UERM EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT AND THE UERM MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER, RESPONDENTS.

In the instant petition for
certiorari, the petitioner labor union seeks the annulment of the
decisions dated June 5 and June 6, 1986 and the order dated August 19, 1986 of
the then Minister of Labor and
Employment Augusto S. Sanchez on the ground of
the finality of his earlier
decision dated March 18, 1986 involving general salary increase and longevity
pay.  It also prays that the respondent
Minister of Labor be compelled to execute said decision of March 18, 1986 insofar as it grants a P100 salary increase
to its members for the year 1984.^[1]

Petitioner union is the
bargaining representative of the employees of the University of the East – Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Medical Center (UERM, a non-stock, non?profit
corporation operating a college of medicine, a college of nursing, and a 256-bed
hospital.  The union members are
employees of the UERM, including the faculty members of the College of Nursing but excluding the
managerial personnel and faculty members of the College of Medicine.

The collective bargaining
agreement between petitioner and the UERM having expired on December
31, 1983, the
parties went through a phase of
renegotiation.  On October
18, 1984, they signed a memorandum agreement, the pertinent portions of which state:

“2. 
that the EMPLOYER agrees to implement Wage Order No. 3 effective November 1, 1984 and
Wage Order No. 5 effective June 16,
1984, and therefore the EMPLOYER further agrees to cause the immediate withdrawal of its pending
application for exemption from Wage Order No. 5 despite its dire financial straits;

“3.  That the EMPLOYEE
agrees to withdraw all present political and economic demands, except the
negotiation of salary increases which will be reopened on May 25, 1985, and
whatever across-the-board salary increases granted by the EMPLOYER shall be
retroactive January 1, 1984, after the preparation of a tentative financial
statement for the fiscal period ending
March 31, 1985;

“4. That the same Collective Bargaining Agreement which
expired on December 31, 1983
will be in full force and effect until a new agreement is made between the
EMPLOYER and the EMPLOYEE”.^[2]

No agreement having been reached by UERM and the union on the
issue of an across-the-board salary increase, the dispute was submitted by both parties to a
voluntary arbitrator (Froilan M. Bacungan)
who, on November 26, 1984
rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

“CONSIDERING ALL THE ABOVE, the Voluntary Arbitrator hereby
decides that UERM should grant to all its employees in the bargaining unit
where the Union is the bargaining representative an
across-the-board salary increase at the rate of P20.00 per month, effective January 1, 1984.”^[3]

Said decision was immediately
implemented.

It turned out, however, that the union was not fully
satisfied.  Hence, on October 2, 1985 on the ground of
bargaining deadlock over the renegotiation of CBA wage increase,^[4]
the union filed a notice of strike with the
Bureau of Labor Relations and on November
6, 1985, it declared a strike and started picketing the UERM
premises.

In view of the fact that a prolonged stoppage of work at the UERM
may not only disrupt hospital
services but would also affect the community as a whole, the then Ministry of
Labor and Employment, in an order issued on the same day of the strike by the
then Acting Minister Carmelo C. Noriel,
assumed jurisdiction over the dispute,^[5]
under Article 264 (should be 263), paragraph (g).  Consequently, the union lifted the picket
line on November 9, 1985.

UERM then filed a petition for compulsory arbitration.  The parties conferred at a series of meetings
at the offices of Director Cresencio Trajano and Deputy Minister Noriel.  Later on, they submitted their respective
position papers.  But the labor dispute
was not fated for an immediate settlement. 
A political upheaval intervened.

An aftermath of the February, 1986 revolution was the change in
leadership within the Ministry.  Augusto S. Sanchez became its head.  Shortly thereafter or on March 18, 1986, a decision signed by Minister
Sanchez was released or somehow got into the hands of union representatives.  Petitioner herein admits that a xerox copy of the decision was received by some of its
officers who had been following up the case, from “the trusted
assistants” of Minister Sanchez.^[6]
Allegedly, the Minister’s men requested the union officers to deliver a copy of
the decision to the UERM.  According to the private respondent herein,
said union officers left the original copy of the decision at the office
of the Chairman of the Board of UERM at around 9:00
o’clock in the morning of March
19, 1986.^[7]

The dispositive portion of said
decision, which contains data relative to the financial status and capacity of
UERM to meet the claims of its employees, states:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, and in the interest of
industrial peace, the UERM Employees Association
and the UERM Memorial Medical Center are directed to conclude a collective agreement for a
three-year period to expire on 31
December 1986 pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement on October 18, 1984, including an across-the-board
wage increase for the rank-and-file covered in the bargaining unit, as follows:

“a) 
P100 per month, effective January
1, 1984

“b) 
P50 per month, effective January
1, 1985

“c)  P50 per month, effective January 1, 1986; and longevity pay of
P5.00 from six months to less than five years of service, P10.00 from five
years to less than 10 years, P15 from 10 years to less than 15 years and P20
from 15 years and more of service.

“The retroactive pay shall be payable on staggered basis,
fifty (50%) percent upon receipt of this order and the balance on or before 16 May 1986.

“It is further ordered that the three days during which the
employees did not work shall be applied to their unused vacation leave.

“SO ORDERED.”^[8]

Alleging that she had not received a copy of the decision, on March 20, 1986, UERM’s
counsel filed a manifestation and
motion praying that she be given a copy thereof as she intended to file a
motion for reconsideration.^[9] On April 9, 1986, said counsel wrote a
follow-up letter to Minister Sanchez calling his attention to the fact that
when she went to the Minister’s office, the record of the case could not be
found; that her client’s copy of the decision was served on her client by union
officers and that these facts lend credence to alleged eyewitnesses’ accounts
that the record of the case was in the possession of the union.^[10]

In his answer to said
letter, Minister Sanchez informed UERM’s counsel that
“the subject decision is not yet official and still subject to dissession
(sic).^[11]

On the other hand, on
April 14, 1986, acting on the theory that the March 18, 1986 decision had
become final and executory, the union filed a motion
for a writ of execution praying
that the total amount of P1,837,190.00 awarded under
said decision be divided equally so that one-half thereof or P918,595.00 should
be delivered immediately while the balance would be collectible on or before
May 16, 1986.^[12]

The Minister did not act
on said motion.  But early May, 1986, the
union officers learned from Minister Sanchez that he had not authorized the
release of the March 18, 1986 decision even if he had already signed it as he
later found out that the decision had certain “defects”.  The Minister allegedly told the union
officers that the management could not afford the monetary award given in the
decision of March 18, 1986
as it might result in the UERM’s closure.  He did not heed their pleas for the
implementation of the March 18, 1986
decision despite the fact that the union members had shown him a memorandum of
the chairman of the board of the UERM increasing substantially the salaries of
the university’s faculty members effective June 1, 1986.^[13]

On June 6, 1986,
the Minister showed union representatives a decision dated June 5, 1986 which had his signature.  The dispositive
portion of the two-page decision states:

“WHEREFORE, in the interest of industrial peace, the UERM
Employees Association and the UERM Memorial Medical Center are hereby directed
to conclude a collective agreement for a three-year period ending on 31 December 1988, providing for an across-the-board
wage increase for the rank­-and-file employees covered in the bargaining unit,
as follows:

“(a) 
P100 a month, effective 1
January 1986;

“(b) 
P50 a month, effective 1
January 1987;

“(c) 
P50 a month, effective 1
January 1988;

and a longevity pay of P5 for workers with
a service of six months, P10 for those with five years’ service, P15 for those
with 10 years’ service, and P20 for those with 15 years’ service.

“The retroactive pay for the wage increase in the first year
of the agreement shall be due in two installments:  50 per cent upon receipt by the parties of
this Order and the balance on or before 15
August 1985.  It is further
ordered that the three days during which the employees did not work shall be
applied to their unused vacation leave.

“SO ORDERED.”^[14]

After reading said
decision, the union representatives allegedly objected on the ground that it
did not provide for an across-the-board salary increase retroactive January
1, 1984.  Worse, it supposedly extended the lifetime of
the CBA from 1986 to 1988; and struck the union as containing virtually the
same economic package which UERM had earlier proposed but which proposal the
union outrightly rejected.  The Minister allegedly said that he had
signed the decision but he did not intend to release it and that he had
handwritten a notice declaring the first decision (dated March 18, 1986) as
null and void as he did not authorize its release.  The union representatives’ audience with the Minister ended with the latter
exhorting them to return on June 9, 1986 as he had to “input” the
retroactive provisions of the October 18, 1984 memorandum agreement.^[15]

The third decision, dated
June 6, 1986,
has the following dispositive portion:

“WHEREFORE, in the interest of industrial peace, the UERM
Employees Association and the UERM Memorial Medical Center are hereby directed
to conclude a collective agreement for a three-year period ending on 31
December 1986, providing for an across-the-board wage increase for the
rank-and-file employees covered in the bargaining unit, as follows:

“(a)  P20 a month,
effective 1 January 1984 as
awarded by the voluntary arbitrator;

“(b)  P50 a month,
effective 1 January 1985;

“(c)  P50 a month,
effective 1 January 1986;

“(d)  and a longevity pay
of P5 for workers with a service of six months, P10 for those with five years’
service, P15 for those with 10 years service, and P20 for those with 15 years’
service.

“The retroactive pay on account of this Order shall be due in
two installments:  50 per cent upon
receipt by the parties of this Order and the balance on or before 15 August 1986.  It is further ordered that the three days
during which the employees did not work shall be applied to their unused
vacation leave.

“SO ORDERED.”^[16]

The union filed an urgent
motion to set aside the decision of June 6, 1986 on the following grounds:  (a) the first decision of March 18, 1986 had long become final and executory and could not be superseded by a third decision
which was “the product of a hasty and ill-studied cover-up of patent
mistakes in the second decision”; (b) the third decision patently violated
the memorandum agreement of October, 1984; and (c) the third decision unduly
favored the management by relieving it of the payment of benefits, and
deceitfully granted the P20 increase of the first year which benefit was
“in actuality not there”.

The said motion also
sought the inhibition of Minister Sanchez from “further involving
himself” in the dispute because his younger brother (Dr. Fernando
Sanchez) was a leading member of the
management negotiating panel, and he had demonstrated a “wishy-washy
disposition” by signing no less than three decisions which, “in their
chronology, had geometrically reduced the benefits accruing to the
workers without rhyme or reason”.^[17]

In his order of August
19, 1986, the
Minister denied the said motion.  On the
issue of the finality of the March 18, 1986 decision, he quoted from his June 6,
1986 decision the
following:

“Parenthetically, there is a matter that calls for some
clarification.  An earlier draft decision
in this case was prepared sometime in March 1986.  That draft was among the several papers reviewed and signed on the same day but
further reflection and subsequent discussions on the draft indicated a need for
another review.  The issuance of the
draft decision was therefore withheld and a deeper study of the record was
directed.  Unfortunately, word had
reached this Office that a final decision in this case had been
officially issued.  Efforts were then taken to correct that
impression and the forebearance of the parties was
earnestly requested to afford this Office an opportunity to have a fair
and objective examination of the record. 
This Office now trusts that this
Order will put all doubts and misimpressions to rest.”^[18]

On the allegation that
the contested decision violates the Memorandum Agreement of October
18, 1984, Minister
Sanchez ruled that aside from the fact that such wage increase of P20 was
considered as fair and equitable, the records show that it was awarded by the
voluntary arbitrator whose award had become final.^[19]

On whether he should
inhibit himself due to his relationship with a management negotiator, the
Minister pointed out that the union wished him “to inhibit himself in a
decision it consider(ed) not favorable to its interest
and on the same vine (sic) execute the decision it consider(ed) beneficial to
it“.^[20]

Inasmuch as two weeks
earlier or on August 4, 1988, the union had filed a notice of strike due to long-standing
economic issues, on August 25, 1986, the union and UERM, signed a memorandum of
agreement, one of the stipulations of which states:

“7. 
Finally, the Parties agree that the issue on the salary increase
corresponding to the year 1984 shall continue to be the subject of litigation before the proper authorities or
courts”.^[21]

Hence,
the instant recourse.

The petition for certiorari
cites as grounds therefor (a) grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Minister of Labor for his failure to order the
execution of the March 18, 1986 decision which, petitioner herein reiterates,
had become final and executory; (b) the Minister’s
“unbecoming” behaviour of participating in
the disposition of the labor dispute wherein his brother had a “direct
involvement”, and (c) the Minister’s having “gravely erred” in
promulgating the June 6, 1986 decision decreeing the salary increase of P20 for
1984 instead of the P100 salary increase awarded in the March 18, 1986 decision.

The sole issue in this
case is whether or not the subject decision of March 18, 1986 became final and executory.

We hold that the March
18, 1986 decision
had not become final and executory so as to entitle
petitioner to the issuance of a writ of execution with respect to the award
therein of a P100 across-the-board salary increase for 1984.

Foremost is the fact that
petitioner’s ultimate objective in filing the instant petition is to obtain a
higher salary increase for 1984.  Petitioner has not interposed any objections
to the other awards in the June 6, 1986 decision, as in fact, such other awards have
all been received by its members.^[22] We hold, however, that under the
circumstances, the instant petition cannot accord the union any relief.

It is undisputable from
the records that the issue of the across-the-board salary increase for 1984 had
already been resolved in the November 26, 1984 decision of the voluntary
arbitrator which having long become final, may not be modified or amended by
another decision on the same issue.

Article 262 of the Labor Code provides that voluntary
arbitration awards or decisions shall
be final, unappealable and executory.  Under similar circumstances, this Court held
that the decision of the voluntary arbitrator should be immediately implemented
for nothing could be clearer than the fact that private respondent had no
choice but to comply with said decision.^[23] The union could have appealed under Section
5, Rule XI of the implementing rules of the Labor Code to the National Labor
Relations Commission within ten (10) days from receipt of the voluntary
arbitrator’s decision, on the
grounds of abuse of discretion and gross incompetence of the voluntary
arbitrator, but petitioner did not only fail to avail itself of said remedy but
its members also had received the P20 salary increase for 1984.^[24] Hence, the respondent Minister could not
have decreed an award any thing more than what was granted by the voluntary
arbitrator.  His June 6,
1986 decision is but
a reiteration thereof.

And even assuming that
the March 18, 1986
decision is valid, it has nonetheless failed to reach finality on the ground
that it was not properly served on the parties.

Decisions emanating from
administrative tribunals or officials like the Minister (now Secretary) of
Labor should be served in accordance with law. 
In the absence of specific provisions in the applicable laws like the
Labor Code and its implementing rules on the service of decisions or orders,
the provisions of the Rules of Court shall be applied in a suppletory
character.

With respect to service
of orders and/or decisions, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court states:

“SEC. 2.  Papers to be filed and served.  – Every order required by its terms to
be served, every pleading subsequent to the complaint, every written motion
other than one which may be heard ex
parte,
and every written notice,
appearance, demand, offer of judgment or similar papers shall be filed with the
court, and served upon the parties affected thereby.  If any of such parties has appeared by an
attorney or attorneys, service upon him shall be made upon his attorneys or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is
ordered by the court.  Where one attorney
appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper
served upon him by the opposite side.”

Accordingly, when a
party is represented by counsel,
notices should be made upon the counsel of record at his given address, to which notices of all kinds emanating from the
court should be sent.^[25]

It is not disputed that both parties herein were represented by counsel.  However, instead of proper service by
Ministry process servers on the said lawyers of the parties, the xerox copy of the decision of March 18, 1986 was released to and received by representatives
of the union who had been following up the case in the office of the
Minister.  Petitioner admits that its
counsel, Atty. Ruben F. Santos, was then not with the union representatives.  It was also through said union
representatives that the original copy of said decision was delivered to the
office of the chairman of the board of UERM. 
Counsel of record for UERM was not served a copy of the March 18, 1986 decision. 
In fact she filed a manifestation
and motion dated March 26, 1986 praying that she be given a copy of the purported decision so that she could take appropriate action.^[26] Subsequently on April 9, 1986, she followed up her request by a letter to
the Minister of Labor and Employment.^[27] However, in the Minister’s reply of April
14, 1986, she was informed that subject decision is not yet official and still
subject to review and was assured of the immediate release of an official
resolution.^[28]

Clearly, therefore, as
correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the period of appeal has not
commenced to run against private respondent UERM.^[29]

Petitioner’s insistence
that the above procedure of service of a copy of the decision not by official
process servers, but by evidently unauthorized union officials to private
respondent is not unusual at all in the Labor Ministry,
is untenable.  In the absence of any
showing that such practice is sanctioned by the Implementing Rules of the
Ministry of Labor or by the Rules of Court, the party who took advantage of
such irregular practice does so at its own risk and cannot now be heard to
complain.

In addition, UERM’s counsel of record has never been changed, so that
petitioner cannot use the pretext of not knowing who is the present counsel of
private respondent as an excuse for furnishing the copy of the decision on the
chairman of UERM and not on its counsel. 
Under the circumstances, it is the consistent ruling of this Court that
where no notice of withdrawal or substitution of counsel was shown, notice to
counsel of record is for all purposes, notice to the client.  Such notice is properly sent to the address of
the counsel of record in the absence of due notice to the court of change of address and the date of
receipt is considered the starting point from which the period of appeal
prescribed by law shall begin to run.^[30]

Be that as it may, we
cannot condone the manner by which
respondent Minister handled the disposition of this case.  Observance of a
modicum of prudence on the Minister’s
part and/or on the part of his subordinates would have prevented the premature
release of the March 18, 1986 decision, and the complications engendered
thereby and ensured the attainment of a fair and speedy resolution of the dispute. 
More than that, the records do not show any form of disciplinary action
meted out on those responsible
for the highly irregular service of the decision.  The confusion caused by the change in
leadership within the Ministry might have partly contributed to the
fiasco.  But that is not an excuse.  The burden of strict observance of the law
and propriety tilted heavily on the part of the Ministry officials and employees concerned.

Moreover, having
discovered defects in the prematurely released and improperly served decision,
matters would have been greatly facilitated had the Minister issued an order
recalling the decision.  Said order
should have been properly served on both parties, instead of informing
only the UERM counsel through a private letter* that he had
not authorized the release of the March 18, 1986 decision.

No less important is the
fact that to avoid any suspicion of bias or partiality, however far-fetched it
might really have been, the Minister should have refrained from having a direct
participation in deciding the labor dispute under paragraph 1, section 1, Rule
137 of the Rules of Court, applied suppletorily,
which provides:

“No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which
he or his wife or child is pecuniarily interested as
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity or to counsel within the
fourth degree x x x.”

While there were no hard facts indicating bias on his part, his brother as a member of the UERM
negotiating panel is undoubtedly covered by this prohibition.  In this
situation, the Minister is not
without a choice.  Article 263 of the Labor Code, paragraph (g)
provides:

 “(g)   When
in his opinion there exists a labor
dispute causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the
national interest, such as may occur in but not limited to public utilities,
companies engaged in the
generation or distribution of energy, banks, hospitals, and export-oriented
industries, including those within export processing zones, the Minister of
Labor and Employment shall assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it
or certify the same to
the Commission for
compulsory arbitration.  Such assumption or certification shall have
the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order.  If one has already taken place at the time of
assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall
immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations
and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before
the strike or lockout.  x x x“.  (Underscoring
supplied.)

Thereunder, he could have certified the case to the
National Labor Relations Commission and disengaged himself from the potentially
explosive situation which usually attends the settlement of a labor
dispute.  Relevant in this regard is the oft-repeated purpose of inhibition which is “to preserve the
prized ideal of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” implicit in the
guarantee of due process.^[31] Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal.^[32]

In any event, it is
evident that no unfair advantage had
been taken by the Minister
against the union.  In fact, when he signed
the March 18, 1986
decision, his brother was already a member of the UERM negotiating panel.  If the interest of the UERM was uppermost in his
mind, he would not under any circumstance
have signed said decision.  It is, therefore, credible that he sensed
that something is wrong and withheld the release.  Ultimately, he correctly reiterated the
decision of the voluntary arbitrator which has long become final and executory.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is
hereby DISMISSED.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 15.

^[2]
Rollo, p. 17.

^[3]
Rollo, p. 51.

^[4]
Rollo, p. 121.

^[5]
Rollo, pp. 121-122.

^[6]
Petition, p. 6; Rollo, p. 7.

^[7]
Rollo, p. 109-A.

^[8]
Rollo, pp. 25-26.

^[9]
Rollo, p. 139.

^[10]
Rollo, p. 140.

^[11]
Rollo, p. 141.

^[12]
Rollo, pp. 27-29.

^[13]
Rollo, pp. 7-8; 31.

^[14]
Rollo, pp. 32-33.

^[15]
Rollo, pp.
8-9

^[16]
Rollo, p. 36.

^[17]
Rollo, pp. 52-59.

^[18]
Rollo, pp. 61.

^[19]
Rollo, p. 62.

^[20]
Rollo, pp. 60-62.

^[21]
Rollo, p. 64.

^[22]
Rollo, p. 211.

^[23]
(See:  United
RCPI Communications Labor Association [URCPICLA]-FUR vs. Inciong, G.R. No. 49959, June 19, 1984, 129 SCRA 587).

^[24]
Rollo, p. 9.

^[25]
(Cubar
vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. 55035, February 23, 1983, 120 SCRA 768,
772).

^[26]
Rollo, p. 139.

^[27]
Rollo, p. 140.

^[28]
Rollo, p. 141.

^[29]
Rollo, p. 152.

^[30]
(Juan v. Musngi, 155 SCRA 134 [1987]; Francisco v. Puno, 108 SCRA 427 [1981]; PLDT v. NLRC, 128 SCRA 402 [1984]; Cubar v. Mendoza, supra.

* Petitioner learned of said
letter from a letter written by UERM’s counsel
to the Philippine Daily Inquirer reacting to a column of Luis Beltran on the
labor dispute.  The said counsel’s letter
was published in the July 26, 1986
issue of said newspaper (Rollo, p. 30).

^[31]
Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz, 50
SCRA 18; Masadao and Elizaga
Re:  Criminal Case No. 4954-M, 155 SCRA
75 [1987]).

^[32]
Ibid.; Geotina v. Gonzales, 41 SCRA 73-74).