JUAN ASONG, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ALBARO ALBANO, JR. AND SEVERINO BANASIG, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals),
dated March 31, 1986 in AC-G.R. CV. No. 63215 entitled “Juan Asong, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Albaro
Albano, Jr., and Severino Banasig, defendants-appellees”
which affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Iloilo.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On October 8, 1973,
Severino Banasig (Banasig, for short) filed a case for forcible entry and
damages against Juan Asong (Asong,
for short) with the Municipal Court (now Municipal Circuit Trial Court) of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo,
presided over by respondent Judge Albaro Albano, Jr., (p. 23, Records).  Banasig alleged,
inter alia, that he is the owner and
the possessor of a parcel of land
(Lot No. 14) covered by Tax
Declaration No. 13635 which is
situated at Barotac
Viejo, Iloilo; that on September 27, 1973, Asong,
by means of force and intimidation, took possession of one and a half hectares
on the eastern portion thereof.

On December 4,
1973, the parties submitted to the Municipal Court on amicable
settlement, as follows:

“1.  That the defendant
recognizes the ownership and possession of the plaintiff over Lot Nos. 2925 and
2654 of the Barotac Viejo Cadastre, Case 3;

2.  The plaintiff recognizes
that the boundary of the two (2) aforementioned lots which are his, in relation
to the adjoining land of the defendant starts from a point on the ‘Iniam‘ tree on the northern side going across another ‘Iniam‘ tree on the other end;

3.  Parties
agree for dismissal of their claim and counterclaim on damages.” (Exhibit
“C”, p. 5, Records)

On December 5, 1973,
the Municipal Court approved the amicable settlement and rendered judgment
based thereon (Exhibit “D”, p. 6, Records).

On March 6, 1975, Asong filed a
complaint before the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), Branch
4, at Iloilo City, against Judge Albaro Albano, Jr. and Banasig for
recovery of ownership and annulment of amicable settlement and judgment.  He averred, inter alia,
that he is illiterate; that as such, he did not understand the contents of the amicable settlement; that he had no
intention of giving up his right over Lot Nos. 2925 and 2654 but only with
respect to Lot 2653; and that he discovered the defective agreement only on
November 26, 1974 when he was cited for contempt by Judge Albano,
Jr. for his refusal to vacate Lot Nos. 2925 and 2654.

On August 6, 1977,
the Court of First Instance rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

“Wherefore, judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant Severino Banasig and against the plaintiff Juan Asong,
hereby dismissing plaintiff’s complaint, and declaring the amicable settlement
(Exh. ‘C’ or ‘3’) to have
bean freely and voluntarily entered by both parties fully cognizant of its
contents and implications and that the decision rendered thereunder
(Exh. ‘D’ or ‘4’) is valid and irrevocable and
constitute a bar to the above-entitled case in so far as possession is concerned.

“The counterclaim is dismissed.

“Costs against the plaintiff.

“SO ORDERED.” (p. 70, Rollo)

After his motion for reconsideration was denied, Asong appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which,
as earlier stated, subsequently affirmed the said decision.  He now comes to Us
and submits only one issue to be resolved, to wit:

“Whether or not the amicable settlement was voluntarily and
freely entered into and fully explained to petitioner.” (p. 77, Rollo)

Petitioner Asong contends that the
amicable settlement should be annulled on the ground of mistake.  He asserts that he is illiterate; that he was
persuaded by his lawyer to enter into an amicable settlement with Banasig without fully informing him of the legal
implications thereof; that “the effect of the amicable settlement (was) worse than a confession of
judgment for under (it) he not only relinquishes possession but also
recognizes the ownership of private respondent over the two lots subject of the forcible entry case thus the same
would constitute a bar to a case for recovery of ownership as well.” (pp.
79-80, Rollo)

In the resolution of May 14,
1986, We granted the motion of Asong to
litigate as pauper.  (p. 4, Rollo)

The instant petition is
devoid of merit.

It is a fundamental and
settled rule that conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are
entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for
strong and cogent reasons because the trial court is in a better position to
examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses
while testifying in the case (Chase vs. Buencamino,
Sr., L-20395, May 13, 1985; 136 SCRA 365). 
We find no convincing reasons in the instant case to depart from this
rule.  The evidence on record shows that Asong was fully apprised of the legal consequences arising
from the amicable settlement.  Aside from
his lawyer, Atty. Joelito Barrera who
represented him in the Municipal Court, a
friend of Atty. Barrera, Atty. Rex
Salas who accidentally interrupted Barrera’s meeting with Asong
and Banasig regarding the amicable settlement at the former’s law office and Municipal Judge Albaro
Albano before whom the amicable settlement was
submitted, explained the terms thereof to Asong in
the Hiligaynon dialect (see pp. 29-30, TSN, November 18,
1976; pp. 21-22, TSN, September 29, 1976 and pp. 41-42, TSN, January 10, 1977, respectively).  We fail to find any tinge of bias or improper
motive on their part to testify against Asong.  On the other hand, Asong’s
vehement denial unsupported by any contrary evidence cannot rebut the positive
testimonies of the aforesaid witnesses.

Moreover, We are not persuaded by Asong’s
argument that the amicable settlement should be voided because he did not gain anything from it and that such agreement
was worse than a confession of judgment. 
The appellate court correctly ruled against Asong’s
supposition, as follows:

“Plaintiff-appellant argues that the defendant-appellee ‘had the concession’ while he ‘never gained
anything but on the contrary lost the case without even a fight,’ citing Art.
2028 of the Civil Code which provides:

‘A compromise is a contract whereby the parties by making
reciprocal concessions avoid the litigation or put an end to one already
commenced.’

In Berg vs. National City Bank
of New York, supra, the Supreme Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Felix Bautista Angelo, opined:

‘hence, it is a general rule in this country that compromise are to
be favored, without regard to the nature of the controversy compromised, and
that they cannot be set aside because the event shows
all the gain to have been on one side, and all the sacrifice on the other, if the
parties have acted in good faith, and with a belief of the
actual existence of the rights which they have respectively waived or abandoned;
and if a settlement be made in regard to such subject, free from fraud or
mistake, whereby there is a surrender or satisfaction, in whole or in part, of
a claim upon one side in exchange for or in consideration of a surrender or satisfaction of a claim in whole
or in part, or of something of value upon the other, however baseless
may be the claim upon either side
or harsh the terms as to either
of the parties, the other cannot successfully impeach
the agreement in
a court of justice x x x x (underscoring supplied). 
Where the compromise is instituted and carried through in good faith,
the fact that there was a mistake as to the law or as to the facts, except in
certain cases where the mistake was mutual and correctable as such in equity,
cannot afford a basis for setting a compromise aside or defending against a
suit brought thereon x x x
x’ (citing McCarthy vs. Barber
Steamship Lines, 45 Phil.
488, 498-499).

Appellant further maintains that the amicable settlement was more
of a confession of judgment which was far from his mind.  But, even conceding that it was a confession
of judgment, it nevertheless partook of the nature of a compromise.  As held
in the case of Republic vs. Caray,
L-21416, December 31, 1965:

‘A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making
reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an
end to one already commenced (Art. 2028, Civil Code).  It is obvious that the pleading entitled
‘Confession of Judgment’, x x x partook of the nature of a compromise, for, in
consideration of defendant’s
recognition of his obligation and the Commissioner’s willingness to allow its
payment on installments, both had agreed to put an end to the
litigation, through the rendition of a judgment incorporating said stipulations.'” (pp. 20-22, Rollo)

It is significant to note that Asong
did not raise any objections to the terms of the amicable settlement until one year and three months later.  His claim that he came to know of the defective agreement only when he was cited in contempt for his
refusal to vacate the questioned lots is dubious.  It appears from the uncontradicted
testimony of Banasig that he took possession of the
lots in controversy immediately after the promulgation of judgment based on the amicable settlement; and that, thereafter, he caused the plowing of the
land and planted sugar cane thereon (p. 46, TSN, March 31, 1977).  With such flurry of
activities, Asong inevitably could have learned of
Banasig’s possession
in no time at all – if not on his own, then, from his neighbors in the surrounding area.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court dated March 31, 1986 is hereby AFFIRMED.  No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, and Grino-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., on leave.