PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PIOQUINTO DE JOYA Y CRUZ, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

In an Information dated 5 May 1978, appellant Pioquinto de Joya y
Cruz was charged before the Regional
Trial Court, 3rd Judicial Region, Branch 14, Malolos, Bulacan with the crime of
robbery with homicide committed as follows:

“That on or about the 31st day of January, 1978, in the
municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused Pioquinto
de Joya y Cruz, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of (sic) gain and
without the knowledge and consent of the owner and, by means of violence and
intimidation, take, carry and cart away two (2) rings, one (1) necklace, one piece of earring, belonging to Arnedo Valencia y
Angeles and Eulalia Diamse Vda.
de Salac, to their damage and prejudice in the sum of
FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P550.00); and
that on the occasion of the said
robbery and for the purpose of enabling him to take the said properties, the
accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with treachery, evident premeditation and great advantage
of superior strength, with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the person of Eulalia Diamse Vda. de Salac by stabbing and
hitting the latter on her neck and other parts of her body with pointed
instrument causing injuries which directly caused the death of the said Eulalia
Diamse Vda. de Salac.

That in the commission of the offense, the following aggravating
circumstances were present (1) abuse of superior strength; (2) committed in the
dwelling of the offended party; (3) disregard of age and sex; (4) abuse of
confidence.

Contrary to law.”^[1]

At arraignment, appellant
De Joya pleaded not guilty. After
trial, the court a quo rendered a decision dated 16 May 1986
convicting De Joya of the crime
charged. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, committed
with the aggravating circumstances of: abuse of superior strength, old age, disregard of sex, the victim a
woman 88 years old, the crime was committed in the dwelling of the victim. The accused being 72 years old death penalty
cannot be imposed against him as provided in Article 47 of the Revised Penal
Code.

The Court therefore, sentences the accused to LIFE IMPRISONMENT; to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P20,000.00 and to pay
damages in the amount of P550.00.

The bond of the accused is ordered cancelled and the accused to be
confined immediately in the National Penitentiary pending review of his case by
the Supreme Court.

The Clerk of Court is ordered to immediately forward the record of
this case to the Supreme Court for review.

SO ORDERED.”^[2]

In this appeal, appellant raises a number of issues all of which,
however, amount to one basic assertion: that the lower court erred in concluding that appellant was guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

The facts have been summarized in the brief of the Solicitor
General in the following manner:

“The spouses Arnedo Valencia and Herminia Salac-Valencia,
together with their ten (10) year old son Alvin Valencia and Herminia
Valencia’s 88-year old mother, Eulalia Diamse, are residents of Balagtas St.,
Baliuag, Bulacan. (TSN, June 11, 1981,
p. 2). Both spouses are teachers by
profession.

Arnedo Valencia teaches at the Tiaong Elementary School at Barrio
Tiaong, Baliuag, Bulacan whereas Herminia Valencia teaches in an intermediate
school at Baliuag, Bulacan. (TSN, March
11, 1980, p. 7).

In the afternoon of January 31, 1978, Herminia Salac-Valencia left
for school to teach. Her mother Eulalia
Diamse was then [sitting] at their sofa
watching the television set. (TSN,
October 12, 1978, p. 3).

Her son Alvin likewise left for school at 1:00 o’clock. And at 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, his
classes were dismissed and he proceeded home. (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 8).

At around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of that same day, the
spouses Valencia’s neighbor by the name of Gloria Capulong, together with a
friend, went out of the former’s house to visit a friend. While at her yard, Gloria Capulong looked
back to the direction of the Valencia’s house. She noticed appellant Pioquinto de Joya standing and holding a bicycle at the yard of the Valencia’s. (TSN, June 11, 1981, pp. 2-4).

When Alvin reached home, he saw his grandmother Eulalia Diamse
lying down prostrate and drenched with her own blood. He immediately threw his bag and ran towards her. He then held her hands and asked her: “Apo, Apo, what happened?”. (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 10).

x x x [E]ulalia Diamse held his hand and after which said: “Si Paqui”. After saying these words, she let go of
Alvin’s hand and passed away. (TSN,
Ibid, pp. 14 and 17).

Alvin then called for his Nana Edeng and told her to see his lola
because she was drenched with her own blood. His Nana Edeng told him to immediately see his mother Herminia
Salac-Valencia to inform her of what happened (TSN, Id).

Upon seeing her mother, Alvin told her: “Mommy, Mommy, apo is drenched in her own blood.” (TSN,
March 11, 1980, p. 20).

Herminia immediately ran outside the school, flagged down a
tricycle and went home. Alvin followed,
riding his bicycle (TSN, Id., p. 21). When she reached their house, she found her mother lying prostrate in
her own blood at their sala in front of the television. Her mother’s hands were stretched open and
her feet were wide apart. Blood was
oozing out of her mother’s ears. She
then embraced her mother and placed her on the sofa. She asked Alvin and the tricycle driver to call Dr. Delfin Tolentino. (TSN, October 12, 1978, pp. 25-26).

Dr. Tolentino arrived at around 4:00 o’clock that same afternoon
and examined the body of Eulalia Diamse. Said doctor declared that said Eulalia Diamse had a heart attack which
caused her death. When asked by
Herminia Valencia why her mother’s ears were punctured, no reply was given by
said doctor. Herminia requested for a
death certificate, but Dr. Tolentino did not
issue one and instead immediately left. (TSN, Ibid., pp. 27-29).

Herminia found out that the two (2) gold rings worn by her mother
were missing. The right earring of her
mother was likewise missing. All of
these were valued [at] P300.00 (TSN, Id., p. 15).

That same afternoon, Herminia saw the room of the groundfloor
ransacked. The contents of the wardrobe
closet (aparador) were taken out. Its
secret compartment/box was missing. And
the lock of the aparador was destroyed. (TSN, October 12, 1978, pp.
15-17).

When she went upstairs after putting her mother on a bed at the ground floor, she found the two
(2) rooms thereat in disarray. She then
caused the rooms and things photographed by a certain Ricardo Ileto (Exhibits
“A” to “A-11”; TSN, October 12, 1978, p. 17).

Later, Herminia went to Dr. Adela Cruz and pleaded [with] said doctor
to issue a death certificate so that her mother could be embalmed. (TSN, Id., pp. 33-34).

On the same night, Herminia found a beach walk step-in (Exhibit
“B”) by the side of the cabinet near the door of their room
downstairs, more or less one meter from where the victim was lying
prostrate. (TSN, October 12, 1978, pp.
24-25).

Herminia was able to recognize the said step-in because of its
color and size, as the other half of the pair she bought for her husband Arnedo
but which she gave to Socorro de Joya, the wife of herein appellant, before
Christmas of 1977 when she saw the old and wornout pair of slippers of the
latter. (TSN, Ibid.).

Appellant Pioquinto de Joya visited the wake only once. During the second day of the four-day wake,
Herminia saw herein appellant Pioquinto de Joya enter the kitchen and peep
under the cabinet of the (Valencia’s) house. (TSN, Id.).

On February 3, 1978, a post-mortem examination was conducted by Dr.
Romulo Madrid, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation. Per examination, the cause of the death
arrived by Dr. Madrid was ‘shock, secondary to punctured wound neck’ (Exhibit
“D-1″) situated at the right side of the neck, just below the right
ear wherein it went out thru and thru, opposite, almost in the same location,
from one side of the neck to the opposite side”. (Exhibit “D-2″).”

In its decision, the trial court became quite clear as to the
factors which led to the judgment of conviction against appellant. These factors, as set out in the decision of
the trial court, were the following:

“In the case at bar, the prosecution relied heavily on the
circumstances surrounding the death of the victim as testified to by the
witnesses and proven during the trial, also the dying statement of the
deceased, which are: Herminia testified
that two weeks before the incident the accused and the deceased quarreled over a bicycle which the former took from
their house without the consent of the latter; that Exhibit ‘B’ (step-in beach
walk type) which was found near the cabinet one meter away from the body of the
victim was identified by Herminia as the step-in that she gave to the wife of
the accused and which she saw accused wearing on January 29, 1978 when she
visited them in their house; the testimony of Gloria Capulong that she saw the accused in the afternoon of January
31, 1978 at around 3:00 p.m. in the yard of Herminia standing and holding a
bicycle; the accused admitted, although his wife is the sister of the husband
of Herminia he never visited the deceased during the four days that it was
lying in state without any justifiable reason and contrary to the ordinary
experience of man; last but most convincing is the dying statement of the
deceased when her grandson Alvin asked her ‘Apo, Apo, what happened?’ and she
answered, ‘Si Paki’, then she expired. When Alvin was asked during his testimony who is this Paki, he
identified the accused. The accused
during his testimony never denied that he is called Paki.

The foregoing circumstances established during the trial plus the
dying statement of the deceased leads only to one fair and reasonable
conclusion, that the accused is the author of the crime.”

Analyzing the above portion of the
decision, the elements taken into account by the court in convicting appellant
De Joya of robbery with homicide may be listed as follows:

1. The dying statement made by the deceased
victim to her grandson Alvin Valencia a 10-year old boy: “Si Paqui”;

2. The quarrel, which, according to Herminia
Valencia, daughter of the deceased victim, took place two weeks before the
robbery and homicide, between the appellant and the deceased over the use of a
bicycle which appellant allegedly took from the Valencia’s house without the
consent of the victim;

3. The rubber slipper, one of a pair, (“step-in beach walk
type”) which according to Herminia, she found near a cabinet in their house one
(1) meter away from the body of the victim, and which Herminia
identified as one of the pair that she had given to the wife of the accused the previous Christmas Season;

4. Accused was seen by one Gloria Capulong
around 3:00 p.m. in the afternoon of 31 January 1978 in the yard of the
Valencias, standing and holding a bicycle and doing nothing;

5. The statement of appellant that he did not
visit the deceased during the four-day wake.

We turn first to the dying statement made by the victim when the
10-year old Alvin Valencia asked his grandmother who was sprawled on the floor
of their house drenched with blood: “Apo, Apo, what happened?” The deceased
victim said: “Si Paqui“. After uttering those two words, she
expired. It is not disputed that
“Paqui” is the nickname of appellant Pioquinto de Joya. It must be noted at once, however, that the
words “Si Paqui” do not constitute by themselves a sensible
sentence. Those two words could have
been intended to designate either (a) the subject of a sentence or (b) the
object of a verb. If they had been
intended to designate the subject, we must note that no predicate was uttered by the deceased. If they were designed to designate the
object of a verb, we must note once more that no verb was used by the
deceased. The phrase “Si Paqui”
must, moreover, be related to the question asked by Alvin: “Apo, Apo, what
happened?” Alvin’s question was not: “Apo, Apo, who did this to you?”

It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must
be complete in itself. To be complete
in itself does not mean that the declarant must recite everything that
constituted the res gestae of the subject of his statement, but that his
statement of any given fact should be a full expression of all that he intended
to say as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact.^[3] The
doctrine of completeness has also been expressed in the following terms in
Prof. Wigmore’s classic work:

“The application of the doctrine of completeness is here peculiar. The statement as offered must not be merely apart of the whole as it was expressed by the
declarant; it must be complete as far it goes. But it is
immaterial how much of the whole affair of the death is related, provided the
statement includes all that the declarant wished or intended to include in
it. Thus, if an interruption (by
death or by an intruder) cuts short a statement which thus
remains clearly less than that which the dying person wished to make, the
fragmentary statement is not receivable, because the intended whole is
not there, and the whole might be of a very different effect from that
of the fragment; yet if the dying person finishes the statement he wishes
to make, it is no objection that
he has told only a portion of what he might have been able to tell.”^[4]
(Underscoring supplied)

The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally
excluded, or if admitted, accorded little or no weight, is that since the
declarant was prevented (by death or other circumstance) from saying all that
he wished to say, what he did say might have been qualified by the statements
which he was prevented from making. That incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to the presumption
of truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are
received.^[5]

It is clear to the Court that the dying
declaration of the deceased victim here was incomplete. In other words, the deceased was cut off by
death before she could convey a complete or sensible communication to
Alvin. The trial court simply assumed
that by uttering the words “Si
Paqui“, the deceased had intended to name the person who had
thrust some sharp instrument through and through her neck just below her
ears. But Eulalia herself did not
say so and we cannot speculate what the rest of her communica­tion might
have been had death not interrupted her. We are unable to regard the dying statement as a dying declaration
naming the appellant as the doer of the bloody deed.

The other elements taken into account by the trial court are
purely circumstantial in nature. When
these circumstances are examined one by one, none of them can be said to lead
clearly and necessarily to the conclusion that appellant had robbed and killed
the deceased Eulalia Diamse. The
quarrel over the use of the bicycle which was supposed to have taken place two
weeks before Eulalia’s death does not, in our view, constitute adequate proof
of a motive capable of moving a person to slay another in such a
violent and gory manner. Failure to
prove a credible motive where no identification was shown at all, certainly
weakens the case of the prosecution.

The testimony of Herminia Valencia about the single slipper that
she found near or under the cabinet in the living room where Eulalia Diamse was
slain, can scarcely be regarded as conclusive evidence that such slipper was
indeed one of the very same pair of slippers that she had given to appellant’s
wife, who was also the sister of Herminia’s husband. Rubber or beach walk slippers are made in such quantities by
multiple manufacturers that there must have been dozens if not hundreds of
slippers of the same color, shape and size as the pair that Herminia gave to
appellant’s wife. And even if conclusive
identification of the slippers had been offered, and it is assumed that
appellant (rather than his wife) had worn those
very slippers on that fatal afternoon, still the presence of that
singular slipper did not clearly and directly connect the appellant to the
robbery or the slaying. At most, under
that assumption, the presence of that slipper in the house of the Valencias
showed that the accused had gone to the house of the Valencias and there
mislaid that slipper. We note in this
connection, that appellant
himself had testified that he did enter the house of the Valencias that
afternoon, but after the killing of Eulalia Diamse had
been perpetrated, and there had found many persons in the house viewing the
body.

The testimony of Gloria Capulong that she saw the accused in the
afternoon of 31 January 1978 around 3:00 p.m. in the yard of the
Valencias, standing and holding a bicycle and doing nothing is,
by itself, not proof of any act or circumstance that would show that appellant had
perpetrated the slaying or the robbery. The behaviour of the appellant, as testified to by Gloria Capulong, offers no basis for
slain that appellant, himself 72 years of age, had just slain an 88-year old
woman by skewering her through the neck and had ransacked both floors of the
Valencia house.

Appellant’s failure to present himself to pay his respects to the
deceased or her immediate family during the four-day wake, does not give rise
to any inference that appellant was the slayer of Eulalia Diamse. Appellant had explained that he had been
busily at work, sewing and carrying on his trade as a tailor. Appellant, as already noted, had dropped in
the Valencias’ house in the afternoon Eulalia Diamse was killed and had viewed
the body (before it was lying in state) along with several other persons. His reluctance or inability to participate
in the formal wake is not necessarily a sign of guilt. We are unable to agree with the trial judge
that such behaviour was “contrary to the ordinary experience of man”
although respect for the dead is a common cultural trait of the Filipinos.

In the Solicitor General’s brief, it is casually contended that
the circumstantial evidence against appellant included: “the attempt on the part of appellant Pioquinto de Joya through his counsel to settle the case
amicably”.^[6]
We have examined the testimony that the Solicitor General pointed to in referring to a supposed attempt to settle
the criminal charge amicably. That
testimony, given by Arnedo Valencia, son-in-law of the deceased Eulalia Diamse
and brother-in-law of appellant Pioquinto de Joya, was as follows:

Q.   You
also testified that before the release of the accused from the municipal jail, you had a conversation with him,
is that right?

A.    Yes, sir.

Q.   What
was this conversation about?

A.    He
called for me and took me to his counsel Atty. Aguilar and
according to him if only Atty. Aguilar can talk with me, everything will be
settled.

Q.   Have
you seen and talked to this Atty. Aguilar?

A.    Yes,
I went with him to Manila, sir.

Q.   When was this?

A.    The
time he was fetched out of jail.

Q.   You
are referring to the municipal jail?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   What
did you and Atty. Aguilar discuss when you finally was able to see Atty.
Aguilar?

A.    When
I went there, I was introduced to Atty. Aguilar and Atty. Aguilar asked me as
to what I liked to happen.

Q.   What
did you say?

A.    I
said if it will be settled, well and good.

Q.   Anything
else that transpired?

A.    He
even told me if I might be able to convince both my wife and her sisters.

Q.   Did
he tell you he can settle this?

A.    He
was very certain that he can settle this, the very reason why he told me
because I was very certain as to what happened.

Q.   Was
the accused Pioquinto de Joya present when you were discussing this with his lawyer?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   He
heard what his lawyer was telling you?

A.    It
is possible because he is only one or two meters distance away.

Q.   Did
the accused say anything?

A.    None,
sir.” (Underscoring supplied)

We find the above testimony quite impalpable and inconclusive so
far as a supposed attempt of appellant, through his counsel, to offer a compromise on the criminal charges is
concerned. We are aware of the
provision of Section 24 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides that:

“Sec. 24 Offer to compromise not admission. An offer of compromise is not an admission
that anything is due, and is not admissible in evidence against the person
making the offer. However, in
criminal cases which are not allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.” (Underscoring supplied)

We do not, however, feel justified in
concluding from the above testimony from a member of the (extended) family of
the deceased victim that “an offer of compromise” had been made
“by the accused” nor that “an implied admission of guilt”
on the part of the appellant may be reasonably inferred in the instant
case. The trial court itself made no
mention of any attempt on the part of appellant to settle the criminal case
amicably through the defense counsel; we must assume that the trial court either did not believe
that appellant had tried to compromise the criminal case or considered that
appellant could not fairly be deemed to have impliedly admitted that he had
indeed robbed and killed Eulalia Diamse. A much higher level of explicitness and specific detail is necessary to justify a conclusion
that an accused had impliedly admitted his guilt of a crime as serious as
robbery with homicide.

The totality of the case made out against appellant De Joya thus
consists of an incomplete, aborted, dying declaration and a number of circumstances which,
singly or collectively, do not necessarily give rise to a compelling inference
that appellant had indeed robbed and slain Eulalia Diamse. We consider, after prolonged scrutiny, that
the sum total of the evidence in the instant case is insufficient to induce
that moral certainty of guilt which characterizes proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The conscience of the Court remains
uneasy and unsettled after considering the nature and speculative character of
the evidence supporting the judgment of conviction.

The Court must, accordingly, hold as it hereby holds that appellant’s
guilt of the crime of robbery and homicide was not shown beyond reasonable
doubt.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court dated 16 May
1986 is hereby REVERSED and appellant Pioquinto de Joya is hereby ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.

It is so ordered.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 42.

^[2]
Rollo, p. 48.

^[3]
Daughters v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 94 A.L.R. 673 (1934); State v.
Patterson, 45 Vt. 308 (1873). See also
Connor v. State, 171 A.2d 699 (1961).

^[4]
Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. V, Section
1448, p. 251 (1940).

^[5]
See cases collected in Annotation: “Admissibility of dying declarations as
affected by their incompleteness”. 94 A.L.R. 679 (1934).

^[6]
Appellee’s Brief, p. 24.