IN THE MATTER OF THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE DECEASED BRIGIDO ALVARADO, CESAR ALVARADO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR., PRESIDING JUSTICE, HON.…

Before us is an appeal
from the Decision dated 11 April 1986^[1] of the First Civil Cases Division of the
then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
Order dated 27 June 1983^[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, admitting to probate the last will
and testament^[3] with codicil^[4] of the late Brigido Alvarado.

On 5 November 1977, the 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a
notarial will entitled “Huling Habilin” wherein he disinherited an
illegitimate son (petitioner) and expressly revoked a previously executed
holographic will at the time awaiting probate before Branch of the Regional
Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

As testified to by the three instrumental witnesses, the notary
public and by private respondent who were present at the execution, the
testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent, as the lawyer
who drafted the eight-paged document, read the same aloud in the presence of
the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter four followed the reading with
their own respective copies previously furnished them.

Meanwhile, Brigido’s holographic will was subsequently admitted
to probate on 9 December 1977. On the
29th day of the same month, a codicil entitled “Kasulatan ng Pagbabago sa
Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na May Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977
ni Brigido Alvarado” was executed changing some dispositions in the
notarial will to generate cash for the testator’s eye operation. Brigido was then suffering from
glaucoma. But the disinheritance and
revocatory clauses were unchanged. As
in the case of the notarial will, the testator did not personally read the
final draft of the codicil. Instead, it
was private respondent who read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of
the three instrumental witnesses (same as those of the notarial will) and the
notary public who followed the reading using their own copies.

A petition for the
probate of the notarial will and codicil was filed upon the testator’s
death on 3 January 1979 by private respondent as executor with the Court of
First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of Siniloan, Laguna.^[5]
Petitioner, in turn, filed an Opposition on
the following grounds: that the
will sought to be probated was not executed and attested as required
by law; that the testator was
insane or otherwise mentally
incapacitated to make a will at
the time of its execution due to senility and old age; that the will was
executed under duress, or influence of fear or threats; that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence
on the part of the beneficiary who
stands to get the lion’s share of the testator’s estate; and lastly, that the
signature of the testator was procured
by fraud or trick.

When the oppositor
(petitioner) failed to substantiate the
grounds relied upon in the
Opposition, a Probate Order was issued
on 27 June 1983 from which an appeal was made to respondent court. The main thrust of the appeal was that the
deceased was blind within the meaning of the law at the time his “Huling
Habilin” and the codicil attached thereto were executed; that since the
reading required by Art. 808 of the Civil Code was admittedly not complied
with, probate of the deceased’s last will and codicil should have been denied.

On 11 April 1986, the
Court of Appeals rendered the decision under review with the following
findings: that Brigido Alvarado was not
blind at the time his last will and codicil were executed; that assuming his
blindness, the reading requirement of Art. 808 was substantially complied with
when both documents were read aloud to the testator with each of the three
instrumental witnesses and the notary public following the reading with their
respective copies of the instruments. The appellate court then concluded that although Art. 808 was not
followed to the letter, there was substantial compliance since its purpose of
making known to the testator the contents of the drafted will was served.

The issues now before us can be stated thus: Was Brigido Alvarado blind for purposes of
Art. 808 at the time his “Huling Habilin” and its codicil were
executed? If so, was the double-reading
requirement of said article complied with?

Regarding the first issue, there is no dispute on the following
facts: Brigido Alvarado was not totally
blind at the time the will and codicil were executed. However, his vision on both eyes was only of “counting
fingers at three (3) feet” by reason of the glaucoma which he had been
suffering from for several years and even prior to his first consultation with
an eye specialist on 14 December 1977.

The point of dispute is whether the foregoing circumstances would qualify Brigido as a
“blind” testator under Art. 808 which reads:

“Art. 808. If the
testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the
subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary public before whom the will is
acknowledged.”

Petitioner contends that although his father was not totally
blind when the will and codicil were executed, he can be so considered within
the scope of the term as it is used in Art. 808. To support his stand, petitioner presented before the trial court
a medical certificate issued by Dr. Salvador R. Salceda, Director of the
Institute of Opthalmology (Philippine Eye Research institute),^[6]
the contents of
which were interpreted in layman’s terms by Dr. Ruperto Roasa, whose
expertise was admitted by private respondent.^[7] Dr.
Roasa explained that although the testator could visualize fingers at three (3)
feet, he could no longer read either printed or handwritten matters as of 14
December 1977, the day of his first consultation.^[8]

On the other hand, the
Court of Appeals, contrary to the medical testimony, held that the testator
could still read on the day the will and the codicil were executed but chose
not to do so because of “poor eyesight.”^[9] Since the testator was still capable of reading at that time, the court a quo
concluded that Art. 808 need not be complied with.

We agree with petitioner
in this respect.

Regardless of respondent’s
staunch contention that the testator was still capable of reading at the time
his will and codicil were prepared, the fact remains and this was testified to
by his witnesses, that Brigido did not do so because of his “poor,”^[10] “defective,”^[11] or “blurred”^[12] vision making it necessary for private
respondent to do the actual reading for him.

The following
pronouncement in Garcia vs. Vasquez^[13] provides an insight into the scope of the
term “blindness” as used in Art. 808, to wit:

“The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to
the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to
him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes
x x x x”

Clear from the foregoing is that Art. 808 applies not only to
blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or another, are
“incapable of reading the(ir) will(s).” Since Brigido Alvarado was
incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on the separate
occasions of their execution due to his “poor,”
“defective,” or “blurred” vision, there can be no other
course for us but to conclude that Brigido Alvarado comes within the scope of
the term “blind” as it is used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way of
ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will and codicil did so conformably with his
instructions. Hence, to consider his
will as validly executed and entitled to probate, it is essential that we
ascertain whether Art. 808 had
been complied with.

Article 808 requires that in case of testators like Brigido
Alvarado, the will shall be read twice; once, by one of the instrumental
witnesses and, again, by the notary public before whom the will was
acknowledged. The purpose is to make
known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the document before signing
and to give him an opportunity to
object if anything is contrary to his instructions.

That Art. 808 was not
followed strictly is beyond cavil. Instead of the notary public and an instrumental witness, it was the
lawyer (private respondent) who drafted
the eight-paged will and the five-paged codicil who read the same aloud
to the testator, and read them only once, not twice as Art. 808 requires.

Private respondent
however insists that there was substantial compliance and that the single
reading suffices for purposes of the law. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that the only valid compliance
is a strict compliance or compliance to the letter and since it is admitted that neither the notary public nor an instrumental witness read the contents of the will
and codicil to Brigido, probate of the latter’s will and codicil should have
been disallowed.

We sustain private respondent’s
stand and necessarily, the petition must be denied.

This Court has held in a
number of occasions that substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose
of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from
all kinds of fraud and trickery but
are never intended to be so
rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege.^[14]

In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator’s will
and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental
witnesses, and the notary public. Prior
and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the
contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and petitioner does not so allege, that the
contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with respect to the “Huling
Habilin,” the day of the execution was not the first time that Brigido had
affirmed the truth and authenticity of the contents of the draft. The uncontradicted testimony of Atty. Rino
is that Brigido Alvarado already acknowledged that the will was drafted in
accordance with his expressed wishes even prior to 5 November 1977 when Atty. Rino
went to the testator’s residence
precisely for the purpose of securing his conformity to the draft.^[15]

Moreover, it was not only Atty. Rino who read the documents on 5 November
and 29 December 1977. The notary public
and the three instrumental witnesses likewise read the will and codicil, albeit
silently. Afterwards, Atty. Nonia de la
Pena (the notary public) and Dr. Crescente O. Evidente (one of the three
instrumental witnesses and the testator’s physician) asked the testator whether
the contents of the documents were of
his own free will. Brigido answered in the affirmative.^[16] With four persons following the reading word
for word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator
was reasonably assured that what was read to him (those which he affirmed were
in accordance with his instructions), were the terms actually appearing on the
typewritten documents. This is
especially true when we consider the fact that the three instrumental witnesses
were persons known to the testator, one being his physician (Dr. Evidente) and
another (Potenciano C. Ranieses) being known to him since childhood.

The spirit behind the law
was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial
requirements of the law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the
formal imperfections should be brushed
aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testator’s will.^[17]

As a final word to
convince petitioner of the propriety of the trial court’s Probate Order and its
affirmance by the Court of Appeals, we quote the following pronouncement in Abangan v. Abangan,^[18] to wit:

“The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of
wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid the
substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and
authenticity. Therefore the laws on the
subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial
ends. But, on the other hand, also one
must not lose sight of the fact that it
is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right
to make a will. So when an interpretation
already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds
nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and
frustrative of the testator’s will, must be disregarded” (underscoring
supplied).

Brigido Alvarado had expressed his last wishes in clear and unmistakable terms in his “Huling
Habilin” and the codicil attached thereto. We are unwilling to cast these aside for the mere reason that a
legal requirement intended for his protection was not followed strictly when
such compliance had been rendered unnecessary by the fact that the purpose of
the law, i.e., to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the
draft of his will, had already been accomplished. To reiterate, substantial compliance suffices where the purpose
has been served.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
assailed Decision of respondent
Court of Appeals dated 11 April 1986 is AFFIRMED. Considering
the length of time that this case has remained pending, this decision is
immediately executory. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., and Quiason, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 29-37.

^[2]
Penned by Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion Original Records, pp. 214 – 224.

^[3]
Exhibit “D”, Folder of Exhibits, pp. 65-72.

^[4]
Exhibit “E”, Id., pp. 73-77.

^[5]
Subsequently transferred to the Regional Trial Court, Br. 26, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna.

^[6]
Folder of Exhibits, p. 78.

^[7]
TSN, 3 August 1982, p. 6.

^[8]
Id., pp. 7-8.

^[9]
Rollo, p. 36.

^[10]
TSN, 18 June 1981, p. 3; 20 August 1981, p. 4; 16 September 1981, p. 5; 1
October 1981, p. 4.

^[11]
TSN, 18 June 1981, p. 3; 1 October 1981, p. 9.

^[12]
TSN, 20 August 1981, p. 4; 5 November 1981, pp. 15-16; 14 January 1982, p. 16.

^[13]
No. L-26884, 30 April 1970, 32 SCRA 490, 502-503.

^[14]
Icasiano v. Icasiano, No. L-18979, 30 June 1964, 11 SCRA 422, 429-430; Abangan v. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479
(1919); Rey v. Cartagena, 56 Phil. 282, 284-285 (1931); Rodriguez v. Yap, 68 Phil. 126, 128 (1939); Leynez v.
Leynez, 68 Phil. 745, 750 (1939); Roxas v.
De Jesus, Jr., No. L-38338, 28
January 1985, 134 SCRA 245, 249.

^[15]
TSN, 18 June 1981, p. 4.

^[16]
TSN, 16 September 1981, pp. 4-5;
14 January 1982, pp. 6, 12.

^[17]
Rodriguez v. Yap, 68 Phil. 126, 128 (1939).

^[18]
40 Phil. 477, 479 (1919).