MARCELO BONDOC, AS SUBSTITUTED BY ROMEO BONDOC, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. CESAR C. PERALEJO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH LXVI OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL…

The Court gave due course to this petition and required the
parties to submit simultaneous memoranda for a full exposition of the issues in
their long drawn-out dispute.  We have
read their respective pleadings in the light of the challenged decision and are
ready to decide the case once and for all.

The facts are simple enough. 
Petitioner Marcelo Bondoc had since 1949
occupied Apartment No. 3 of a 4-door apartment building used for commercial
purposes, paying a monthly rental of P200.00.^[1]
He managed a tailoring business there, employing several tailors and
seamstresses.^[2]
In 1974, the private respondent, Lorenzo Quiambao,
who was occupying the first 2 apartments, bought the entire building and
requested Bondoc to transfer to Apartment No. 4 so Quiambao could also occupy the third apartment.^[3] Bondoc agreed, allegedly on the assurance given him by Quiambao that he and his wife could continue with their
lease during the lessor’s lifetime.^[4]
Sometime later, Quiambao allowed Bondoc,
on his request, to construct a temporary residential structure on the lot
behind Apartment No. 4, also belonging to Quiambao,
provided that the petitioner would leave the land any time he was required to
do so.^[5] Bondoc admits that Quiambao did
not charge any rentals for this lot.^[6]
In 1977, Quiambao asked Bondoc
to vacate the apartment and the lot.  Bondoc claims Quiambao’s reason
was his need for the apartment although Quiambao says
this was only secondary, as the principal ground was the expiration of the
monthly lease.  Bondoc
refused, invoking Quiambao’s promise.  Written demand was then made on him by Quiambao, followed by a complaint for ejectment
when the defendant refused to leave.^[7]

Quiambao won in the Municipal Circuit
Court of Concepcion and Bondoc
was required to vacate the subject premises.^[8] Bondoc appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, which, while
inferentially holding that the petitioner could be ejected from the apartment,
ordered Quiambao to execute a new contract with Bondoc for a period of two years over the lot where Bondoc had built his house.^[9]
Not satisfied with this judgment, Bondoc filed a
petition for certiorari with the
respondent court^[10]
and asked that the complaint for ejectment be
dismissed altogether.  The respondent
court set aside the judgment of the regional trial court and virtually
reinstated the decision of the municipal court.^[11]

The dispositive portion of the decision
of the respondent court read:

WHEREFORE, the  appealed
judgment is hereby set aside.  Judgment
is hereby rendered:

(1) ordering the petitioner to vacate Apartment No. 4;

(2) ordering the petitioner to vacate the lot or portion thereof in
which he had erected his temporary dwelling within sixty (60) days from
finality of judgment;

(3) authorizing the private respondent to remove/demolish the said
structure should the petitioner fail to remove his temporary dwelling within
the above period of sixty (60) days from finality of judgment.

In the petition now before us, Bondoc
asks for the reversal of this decision on the principal ground that there was
no valid reason for the termination of his lease.  He claims that Quiambao
first said in his complaint that he needed the premises in question, and it was
only later that he argued that his reason for the complaint was the expiration
of the lease.  The second ground had not
been invoked earlier and so may not be pleaded on appeal.  Bondoc also
contends that the law applied in the case of Salaria
v. Buenviaje,^[12]
which he said rejected the need for the premises as a valid reason for the ejectment of the lessee, was Article 1673 of the Civil
Code.  This provision is applicable to
both residential and commercial leases.

For his part, the private respondent maintains that he pleaded
both expiration of the term and the need for the premises in the lower courts,
stressing that under the Rules of Court the complaint is limited only to the
ultimate facts and should not contain all the legal arguments and conclusions
of the pleader.  In any event, he
insists, the leased premises are admittedly commercial in nature and so is not
governed by Batas Pambansa Blg.
25, which prohibits ejectment for expiration of the
term from residential buildings. 
As the premises have been established to be commercial in nature, the
lease is deemed to have expired in accordance with Article 1687 of the Civil
Code, providing thus –

ART. 1687.  If the period for
the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the
rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to
week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid
daily.  However, even though a monthly
rent is paid, and no period for the lease has been set, the courts may fix a
longer term for the lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over
one year.  If the rent is weekly, the
courts may likewise determine a longer period after the lessee has been in
possession for over six months.  In case
of daily rent, the courts may also fix a longer period after the lessee has
stayed in the place for over one month.

We hold for the private respondent.

There is no question that the lease of the disputed apartment is
from month to month, considering the monthly payments.  Hence, it was terminable at the end of each
month at the option of the lessor, conformably to
Article 1673, also invoked by the petitioner. 
This provides as follows:

ART. 1673.  The lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of the
following causes:

(1) When the period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for the
duration of leases under articles 1682 and 1687, has expired;

(2) Lack of payment of the
price stipulated;

(3) Violation of any of the conditions agreed upon in the contract;

(4) When the lessee devotes the thing leased to any use or service
not stipulated which causes the deterioration thereof; or if he does not
observe the requirement in No. 2 of article 1657, as regards the use thereof.

The ejectment of tenants of agricultural
lands is governed by special laws.

The Salaria case is clearly not
applicable because it dealt with residential land, unlike the property subject
of this case which was admittedly commercial in nature, conformably to Morales
v. Zamora,^[13]
where it was held:

When a barber or tailor pursues his calling by serving customers in
his dwelling, he is merely exercising a home industry; engaging other tailors
or barbers to expand his business and increase his returns, his establishment
becomes commercial and the incidental fact that his family lives therein does
not include him in that class of tenants equally favored by recent emergency
legislation on housing.

There is no question that Batas Pambansa
Blg. 25 does not cover commercial lands.

The alleged promise of Quiambao that he
would allow Bondoc to remain in the leased premises
during the former’s lifetime has not been clearly
established.

It is clear, though, that the lot on which Bondoc’s
house is located was never the subject of a lease and was occupied by him only
on Quiambao’s tolerance and subject to its return any
time it was needed by the owner. 
Moreover, he was allowed to build thereon only a temporary shelter and
not the permanent structure he erected at the alleged cost of P15,000.00.  The petitioner never specifically denied
these allegations in the complaint for ejectment and
is therefore deemed to have admitted them.^[14] Bondoc can therefore not insist that he is a builder in
good faith or demand payment for the improvements he has constructed, nor may
he retain the same until reimbursement is made.

In raising all the procedural objections that have considerably
delayed the disposition of this case, the petitioner has impeded rather than
promoted the orderly administration of justice. 
By his clever maneuvers, he has suppressed the truth and prevented its
early discovery, thus managing to remain unlawfully in the disputed premises
all these years.  The essential facts of
this case cannot be denied despite the petitioner’s deplorable attempt to
conceal them.  His lease has expired over
Apartment No. 4 nor can he claim a lease over the lot behind it, which means
that he should have vacated the disputed premises long ago.  This conclusion, supported by the evidence
and demanded by the law, cannot be deferred much longer to the private
respondent’s prejudice.  It is time we
wrote finis to this case, as we do so now.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the
respondent court AFFIRMED in toto, with
costs against the petitioner.  This
decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Gancayco, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Memorandum for the Petitioner, p. 2; Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 1, 4 and
6.

^[2] Ibid., pp. 2 and 1.

^[3] Id.

^[4]
Memorandum  for Respondents, p. 3; Rollo, p. 78.

^[5]
Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 1 and 2.

^[6] Rollo, pp. 10, 118, 121 and 122.

^[7]
Memorandum for Respondents, p. 2.

^[8]
Decision penned by Judge Melencio P. Austria; Rollo, pp. 63 and 64.

^[9]
Decision penned by Judge Cesar C. Peralejo; Rollo, p. 81.

^[10] Rollo, pp. 90-104.

^[11]
Romeo Bondoc substituted Marcelo Bondoc
as petitioner upon the latter’s death on March 16, 1985.  Ibid.,
pp. 105-106.

^[12]
81 SCRA 723.

^[13]
81 Phil. 203.

^[14] Rollo, pp. 44 and 61.