ANG PING AND CARMEN PIMENTEL, PETITIONERS, VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 40; AND JULIO AND ZENAIDA KO, RESPONDENTS.

The issue in this
petition is whether or not the execution of a final judgment in an ejectment case which has gone all the way to the Supreme
Court may be stayed by a trial court on the ground of a supervening event,
namely a decision by a regional trial court ordering the nullification of sale
and title and granting legal redemption in favor of the
private respondents.

On November
13, 1985, in G.R.
No. 70581 (Ang Ping, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al.), we issued a resolution which reads in part:

“On October 25, 1983,
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila rendered judgment in an ejectment case filed by the petitioners Ang
Ping and Carmen Pimentel against private respondents Julio Ko and Zenaida Ko.  The trial court
ordered the respondents to vacate the disputed premises, pay P5,000.00 a month in rentals from March 1, 1981 until they vacate minus whatever payments
may have been made in the meantime, and pay P3,000.00 attorney’s fees and
costs.

“On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, the decision
was affirmed in toto on March 26, 1984.

On July 5, 1984,
RTC Judge Conrado T. Limcaoco
partially granted a motion for reconsideration by reducing to P500.00 monthly
rentals, the rate of monthly rentals agreed upon from June, 1979 or earlier when the respondents and their parents were leasing
the premises from Uy Chaco Sons and Co., Inc.  The Regional Trial Court of Manila sustained
the MTC findings that B.P. No. 25 is not applicable because (1) the monthly
rental is more than then P300.00 rental covered by the law and (2) the respon­dents
use the (sic) commercial reasons and not for a residence.  The Urban Land Reform Law,
P.D. 1517 was likewise not deemed applicable, a finding impliedly accepted by
the respondents when they abandoned this ground.

“In their petition for review filed with the Intermediate
Appellate Court, the respondent questioned the validity of the October 25, 1983
decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court on the ground that it was released only on January 24, 1984
when Judge J. Cesar Sangco had already retired.”
(p. 9, Rollo)

We resolved affirmatively
the issue of whether or not the October 25, 1983 decision of Judge J. Cesar Sangco in the ejectment case was
valid.  Instead of remanding the case for a re-promulgation of the same
judgment, this Court affirmed the decisions of the courts below as modified,
i.e. reducing the P5,000.00 per month rentals to their
pre-litigation level of P500.00 per month.

After a motion for
reconsideration was denied and entry of judgment was made, the petitioners
returned to the metropolitan trial court where they filed a motion for
execution of the judgment.  The private
respondents opposed the motion on the ground that a complaint for annulment of
sale which they filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila had, in the
meantime, been decided in their favor.

The Regional Trial Court
of Manila in Civil Case No. 13911 declared null and void the sale by the
earlier owner, T & C Corporation, to the petitioners on grounds of equity
under Article 19 of the Civil Code and ordered the petitioners to sell 190
square meters of the land they had purchasd to the
respondents upon Julio Ko’s paying them P190,000.00.  The
petitioners filed a motion to set aside and/or reconsider the decision.

According to a
manifestation filed September 1, 1987, the motion for reconsideration was denied,
whereupon the matter was raised to the Court of Appeals where the case is
now pending.

Going back to the ejectment case, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
denied the respondents’ opposition and granted the motion for execution.

On April 28, 1986,
respondents Julio and Zenaida Ko filed a petition for certiorari with prayer
for a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction
to stop the implementation of the writ of execution in the ejectment
case.  It is the preliminary injunction
issued by Branch 40 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No.
86-35622 which is now before us.

The bases for the decision in the ejectment
case are summarized by the Regional Trial Court of Manila as follows:

“Defendants contend that they cannot be ejected because:  (1) they are subsist­ing lessees at the time
of the purchase of the property in question by the plaintiffs from T & L
Development Corporation, under Sec. 5 of B.P. No. 15; (2) plaintiffs’ need of
the leased premises is not for use as a residential unit as required by said
law, but as
an office and bodega; and (3) since they were not given an opportunity
to exercise their right of first
refusal before the leased premises were sold to the plaintiffs, the sale thereof to the latter is null and void and in fact
filed a complaint for annulment thereof on that ground.

“As to the first two grounds the basic issue is whether or not
B.P. No. 25 is applicable to this case. 
The coverage of said law is defined in Sec. 7 thereof according to which
said law applies only to ‘All residential units the total monthly rental of
which does not exceed three hundred pesos (P300.00) as of the effectivity of this Act x x x’.  The
undisputed fact is that at the time of the purchase of the premises in question
defendants were paying a monthly rental of P500.00. 
Moreover, it is even doubtful whether the leased premises may be
considered as a residential unit under
Sec. 2(b) of B.P. No. 25, considering that defendants are undeniably using the same for commercial purposes because it is
there where they do business under the name of Johnson Blacksmith & Machine
Shop.

“As to the third ground, while it is not necessary to resolve
it, it is just as obvious that
P.D. 1517 is likewise not applicable, as correctly pointed out by counsel for
the plaintiff and as indicated
by the plaintiff and as indicated by defendants’ abandonment of this ground.

“Since neither B.P. No. 25 nor P.D. 1517 are
applicable, the settled rule that a month to month contract of lease is a
contract for a fixed period,
expires at the end of every month and may be terminated on any month,
applies.  Plaintiff did so when it served
notice of termination thereof dated February
20, 1981, effective 30 days thereafter.

“Premises considered the court finds and so declares
that plaintiffs have satisfactorily established their causes of action.”
(Annex J, Rollo, pp. 75-76) (Rollo, pp. 5-6).

On the other hand, the
decision in Civil Case No. 139111, nullifying the sale in favor of petitioners
Ang Ping and Carmen Pimentel is based on a finding that justice and
equity would be served by allowing Julio and Zenaida Ko to buy the properties already
sold to the petitioners.

Among the findings in
Civil Case No. 139111 are:

(1) Julio Ko
has been operating his Johnson Blacksmith and Machine Shop in the disputed
premises since 1965.

(2) The respondents have religiously paid the monthly rentals of
P500.00 for the premises.

(3) The respondents were never informed that T & L
Development Corporation intended to sell the premises.  They claimed a right to priority in the purchase
of the lot and the corresponding part of the building and on April 24, 1981
deposited with Equitable Banking Corporation the amount of P192,161.78 in trust
for Ang Ping for the redemption or repurchase of the
lot and apartment door sold to Ang Ping and Carmen
Pimentel.

The court stated that
there is nothing legally wrong in an owner of a leased property selling it without notifying the tenant.  However, it found a failure of the owner and
the buyers to observe honesty and good faith because other tenants were
informed of the proposed sale but
not Julio and Zenaida Ko.

The petitioners raise two
grounds for the allowance of their petition, namely:

A

“The respondent court gravely abused its discretion
and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the temporary restraining
order of April 28, 1986 and the Order of
May 16, 1986, denying petitioners’
Motion to Dismiss and directing
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to stop
the implementation of the writ of execution
issued by the MTC of Manila.  (Rollo, p.13)

B

“The respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
in issuing
the writ of preliminary
injunction, thereby depriving the petitioners
of the fruits of their legal victory through the implementation of the
final and executory decision.” (pp. 13 and 18, Rollo)

The petitioners contend that
the decision of Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in the
nullification of sale and title and reconveyance case
does not as yet confer on the respondents any enforceable right whereas this
Court has already entered judgment in the ejectment
case.

The petitioners also point out that we were fully
aware of the pending nullification and reconveyance
case because the same was brought to our attention in G.R. No. 70581.  Yet, we denied a motion for reconsideration
of our decision in the petition for review of the ejectment
case.

We agree with the
petitioners.

The principle enunciated
in Ramirez v. Bleza (106 SCRA
187) applies.  We ruled in Ramirez:

“Moreover, the pendency
of Civil Case No. R436,
an ‘accion publiciana‘,
where ownership is concededly the principal issue, (Rollo,
p. 59.) before the Court of First Instance
of Oriental Mindoro, does not preclude nor bar
the execution of the judgment rendered in Civil
Case No. R184, where the action was for forcible entry and the only issue involved was the material
possession or possession de facto of the land under
litigation.  Such action which involves
the title over the premises is entirely independent
from forcible entry.” (at p. 194)

Justice Ramon C. Aquino was more emphatic in his concurrence:

“I concur.  Respondent
judge of first instance acted with grave abuse of discretion in preventing the
execution of the final and executory judgment of the
municipal court in the ejectment case on the flimsy
pretext that another possessory action was pending in
his court involving the same land.

The judgment of the municipal court is res judicata
as to the issue of possession de facto but is not conclusive as
to the title or ownership (Sec. 7, Rule 70, Rules of Court; Penalosa
v. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303).

“Possession and ownership of a parcel of land may be held by
different persons.  The winning party is
entitled to the execution of the municipal court’s final judgment as to
possession.  The enforcement of that
judgment would not cause ‘chaos and confusion’. 
(id.
at p. 195).

In De la Cruz v. Court of
Appeals (133 SCRA 520), we had a similar ruling:

“We find no merit in
petitioners’ aforesaid submission. 
An unlawful detainer action has an entirely different subject from that
of an action for reconveyance of title. 
What is involved in unlawful detainer case is
merely the issue of material possession or possession de facto;
whereas in an action for reconveyance, ownership is the issue.  So much so that the pendency
of an action for reconveyance of title over the same
property does not divest the city or municipal court of its jurisdiction to try
the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case, nor will it preclude or bar execution of judgment in the ejectment case
where the only issue involved is material possession or possession de facto.  (Ramirez v. Bleza, L45640, July 30, 1981, 106 SCRA 187).

“This is so because:

“‘The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession
only and in no case bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or
building.  Such judgment shall not bar an
action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor
shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein found in case between the same
parties upon a different cause of action involving posses­sion.'” (Section
7, Rule 70, Rules of Court).

“The rationale is that forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to provide
for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to
possession of the property involved.  (Republic v. Guarin, supra).  It does not admit of a delay in the determination
thereof.  It is a ‘time procedure’
designed to remedy the situation.  (Mabalot v. Madela,
Jr., 121 SCRA 347).  Procedural
technicality is therefore obviated and reliance thereon to stay eviction from
the property should not be tolerated and cannot override substantial
justice.  (Dakudao
v. Consolacion, 122 SCRA 877).  So much so that judgment
must be executed immediately when it is in favor of the plaintiff in order to
prevent further damages arising from loss of possession.” (Salinas
v. Navarro, 126 SCRA 167).  (At pp.
527-528)

As early as 1922, this Court declared in Shioji v. Harvey (43 Phil. 333) that
“the only function of a lower
court, when the judgment of a higher court is returned to it, is the ministerial one of issuing the order of execution.  A lower court is without supervisory jurisdiction to interpret or to reverse the
judgment of the higher court.”

This is especially true
where it is a Supreme Court decision or resolution which
states with finality how the particular case before it has been resolved.  We ruled in Tugade
v. Court of Appeals (85 SCRA 226):

“Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice
at all.  It could not have ruled in any
other way on the legal question raised. 
This Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey.  It is as simple as that.  There is relevance to this excerpt from
Barrera v. Barrera.  (L-31589,
July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 98).  ‘The
delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a
constitutional or statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or
a municipal ordinance is committed to the judiciary.  It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other two
departments in the maintenance of the rule of law.  To assure stability
in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice.  It does so with finality, logically and
rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court.  What it says then should be definitive and authoritative, binding on
those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy.  They have to defer and to submit.’ (Ibid, 107.  The
opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937] was cited.) The
ensuing paragraph of the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point:  ‘Such a thought was reiterated in an opinion
of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized
in these words:  ‘Judge Gaudencio
Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court,
by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on
what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy.  There is only one Supreme Court from whose
decisions all other courts should take their bearings.'” (Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. Court of First
Instance of Manila [Branch VI], L-26364, May
29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948, 961.) (at pp.
230-231).

We refrain from expressing any opinion on the merits of the decision
in the nullification of sale and reconveyance of
property case.  The merits will have to
be threshed out by the proper court on a full consideration of the evidence and
the law upon which it is based.  Our
decision here is limited to the execution of the decision in the ejectment case.

From the foregoing, it is plain that the law is on the side of
the petitioners.  The injunction was
improperly issued.

Do the equities of the case warrant a disregard of established
precedents?  It is true that the private
respondents would suffer painful consequences if they are ejected now only to be reinstated
if they eventually win the nullification of sale case.  However, the petitioners are also suffering
an injustice.  The ejectment
case in their favor was decided as early as 1983.  The regional
trial court affirmed the decision.  The
Intermediate Appellate Court ruled that the promulgation of the trial court’s
decision was defective and ordered it repromulgated
but this Court set aside the appellate decision and reinstated the
metropolitan trial court and regional trial court decisions.

There being no final decision in the annulment of sale case, the petitioners have
equal chances with the private respondents of also winning that case. 
The private respondents cannot claim to have overriding considerations
of equity on their side, sufficient to stop the execution of a final judgment in the ejectment proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
GRANTED.  The orders dated April
28, 1986 and May 16,
1986 of the
respondent court are SET
ASIDE.  The Metropolitan Trial Court is ORDERED to immediately execute the decision in the ejectment case.  No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration of
this decision will be granted.

SO
ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.