OF THE LAND CONVEYED TO HIM BY SUSANA MELGAR, AND DECLARING
THE PLAINTIFF OWNER OF THE OTHER HALF BY EXPRESS ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE OTHER
DEFENDANTS.  THE PLAINTIFF APPEALED FROM
THAT PART OF THE JUDGMENT WHICH IS FAVORABLE TO NICOLAS RAFOLS.

“THE LOWER COURT ABSOLVED NICOLAS RAFOLS UPON THE THEORY THAT
SUSANA MELGAR COULD NOT HAVE SOLD ANYTHING TO PEDRO CUI BECAUSE THE LAND WAS
THEN IN CUSTODIA LEGIS, THAT IS, UNDER JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION.  THIS IS ERROR.  THAT THE LAND COULD NOT ORDINARILY BE LEVIED
UPON WHILE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS, DOES NOT MEAN THAT ONE OF THE HEIRS
MAY NOT SELL THE RIGHT, INTEREST OR PARTICIPATION WHICH HE HAS OR MIGHT HAVE IN
THE LANDS UNDER ADMINISTRATION.  THE
ORDINARY EXECUTION OF PROPERTY IN CUSTODIA LEGIS IS PROHIBITED IN
ORDER TO AVOID INTERFERENCE WITH THE POSSESSION BY THE COURT.  BUT THE SALE MADE BY AN HEIR OF HIS SHARE IN
AN INHERITANCE, SUBJECT TO THE RESULT OF THE PENDING ADMINISTRATION, IN NO WISE
STANDS IN THE WAY OF SUCH ADMINISTRATION.”

THE REFERENCE TO JUDICIAL
APPROVAL IN SEC. 7, RULE 89 OF THE RULES OF COURT
CANNOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO
DISPOSE OF HER IDEAL [NOT INCHOATE, FOR THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP ENDED WITH HER
HUSBAND’S DEATH, AND HER HEREDITARY RIGHTS ACCRUED FROM THE MOMENT OF THE DEATH
OF THE DECEDENT (ART. 777, CIVIL CODE)] SHARE IN THE CO-HEIRSHIP AND/OR
CO-OWNERSHIP FORMED BETWEEN HER AND THE OTHER HEIRS/CO-OWNERS (SEE ART. 493, CIVIL CODE, SUPRA.).  SEC. 7, ART. 89 OF THE CIVIL CODE APPLIES IN A CASE WHERE
JUDICIAL APPROVAL HAS TO BE SOUGHT IN CONNECTION WITH, FOR INSTANCE, THE SALE
OR MORTGAGE OF PROPERTY UNDER ADMINISTRATION FOR THE PAYMENT, SAY OF A
CONJUGAL DEBT, AND EVEN HERE, THE CONJUGAL AND HEREDITARY SHARES OF THE WIFE
ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE REQUISITE JUDICIAL APPROVAL FOR THE REASON ALREADY
ADVERTED TO HEREINABOVE, PROVIDED OF COURSE NO PREJUDICE IS CAUSED OTHERS,
INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT.

MOREOVER, PETITIONER IS
ALREADY ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE MORTGAGE. 
AN ESTOPPEL MAY ARISE FROM THE MAKING OF A PROMISE EVEN THOUGH WITHOUT
CONSIDERATION, IF IT WAS INTENDED THAT THE PROMISE SHOULD BE RELIED UPON
AND IN FACT IT WAS RELIED UPON, AND IF A REFUSAL TO ENFORCE IT WOULD BE
VIRTUALLY TO SANCTION THE PERPETRATION OF FRAUD OR WOULD RESULT IN OTHER
INJUSTICE (GONZALO SY TRADING VS. CENTRAL BANK, 70 SCRA 570).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, THE INSTANT PETITION IS HEREBY
DENIED AND THE ASSAILED DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera,
Padilla, and Sarmiento,
JJ., concur.

* PENNED BY JUSTICE LEONOR INES
LUCIANO, CONCURRED IN BY JUSTICES RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR. AND MA. ROSARIO
QUETULIO-LOSA.