G.R. No. 74229. August 11, 1989
SHOEMART, INC., AND ROMEO B. PEREZ, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION) AND MAXIMA R. SORIANO, RESPONDENTS.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition seeking to reverse and set aside the December 3, 1985 decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Case No. AB-4-10-10849-81 [should
be NLRC-NRC Case No. 10-4473-83],[1]
entitled “Maxima R. Soriano v. Shoemart, Inc.” The NLRC modified the April 26, 1985
decision of the Labor Arbiter which sustained the termination/dismissal of
respondent employee by Shoemart, Inc., but directed
the latter to pay the former certain short payments and withheld payments in
the total amount of P199.26. The
respondent Commission ordered the reinstatement of the private respondent.
Respondent Maxima R. Soriano was
employed by petitioner Shoemart, Inc., on July 5, 1973, as salesclerkĀ-invoicer in its cosmetics department.
On March 17, 1981,
Shoemart sent Soriano a
notice of termination on the ground of abandonment of work from February 13, 1981 to March 17, 1981. Soriano, in turn,
filed a complaint with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment (Case No. AB-4-10849-81) for illegal dismissal and certain money claims. While the case was pending before the labor
arbiter, Soriano was allowed to resume work on July 21, 1981 at the Company’s Cubao store.
Despite Soriano’s reinstatement, trial
proceeded but only on the issue of money claims. On December
7, 1981 a decision was rendered by the Labor Arbiter in favor of
Maxima Soriano, the decretal
portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, respondent SHOEMART, INC., of 627 C. Palanca Sr., St., San Miguel, Manila, is directed to pay
complainant MAXIMA SORIANO in care of Attorney Felixberto
Boquiren, 5th Floor, Maritima
Bldg., 117 DasmariƱas St., Manila, the amount of FIVE
THOUSAND SEVENTY PESOS AND 63/100 (P5,070.63), as backwages, service incentive leave and overtime pay, plus
FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS as attorney’s fee.” (p. 25, Rollo-63912)
An appeal to the NLRC was dismissed in a resolution dated December 28, 1982.
On certiorari with preliminary
injunction and/or a restraining order in G.R. No. 63912 “Shoemart v. The NLRC, et al.”, the Second
Division of this Court in its resolution dated May 18, 1983 dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. (p. 44, Rollo-63912)
Meanwhile, after her reinstatement, due to a diffiĀcult
pregnancy, Soriano filed successive leaves of
absences. On September 30, 1981, when she was four (4) months
pregnant, she applied for a fifteen (15) day sick leave, September 30, 1981 to October 14, 1981 due to threatened
abortion. On October 20, 1981 she applied for four (4) months
vacation leave commencing October 21,
1981 to February 20, 1982
upon her physician’s advice to avoid possible complications in her
pregnancy. Then on February 7, 1982, Soriano
applied for forty-five (45) days maternity leave (February 21, 1982 to April 7,
1982) giving February 22, 1982
as her expected date of confinement. All
these applications were granted.
After the expiration of her maternity leave, Soriano
did not report back for work. No leave
extension having been granted nor any word sent to Shoemart
as to why she could not report for work, her continued absence was marked
unauthorized.
On April 15, 1982, Soriano sent a
notice to Shoemart stating that she had not yet
delivered her baby, and that she could have been mistaken in her
“counting.” Shoemart’s department manager
accepted the note but inĀformed its bearer (Soriano’s
husband) that Soriano should report for work on May 30, 1982. However, on May 30, 1982 and on the succeeding days, Soriano did not return to work. She did not inform Shoemart
of her condition nor give any reason for her unexplained absence. Consequently, Shoemart
was prompted to terminate her services for gross neglect of duty amounting to
abandonment of work under Article VI of its Rules and Regulations which is also
a ground for dismissal under the New Labor Code.
On October 7, 1983, Soriano filed a new
complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) [NLRC-NCR Case No.
10-4473-83] charging Shoemart with illegal dismissal,
violation of PD 1571 (integration into the basic wage of the emergency cost of
living allowances under PD 525 and PD 1123) and of the CBA wage increase of
P1.00 a day effective July 1, 1981, and withholding of SSS check for sickness
benefits in the amount of P122.70 (p. 27, Rollo).
In his decision dated April
26, 1985, the labor arbiter found Soriano’s
dismissal justified. However, he ordered
Shoemart to pay her the amount of P76.56 repreĀsenting
her short payment and unpaid P1.00 wage increase a day per existing CBA, plus
the amount of P122.70 coverĀing the withheld payment of her sickness benefits,
or a total of P199.26.” (p. 34, Rollo)
As earlier stated, the NLRC on appeal modified the decision of
the labor arbiter. It ruled that the disĀcharge
of Soriano was illegal for being violative
of procedural due process as mandated in BP Blg. 130
and ordered her reinstatement with backwages. One commissioner dissented. The NLRC decision states:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered the appealed Decision is
hereby, MODIFIED as above discussed, by ordering respondent-appellee
to reinstate complainant-appellant to her posiĀtion without loss of seniority
rights plus backwages computed from October 7, 1983
up to the time of actual reinstatement.
“Respondent-appellee are (sic)
likewise ordered to pay complainant-appellant the amount of P76.56 representing
her short payment and the unpaid P1.00 wage increase a day per the existing
CBA, plus the amount of P122.70 coverĀing the withheld payment of her sickness
benefit.
xxx xxx xxx
(p. 46, Rollo,
Decision dated December 3, 1985)
On January 23, 1986,
Shoemart filed a motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid decision. The motion was subĀsequently
denied. Hence, the present petition for certiorari.
The petitioner submits that respondent NLRC gravely abused its
discretion when it modified the decision below and decreed the reinstatement
with backwages of Soriano
despite the clear existence of a valid ground for termination.
It should be noted that respondent NLRC ordered the reinstatement
with backwages of Soriano
because it consiĀdered her dismissal as illegal for want of due process. It could not find evidence showing the
petitioner’s subsĀtantial, or at least minimum, compliance with the procedure
set forth in the rules implementing BP Blg. 130, the
pertiĀnent provisions of which state:
“RULE
XIV.
TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
“SEC. 2. Notice of dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker
shall furnish him a written notice stating the partiĀcular acts or omission
constituting the grounds for his dismissal.
In cases of abandonment of work, the notice shall be served at the
worker’s last known address.
“SEC. 5. Answer and hearing. The worker may answer the allegations stated
against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt
of such notice. The employer shall
afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the
assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
“SEC. 6. Decision to dismiss. The employer shall immediately notify a
worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.”
In its memorandum filed with this Court, dated November 14, 1986, the petitioner
admitted that it failed to comply with the mandated requirements of BP Blg. 130. (pp.
126-127, Rollo)
Shoemart rationalized its omission by
stating that a cloud of bias would have engulfed the process had it been
resorted to and that it would merely be one of formality, a farce and a mockery
of the procedural requireĀments. The
petitioner may have had some reasons for not complying with the procedures
outlined in the law but these are not sufficient to detract from the necessity
of basic fair play.
The dismissal of an employee without any formal investigation is
unwarranted. The due process requireĀment
is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with at will. Its disregard is a matter of serious concern
since it constitutes a safeguard of the highest order in response to man’s
innate sense of justice. (Miguel v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 78993, June 22, 1988)
It is clear in Section 1, Rule XIV – Implementing Regulations of
the Labor Code, that “No worker shall be
dismissed except for a just or authorized cause provided by law and after due
process.”
Thus, the two facets of this legal provision as discussed by this
Court in an earlier case (Primero v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 436 [1987]), are:
(a) the legality of the act of dismissal; that is dismissal under the
grounds provided for under Article 283 of the New Labor Code and (b) the
legality in the manner of dismissal; that is with due observance of the
procedural requirements of Sections 2, 5 and 6 of BP Blg.
130.
Conversely, illegality of the act of dismissal consĀtitutes
discharge without just case, while illegality in the manner of dismissal is
dismissal without due process.
While the Labor Code treats the nature of and the remedies
available as regards the first which are:
(1) reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority
rights and (2) payment of backwages corresĀponding to
the period from his illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement (Article 279,
Labor Code; DM Consunji, Inc. v. Pucan,
159 SCRA 113 [1988]), said Code does not deal at all with the second, that is
the manner of the dismissal, which is therefore governed exclusively by the
Civil Code. (Primero
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra)
In any event, the decisive issue which arises is whether or not
the denial of due process under the cirĀcumstances of this case makes the
dismissal for just cause so arbitrary and illegal as
to warrant reinstateĀment and payment of backwages.
While it appears that Shoemart failed
to observe due process in the termination of Soriano’s
employment, the clearly apparent conclusion in this case is that respondent Soriano is not entirely without fault. She was grossly remiss in her duties toward
her employer, as shown by her frequent,
prolonged and unexplained absences. She
was intermittently absent from September 30, 1981 to October 14, 1981 and from
October 21, 1981 until the present complaint for illegal dismissal was
filed on October 7, 1983. And while
there might have been occasions when petitioner was apprised of the reasons for
her non-appearance (e.g., Exhibit E, Letter to Shoemart
dated August 10, 1982 with copy of the death certificate of Soriano’s
father), the fact remains that from May 30, 1982 and onwards to October 7,
1983, there was absolutely no communication from her. (pp. 11-12, Private Respondent’s Memorandum)
We note that Soriano was earlier dismissed,
also for abandonment, but was allowed to work while the first case was pending
before the labor arbiter. There was
likewise misrepresentation if not deception because on February 21, 1982 the respondent filed an
application for maternity leave stating that February 22, 1982 or the following day was her expected
date of delivery. This expected date was
supported by a medical certificate
giving May 15, 1981
as
her last menstrual period. Almost two
months from the expected date or on April
15, 1982, Soriano sent word
that the baby had not yet been delivered.
The Labor Arbiter not only found the delay “unusual” but the
alleged misĀcarriage of that same child on August 4, 1982 was declared “highly unbelievable and
improbable.” (p. 30, Rollo)
Otherwise stated, the
petitioner was justified in assuming that Soriano was
no longer interested in resuming her employment. “Abandonment” of work is
manifest. It can not be said that
Soriano was not aware of the consequences of her acts
under the circumstances of this case.
The petitioner cannot be faulted for not continuing Soriano
in her employment.
In the final analysis, respondent Soriano
was afforded due process although belatedly before the Labor Arbiter and then
before the NLRC. As we have ruled, the
purpose of the law is to insure that the employer’s prerogative to dismiss or
lay-off an employee is exercised without abuse of discretion or
arbitrariness. The proceedings before
the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission have upheld this
guarantee. The rights of the employee
have been effectively safeguarded. (Piedad v. Lanao del Norte
Electric Cooperative Inc., 153 SCRA 511 [1987])
In fact, Shoemart generously reinstated
her while the first case was pending.
But the events that transĀpired thereafter,
proved without question, that she is an inveterate absentee who does not
deserve reinstatement.
In a recent case (Wenphil
Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission and Roberto Mallare, G.R. No.
80587, February 8, 1989), under circumstances similar to the case at bar, this
Court, without condoning the employer’s failure to extend to an employee his
right to an investigation before causing his dismissal, sustained the dismissal
of the respondent employee where his dismissal was found to be for just and
authorized cause in an appropriate proceeding in the Ministry of Labor and
Employment. Thus, said the Court,
“It will be highly prejudicial to the interests of the employer to impose
on him the services of an employee who has been shown to be guilty of the
charges that warranted his dismissal from employment. Indeed, it will demoralize the rank and file
if the undeserving, if not undesirable remains in the service (Wenphil Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
et al., supra).
For failure to observe the procedural requirements, a sanction
was imposed by this Court on the employer to indemnify the dismissed
employee. It was held however, that the
measure of the award depends on the facts of each case and the gravity of the
omission committed by the employer (ibid).
We take into account the following circumstances stressed by the
petitioner in its memorandum:
“1. Private Respondent was absent from work from May 30, 1982 to October 7, 1983 or a period of one (1) year, four
(4) months and nine (9) days;
ā2. Such prolonged absence from work was without
any valid notice or leave from Petitioner-Company;
“3. Such absence was not by reason of any illness,
disease or like ailments;
“4. Private Respondent despite opportunity to resume
employment deliberately refused to report back for work; and,
“5. The NLRC found Private Respondent guilty of
negligence of duty.” (p. 128, Rollo)
In view of the length of service of the private respondent with Shoemart, however, we apply the precedent in Wenphil v. NLRC, et al., (supra) where
a P1,000.00 indemnity was given to the dismissed
employee for the failure of the employer to strictly comply with the
requirements of due process.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission dated December 23, 1985
is REVERSED insofar as its order of reinstatement with backwages
is concerned. Petitioner Shoemart, Inc. is, however, ordered to indemnify the
private respondent in the amount of P1,000.00. The P76.56 short payment, P1.00 wage increase
a pay per the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement, and the P122.70
sickness benefit payment ordered by the respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), no part.
[1] AB-4-10-10849-81
is the first case already decided by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 63912, āShoemart, Inc. v. NLRC, et al.ā, May 18, 1983.