OSMUNDO MEDINA, ROSARIO BANZUELA, NATIVIDAD GATCHALIAN, ANTONIO REYES, DAMIAN MARABE, ANGELITO ADOLFO, VIRGILIO ABALARAO, ANTONIA GONZALES, DANILO MARIANO, GAUDENCIO MARIANO, PA…

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated June 26, 1986, dismissing petitioners’ petition for
prohibition, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED.  The temporary
restraining order previously issued is hereby lifted, dissolved and set
aside.  No pronouncement as to costs.

“SO ORDERED.”

Briefly, the antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioners are residents of Marulas-A,
a parcel of land situated in Caloocan
City, which is owned by the
Philippine National Railways (PNR).  They
claim to be long-time legitimate tenants and sub-tenants of the PNR.

In August of 1980, fire hit Marulas-A
which rendered a number of families homeless, petitioners included.  Subsequently, petitioners started
reconstructing their dwellings.  The said
constructions were allegedly authorized by respondent Asistio,
in his capacity as Mayor of Caloocan City.

In February 1982, PNR sold the lot in question to the City
Government of Caloocan.  The latter bought the lot in coordination with the then Ministry
of Education, Culture and Sports preparatory to the construction of a new
school building thereon.

Having learned of the sale of the lots which they have been
occupying to the City Government of Caloocan,
petitioners, in April 1982, sent a letter-petition to respondent Asistio anent their impending eviction from the premises
and asked that they be allowed to continue to occupy the same (Rollo,
p. 106).

In January 1984, petitioners again sent another letter addressed
to respondent Asistio this time expressing their
willingness to purchase the property sold by the PNR at a reasonable price pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 1517 (proclaiming urban land reform in the
Philippines and providing for the implementing machinery thereof).

Subsequently, petitioners received a “Paunawa
sa Paglilipat”
sent by respondent Asistio through the City Architect,
Edmundo Sadie. 
Thereupon, petitioners requested assistance from the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission and a dialogue was held between petitioners and
respondent to work out a possible compromise.

The parties failed to reach a compromise so that on February 1, 1985, respondent City
Engineer Uson delivered a final notice to petitioners
requiring them to remove and
demolish their respective houses, which reads as follows:

“Pursuant to the provisions of the Letter of Instruction No.
19 and its amendment, and the Memorandum of the Office of the President dated
November 13, 1972, you are hereby directed to remove/demolish your house at
above address which has illegally occupied, encroached, obstructed and/or
usurped the road right-of-way, waterways, open space, other government lot or
other private lot in violation of laws, decrees, instructions, order and/or
ordinances within ten (10) days from notice hereof.

“You are further advised that in the event of your failure to
remove/demolish said structure within the stated period, the city government
will undertake the same at your expense or will undertake other measures
necessary or required under the circumstances.” (Rollo,
p. 120)

On February 8, 1985,
petitioners filed a petition for prohibition before this Court, docketed as
G.R. No. 69790, which was then referred to the Court of Appeals (then
Intermediate Appellate Court) for reception of evidence.

On June 26, 1986,
the Court of Appeals issued the assailed decision dismissing the petition.  Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied.  Hence, this
instant petition.

Petitioners assign the following errors:

I.

THE IAC ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PETITION
IS BEREFT OF SUBSTANCE AND DEVOID OF MERIT BECAUSE IT ALLEGES THAT EXCEPT FOR
PETITIONER MEDINA, ALL THE
PETITIONERS ARE NOT LEGITIMATE TENANTS BUT SQUATTERS WHO BUILT THEIR HOUSES
NEAR OR ALONG THE RAILROAD TRACKS.

II.

THE IAC ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE HOUSES OF
THE PETITIONERS WERE ILLEGALLY CONSTRUCTED AS THEY WERE BUILT ON PUBLIC
PROPERTY AND WITHOUT ANY BUILDING PERMITS.

It is at once apparent that petitioners’ assignment of errors
takes issue with the findings of facts and appreciation of the evidence passed
upon by the Court of Appeals which is now brought before this Court for review.

In support of their petition, petitioners seek reliance in the
case of Cunanan v. Lazatin
(74 Phil. 719 [1944]) contending that a
question as to whether or not the conclusion drawn by the Court of Appeals from proven facts is correct, involves a
question of law.

We find petitioners’ argument devoid of merit.  The Cunanan case (supra)
relied upon by petitioners speaks of proven facts.  In the case at bar, the facts are yet to be
proven.  As held in Cunanan:

“There is no
question of facts here because the facts are admittedly proven.  Whether or not the conclusion drawn by the
Court of Appeals from those facts is correct, is a question of law which this
Court is authorized to pass upon.” (Underscoring supplied)

The ruling in Cunanan cannot apply to
the case at bar in the absence of proven facts. 
Moreover, for a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.  And the distinction is well?known:  There is a question of law in a given case
when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts; there is a question of fact when
the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged
facts (II Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 Ed., 473; citing Ramos,
et al., v. Pepsi?Cola Bottling Co, of the P.I., et al., 19 SCRA 289
[1967]).

Petitioners’ allegation that the Court of Appeals “grossly
disregarded” their Exhibits “A”, “B”, “C”,
“D”, and “E”, in effect, asks us to re-examine all the
evidences already presented and evaluated – as well as the findings of fact
made – by the Court of Appeals.  Thus, in Sotto v. Teves
(86 SCRA 154 [1978]), We held that the appreciation of
evidence is within the domain of the Court of Appeals because its findings of fact are not reviewable
by the this Court (Manlapaz v. CA, 147 SCRA 236
[1987]; Knecht v. CA, 158 SCRA 80 [1988] and a long
line of cases).

It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh such
evidence all over again.  Our
jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors
of law that may have been committed by the lower court.  (Nicolas et al., v. CA, 154
SCRA 635 [1987]; Tiongco
v. de la Merced, 58 SCRA 89 [1974]).

It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that only questions
of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, this Court being bound by the findings of fact made by the
Court of Appeals.  The rule, however, is
not without exception.  Thus, findings of
fact by the Court of Appeals may be passed upon and reviewed by this Court in
the following instances, none of which obtain in the instant petition:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna v. Linatok,
74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.);* (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making
its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee
(Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]); (7) The
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court
(Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay
v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]);* (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9)
When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of
fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and is contradicted by the
evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).

Essential to the resolution of petitioners’ assignment of errors
is the issue of whether or not they are legitimate tenants of PNR entitled to
the benefits provided under Sec. 6, PD 1517, which reads:

“Section 6.  Land Tenancy in Urban Areas.  Within the Urban Zones legitimate tenants who
have resided on the land for ten years or more who have built their homes on
the land and residents who have already occupied the lands by contract,
continuously for the last ten years shall not be dispossessed of the land and shall
be allowed the right of first refusal to purchase the same within a reasonable
time and at reasonable prices, under terms and conditions to be determined by
the Urban Zone Expropriation and Land Management Committee created by Section 8
of this Decree.”

Invoking Presidential Decree No. 1517, petitioners claim to be
legitimate tenants and sub-tenants of PNR for more than ten (10) years.  As such, they contend that under said decree,
they cannot be evicted from the premises they are currently occupying and have
the right of first refusal to purchase the same within a reasonable time and at
a reasonable price.

The Court of Appeals found otherwise.  It said:

“The records, however, disclose that only petitioners Osmundo Medina, Natividad Gatchalian, Rosario Band(z)uela, Antonia de los Reyes and
Antonia Gonzales appear to be lessees of the PNR while the rest appear to be squatters.  Of the five
lessees, only petitioner Osmundo Medina,
however, was able to renew his contract of lease with the PNR under Contract No.
8603 which will expire on December
31, 1985.  It also appears
that the houses of Medina, Gatchalian and Banzuela are
situated within the territorial jurisdiction of Manila
while that of Antonia de los Reyes and Antonia
Gonzales are within the jurisdiction of Caloocan City.”
(Rollo, p. 18).

While it is true that Marulas-A is a
priority development area under Proclamation 1967 (1980), petitioners’ alleged
right of first refusal and the consequent prerogative to stay thereon never
existed in the absence of
contract over the disputed land.  In
Bermudez v. Intermediate Appellate Court (143 SCRA 351 [1986]), we held:

‘It is a proved fact that the disputed land is in an area already
proclaimed for priority development, and that the petitioners have occupied the
premises for more than ten (10) years. 
Nonetheless, We hold that they cannot take
advantage of the beneficient provisions (e.g. right
of first refusal) granted by Presidential Decree No. 1517, because among other
things they are not bona fide tenants of the property.

“Sections 3 (f) and 6 of PD 1517 provides:

“(f) Tenant refers to the rightful
occupant of land and its structure, but
does not include those whose presence
on the land is merely tolerated and
without the benefit of contract, those who
enter the land by force or deceit, or those whose possession is under
litigation.

“xxx          xxx       xxx

“Section 6.  Land Tenancy in Urban Areas.  Within the Urban Zones legitimate tenants
who have resided on the land for
ten years or more who have built
their homes on the land and residents
who have already occupied the lands by contract,
continuously for the last ten
years shall not be dispossessed of the land and shall be allowed the
right of first refusal to purchase the same
within a reasonable time and at reasonable
prices, under terms and conditions to be determined by the Urban Zone
Expropriation and Land Management Committee created by Section 8 of this
Decree.” (Underscoring supplied)

Based on the afore-quoted provision, only legitimate tenants may
be extended the protective mantle of the decree cited to the exclusion of all
others.  Since the petitioners do not
have contracts with the PNR to qualify them
as legitimate tenants, the protection afforded therein cannot be rightfully
invoked (Zansibarian Residents Ass’n.
v. Municipality of Makati, 135 SCRA 239 [1985]; cf. Aquino v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 132 SCRA 377
[1984]).  Consequently, petitioners
cannot also be granted the right of first refusal to purchase the property involved.

It appears, however, that petitioners Osmundo
Medina, Natividad Gatchalian,
Rosario Banzuela, whose houses are within the limits
of the City of Manila, and Antonio
de los Reyes and Antonia Gonzales are registered
lessees of PNR (Rollo, p. 97).  Since the house of the above-named three (3) petitioners fall outside the
jurisdiction of Caloocan
City, respondents are without
authority to order the demolition of their dwellings.  Consequently, the appealed decision must be
modified in this respect.  On the other
hand, petitioners de los Reyes and Gonzales failed to
adduce any evidence showing legitimate occupancy of the disputed property for
the last ten (10) years by virtue of a contract.  Their bare assertions sans substantive proof
militate against their cause.

Petitioners claim that they have been religiously paying the
rentals, only that the receipts
issued therefor by PNR were either lost or burned by
the August fire.  Records of the PNR
submitted by petitioners indicate, however, that latest payments made by
petitioners date back as far as 1971 and 1962 (Rollo,
p. 100-102).  Contrary to what they
claim, petitioners have been remiss in the payment of rentals.  The fact that PNR instituted no ejectment proceedings against petitioners only amounted to
tolerance and cannot legitimize their occupancy.

Petitioners likewise deny that their houses are built near or
along railroad tracks because a memorandum issued by the Gen. Manager of PNR (Annex “Q”) allowed them to
build their houses within five (5) meters from the outer rail tracks (Rollo, p. 11).  We
note an overt mischief in their denial. 
Indeed, a perusal of the memorandum (Exh.
“Y”, Rollo, p. 133) adverted to reveals no
such authorization.  Instead, it makes
demands that the PNR right-of-way “be cleared immediately of all houses
and other structures built and existing within 5-meters from the outer rail
tracks.”

It may be gleanded from the foregoing
that petitioners have indeed been occupying restricted areas.  As such, illegal constructions thereon may be
demolished by respondents pursuant to Letter of Instruction No. 19, as amended
and the Memorandum of the Office of the President dated November 13, 1972.

It is further contended that petitioners were issued building
permits by respondent Asistio as proven by the fact that they were able to secure
water and electrical connection since the agencies concerned, MWSS and MERALCO, respectively, require
prior presentation of said permits (Rollo, p. 5).

The contention is without merit. 
If building permits were actually issued as claimed by petitioners, We see no reason
why not even a single permit was presented in evidence.  Granting
that the alleged permits were either lost or burned, a duplicate copy thereof
could have been secured from either MWSS or MERALCO, or from the city government
of Caloocan
itself which issued the same.  There
being none, it cannot be presumed that petitioners were possessed of the
requisite building permits.

In Zanzibarian
Residents Ass’n. v. Municipality
of Makati
(supra), we upheld the
authority of municipal mayors to remove illegal constructions along railroad
tracks, thus:

“On the other hand, the authority of respondent to demolish
the houses or shanties of the petitioners is mandated by P.D. 772 and LOI No.
19.  Section 1 of LOI No. 19 orders
certain public officials, one of whom is the municipal mayor to remove all
illegal construction, including
buildings, on and along esteros and river banks;
those along railroad tracks and those built without permits on public or
private property.”

Finally, reliance is placed on Presidential Decree No. 2016
(1986) which prohibits the eviction of occupant families from lands identified
and proclaimed as Areas for Priority Development or Urban Land Reform Zone, the
General Moratorium on Eviction and Demolition (Rollo,
p. 121-122) and Resolution No. 2-87 of the Presidential Commission for the
Urban Poor (PCUP) providing policies and guidelines on squatting, otherwise
known as “Tigil Tayuan,
Tigil Gibaan” (Rollo, pp. 123-127).

Section 4 of PCUP Resolution No. 2-87 states that “subject
to existing laws”, all urban poor occupants
of dwelling structures built on or before February 25, 1986 shall be extended
the necessary assistance and protection on their dwelling; whereas, par. (f) of the same section provides, among others, that “Court
orders to evict squatters shall be respected” (Rollo,
pp. 124-125).  In the General Moratorium,
there is again a reference to
Court orders in B.2, viz.,
“(r)elocation and
resettlement will be undertaken only as a last recourse except in danger
areas and those covered by Court orders
(Rollo, p. 122).

Read in harmony with the phrase “subject to existing
laws”, Section 4 of Resolution No. 2-87 is deemed subject to Section 3 (f)
of PD 1517 (supra) as regards those occupants “whose possession is
under litigation”, as in the case at bar,
the resolution of which calls for a Court order.  Since the property subject of the controversy
has been under litigation prior to the issuance of PD 2016 and PCUP Resolution
No. 2-87, petitioners cannot be considered as included thereunder.

WHEREFORE, the appealled
decision dismissing the petition is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that
respondents are without authority to demolish the houses of petitioners Medina,
Gatchalian and Banzuela,
being outside of respondents’ territorial jurisdiction.  As thus modified, the petition for certiorari
is hereby DENIED with respect to all other petitioners.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.

*
Actually the same as exception No. 5.