G.R. No. 75602. December 29, 1989
TRANS-ORIENT OVERSEAS CONTRACTORS, INC. AND JOINT VENTURE YIT-VESIPEKKA, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. ELMOR D. JURIDICO AND DIOSDADO P. VILLARAMA, …
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review (treated as a petition for certiorari)
of the majority resolution[1]
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Third Division, affirming in
toto the decision[2]
of respondent Director Elmor D. Juridico
of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), the decretal portion of which reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, respondents Trans-Orient Overseas Contractors,
Inc. and Joint Venture YV YIT-VESIPEKKA are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally
the complainant the following sums:
1. US $15,839.99 or its Peso
equivalent representing salaries for the remaining period of nine months and
twenty seven days considering that complainant was illegally terminated.
2. US $929.67 as
reimbursement of travel expenses.
Insofar as complainant’s other claims, this Office cannot award the
same for lack of merit and without basis.
SO ORDERED.”
The facts, as stated in the comment of the Solicitor General, are
as follows:
“On June 12, 1981,
petitioners hired private respondent Diosdado Villarama, Jr. as camp physician at their Taijat Island Resort or YIT-VESIPEKKA jobsite in Baghdad,
Iraq at a monthly salary
of US $1,600.00 for a period of twelve (12) months commencing from the date he
would leave Manila.
On August 18, 1981,
private respondent departed from Manila,
subject to a probation period of ninety (90) days, to commence from the actual
date of work at the jobsite. The
contract of employment pertinently stated:
‘3. Probation Period
The employee shall be under probation for a period of 90 days
commencing from the actual starting date of the Employee’s work in the work location.
If the employee fails to meet the requirement as to the skill and
willingness to work or fails to adjust himself to the rules and regulations for
the camp and the working conditions, or if he in any way gets in conflict, with
the local laws and regulations’, he will immediately be sent back to the
country of recruitment.’
On August 22, 1981, respondent Villarama
immediately attended to emergency consultations. During the following days, the work
operations being twenty four (24) hours
a day, he attended to consultations and treatment of workers from 5:30 a.m. to 11:00 p.m., or 12:00 midnight.
On September 3, 1981,
he wrote Seppo Havia, the
Personnel Manager, about the availability for use of a service coaster in
emergency cases for transporting patients to the hospitals. He added that although Havia
had assured him the availability of a service coaster for ambulance use, he had
yet to obtain permission from the Finnish supervisor whenever the need arose.
On September 7, 1981, he again wrote Havia
about the need to provide workers with safety boots and heavy duty hand gloves
to minimize, if not prevent, the widespread incidence of punctured wounds of
the feet as well as lacerations and crushing injuries of the hands of workers.
He also wrote Borja, officer-in-charge of the
Filipino camp area, on the cleanliness and sanitation of the camp. He requested receptacles with covers for
waste matter so as to eliminate the sticky pungy
smell of the place.
On September 12, 1981,
he wrote again to Havia regarding the quality and
variety of food being served on Filipino workers. This complaint was answered. A letter was written to the concessionaire,
warning on the problems of food served to workers.
On September 26, 1981,
he wrote another letter suggesting that immediate action be taken to correct
the continued serving of spoiled food which had caused diarrhea and loose bowel
movement among the workers. Instead of
taking immediate action on the complaint, Havia took
samples of the food and sent them to a laboratory to test whether the food was
spoiled or not.
On October 16, 1981,
respondent Villarama’s employment contract was
terminated by Havia.
Upon receipt of the letter of termination, he verbally protested
the same, but to no avail. He also
demanded payment of his salaries and overtime pay but was told that the amount
would be sent to him in Manila.
In Manila, after
pressing for payment, he was paid first P10,000.00, then after filing a
complaint, later amended, P23,853.09 for salaries up to October 15, 1981.
On February 23, 1982,
he filed an amended complaint alleging among others, that he was prematurely
and unlawfully terminated.
On February 7, 1983,
after the parties had filed their respective position papers and other
pleadings, respondent Director Juridico rendered the
questioned decision.”[3]
The motions for reconsideration
filed by both parties were initially dismissed by the NLRC on 29
February 1984 for
their failure to comply substantially with the jurisdictional requirements of
appeal. However, on 25 June
1986, the NLRC
reconsidered its resolution and gave the appeals due course. On 25
June 1986, the NLRC, through a majority of two (2) commissioners, with
one (1) commissioner dissenting, issued the now assailed resolution dismissing
the appeals of both parties for lack of merit, and affirming the decision of
the POEA.[4]
Hence, this petition.
The only issue to be
resolved in the petition is whether or not public respondents gravely abused
their discretion in holding that Diosdado P. Villarama was illegally dismissed by petitioners.
It is the contention of petitioners
that Villarama, a probationary employee, was terminated for his failure to meet the performance standards
set by them for regularization.
Petitioners argue that in
terminating Villarama’s services, they were merely
exercising their reserved prerogative
of probationary termination for, after all, the selection of employees is of
particular importance to any employer, as it affects the enterprise in no small
measure. Probationary
termination, according to petitioners, is not the same as dismissal for
cause. They maintain that as long as an employer does not abuse
his discretion in exercising his reserved prerogative of probationary
termination, the dismissal of an employee under probation who fails to qualify
for regularization is not illegal. Petitioners
assert the public respondents should not have substituted their (respondents’)
own discretion and judgment in deciding whether an employee is to be terminated
or regularized; and since public respondents did substitute their judgment for
that of the employer, this was grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction.
In further support of their position, petitioners contend that
they gave Villarama guidelines for the operation of
the clinic, e.g., regular clinic hours; personnel rotation; maintenance of
hygiene and sanitation; medical records; etc.
They allege that Villarama failed to schedule
clinic hours within his eight (8) hour regular work, which resulted in
unnecessary overtime work. He likewise
failed to comply with company rules on the observance of prior requests and
authorizations for medical treatment and established procedures for emergency
consultations. Instead, petitioners
state, Villarama dismissed these instructions as
impossible to comply with, as he was the only camp physician and that he had to
treat all medical referrals coming to him as emergency cases. Petitioners further allege that Villarama met with hostility petitioners’ reminders to him
to keep the first aid kits replenished and the clinic surroundings clean and
sanitary.
On the matter of the quality of food served in the camp,
petitioners maintain that they tried to find solutions to the complaints of the
Filipino workers but, unfortunately, Villarama
instead of cooperating with management in finding solutions to the very
problems he perceived, accused petitioners of maintaining sub-human conditions
in his memorandum to the personnel manager and went so far as to circularize these “Memos” not only inside the job site but
even furnished copies thereof to various Philippine government agencies,
including the Office of the President.
Last but not least, petitioners aver that Villarama’s
performance should reflect not only his skills as a doctor, which they do not
question, but also his overall competence in all areas of activity covered by
his assigned task as camp physician. As
camp physician, they expected Villarama not only to
be medically competent but likewise possessed of effective management and
administrative skills in order to effectively run and operate the camp
clinic. In short, Villarama’s
performance and willingness to work must be judged, according to petitioners,
on his work attitude, relationship with co-employees, adjustment to work and
camp conditions, rapport with other
site officials and the ability to work as a team.
Petitioners submit that POEA made no express finding that they
(petitioners) were guilty of grave abuse of discretion in terminating Villarama but only concluded that Villarama
was dismissed mainly to silence him because of his compilation and distribution
of letters critical of petitioners’ operation which tended to be detrimental
to the interest of petitioners.
On the other hand,
private respondent contends that work at the jobsite was a 24-hour
operation. Being the only camp
physician, he had to work beyond the eight (8) regular clinic hours. For this reason, he avers, he found himself
attending to consultations and treatment of workers as early as 5:30 a.m. and as late as 11:00 p.m. or 12:00 midnight. He
alleges that because he noticed the high incidence of punctured wounds in the
feet and lacerations and crushing injuries of the workers’ hands, he was
prompted to write to the personnel manager suggesting that safety boots and
heavy duty hand gloves be provided the workers.
Another memo he had to write concerned food being served to Filipino
workers. He alleged that spoiled food
was served to the Filipino workers with deleterious effect.
Villarama maintains that when he wrote
“memos” to the personnel manager, he was merely taking the cudgels
for the workers whose health and safety were his concern as the camp physician
and to “wake up” management.
It was, he adds, a legitimate exercise of freedom of speech and of
expression equally important to the cause of labor in this country and anywhere
in the world. He insists that his
dismissal is mainly because of his compilation and distribution of letters in
which he criticized the operation of JV Yit? Vesipekka and its sub-contractors, which petitioners
regarded as an intentional action against the employer.
The petition must fail.
Undoubtedly, Villarama’s skill
as a physician is not questioned by petitioners. They, however, submit that the term
“skills” more accurately refers to Villarama’s
overall competence as a camp
physician, which covers possession of effective management and administrative
ability in supervising and
operating the camp clinic. Furthermore,
petitioners accuse Villarama of refusing to cooperate
with the site management and actually discrediting petitioners in the public
eye.
Admittedly, Villarama was the only doctor in the camp who could attend
to the medical cases referred to him.
The locale was a construction site on a 24-hour operation. Hence, injuries to the workers could be
expected to occur not only during daytime but even at night time. True, guidelines were set regarding clinic
hours but, as already stated, injuries and emergency cases could occur at any time. Petitioners, instead of resenting Villarama’s suggestion to provide the workers with heavy
duty gloves and safety boots, should have welcomed the same, as it would
minimize, if not totally avoid the cases of injuries that the doctor had to
treat.
The letters/memos written by private respondent, e.g., the serving
of spoiled food and the short supply of food to the workers, proved that Villarama was not only concerned with the health of the
workers but showed that he was also concerned with the interest of petitioners
who in the long run would be spared strikes called by workers complaining about
the quality and quantity of food served to them.
The Court agrees with the finding of public respondents that Villarama’s letters were constructively written, calling
the attention of petitioners to the conditions at the jobsite. The tenor of the
letters was informative. We do
not discern any intent on the part of private respondent to discredit
petitioners. Had petitioners taken more
time to implement the suggestions of Villarama
concerning the problems of the workers, a more pleasant and understanding
working relationship would have developed to their mutual benefit. But, unfortunately, petitioners opted to
dismiss private respondent after
only two (2) months, even as they claimed to be working towards a solution to
the problems cited by private respondent.
Petitioners cite the case
of Grand Motor Parts Corp. vs. Minister of Labor (130 SCRA 436) to justify their dismissal of Villarama. That case cannot be applied to the case at
bar. There, private respondent was hired
as manager of a branch store, a position he never held before. On his managerial skills hinged the success
and profitability of the business. He
was found negligent in submitting reports vital to business operations and lax
in implementing company policies.
In the case at bar,
private respondent was hired specifically as a camp physician.
His skills as a doctor
were never questioned by petitioners. He
was not found to be ineffective or inept as a physician. There were no complaints from the
workers against him. What petitioners
allegedly question is the administrative skills of Villarama
in running the clinic. But these skills
are only corollary to his main work as a camp physician. In truth, petitioners became unhappy at
having to pay an “alarming claim” for overtime pay by respondent Villarama. They
faulted him with the non-replenishment
of the first-aid kits and the dirty state of the clinic premises. These conditions were satisfactorily
explained by private respondent.
In fine, petitioners’
dismissal of private respondent was not based on any of the grounds provided in
the contract of employment entered into between them. We are more inclined to believe and agree
with the respondents that Villarama was dismissed
because petitioners’ personnel manager resented the act of Villarama
of writing memos calling the manager’s attention to the problems in the camp
site and furnishing copies of said memos to government agencies and the Office
of the President of the Philippines, which act petitioners perceived as
detrimental to their interest.
In the final analysis,
petitioners are not raising in the case at bar a question of jurisdiction but
only questions of fact. As aptly
observed by the Solicitor General, in reality petitioners are claiming that
respondent officials erred in not believing their submission that Villarama had failed to meet the prescribed standards for
regularization and in giving credence to Villarama’s
claim to the contrary. Clearly, this is
a factual issue.[5] Factual findings of the NLRC are not
correctible by certiorari;[6]
in fact, they are binding on this Court
in the absence of any showing that they are completely without any support in
the evidence on record.
We do not believe that public respondents acted capriciously and
whimsically in their exercise of judgment as to warrant a conclusion that there
was, on their part, a grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
[1]
Commissioners Guillermo C. Medina and Gabriel M. Gatchalian
concurred; Commissioner Miguel B. Valera dissented.
[2]
Annex B, pp. 34-45, Rollo
[3]
Rollo, pp. 261-264
[4]
Annex “A”, pp. 29-30, ibid.
[5]
p. 272, ibid.
[6]
Manila Hotel Corp. vs. NLRC,
G.R. NO. L-53453, January 22, 1986, 141 SCRA 169; CCLU vs. NLRC, G.R.
NOS. L-38955-56, October 31, 1974, 60 SCRA 450.