PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DANILO SANCHEZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Appellant, with Juanito Zamora, was charged with the crime of
arson in Criminal Case No. D-5402 before Branch XLIV (Dagupan City) of the
Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, in an Information the accusatory
portion of which reads:

x x x

“That on or about November 22, 1982, in the evening, in the
barangay of Longos, municipality of Calasiao, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused Danilo Sanchez and Juanito Zamora aiding one another and
conspiring with two others whose identities are not yet known, did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloneously (sic) set fire to the residential
house of Spouses Elpidio Nepuscua and Julieta Nepuscua worth P50,000.00 known
to be occupied at the time.

Contrary to Article 321 of the Revised Penal Code.”^[1]

Only accused Danilo Sanchez could be served with the warrant of arrest. According to the return indorsement dated 23
June 1983, his co-accused, Juanito Zamora, “could not be located in his indicated address.”^[2]

Accused entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment. Trial then proceeded against him with the prosecution presenting
as its witnesses Demetrio Matabang, Pedro Parayno, Julieta Nepuscua and Cesar
Nepuscua. The lone eyewitness, Mr.
Elpidio Nepuscua, could no longer be presented because he died on 13 December
1982.^[3]
He, however, signed a statement on 24
November 1982 before an investigator of the Integrated National Police of Aguilar, Pangasinan wherein he
implicated the accused as the person who burned the house.^[4] Upon the other hand, after the trial court denied^[5]
a Demurrer to Evidence,^[6] the
defense presented as its witness the
accused, Benedicto Mola and Herminigildo Mamaradeo.

On 20 March 1986, the trial court promulgated its decision^[7]
finding the accused guilty of the crime of Arson as defined under Presidential Decree No. 1613 and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of “reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment)” and to pay
Julieta Nepuscua the sum of P50,000.00 representing the value of the
house. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Danilo Sanchez guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson as defined by Presidential Decree
Number 1613 and considering the presence of the special aggravating
circumstance that the offender is motivated by spite or hatred towards the
owner or occupant of the property burned and the generic aggravating
circumstance of nighttime, without any mitigating circumstance to offset the
same, pursuant to Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree Number 1613, hereby sentences
accused Danilo Sanchez to serve and suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
(Life Imprisonment), to pay Julieta Nepuscua the sum of P50,000.00 representing
the value of the house that was burned, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.”^[8]

Undaunted by his defeat and insisting on his innocence, accused
immediately appealed the decision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now
Court of Appeals).^[9]
The records of the case were thus referred, although erroneously, to the
Intermediate Appellate Court on 12 May 1986.^[10] The
latter forwarded the same to this Court on 5 July 1986.^[11]

In the Appellant’s Brief,^[12]
accused imputes upon the trial court the commission of the following errors:

“1. x x x in
not considering the statement of Elpedio (sic) Nepuscua as hearsay evidence.

2. x x x in convicting the accused?appellant
by considering the information made by Elpedio (sic) Nepuscua to his wife
Julieta Nepusca and his son Cesar Nepuscua as part of the res gestae.

3. x x x in not giving credence to the
defense of alibi interposed by the accused.

4. x x x in convicting the accused under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1613 considering that the accused was
charged under the provisions of Art. 321 of the Revised Penal Code.”^[13]

The facts are not disputed.

Prior to 22 November 1982, the spouses Elpidio and Julieta
Nepuscua were residents of Longos, Calasiao, Pangasinan. They lived in a house valued at
P50,000.00. On 21 November 1982,
Julieta, her children and three (3) grandchildren were evacuated by her husband
to the house of his sister, Filomena Nepuscua, allegedly because the accused
and Juanito Zamora were angry with her (Julieta’s) husband who reported them to
the police authorities for having cut, on 20 November 1982, the bamboo trees on
a lot mortgaged to them (Nepuscuas) by Maria Billota, mother of Juanito
Zamora. At midnight of 22 November
1982, while in the house of
Filomena, Julieta was awakened first by a burst of gunfire and then by the
barking of dogs from the direction of their house, which was about 150 meters
from Filomena’s house.^[14] She
rushed to the window and saw their house on fire. She woke up their children.^[15]

Elpidio and Juanita’s only son, Cesar, who had arrived from
Manila in the evening that same day and who was also sleeping in the house of
Filomena, witnessed the fire after being roused from sleep. He wanted to go to their burning house but
his mother prevented him from leaving as
he could be harmed by those responsible for the fire. The conflagration lasted for one and
one-half (1½) hours. Earlier that
evening, he was in their house but he left at about 11:30 o’clock for
Filomena’s house to spend the night there. At 3:00 o’clock in the early morning of 23 November 1982, Cesar left for
Manila to report for work and to consult with his uncle, Atty. Cirilo Nepuscua,
about the burning of the house.^[16]

According to Julieta, at 4:00 o’clock in the morning of 23
November 1982, her husband arrived at the house of Filomena and related to her
that “on that evening of November 22, 1982, there were four (4) persons
who went near our house and they were carrying with them rice stalks or hay and
then one of them called out, saying ‘Tatay,
tatay, bangon kayo ta ansakit so eges nen nanay, iyacar tayo ed hospital’, which
means, “Father, father wake up because my mother is suffering from stomach
(sic) ache and we will rush her to the hospital.” He further told her that
on that same evening, Danilo Sanchez went up to the balcony of their house
carrying with him one (1) bundle of rice hay which he then set on fire thus
causing the burning of their house.^[17]

However, Cpl. Demetrio Matabang of the Integrated National Police
of Aguilar, Pangasinan, testified that although Elpidio reported the burning of
their house to the police authorities of Calasiao, Pangasinan on 23 November
1982, the latter did not mention the name of any suspect.^[18]

Later, Elpidio reported the incident to the 152nd P.C. Company
Headquarters at Lingayen, Pangasinan; on 24 November 1982, both his and
Julieta’s sworn statements^[19] were
taken by Cpl. Matabang in the presence of TSG Pedro Parayno of the said 152nd
P.C. Company.

In his sworn statement, Elpidio narrated the burning
incident. He categorically admitted
therein that he reported the incident to the Calasiao Police Station, but he did
not mention the names of the culprits for fear that he and his family would be
placed in danger once the culprits discovered that they had been identified as suspects. Thus:

“23.
Q: Did you ever made (sic) a report to
the Police Station of Calasiao, Pangasinan, that your house was set fired (sic)
by those subject persons named-above (sic)?

A: Yes sir, I reported the same on the
following morning, November 23, 1982, but I did not made (sic) mentioned of
(sic) any names, knowing that my life and the life of my family is (sic) in
danger once those persons involved will come to know that I suspected them in
(sic) doing the same and besides my plan is (sic) to report this to this PC
Headquarters.”^[20]

At the time the four (4) persons
(allegedly, the accused, Juanito Zamora and two other unidentified persons)
arrived at the house, Elpidio was actually under the same and thus he was able
to recognize the accused and Zamora because of the illumination caused by the
burning rice hay.^[21] He
also declared that:

“22. Q:   When your house was already on fire and that
those suspects have (sic) already left, what did you do, if any?

A:   I already run (sic) to the house of my sister
where my family were (sic) and told them that it was Danilo Sanchez, Juanito
Zamora and two (2) unidentified others who burned our house.”

Matabang and Parayno then indorsed the case to the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal.

On 18 December 1982, Elpidio Nepuscua died.^[22]

It was only on 8 February 1983 that the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal prepared the Information for Arson against the accused and Juanito
Zamora. It was actually filed in court
on 28 February 1983.^[23]

There can, therefore, be no question that the only eyewitness to
the burning of the house was Elpidio Nepuscua. Unfortunately, he died even before the Information was prepared and
filed. Thus, he could no longer testify
during trial.

The core issue then is whether or not the prosecution was able to
prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt to overcome the presumption of innocence which the
Constitution guarantees every person accused of a crime.

A careful scrutiny of the records discloses that the prosecution
relied solely on the sworn statement of Elpidio Nepuscua wherein he named the
accused, Juanito Zamora, and two others whom he failed to identify, as the
parties who set his house on fire, and the testimony of his wife Julieta
Nepuscua to the effect that on 21 November 1982, she, her children and three
(3) grandchildren were evacuated by Elpidio to the house of her sister-in-law,
Filomena Nepuscua, because herein accused and Juanito Zamora were angry with
Elpidio because the latter reported them for having cut on 20 November 1982 the
bamboo trees that were mortgaged to them Nepuscuas) by Maria Billota, Juanito’s
mother. Julieta also declared that at
4:00 o’clock in the morning of 23 November 1982 — four (4) hours after the
burning of the house — Elpidio told her that in the evening of 22 November
1982, four (4) persons carrying rice stalks went near their house; one of them
uttered “father, father wake up because my mother is suffering from stomach (sic)
ache and we will rush her to the hospital”; thereafter, Danilo
Sanchez went up to the balcony of their house carrying a bundle of rice stalks
and set the same on fire. The court
admitted in evidence Elpidio’s sworn statement and considered Elpidio’s
declaration to Julieta as part of res gestae.

In the light of the above facts, the first assigned error must be
resolved in favor of the accused.

Unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to
testify thereon,^[24]
affidavits must be rejected, in judicial proceedings; the same would be
inadmissible in evidence as hearsay. The reason for this is that an accused has
the Constitutional right “to meet the witnesses face to face”^[25]
or to confront the witnesses against him.^[26] To
safeguard this right, Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that
the examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in
open court, and under oath or affirmation. The most that the trial court could have done was to admit the sworn
statement of Elpidio Nepuscua merely as part of the testimony of the peace
officer who conducted the investigation; assignment of any probative value to
it could not be done without violating the hearsay rule and infringing upon the
above-stated right of the accused.

The second assigned error must likewise be resolved in favor of
the accused. The so-called statement
uttered by Elpidio Nepuscua to his wife Julieta at about 4:00 o’clock in the
morning of 23 November 1982, or four (4) hours after the burning, implicating
accused, should not have been admitted as part of the res gestae.

Section 42 of Rule 130 provides:

“Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be
received as part of the res
gestae.”

Res gestae means
the “things done”.^[27] It
“refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or
spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the
commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements
were made as a spontaneous
reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was
no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false
statement.”^[28]
A spontaneous exclamation is defined
as “a statement or exclamation made immediately after some exciting
occasion by a participant or spectator and asserting the circumstances of that
occasion as it is observed by him. The
admissibility of such exclamation is based on our experience that, under
certain external circumstances of physical or mental shock, a stress of nervous
excitement may be produced in a spectator which stills the reflective faculties
and removes their control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a
spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions
already produced by the external shock. Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled
domination of the senses, rather than reason and reflection, and during the
brief period when consideration of self-interest could not have been fully
brought to bear, the utterance may be taken as expressing the real belief of
the speaker as to the facts just observed by him.”^[29]
In a manner of speaking, the
spontaneity of the declaration is such that the declaration itself may be
regarded as the event speaking through the declarant rather than the declarant
speaking for himself.^[30] Or,
stated differently, “x x x the events speak for themselves, giving out
their fullest meaning through the unprompted language of the participants. The spontaneous character of the language is
assumed to preclude the probability of its premeditation or fabrication. Its utterance on the spur of the moment is
regarded, with a good deal of reason, as a guarantee of its truth.”^[31]

There are, therefore, three (3) requisites for the admission of
evidence as constituting part of the res gestae: (1) that the principal act, the res
gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) that the statements must
concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.^[32]

In People vs.
Ner,^[33]
this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Concepcion, held:

“x x x All that is required for the admissibility of a given
statement as part of the res gestae, is that it be made under the
influence of a startling event witnessed by the person who made the declaration^[34]
before he had time to think and make up a story,^[35] or
to concoct or contrive a falsehood,^[36] or
to fabricate an account,^[37] and
without any undue influence in obtaining it,^[38]
aside from referring to the event in question or its immediate attending
circumstances.”^[39]

The cases are not uniform as to the interval of time that should
separate the occurrence of the startling event and the making of the
declaration. What is important is that
the declarations were voluntarily and spontaneously made “so nearly
contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction which they
illustrate and explain, and were made
under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the idea of design or
deliberation….”^[40]

In the light of the foregoing principle on res gestae and
the settled jurisprudence thereon, We find the questioned statement of Elpidio
Nepuscua to his wife to be lacking in spontaneity and to have been given after
he had the luxury of time to concoct a story or fabricate an account. If indeed he was at his house at the time
the accused and the latter’s alleged companions came, and the burning took
place at midnight, considering that the house of Filomena where his wife and
children were sleeping was only 150 meters away, and there being no evidence at
all that he was prevented through threats and intimidation by the accused and
his companions or that he was struck by fear which immobilized him from
immediately leaving the scene of the fire, no plausible reason may be summoned
to justify or explain his nearly four-hour delay in reporting the incident to
his wife and other members of his family. He could easily negotiate that distance in less than five (5)
minutes. Doubtless, the burning of
their house was no ordinary
event; such a dastardly occurrence caused an irreparable loss of property and
rendered them homeless. The shock and
excitement it naturally produced was more than enough to propel his feet to
bring him to his family as soon as possible. It behooved Elpidio to relay the tragic event to those dear to him
without any delay; thus, his conduct cannot be reconciled with human
experience, ordinary habits of men and common sense. It could, however, be easily reconciled if he were, in fact, with
his family in the house of Filomena during the fire. If he evacuated his family to the house of Filomena on 21
November 1982 because he was afraid of the accused and Juanito Zamora, there
was no reason at all for him to risk his life and limb by staying alone in
their house. That he was not in the
house at the time of the burning seems to be supported by the conduct of the
members of his family. As testified to
by Julieta and her son Cesar, they just looked out the window of Filomena’s
house while their own house was burning. They never mentioned that they expressed fears as to Elpidio’s fate, if
in fact the latter was left in the house. All that Julieta could do was to prevent Cesar from returning to their
burning house for fear that the persons who set it on fire would harm him. Cesar then left for Manila at 3:00 o’clock
early the next morning, 23 November 1982, barely three (3) hours after the
fire. He did not proceed to their house
to find out what had happened to his father. By that time, worry over Elpidio’s fate did not seize or overcome both
Julieta and Cesar. If indeed Elpidio
was in their house before the fire and he left the scene only four (4) hours
later, the conduct of his wife and son seemed too unnatural.

Another badge of untrustworthiness attributable to the alleged
statement given by Elpidio to his wife is his deliberate suppression of the
names of the “suspects” when he reported the incident to the police
authorities of Calasiao, Pangasinan in the morning of 23 November 1982. The reasons given therefor are palpably
untenable. In the first place, there is
no evidence that the accused and his companions had a reputation for being
violent; if they were known for their violence and Elpidio was so afraid of
revealing their names, then he would have kept their identities in pectoris. This he failed to do during the
investigation at the P.C. Headquarters the following day despite the absence of
any assurance of protection.

After everything is said and done, it is clear to Us that serious
doubts surround the questioned statement of Elpidio to his wife, especially when
viewed in the light of the probability of concoction – he had every reason to
get even with the accused and Juanito Zamora.

Accused then deserves an acquittal on the ground of reasonable
doubt. This conclusion renders
unnecessary further disquisitions on the remaining assigned errors. It may however be pointed out that, as to
the fourth assigned error, the Fiscal who conducted the preliminary
investigation and filed the Information, 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal Pedro
T. Fernandez, charged the accused and Juanito Zamora with the crime of Arson as
defined and penalized under Article 321 (Other forms of Arson) of the Revised
Penal Code. He must have been unaware
of P.D. No. 1613, entitled Amending the Law on Arson, which was promulgated on 11 November 1980, or more
than two (2) years earlier, repealing clause of which provides:

“SEC. 9. Repealing clause. — The provisions of
Articles 320 to 326-B of the Revised Penal Code and all laws, executive orders,
rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of
this Decree are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.”

The proper charge should have been for a
violation of P.D. No. 1613. However,
the crimes defined and punished in Article 321 are also included in said decree
although, inter alia, the latter imposes varying penalties depending on
the nature, character or use of the property burned, and provides for the
effects of special aggravating circumstances. The allegations in the information
sufficiently charge an offense defined and penalized in P.D. No. 1613. Hence, having voluntarily pleaded thereto without
any question, the accused could be convicted for the violation of P.D. No.
1613. The inaccuracy or error
committed by the Fiscal was not a fatal defect. We take this opportunity, however, to advise Prosecutors to exercise utmost care in the preparation of Informations to the end that
no injustice would be done to the
accused and no prejudice would befall the State whose interest they are bound
to protect.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from in Criminal Case No.
D-5402 of Branch XLIV of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City is REVERSED
and the accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged with costs de
officio.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Bidin, and Romero, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on official
leave.

^[1]
Original Records, 1.

^[2]
Original Records, 6.

^[3]
Exhibit “E”, Id., 79.

^[4]
Exhibit “A”, Id., 5-6.

^[5]
Resolution of 23 January 1985, Id., 88-92.

^[6]
Id., 83-87.

^[7]
Id., 125-133. Per Judge Crispin
C. Laron.

^[8]
Original Records, 133.

^[9]
Id., 141.

^[10]
Rollo, 2.

^[11]
Id., 1.

^[12]
Id., 43-53.

^[13]
Rollo, 45.

^[14]
TSN, 5 March 1984, 4.

^[15]
TSN, 27 December 1983, 2-10.

^[16]
TSN, 5 March 1984, op. cit., 4-7.

^[17]
TSN, 27 December 1983, 10-14.

^[18]
TSN, 5 September 1983, 11.

^[19]
Exhibits “A” and “B”, respectively; Original Records, 5 and 4.

^[20]
Id., 6.

^[21]
Q and A No. 15.

^[22]
Exhibit “E”; Original ?????

^[23]
Id., 1.

^[24]
People vs. Pagkaliwagan, 76 Phil. 457 [1946]; People vs. Mongado,
28 SCRA 642 [1969]; People vs. Brioso, 37 SCRA 336 [1971]; People vs.
Villeza, 127 SCRA 349 [1984].

^[25]
Section 14(2) of Article II, 1987 Constitution.

^[26]
U.S. vs. Tanjuanco, 1 Phil. 374 [1902]; U.S. vs. Escondo, 25
Phil. 579 [1913].

^[27]
Underhill’s Criminal Evidence, 5^th ed. vol. I, section 266, p. 664.

^[28]
Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, 12th ed., vol. I, section 279, p. 624.

^[29]
Keefe vs. State. 50 Ariz. 293, 72 Pac 2d 425, cited in Wigmore on
Evidence, Third ed., vol. VI, section 1745, pp. 132-133.

^[30]
Wharton, op. cit., section 280, p. 632.

^[31]
Underhill, op. cit., section
267, p. 671.

^[32]
People vs. Ricaplaza, 23 SCRA 374 [1968]; Ilocos Norte Electric Co. vs. Court Appeals, 179
SCRA 5 [1989].

^[33]
28 SCRA 1151, 1161-1162 [1969].

^[34]
Citing People vs. Cuevas, L-5844-45, 30 May 1955; Air France vs.
Carrascoso, L-21438, 28 September
1966, 18 SCRA 155.

^[35]
Citing People vs. Avila, L-4640, 23 March 1953, 92 Phil. 805.

^[36]
Citing People vs. Alban,
L-15203, 29 March 1961, 1 SCRA 931.

^[37]
Citing People vs. Ruzol, L-8699,
26 December 1956, 100 Phil. 537.

^[38]
Citing People vs. Durante, 53 Phil. 363, 371 [1929].

^[39]
Citing People vs. Nartea, 74 Phil. 8 [1942]; People vs. Cuevas,
L-5844-45, 30 May 1955; People vs. Quianzon, 62 Phil. 162 [1935]; People
vs. Portento, 48 Phil. 971 [1924]; U.S. vs. Macuti, 2 Phil. ?????0
[1913].

^[40]
People vs. Ner, supra, citing Lousville N.A. & C.Ry.
Co. vs. Buck, 19 NE 453,
458.