MANUEL CO KENG KIAN, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (FOURTH SPECIAL CASES DIVISION) AND PLAZA ARCADE, INC., RESPONDENTS.

The legal issue raised in this petition is whether the notice to
vacate required to be served on the lessee under Section 2, Rule 70 of the
Revised Rules of Court in order to confer jurisdiction on the Metropolitan
Trial Court in an action for ejectment, may be served by registered mail.

On February 23, 1982, a complaint for ejectment
against petitioner Manuel Co Keng Kian
was filed by private respondent Plaza Arcade, Inc., alleging that despite the
expiration of the written contract of lease over a portion of the ground floor
of the former Manila Times Building, petitioner refused to vacate the premises
and to pay the monthly rentals notwithstanding receipt of several letters of
demand, the last of which was sent to
petitioner by registered mail.

During the pendency of the trial before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila or on August 27, 1982,
petitioner voluntarily vacated the disputed premises, turning over the key to
the clerk of court but without paying the accrued rent.

On May 17, 1984,
the inferior court rendered its judgment dismissing the ejectment
case for lack of jurisdiction.  It
refused to give probative value to the three letters of demand to vacate which
were all sent to petitioner and which he refused to receive.  The court held that since none of the demand
letters was served (1) personally, or
(2) by written notice of such demand upon a person found on the premises, or
(3) by posting such notice on the premises if no person can be found thereon
pursuant to the provisions of Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, there
was no valid demand.  If none was made,
the case came within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the
Metropolitan Trial Court.  Whereupon, it
ordered Plaza Arcade, Inc. to pay petitioner P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees and
another P5,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.

Plaza Arcade, Inc. appealed to the Regional Trial Court which
initially reversed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, but on motion
for reconsideration by petitioner, affirmed the dismissal of the ejectment case in its order of October 9, 1985.^[1]

A petition for review was filed with the then Intermediate
Appellate Court.  In its decision dated July 3, 1986 the Appellate Court overturned the appealed order of the trial court which had earlier sustained
the dismissal of the ejectment case.  Motion
for reconsideration having been denied, the aforesaid decision of the Appellate
Court was elevated to this Court on a petition for review on certiorari.

In reversing the dismissal order, the Appellate Court took the
lower courts to task for taking a rather constricted view of Section 2, Rule
70, and declaring that the service of demand letters to vacate on the lessee is
strictly limited to the three (3) modes enumerated therein.  They failed to note the common practice of
serving said notices on the tenant by registered mail with return card so that
the registry receipt and the receipt thereof by the addressee through the
return card could be presented in evidence to prove the fact of delivery, in
the event of a litigation.

We agree and in our opinion the facts in the instant case
indicate personal service on the lessee. 
In arriving at this conclusion, we have been greatly aided by
respondent’s citation of American cases which, by and large, represents a
practical, if not realistic, approach to the problem.

In the cases of Nunlist vs.
Motter,^[2] and Gehring
vs. Swoll,^[3]
the Court held that where the notice to leave the prem­ises is transmitted by
registered mail with a return card and thereafter the receipt bearing the
signature of the defendant was returned,
a prima facie case is established of the fact of delivery of said notice to the
defendant personally by the Postal Office Department although he refused to
accept the same.^[4]

Indeed, notice by registered mail is considered an effective
service on the person concerned.  It
cannot be avoided by the mere expediency of declining to accept delivery after
notification thereof.  The service is
deemed complete regardless of such refusal to accept if the addressee fails to
claim his mail from the postal office after the lapse of five (5) days from the
date of the first notice of the postmaster.^[5]

In conclusion, we stress that the notice to vacate the leased
premises, required by the Rules to be served on the tenant before a forcible
entry or unlawful detainer action can be com­menced
against him, may be served by registered mail. 
This is a substantial compliance with the modes of service enumerated
under Section 2, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court.

At this juncture it bears repeating that actions for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature
because they involve a disturbance
of social order which must be abated as promptly as possible without any undue
reliance on technical and procedural rules which only cause delays.  In the ultimate analysis, it matters not how
the notice to vacate was conveyed, so long as the lessee or his agent has personally received the written demand, whether handed to him by the lessor, his attorney, a messenger or even a
postman.  The undisputed facts in the
instant case show that the Manila Times Publishing Company, through its
manager, had informed petitioner that Plaza Arcade Inc. was the new owner of
the subject building; that on October 18, 1979, a demand letter was sent to
petitioner advising him to leave the premises but petitioner refused to receive
the letter; that a second demand on January 12, 1981 elicited the same
reaction; that a final demand dated November 16, 1981 was sent to petitioner by
registered mail which he again refused. 
And even on the supposition that there was no personal service as
claimed by petitioner, this could only be due to petitioner’s blatant attempts at evasion which compelled
the new landlord to resort to registered mail.  The Court cannot countenance an unfair
situation where the plaintiff in an eviction case suffers further injustice by
the unwarranted delay resulting from the obstinate refusal of the defendant to
acknowledge the existence of a valid demand.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the dismissal order of the trial court is affirmed.  Civil Case No. 071279-CV is hereby ordered reinstated in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 7.  This decision
is immediately executory.  Costs against petitioner.

So ordered.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 49.

^[2]
77 N.E. 2d 369 (1947)

^[3]
79 N.E. 2d 913 (1947)

^[4]
See also Alexander vs. Bates, 206 So. 2d 763, 765 (1968)

^[5]
Rule 13, Section 8.  See Isaac vs.
Mendoza, 89 Phil. 279 (1951)