PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BERTITO TRIGO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

For the death of his wife, Alicia Dequiña Trigo, the
accused-appellant, Bertito Trigo, was charged with the crime of PARRICIDE in
Criminal Case No. C-1790 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, at Roxas
City, and under the information
which reads:

“The undersigned accuses BERTITO TRIGO of the crime of
Parricide, committed as follows:

“That on or about 9:00 o’clock in the morning in May 30, 1983
at New Road St., Municipality of
Pontevedra, Province of Capiz, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the above-named accused, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident
premeditation, that is, having conceived and deliberated to kill his estranged
wife ALICIA DEQUIÑA TRIGO, with whom he was united in lawful wedlock, assault
and stab his said wife with a knife (sevillana), thereby inflicting stab wounds
on the different parts of her
body which caused her death thereafter.

“CONTRARY TO LAW.” (p. 11, Rollo)

Upon being arraigned on January
9, 1984, Trigo
entered the plea of not guilty to the offense charged.  Trial ensued. 
On September 16, 1985, the court a quo rendered its
decision convicting Trigo of the offense charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, this
Court finds the accused Bertito Trigo, 32 years old, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Parricide
for killing his estranged wife, Alicia Dequiña Trigo, on May 30, 1983 in
Pontevedra, Capiz, and hereby sentences him, appreciating the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstance
offsetting it, to the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA (Revised Penal Code,
Articles 246; 63(3), as (sic) to indemnify the heirs of his wife, his children
in the care of the children’s grandmother, Reynalda dela Fuente, or whoever has
custody over them, in the sum of P12,000.00, with the accessory penalties of
the law.  Accused is given the benefit of
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

“Costs against the accused.

“SO ORDERED.” (p. 30, Rollo)

Not satisfied with the decision, Trigo appealed and assigned the
following errors:

“I.       THE COURT A
QUO ERRED IN RELYING HEAVILY ON THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESS MARCOS FUENTES AND IN ABSOLUTELY DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED   BY THE DEFENSE.

“II.      THE COURT A
QUO ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIME CHARGED.” (p. 1, Appellant’s
Brief; p. 44, Rollo)

The records show that the
accused and his wife were married by the parish priest of Panitan, Capiz on January
19, 1972 (Exhibits
“D” to “D-3”, p. 256, Records).

The prosecution’s version of the killing is based mainly on the testimony of Marcos
Fuentes.  He testified, inter alia,
that he knew the spouses Bertito and Alicia Trigo because he bought from them
their house located at Sitio Umigon, Brgy. Tincupon, Panitan, Capiz, in 1982;
that at about nine o’clock in the morning of May 30, 1983, he was at the market of the town of Pontevedra;
that he met Alicia Trigo at the said market and even greeted her; that he did
not notice at the time whether Alicia was with a companion or not; that after
awhile, a commotion took place; that when he stood up he saw Bertito Trigo
stabbing Alicia; that he saw
blood spurting from Alicia’s left chest; that Bertito Trigo was at the time in
front of Alicia and holding the latter with one of his arms; that there were no
other persons near Alicia when he saw the latter bleeding; that Alicia later
fell on the ground; and that he was about 50 meters from where the incident
took place.

The body of Alicia Trigo was examined by Dr. Ma. Roselle B.
Gedang, resident physician of the Provincial
Hospital at Bailan, Pontevedra,
Capiz.  The medical certificate dated February 4, 1984 indicated the
following pertinent physical findings, to wit:

“Multiple Stab
wounds;

Right arm anterior
aspect middle third about 2 cm. thru and thru;

Left arm anterior aspect
– proximal third about 01 cm.;

Left forearm lateral
aspect about 3 cm. thru and thru left side of the left nipple chest;

Left chest wall – left
side of the nipple and slightly below intering the 4th intercostal space the
penetrating perforating the heart;

Right hypogastric area
about 1 cm. superficial;

Right lumbar area above
the anterior superior iliac spine about 2.5 cm. mid acillary line superficial;

Upon admission, patient
was restless, chyne strokes
respiration noted, B/P not appreciated, pronounced dead.

Cause of Death:

Cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hemorrhage.” (p.
255, Records)

Accused, upon the other hand, denied that he killed his wife
Alicia.  According to him, he and his
wife were at the market to buy some goods for their store; that while they were
walking, he saw Orline Buaco draw from his waist a weapon; that Buaco tried to
stab him but he (accused) was able to evade the blow; that it was his wife who got hit by the blow delivered by
Buaco; and after his wife was hit, Buaco successively stabbed her.  He also claimed that Orline Buaco is also a resident of Barangay Tincupon; that
Buaco had previously fired shots
at the house of accused and his family on November 19, 1982 because the accused
had not paid his debt to Buaco in the sum of P1,000.00;
that such incident was recorded at the police department and a complaint was
filed by him against Buaco with the Municipal Court of Panitan (TSN, February
13, 1985, pp. 51-62, Records).

Appellant submits that the trial court should not have relied on the
testimony of the prosecution witness Marcos Fuentes in view of the
inconsistencies and improbabilities found in his testimony.  Appellant also asserts that there is no
evidence in the records to show that he had a motive to kill his wife.

After a careful review of the records, We
find the appeal to be without merit.

The issue in this case
hinges on the credibility of prosecution witness Marcos Fuentes. 
It is a well-established rule that in criminal prosecutions
on the matter of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court are
given weight and the highest degree of respect by appellate courts because the
former is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial (People vs. Kintuan, G.R. 84100, December 3, 1987, 156 SCRA
195).  We find no strong and cogent
reason to depart from this established rule. 
The testimony of Marcos Fuentes which stated that he saw appellant stab
his wife (p. 4, TSN, March 4, 1984) was clear and positive. 
There was no showing of any
ulterior motive on his part to
falsely charge the accused-appellant. 
The testimony of only one witness, if credible and positive and if it
satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt is sufficient to
convict (see People v. Luces, L-60744, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 813).

We affirm the trial
court’s finding when it declared that even as Marcos Fuentes sort of wavered at
the outset in his testimony, his declaration was
straight-forward even during the cross-examination; and that his court
testimony is a reiteration of his declaration in his sworn statement
supporting the complaint (p. 29, Rollo).

Appellant also submits
that the prosecution did not prove
the motive of appellant for killing his wife. 
The law is
well-settled that motive is relevant only where the identity of person accused of having committed the crime is in dispute, where
there are no eyewitnesses, and where suspicion is likely to fall upon a
number of persons.  In the case at bar,
the identity of the accused was
positively proved by the eyewitness. 
Hence, motive is irrelevant (People v. Dueño, G.R. No. L-31102, May 5, 1979, 90 SCRA 23).

Further, We are not persuaded by appellant’s claim that it was not
him but a certain Orline Buaco who stabbed his wife.  In rejecting this defense, the trial
court correctly observed significant factors/circumstances
surrounding the incident which belie appellant’s defense that it was not he who
stabbed and killed Alicia Trigo.  Firstly, there is great improbability of Orline Buaco’s alleged first attack hitting his wife if the said
attack were aimed at accused.  Secondly,
there is greater improbability of the
deceased Alicia Trigo sustaining multiple stab wounds if it were the appellant
whom Buaco wanted to stab as then the latter would have aimed all the five
other thrusts of the weapon at the accused and not at the deceased Alicia
Trigo.  Thirdly, there was failure not only to shield her from the attack but also
failure to retaliate within the duration of the next five attacks upon the
deceased.  Fourthly, knowing that his wife was already seriously
wounded, the appellant would not have left her alone in the care of a policeman
especially after Buaco had already fled, and there was no more danger that the
latter might attack him.  Fifthly,
after appellant had secured police protection at the police station, appellant
never returned to personally attend to his wife and to ascertain if she
received timely medical attention at the provincial hospital at Bailan, Pontevedra.  All these
facts and circumstances were considered by the trial court to bolster one thing
– that accused was really estranged from his wife and it was he who killed her.

The direct and
circumstantial evidence established at the trial sufficiently prove the guilt
of accused-appellant.  As aforestated,
the trial court’s findings of fact are generally given due respect.  Appellant has the burden, therefore, to
convince this Court that a departure from this rule is justified upon
satisfactory showing that the trial court misapplied some facts of weight and
substance as would alter the result of the proceedings.  He failed to do so.

The court a quo appreciated in favor of
the accused the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.  We do not agree with this finding.  The accused himself testified that he went to
the police station to report that his wife was stabbed by Buaco and to seek
protection as he feared that
Buaco would also stab him.  Clearly, his
action cannot in any manner be considered as amounting to voluntary
surrender.  In any event, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua was correctly imposed by the said court.

The indemnity in the amount of P12,000.00
ordered by the court a quo to be paid by the accused-appellant
to the heirs of the deceased Alicia Trigo is increased to P30,000.00.

ACCORDINGLY, with the modification above indicated, the
judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects, with costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Grino-Aquino, JJ., concur.