ANTONIO DE LEON, PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF GREGORIO REYES, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, THRU MANUEL LAZARO, (NOW OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, RES…

The land in dispute is located in Sta. Quiteria,
Caloocan City,
and has an area of 13,956 square meters. 
It is the subject of two separate applications, one for sale filed by
the late Gregorio Reyes on December 21, 1967, and the other for free patent filed
by petitioner Antonio de Leon on September 23, 1968.  Both are based on the claim of actual
possession.  To resolve the conflict, the
Bureau of Lands conducted an investigation and after hearing ruled against
Gregorio Reyes,^[1]
who appealed to the Ministry of Natural
Resources.  The decision of the Bureau of
Lands was there set aside by the assistant secretary for legal affairs,^[2] but he was himself, on motion for
reconsideration, reversed by the Minister.^[3] The private respondents* then
elevated the case to the Office of the President, where they were sustained.^[4] The subsequent motion for reconsideration of
the petitioner was denied.^[5]

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was originally dismissed, and the first motion for
reconsideration was denied.  We held that the issues raised were mainly
factual and there was no showing that the findings thereon were not supported
by substantial evidence.  Upon the filing
with leave of a second motion
for reconsideration, the Court decided to take a harder look at the case, set aside the earlier dismissal of the
petition and gave due course thereto, requiring the parties to file memoranda.^[6]

As a matter of law and
policy, this Court does not review the factual findings of administrative
bodies as long as there is substantial
evidence to support them.  Only in
exceptional cases do we deviate
from this discipline, which is
based on a proper respect for the decisions of a coordinate department and a just recognition of its expertise on
matters coming under its direct jurisdiction. 
After the thorough study of the pleadings filed by the parties, and of
the antecedent proceedings, we find that this is one occasion for such
deviation.  The Court feels that there is
justification to review the decision here questioned on the challenge that it
was issued with grave abuse of discretion by the public respondent.

The reversal was made by
then Presidential Assistant of Legal Affairs Manuel M. Lazaro
on December 19, 1985.  The petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied on April 29, 1986, on the ground that
there was “no strong and cogent reason to warrant the reversal or
modification of the decision.”

The questioned decision
was based on the reports made by Land Investigator Pablo Bautista on November
7, 1967, and December
21, 1967, as
corroborated by Land Surveyor Medardo Habal after his survey of the disputed land on November
29, 1967.  Bautista found that the private respondent
had been in possession of the land in question since 1950, had planted it to
fruit trees and seasonal crops, and that no other person was occupying
it.^[7] Habal, for his
part, said that no one else was
claiming the land, nobody had protested his survey, and that there was no house
on the said property.^[8]

The public respondent
also noted that it was only on December 3, 1968, that the petitioner had declared the said
land for taxation purposes, retroactive to 1965.  This was deemed an indication that the
petitioner was not really in possession thereof as he claimed and had
filed the decla­ration only to support his free patent appplication.^[9]

To bolster these
findings, the private respondents submit that the land in dispute was part of
the lot from the Piedad Estate which had been sold on
July 16, 1931,
to the Bartolome spouses and that this portion had
merely been inadvertently omitted in the technical description of the said
lot.  Even so, it was occupied by the Bartolomes (including Gregorio Reyes and his wife, who was
a daughter of the Bartolomes) along with the rest of
the lot since its purchase in the aforesaid year.^[10]

Conversely, the
petitioner points to the finding of the Bureau of Lands, as affirmed by the Ministry of Natural Resources, that his father, Simeon de Leon,
had been in possession of the disputed land since 1925 and until his death in
1950.  His possession was then continued
by the petitioner.  According to Land
Investigator Jose B. Isidro, who inspected the land on October
30, 1968, it was
planted by the petitioner and his father to fruit-bearing trees, and there were
two nipa huts thereon, one belonging to the
petitioner and the other to his daughter, Catalina.^[11] Another report, filed this time by Land
Investigator Romeo Salvado, found that the
petitioner’s possession was dis­continued
only in 1969 when Gregorio Reyes
forced himself into the land in dispute and with the aid of armed men bulldozed
the trees and plants thereon.  The
petitioner complained to the Bureau of Lands, which issued a status quo order
on May 4, 1970.  Nevertheless, Reyes ignored the same and in
violation of the order and the Public Land Act, leased the land to Hi-Protein
Corporation, which introduced its own improvements on the property.^[12]

While there is no disputing the authority of administrative
superiors to reverse the findings of their subordinates, this power must be
exercised sparingly and only upon a clear
showing of error.  Lacking such flaw, the
decision of the lower administrative officials should be sustained, if only
because they have closer access to the problem sought to be resolved and have
the direct oppor­tunity to question the parties and their witnesses and to assess the evidence first-hand.

The hearing officer of the Bureau of Lands, who made the initial
investigation in the case at bar, had such an opportunity.  It was Jose B. Isidro who conducted the
hearings to resolve the conflicting claims
of possession of the petitioner and Gregorio Reyes, examined them and their
witnesses and inspected the disputed property. 
His report of December 5, 1968,
was in favor of the petitioners. 
Notably, not even the private respondents impugn his integrity and
impartiality and in fact even cite him to support
their own position that de Leon had abandoned the property by selling it in
1968 and 1969.^[13]

By contrast, the motives of both Bautista and Habal
have been questioned by the petitioner, and for good reason.  The record shows that it was Bautista who
advised Gregorio Reyes to file his sales application,^[14]
and by some happenstance, it was also Bautista
who was assigned to investigate the same. 
It is also not denied
that Habal was retained by Reyes to conduct the
survey of the land in dispute, presumably for a corresponding compensation.^[15]
Given such circumstances, we find it not unreasonable to suppose, and even
expect, that the reports of these two individuals would be, as in fact they were, favorable to
Reyes.

It is worth noting that in his decision reversing the Ministry of
Natural Resources, the public respondent merely rejected the report of Isidro
and opted in favor of the reports of Bautista and Habal,
but without saying why except to note that Bautista’s report was earlier.  No effort was made to explain away their
apparent bias as directly challenged by the petitioner.  The reports were simply and completely
accepted to sustain the private respondents’ stand.  There was also no mention of Land
Investigator Salvado, who reported on August 12, 1983, that Reyes had
violated the status quo order of the Bureau of Lands and recommended that he be held civilly
and criminally liable.  His report was totally ignored.

Besides invoking the
reports of Isidro and Salvado, the petitioner
presented two witnesses who both testified that he and his father had been in
continuous possession of the land in dispute, raising fruit-bearing trees
there.  Pastor Buenaventura swore he was
born in Sta. Quiteria in 1917 and Ricardo Javier
claimed he transferred to the place in 1938, and both were positive that the de
Leon father and son were occupying the disputed property until it was bulldozed
in 1969.^[16] Giving credence to this evidence, the Bureau
of Lands in its decision declared:

“Evidence for the
protestant (herein petitioner) bears heavily upon the facts that he has been in
actual and physical control of the
property since 1925 through his predecessor-in-interest Simeon de Leon.  The preliminary investigation report
submitted by Land Investigator Jose Isidro relative to his free patent
application as to the fact of possession confirmed the testimonies of his
witnesses, who are long time residents and native-born of the barrio where the
land is situated.  The final
investigation report on the application stated, among others, that the
cultivation and occupation of the land in question by Antonio de Leon has been
continuous, notorious and exclusive since 1925, and the improvements on the
land as ascertained by the investigator during his ocular inspection on October
30, 1968 were clearly indicated on the sketch
drawn at the back thereof consisting of ten guava trees, two guyabano trees, fifty atis trees,
two star apple trees, three tieza trees, several
bamboo grooves, patola, camote
patch, a nipa house owned by the applicant’s daughter
Catalina de Leon.  In a desperate bid to
obliterate traces of improvements by Antonio de Leon, respondent bulldozed and
destroyed them, and in their stead replaced them with his improvements, to give it a semblance that it was he who is in actual possession of the land. 
Forthwith, Antonio de Leon lodged a complaint before the barrio captain
and wrote this office to inform that
on June 30, 1969,
Gregorio Reyes, in company with a number of armed men and with a bulldozer
forcibly entered the land covered by his Free Patent Application No. (III-1)
4649.  Once inside the premises his
(Gregorio Reyes) men destroyed many of his (Antonio de Leon)
improvements.”^[17]

The private respondents’
allegation that the petitioner had sold the land in question was never
established.  Their counsel tried hard
enough to draw an admission to this effect but all he got from the petitioner
was a consistent denial.^[18] It was never proved that the alleged deeds
of sale were authentic and had been signed by the petitioner, who said he could
never manage to write his full name, which was the signature on the
instruments.  The alleged vendees were
never presented at the hearing.  The
private respondents also did not offer the testimony of a handwriting expert to
prove the genuineness of the sig­nature on the challenged deeds of sale.  There was also a supposed affidavit of de Leon’s daughter Catalina affirming that her hut
had not been bulldozed by Gregorio Reyes but had been destroyed during a typhoon, but this too has no evidentiary value.  As the alleged affiant was never presented
and could not be examined on the said sworn statement, it must be rejected as
hearsay.

The Minister also found
that the tax declarations made by Gregorio Reyes referred not to the land in
dispute but to the lot purchased from the Piedad
Estate by the Bartolome spouses, his parents-in-law.^[19] The private respondents’ argument
that the disputed land was part of the said lot is weakened by the fact that
Reyes filed a sales application therefor and so
impliedly admitted it was public land. 
Then there is Reyes’ assertion that the Bartolomes
had merely allowed or tolerated de Leon’s occupation of the land because he was
their relative.  This claim, if true at
all, would only disprove the reports made by Bautista and Habal
that no one but Reyes was at the time of their inspection occupying the land.

We are satisfied from an examination of the evidence of record
that the petitioner, as his father before him, was in continuous possession of
the disputed land from 1925 and raised fruit-bearing trees therein.  In 1969, Reyes forcibly ousted de Leon from
the said property and destroyed the trees and structures on the said
property.  Thereafter, despite the order
of the Bureau of Lands requiring the parties to maintain the status quo pending the
resolution of their dispute, Reyes leased the property to the Hi-Protein
Corporation, which itself introduced improvements on the land.

While, as previously remarked, the decisions of administrative
officials are subject to review by their superiors, such review, to be valid,
must not be whimsical or arbitrary or devoid of substantial basis.  There is no question that the public
respondent, acting on behalf of the President, can reverse the decisions of a
department head although the former is lower in rank than the Cabinet
member.  But that is not the point.  The point is that, although the power is
conceded, it must be exercised, like all powers, within the limits of the law,
if substantive rights are to be
protected and justice is to be upheld.

Our finding is that such
power was not properly exercised in this case, to the prejudice of the
petitioner.  The basis of the reversal,
to wit, the reports of Bautista and Habal, have been
discredited for partiality and refuted by the private respondents themselves
when they argued that the petitioner’s possession of the land was only
tolerated.  This was an implicit
admission that the petitioner was actually occupying the land at the time they
said they had no possession of it. 
Moreover, the public respondent did not consider the other official
reports submitted by Isidro and Salvado and just
dismissed them out of hand notwithstanding that these were the very bases used
by the Bureau of Lands in deciding for the petitioner.

The public respondent, in
setting aside the decision of the Bureau of Lands, as affirmed by the Ministry
of Natural Resources, disregarded the long line of decisions holding that the
findings and conclusions of the Director of the Bureau of Lands and approved by
the Secretary of Agriculture upon a question of fact are conclusive and not
subject to review, in the absence of showing that such decision was rendered in
consequence of fraud, imposition, or mistake.^[20]

The writ of certiorari is available in this
case.  If all administrative decisions
were conclusive upon us in any event, there would have been no reason at all to
offer this extraordinary remedy to litigants who otherwise would have been
deprived of this only and last resort to the courts of justice.  This remedy applies to administrative
decisions up to the highest level and includes the decision at bar even if rendered
“by authority of the President.” The sacramental phrase does not
remove these decisions from the certiorari jurisdiction of the
Court or inhibit us from reversing them when warranted by a clear showing of a
grave abuse of discretion.

The petition is
granted.  The writ must issue.

It bears emphasis that whereas the petitioner is a humble farmer
applying for a free patent over the only land he and his father before him have
tilled all these many years, the private respondents are subdivision owners who
really do not need the disputed property as much as the petitioner.  We are elated that the facts and the law of
this case have tilted in favor of the party with “less privileges in
life” and thus given meaning to the consti­tutional ideal of a more
equitable distribution among our people
of the bounties of the earth.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Presidential Assistant for
Legal Affairs dated December 19, 1985,
and the Order of the Deputy Executive Secretary dated April 29, 1986, are SET ASIDE and the Order of
the Minister of Natural Resources dated
March 8, 1985,
is REINSTATED, with costs against the private respondents.  It is so ordered.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, and Bidin, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 33-37.

^[2]
Ibid., pp. 188-200.

^[3]
Id., pp. 38-61.

* Gregorio Reyes died during the pendency of his appeal
to the Ministry and was then substituted by his heirs, the herein
private respondents.

^[4]
Id., pp. 62-65.

^[5]
Id., p. 66.

^[6]
Id., p. 316.

^[7]
Id., p. 64.

^[8]
Id.

^[9]
Id., pp. 64-65

^[10]
Private Respondents’ Memorandum, pp.
7-12; Rollo, pp. 349-354.

^[11]
Petition, p. 15; Rollo,
p. 22.

^[12]
Rollo, pp. 47-51.

^[13]
Private Respondents’ Comment, pp. 2-6; Rollo, pp. 145-150.

^[14]
Rollo, p. 41.

^[15]
Id., p. 40.

^[16]
Petitioner’s Supplemental Memorandum, pp. 11-12.

^[17]
Rollo, p. 36.

^[18]
Ibid., pp. 272-288.

^[19]
Id., p. 53.

^[20]
Aggabao v. de Guzman, 116 SCRA 280 citing Jamisola v. Ballesteros,
122, Phil. 442, 446, Julian v. Apostol, 52
Phil. 422; Ortua v. Singson
Encarnacion, 59 Phil. 440; Eusebio
v. Sociedad Agricola
de Balarin, 16 SCRA 569; Ramirez v. CA, 30 SCRA 297; Pindangan
Agricultural Co., Inc. v. Dans, 4 SCRA 1035; Alejo v. Garchitorena, 83
Phil. 924; de Guzman v. de Guzman, 104 Phil. 24; de los
Santos v. Rodriguez, 22 SCRA 451.