FEDERATION OF DEMOCRATIC TRADE UNIONS (FDTU) AND RIK RAK INTERNATIONAL, INC., (RRI), PETITIONERS, VS. PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG PAGGAWA AND DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS (BLR)…

Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order to annul and set aside the decision and order, dated 11 March
1986 and 10 April 1986, respectively,
of public respondent Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, ordering the holding
of a certification election
among the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner Rik
Rak International, Inc. and denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.

The facts of the case are not disputed.

On 1 April 1985, a collective bargaining agreement^[1]
good and effective for three (3) years was entered into and executed by Rik Rak
International (RRI, for short) and the Federation
of Democratic Trade Unions (FDTU, for short), both petitioners herein.  The collective bargaining agreement was duly
filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment as required by law.

On 6 June 1985, or just
about two (2) months after the
conclusion of the collective bargaining agreement, private respondent Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (KILUSAN, for short)
filed a petition for certification election with the Med-Arbiter.  RRI opposed the petition, invoking the
contract-bar rule and prayed that the petition for certification election be
dismissed.  KILUSAN filed a reply to RRI’s opposition, alleging that the collective bargaining
agreement was null and void as it was entered into only for the purpose of
defeating the rights of the workers to self-organization and collective
bargaining.  FDTU, for its part, filed a
motion to intervene and alleged therein that KILUSAN’s
act, in filing the petition, constitutes union raiding, which is violative of existing government policy.

On 22
August 1985, the
Med-Arbiter^[2] issued an order dismissing the petition
based on the contract-bar rule.  On the
same date, KILUSAN and its members
declared a strike. 
On the following day, RRI
filed a notice of lockout.  The labor
dispute was thereafter referred to the
Minister of Labor and Employment who, on 30 August 1985, issued an order, the dispositive
part of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the Minister of Labor and Employment, pursuant to
Article 264 (g) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, hereby
assumes jurisdiction over the unresolved issues and pending cases before the
NCR-Arbitration branch of the NLRC, between the Samahang
Manggagawa sa Rik-Rak and Rik-Rak International
including the pending representation issue docketed as Case No.
NCR-LRD-M-6-234-85.

All striking workers/employees are directed to immediately left
(sic) the picket and to return to work within forty-eight (48) hours from
receipt of this Order and the management to accept them back under the same
terms and conditions prevailing prior to the work stoppage.

The Bureau is directed to hear the dispute and submit its
recommendation within twenty (20) days from submission of the position papers
of the parties”^[3].

On 12 September 1985,
KILUSAN appealed the decision of the Med-Arbiter (dismissing the petition for
certification election) to the Director, Bureau of Labor Relations.  The decision was reversed and a certification
election was ordered among the rank-and-file employees of RRI, within twenty
(20) days from receipt of said decision dated 11 March 1986^[4].  Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration.  This was denied in an
order dated 10 April 1986^[5]:  hence, the present recourse.

As prayed for by petitioners, a temporary restraining order was
issued by this Court on 30 April 1986.

In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor
General, representing public respondent, recommends that the petition be given
due course, that the questioned orders
be declared null and void; and, that public respondent be directed to comply
with the order of the Minister of Labor dated 30 August 1985^[6].

The Court finds the
recommendations of the Solicitor General proper and in order.

The issue for resolution
in this petition is whether or not public respondent Director, Bureau of Labor
Relations, had jurisdiction to resolve the labor dispute between petitioners
and KILUSAN.

To recapitulate, the
Minister of Labor, in his order dated 30 August 1985, directed public
respondent Director, Bureau of Labor Relations “to hear the dispute and
submit its (his) recommendation within twenty (20) days from submission of the
position papers of the parties”. 
Public respondent, instead of complying with the order of the Minister
of Labor, took cognizance of the case and resolved the issues presented by the
parties.  His acts, according to the
Solicitor General, with whom We agree, constitute grave abuse of
discretion.  The Solicitor General
states:

“Respondent official
failed to adhere faithfully to the two fold directive of the Minister of Labor
to hear the dispute on the representation case (No. NCR-LRD-M-6-234-85) and
to submit his recommendation
thereon.  Thus, instead of conducting a
hearing, he took cognizance of the motion for reconsideration of the
med-arbiter’s decision filed by respondent Kilusan
and proceeded to treat it as an appeal. 
Also, instead of submitting a recommendation to the
Minister of Labor and letting him finally decide the case, respondent official
preempted the role and, on his own, decided the case.  Undoubtedly, respondent official completely
ignored the Labor Minister’s mandate.  In
so doing, he acted without jurisdiction and his assailed orders are therefore
null and void.  Notedly,
respondent union made no attempt in its comment to refute the arguments
relating to respondent official’s lack of jurisdiction, much less, to state the
legal basis for the latter’s acts”^[7].

Although the issue of certification election may not be strictly
proper for resolution in the instant petition, we deem it necessary to resolve
the same to avoid further delay in the disposition of the case.

According to KILUSAN, the contract-bar rule cannot be made to
apply in the case at bar, because of the patent invalidity of the collective
bargaining agreement.  KILUSAN contends
that of the signatories to said collective bargaining agreement, numbering
eighty (80), only fifty (50) thereof are qualified while the remaining thirty
(30) do not even belong to the rank-and-file but to the managerial level.

The above contentions are mere allegations.  No substantial proof was presented by KILUSAN
to establish its claim.  As correctly
found by the Med-Arbiter:

” x x x.  We cannot
subscribe to the petitioner’s (KILUSAN’s) contention
for the simple reason that petitioner union has not presented proof to
disqualify the other thirty employees who approved and ratified the CBA except
the “Pahayag ng Matinding Pagtutol sa CBA ng Rik-Rak
International-FDTU” executed by fifty nine (59) employees.  In fact, eight of the signatories to the
petition signed the CBA ratification.  As
established herein, the number of employees who ratified the CBA is greater
than those who opposed it.  In other
words, majority of the employees in the bargaining unit ratified the CBA which
is an indispensable requirement for the submission of the CBA.  Besides, the CBA ratification was
corroborated by the sworn statement of the President and Secretary of the intervenor union to the effect that the CBA was ratified by
the general membership and the CBA was posted in the premises of the company as
certified to by the company’s Personnel Manager.  All this proved the fact that the CBA has
been duly submitted with all the requirements provided by law”^[8].

In Trade Unions of the
Philippines and Allied  Services vs. Inciong, the Court said:

“We find no merit in the petition.  As observed by the Solicitor General, while
the petition of TUPAS for a certification election may have the written support
of 30% of all the workers of the bargaining unit, it is also an undisputed fact
that UMI has a clear majority of the said workers, as shown by the fact that 499 workers out of the total working
force of 641 have not only ratified the collective bargaining agreement
concluded between UMI and LUSTEVECO, but also affirmed their membership in UMI
so that there is no more need for holding a certification election. 
He said:

“True, TUPAS’ petition for certification election has the
written support of 30% of all the employees in the bargaining unit.  But it is equally undisputable that herein
respondent union possesses a clear majority of said employees.  And this is unequivocably
shown in the document marked as Annex ‘A’ of herein respondent union’s appeal
to the Bureau of Labor Relations wherein 499 employees out of a total working force of 641
signified not only their ratification of the collective bargaining agreement
concluded between respondent union and the company but, more importantly, their
affirmation of membership in Union de Marinos de
Iloilo.  x x x

“Considering, therefore, that the overwhelming majority of the
employees in the bargaining unit have recognized the Union de Marinos de Iloilo (respondent union) as their sole
collective bargaining agent, the issue of majority
choice no longer exists, thereby, clearing away the need for a certification election which entails tremendous expenses and causes
disruption of the company’s business, not to mention the fact that such an
election generally brings about disharmony among employees.  Indeed, such a situation is not salutary to
the purposes of the Labor Code”^[9].

Indeed, a valid and
subsisting collective bargaining agreement between RRI and FDTU exists and is a
bar to the filing of a petition for certification election.  The law on the matter is Article 257 of the
Labor Code, as amended, which provides:

“No certification election issue shall be entertained if a
collective bargaining agreement which has been submitted in accordance with
Article 231 of the Code exists between the employer and a legitimate labor organization except within sixty (60) days
prior to the expiration of the life of such collective agreement”.

The cited provision of
law is clear.  Except within the sixty (60) day freedom period, no
certification election petition
may be entertained during the lifetime of a collective bargaining agreement.  There is
no doubt that KILUSAN’s petition for
certification election was filed on 6 June 1985 or during the lifetime of the
collective bargaining agreement, in
fact, barely (2) months after its inception. 
The contract-bar rule therefore applies.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.  The
decision and order of public respondent Director, Bureau of Labor Relations dated 11 March 1986 and
10 April 1986, are hereby ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Med-Arbiter, dated 23 August 1985, is
hereby reinstated.  The temporary
restraining order issued by the Court on 30 April 1986 is hereby made permanent.  With costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera,
Paras, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Annex C, Rollo p. 14

^[2]
Med-Arbiter Rasidali C. Abdullah

^[3]
Rollo, pp. 40-41

^[4]
Rollo, pp. 11-12

^[5]
Rollo, p. 13-a

^[6]
Rollo, p. 90

^[7]
Rollo, pp. 89-90

^[8]
Decision of the Med-Arbiter, p. 4

^[9]
115 SCRA 847, 851-852