JESUS DACOYCOY, PETITIONER, VS. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ANTONIO V. BENEDICTO, EXECUTIVE JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH LXXI, ANTIPOLO, RIZAL, AND RUFINO DE …

Dacoycoy versus De Guzman

The Case

This is a petition for review brought by Jesus Dacoycoy against the Intermediate Appellate Court, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, and private respondent Rufino de Guzman. The petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of two deeds of sale over a parcel of riceland in Lingayen, Pangasinan, plus surrender of the produce and damages. The trial court dismissed that complaint on its own initiative on the ground of improper venue, and the appellate court affirmed. The case matters because it draws the classic line between jurisdiction and venue, and it settles that a court cannot dismiss a complaint for improper venue on its own motion, since venue is a defense that belongs to the defendant and may be waived.

Procedural History

The petitioner filed his complaint before the Regional Trial Court, Branch Seventy-One, Antipolo, Rizal. Before summons could be served on the defendant, the Executive Judge issued an order requiring counsel for the petitioner to confer with the respondent trial judge on the matter of venue. After that conference, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper venue, finding that the action was a real action because it sought recovery of ownership of riceland located in Lingayen, Pangasinan, outside the court's territorial jurisdiction.

The petitioner appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, now the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal. The petitioner then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review, arguing that the venue was improperly laid only if the defendant says so, and that the trial court had no power to dismiss the case on its own motion.

Facts

On March 22, 1983, Jesus Dacoycoy, a resident of Balanti, Cainta, Rizal, filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, against Rufino de Guzman. He prayed for the annulment of two deeds of sale covering a parcel of riceland situated in Barrio Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan, for the surrender of the produce of that land, and for damages arising from the defendant's refusal to set the deeds aside upon demand.

On May 25, 1983, before summons could be served on the defendant, the Executive Judge issued an order requiring counsel for the petitioner to confer with the respondent trial judge on the matter of venue. After the conference, the trial court dismissed the complaint outright, holding that the action was a real action and that the land lay outside its territorial jurisdiction.

The defendant had not answered the complaint, had not appeared voluntarily, and had not objected to the venue. The petitioner insisted that the right to question venue belongs solely to the defendant, while the private respondent argued that a court may take judicial notice and dismiss on its own motion a suit clearly denominated a real action and improperly filed before it.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court may dismiss a complaint on its own motion on the ground of improper venue.
• Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over the action even assuming that it is a real action involving land situated outside its province.
• Whether or not the trial court should have required the plaintiff to exhaust the modes of service of summons before dismissing the complaint.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2, paragraph (a), of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, as invoked by the private respondent, provides:

Actions affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, shall be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof lies.

This is the venue rule the trial court applied when it dismissed the complaint, and the Court clarifies that it is a rule of venue, not of jurisdiction.

Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, on waiver of venue, provides:

The court may motu proprio dismiss the claim if it appears from the complaint that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or that venue is improperly laid.

The Court reads this provision in harmony with the nature of venue, holding that the objection must be raised by the defendant in a motion to dismiss and is deemed waived if not timely raised.

Section 19, paragraph (2), of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, on the jurisdiction of regional trial courts, provides:

Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein.

This provision confirms that the Antipolo court had jurisdiction over the subject matter wherever the land lies, so the objection was one of venue alone.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court granted the petition and held that the dismissal on its own motion was plain error, traceable to a failure to distinguish jurisdiction from venue. Venue is procedural rather than substantive. It relates to the jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter, and it establishes a relation between the plaintiff and the defendant, not between the court and the subject matter. Jurisdiction is the power of the court to decide a case on the merits, while venue is the locality, the place where the suit may be had. Unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue cannot truly be said to have been improperly laid, because the parties for whose convenience the rules were devised may accept it. The trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object.

On the second issue, the Court held that even granting that the action is a real action, the Antipolo court still had jurisdiction, being a regional trial court vested with exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to or possession of real property. The Court recalled its ruling in Luna versus Carandang that a court of first instance has jurisdiction over suits involving title to or possession of real estate wherever situated in the Philippines, subject to the rules on venue, and that the rule requiring the action to be brought where the land lies is a rule of venue that may be waived expressly or by implication.

On the third issue, the Court held that the trial court should have required the petitioner to exhaust the alternative modes of service of summons, namely personal service, substituted service, and service by publication when the address of the defendant is unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. Dismissing the complaint for improper venue was not the appropriate course at that stage.

Doctrine

Venue is procedural, not substantive. It relates to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, not over the subject matter, and it may be waived expressly or by implication. The right to question venue belongs to the defendant, who must raise it timely in a motion to dismiss; if he allows the trial to proceed and a decision to be rendered, he cannot belatedly challenge the wrong venue on appeal or in a special action, for the objection is deemed waived. A court cannot dismiss a complaint on its own motion on the ground of improper venue, because that would pre-empt the defendant's prerogative. Jurisdiction over the subject matter, by contrast, is conferred by law and cannot be waived, and a regional trial court has jurisdiction over real actions involving land wherever situated in the Philippines, subject only to the rules on venue.

Disposition

The Court nullified and set aside the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, revived and reinstated the complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Branch Seventy-One, and enjoined that court to proceed in accordance with law.

Remember This

Memorize the line that venue is waivable and belongs to the defendant, so a court cannot dismiss on its own motion for improper venue. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between jurisdiction and venue, and to ask whether a trial court may motu proprio dismiss a real action filed outside the province where the land lies.