BEATRIZ F. GONZALES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ZOILO AGUINALDO, JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 143, MAKATI, METRO MANILA AND TERESA F. OLBES, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari
which seeks to annul, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, the Order of
the respondent Judge, dated 15 January 1985, cancelling the
appointment of the petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales as a co-administratrix
in Special Proceedings No. 021 entitled “In the Matter of the Intestate
Estate of Ramona Gonzales Vda. de Favis,”
Branch 143, RTC, Makati, Metro Manila; and the Order of 15 May
1985 denying
reconsideration of the same.

The facts are:

Special Proceedings No.
021, pending before the court a quo, is an intestate proceeding
involving the estate of the deceased Dona Ramona Gonzales Vda.
de Favis.  Dona
Ramona is survived by her four (4) children who are her only heirs,
namely, Asterio Favis,
Beatriz F. Gonzales, Teresa Olbes, and Cecilia Favis-Gomez.

On 25 October 1983,
the court a quo appointed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales and
private respondent Teresa Olbes as co-administratrices of the estate.

On 11 November 1984, while petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was in
the United States accompanying her ailing husband who was receiving medical
treatment in that country, private respondent Teresa Olbes
filed a motion, dated 26 November 1984, to remove Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-adminis­tratrix, on the ground that she is incapable or
unsuitable to discharge the trust and had committed acts and omissions
detrimental to the interest of the estate and the heirs.  Copy of said motion was served upon
petitioner’s then counsel of record, Atty. Manuel Castro who, since 2 June 1984, had been suspended by the
Supreme Court from the practice of law throughout the Philippines.^[1]

After the filing of private respondent’s aforesaid motion,
respondent Judge Zoilo Aguinaldo
issued an Order dated 4 December 1984 which required Beatriz F. Gonzales and the
other parties to file their opposition, if any, thereto.  Only Asterio Favis opposed the removal of Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix, as the latter was still in the United
States attending to her ailing husband.

 In an Order dated 15
January 1985, respondent Judge cancelled the letters of administration granted
to Beatriz F. Gonzales and retained Teresa Olbes as
the administratrix of the estate of the late Ramona
Gonzales.  The Court, in explaining its
action, stated:

“x x
x.  In
appointing them, the court was of the opinion that it would be to the best
interest of the estate if two administrators who are the children of the
deceased would jointly administer the
same.  Unfortunately, as events have
shown, the two administrators have not seen eye to eye with each other and most
of the time they have been at loggerheads with each other to the prejudice of
the estate.  Beatriz F. Gonzales has been
absent from the country since October, 1984 as she is in the United States as stated in the motion and opposition of Asterio Favis dated December 11,
1984, and she has not returned even up to this date so that
Teresa F. Olbes has been left alone to administer the
estate.  Under these circumstances, and
in order that the estate will be administered in an orderly and efficient manner, the court believes that there
should be now only one administrator of the estate.”^[2]

Petitioner moved to reconsider the Order of 15 January 1985. 
Her motion was opposed separately by private respondent Teresa Olbes and another co-heir Cecilia Gomez.  In her manifestation and opposition to
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, Cecilia Gomez stated that it would be
pointless to re-appoint Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix
of Teresa Olbes, as the former would be leaving soon
for the United States
to attend to unfinished business. 
Moreover, she expressed
satisfaction with the manner respon­dent Teresa Olbes
had been managing and administering the estate.

In his Order dated
7 May 1986, a part of which
is hereunder quoted, respondent Judge denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.  He
said:

“x x x.

After a consideration of the motion for reconsideration and the
oppositions thereto, the court believes and so holds that it should be
denied.  The court in its discretion has
issued its order dated January 15,
1985 cancelling the appointment and the
letters of administration issued to Beatriz F. Gonzales and it reiterates the
same for the best interest of the estate of the deceased.  It is noteworthy that of the four heirs of
the deceased, one of them being the movant Beatriz F.
Gonzales, two of them, namely, Cecilia F. Gomez and Teresa F. Olbes, opposed the motion. 
The other heir Asterio Favis,
did not file or make any comment to the motion. 
As can be gathered from the oppositions of Cecilia F. Gomez and Teresa
F. Olbes, the reappointment of Beatriz F. Gonzales as
a co-administratrix would not be conducive to the
efficient and orderly administration of the estate of the deceased Ramona
Gonzalez vda. de Favis.”^[3]

Petitioner contends before this Court that respondent Judge’s
Order dated 15 January 1985 should be nullified on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion, as her removal was not shown by respondents to be anchored on any
of the grounds provided under Section 2, Rule 82, Rules of Court, which states:

“Sec 2.  Court may remove or accept resignation of
executor or administrator.  Proceedings
upon death, resignation or removal – If an
executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the
estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a
duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or
otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove
him, or in its discretion, may permit him to resign.  xxx”

While appellate courts are generally disinclined to interfere
with the action taken by the probate court in the matter of removal of an
administrator,^[4]
we find, in the case at bar, sufficient cause to reverse the order of the probate
court removing petitioner as co-administratrix of the
estate.

The rule is that if no executor is named in the will, or the named executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, the court must appoint an administrator of the estate of the
deceased^[5]
who shall act as representative not only of the court appointing him but also
of the heirs and the creditors of the estate.^[6]
In the exercise of its discretion, the probate court may appoint one, two or
more co-administrators to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all
times to have different
interests represented.^[7]

In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased
person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be
appointed as administrator.^[8]
This is the same consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in
establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrators for
the estate.  The underlying assumption
behind this rule is that those
who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of the
estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence
or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate
correctly.^[9]

Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their
trust as entitle
them to protection from removal without just cause.^[10]
Hence, Section 2 of Rule 82 of
the Rules of Court provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the court
to remove an administrator.^[11]

While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample
discretion in the removal of an administrator, it however must have some fact legally before
it in order to justify a
removal.  There
must be evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator not
conformable to or in disregard
of the rules or the orders of the court, which it deems sufficient or
substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator.  In making such a determi­nation, the court
must exercise good judgment, guided by law and precedents.

In the present case, the court a quo did not base the removal of the petitioner as co-administratrix on any
of the causes specified in respondent’s motion for relief of the
petitioner.  Neither did it dwell on, nor determine the validity of the
charges brought against petitioner by respondent Olbes.  The court based the removal of the petitioner
on the fact that in the administration of the estate, conflicts and
misunderstandings have existed
between petitioner and respondent Teresa Olbes which
allegedly have prejudiced the estate, and the added circumstance that
petitioner had been absent from the country since October 1984, and up to 15
January 1985, the date of the questioned order.

Certainly, it is desirable that the administration of the
deceased’s estate be marked with harmonious relations between
co-administrators.  But for mere
disagreements between such joint fiduciaries, without misconduct,
one’s removal is not favored.^[12]
Conflicts of opinion and judgment naturally, and, perhaps inevitably, occur
between persons with different interests in the same estate.  Such conflicts, if unresolved by the co-adminstrators, can be resolved by the probate court to the
best interest of the estate and its heirs.

We, like petitioner, find of material importance the fact that
the court a quo failed to find hard facts showing that the
conflict and disharmony between the two (2) co-administratrices
were unjustly caused by petitioner, or that petitioner was guilty of
incompetence in the fulfillment of her duties, or prevented the management of
the estate according to the dictates of prudence, or any other act or omission
showing that her continuance as co-administratrix of
the estate materially endangers the interests of the estate.  Petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales is as
interested as respondent Olbes and the other heirs in
that the properties of the estate be duly administered and conserved for the
benefit of the heirs; and there is as yet no ground to believe that she has
prejudiced or is out to prejudice said estate to warrant the probate court into removing petitioner as co-administratrix.

Respondent Judge removed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix
of the estate also on the ground that she had been absent from the country
since October 1984 and had not returned as of 15 January 1985, the date of the
questioned order, leaving respondent Olbes alone to
administer the estate.

In her motion for reconsideration of the Order dated 15 January 1985, petitioner explained
to the court a quo that her absence from the country was due to
the fact that she had to accompany her ailing husband to the United
States for medical treatment.^[13]
It appears too that petitioner’s absence from the country was known to
respondent Olbes, and that the latter and petitioner
Gonzales had continually maintained correspondence with each other with respect
to the administration of the estate during the petitioner’s absence from the
country.^[14]
As a matter of fact, petitioner, while in the United States, sent respondent Olbes a letter
addressed to the Land Bank of the Philippines dated 14 November 1984, and duly
authenticated by the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, authorizing her (Olbes) to receive, and collect the interests accruing from
the Land Bank bonds belonging to the estate, and to use them for the payment of
accounts necessary for the operation of the administration.^[15]

The above facts, we note, show that petitioner had never abandoned
her role as co-administratrix of the estate nor had
she been remiss in the fulfillment of her duties.  Suffice it to state, temporary absence in the
state does not disqualify one to be an administrator of the estate.  Thus, as held in re Mc Knight’s Will, a temporary residence outside of the state,
maintained for the benefit of the health of the executors’ family, is not such
a removal from the state as to necessitate his removal as executor.

“x
x x.  It seems quite clear that a temporary
absence from the state on account of ill health, or on account of business, or
for purposes of travel or pleasure, would not necessarily establish the fact
that an executor ‘has removed’ from the state, within the intent of the
statute.  The learned surrogate was evidently
satisfied that the sojourn of these executors in New Jersey was nothing more
than a departure from the state for the benefit of relatives, not designed to
constitute a permanent change of abode, and contemplating a return to New York
as soon as the purpose of their
absence should be accomplished.  In this
view, I am inclined to think that he was right in refusing to hold that he was constrained
to revoke the letters by the provisions of the Code to which I have
referred.  I therefore advise an affirmance of the order.”^[16]

Finally, it seems that the court a quo seeks refuge
in the fact that two (2) of the
other three (3) heirs of the estate of the deceased (Teresa Olbes
and Cecilia Favis Gomez) have opposed the retention
or re-appointment of petitioner as co-administratrix
of the estate.  Suffice it to state that the removal of an
administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or
beneficiaries of the estate, nor on the belief of the court that it would
result in orderly and efficient administration. 
In re William’s Adm’r.,
the court held:

“A county court having appointed a stranger administrator as
expressly authorized by Ky. St. 3897, after the relatives of decedent had lost
their right of precedence, could not remove the appointee merely because of the
request of relatives and the belief upon the part of the court that the best
interest of deceased would be thereby subserved,
since the administrator had such an interest as entitled him to protection from
removal without cause.”^[17]

As the appointment of petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was valid,
and no satisfactory cause for
her removal was shown, the court a quo gravely abused its discretion in removing her.  Stated differently, petitioner Beatriz F.
Gonzales was removed without just cause. 
Her removal was therefore improper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The Order of the court a quo
dated 15 January 1985 removing petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix
in Special Proceedings No. 021,
entitled “In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Ramona Gonzales Vda. de Favis” and the Order
of the same Court dated 15 May 1985 denying reconsideration of said Order, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. 
Petitioner is ordered reinstated as co-administratrix
of said estate.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Paras, J., on leave.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 159

^[2]
Ibid., pp. 11-12

^[3]
Ibid., p. 13

^[4]
Borromeo v. Borromeo,
G.R. No. L-6363, September 15, 1955,
97 Phil. 549

^[5]
Sec. 6, Rule 78, Rules of Court which states:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration
granted.  – If no executor is named in
the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or
fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or
wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or
wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects
for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration
or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be
granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor
competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the
court may select.

^[6]
San Diego v. Nombre, G.R. No. L-19265, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 165; Chua Tan v. Del Rosario,
57 Phil. 411

^[7]
In re Drews Estate, 236 N.W. 701, 702

^[8]
Nicolasa de Guzman v. Angela Limcolioc, 67 Phil. 404

^[9]
Cooper v. Cooper, 88 NE 341, 342

^[10]
Rieke’s Adm’r. v. Rieke, 208 SW 764, citing Dunlap v. Kennedy, 10 Bush
539, Ex-parte Williams’ Adm’r.,
158 Ky. 61, 164 SW
307, and Davis’ Adm’r. v. Ruth Davis,
162 Ky. 318, 17 SW 665

^[11]
Section 2, Supra.

^[12]
Bronson v. Bronson, 48 How Pr. (N.Y.) 482; Oliver V. Frisbie,
3 Denn Surr. (N.Y.) 22; Fairbairn v. Fisher, 57 N.C. 390, cited in
Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol
5, p. 89

^[13]
Rollo, pp. 148, 150

^[14]
Ibid., pp. 151-153

^[15]
Ibid., p. 154

^[16]
In re Mc Knight’s Will, 80 New York
Supplement 251

^[17]
In re Williams’ Adm’r., 164 SW 307