JUNE PRILL BRETT, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND, JAMES BRETT, PETITIONERS, VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES, HEIRS OF JOHN GUILLES, SR. AND MARIA GUILLE…

These two consolidated
petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seek to annul the
following decisions of respondent court, to wit:  (1) In G.R. No. 74223, the decision^[1] dated January 15, 1986 in AC-G.R. SP No. 05589 dismissing therein petitioner’s original action for certiorari
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (2) In G.R. No. 77098, the
decision^[2] dated October 24, 1986 in CA-G.R. SP No.
09349 dismissing therein petitioners’ petition for certiorari on the
ground that there is a pending appeal by petitioners in the Office of the
President and another similar petition pending with this Court.

I. The antecedental facts which spawned
the filing of the cases below are hereunder set forth as synthesized by
respondent court in the assailed decisions.^[3]

1.    G.R. No. 74223

On September 2, 1980, the
Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences rendered a decision declaring and
recognizing the preferential right of therein petitioner June Prill Brett to explore, develop, exploit and lease the area
covered by her “MAMAKAR” mining claims situated at Sitio Palasaan, Barrio Suyoc, Municipality of Mankayan, Benguet.  This
decision was appealed by private
respondents to the then Ministry of Natural Resources.

On October
6, 1982, respondent
Minister of Natural Resources dismissed the appeal.  From this dismissal, private respondents
heirs of John and Maria Guilles interposed an appeal
on November 4, 1982 to the Office of the President, docketed therein as MNR Case No. 5096,
but failed to prosecute the same.  Private
respondents later filed their respective motions for reconsideration which,
however, proved to be belated as the decision of respondent Minister had
already become final and executory.

The finality of the
decision notwithstanding, respondent Minister of Natural Resources rendered
another decision in the same MNR Case No. 5096 on June 25, 1984, reversing and setting aside the decision of
October 6, 1982 and declaring petitioner’s “MAMAKAR” claims as null and void ab initio.

On July 25,
1984, petitioner
sought the reconsideration of the decision and prayed for a status
quo order.  The Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs of the
Office of the Minister of Natural Resources issued the status quo
order on August 20, 1984 and directed the respondents to answer the motion within five (5) days
from receipt of the order.  However, none
of the respondents complied therewith.

On February 19, 1985, with the motion for
reconsideration still unresolved,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for preliminary injunction, before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 69937, for the nullification of the
decision of respondent Minister of Natural Resources dated June 25, 1984 and to
restrain public respondent from further
proceeding in said case.  Petitioner
contended that respondent Minister acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in rendering said decision.

On February 27, 1985,
this Court resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals (then
Intermediate Appellate Court) for determination.  On March
7, 1985, respondent court initially dismissed the petition for
being premature inasmuch as petitioner had an unresolved motion for
reconsideration pending in the Office of the Minister of Natural Resources.

On March 27, 1985,
petitioner prayed for the reconsideration of the dismissal and informed
respondent court that her motion for reconsideration had been denied by the
Minister of Natural Resources on January
31, 1985, notice of which she received only on February 25, 1985.  Petitioner also filed with this Court on March 1, 1985 an addendum to the
petition giving the same information, not knowing that said petition had been
referred to respondent court.

On April 10, 1985,
respondent court reconsidered its decision dismissing the petition.  Nevertheless, it thereafter ruled against
petitioner, holding that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies
and for which the petition must be
dismissed.  It cited Section 50,
Presidential Decree No. 463, as authority for its ruling, as follows:

“Sec. 50.  Appeals
– Any party not satisfied with the decision or order of the Director may within
five (5) days from receipt thereof, appeal to the Secretary.  Decisions of the Secretary are likewise appealable within five (5) days from receipt thereof by the
affected party to the President of the Philippines
whose decision shall be final and executory.”

x x
x

Corollarily, respondent court declared that it had no
authority to grant petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation of the questioned decision
as it is precluded from doing so by Presidential Decree No. 605, thus:

“SECTION 1.  No court of
the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case
involving or growing out of the issuance, approval or disapproval, revocation
or suspension of, or any action whatsoever by the proper administrative
official or body on concessions, licenses, permits, patents or public grants of
any kind in connection with the disposition, exploitation, utilization,
exploration and/or development of the natural resources of the
Philippines.”

Hence, the instant
petition.

2.    G.R. No. 77098

On March
24, 1986, after the
Brett spouses filed the above-mentioned petition in this Court, James Brett
wrote a letter to the newly appointed Minister of Natural Resources Ernesto Maceda praying that the former minister’s decision of June 25,
1984 be
rectified.  In an order dated June 10, 1986, respondent Minister Maceda did set aside Minister Teodoro
Peña’s aforesaid decision and reinstated the ministry’s original decision of October
6, 1982 and that of
the Director of Mines in favor of Brett.

Upon being notified of
Minister Maceda’s decision against them, on June 19,
1986 petitioners filed with this Court in the pending case G.R. No. 74223 a
petition to declare the order of June 10, 1986 issued by respondent Minister Maceda ineffectual, null, void and illegal for having been
issued without jurisdiction.

Four days later,  or on June 23, 1986, they also filed before
respondent court a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
09349, praying that respondents therein be enjoined from enforcing the order
and that the same be declared null and void.

Petitioners likewise sent
an appeal to the Office of the President, docketed as O.P. Case No. 3360,
praying for the reversal of the order of June 10, 1986. 
Acting thereon, said office, through Assistant Executive Secretary Magdangal Elma, ordered the Ministry to elevate the
records of MNR Case No. 5096, the appellant to pay the appeal fee of P50.00,
and the parties to file their respective
memoranda.

Subsequently ruling on
the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 09349 in a decision dated October
24, 1986, respondent
court found merit in said petition but nonetheless dismissed the same, taking
note of the fact that there is an appeal by petitioners of respondent minister’s
decision pending in the Office of the President.  Furthermore, it cited Section 17 of the Interim Rules of Court which provides that
“no petition for certiorari may be filed in the Intermediate
Appellate Court if another similar petition has been filed or is still pending
in the Supreme Court,” a violation of the rule being a ground for the
dismissal of both petitions.

On these facts rests this
second petition.

II. Shorn of
unnecessary details, the issues formulated and raised by the parties in the
aforesaid two petitions, and their respective contentions thereon, are
succinctly discussed hereunder seriatim.

1.    G.R. No. 74223

In her so-called
assignment of errors, June Prill Brett faults
respondent court for not holding that respondent minister acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion and asks us to
resolve –

(a)  Whether or not
respondent court erred in dismissing petitioner’s original action for certiorari
on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies; and

(b)  Whether or not
respondent court erred in invoking Presidential Decree No. 605 to deny
petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.^[4]

In amplification of her
plaint, June Prill Brett contends that the case at
bar is an instance where resort to administrative remedies was no longer
necessary and advisable since it is one where the recognized exceptions
to the doctrine come into play.  She
manifestly refers to, among the other exceptions,
Minister Peña’s alleged patent lack of jurisdiction in reversing his previous
decision which she claims had already become final and executory.  Concerning respondent court’s invocation of
Presidential Decree No. 605, she submits that the same does not authorize the courts to shed or abdicate
their inherent judicial authority.

On the other hand, all of
the private respondents make the riposte that Section 50, Presidential
Decree No. 463 provides for and thereby constitutes a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy to contest and seek a review and reversal of the decision of Minister Peña.  June Prill Brett having failed to avail of the same, she cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the courts. 
As an offshoot, private respondents point out that her failure to
perfect a timely appeal to the Office of the President rendered the June 25,
1984 decision of
Minister Peña final and executory.  Minister Maceda,
therefore, overstepped his authority in rendering the June 10,
1986 decision which
should be declared null and void ab initio.

2.    G.R. No. 77098

On their part, the heirs
of John Guilles, Sr. desire a resolution on whether
or not respondent court erred in dismissing their original action for certiorari
on the ground of the pendency of their appeal in the
Office of the President and a similar petition with this Court.^[5]

Said heirs explain that
what they did was only to write a personal letter to the President complaining
about the alleged unwarranted action by respondent Minister Maceda.  The letter,
so it is alleged, was unsubscribed and unsworn and,
therefore, should not be considered as “a remedy in the course of law.” With regard to the
petition filed with this Court, these heirs of John Guilles,
Sr. claim that the same was intended only to be a manifestation but was erroneously captioned as a “petition.”
In any event, they insist that their case
falls under the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, the order of June 10,
1986 having been issued without jurisdiction and without giving them an opportunity to be heard.

June Prill
Brett, on the other hand, adheres to the findings of respondent court.  She moreover adopts the explanation made by
Minister Maceda in his comment filed in G.R. No.
74223 to the effect that the order of June 10, 1986 was issued in the exercise
of his office’s inherent power to correct its orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice and under respondent minister’s authority as alter
ego of the President pursuant to
Section 2, Article IV of Proclamation No. 3, otherwise known as the
“Freedom Constitution of the Philippines,” to review all contracts,
concessions, permits or other forms of privileges for the exploration,
development, exploitation or utilization
of natural resources entered into, granted, issued or acquired before the date
of said proclamation, and when the national interest requires, to amend, modify
or revoke them.

III.  We find merit in and
consequently sustain the petition in G.R. No. 74223.

It is true that in our
jurisdiction, unless otherwise provided by law or required by public interest,
before bringing an action in or resorting to the courts of justice, all
remedies of administrative character affecting or determinative of the
controversy at that level should first be exhausted by the aggrieved party.^[6]

It is likewise true,
however, that the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule.^[7] Foremost among the exceptions is when the assailed
act, order or decision is patently illegal or was performed or issued without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.^[8]

In the case at bar, it is
our considered opinion that the decision in question, dated June 25,
1984, is of such a
defective nature.  The decision, it
superseded, dated October 6, 1982, was already final and executory,
the belated motions for reconsideration by all the private respondents in G.R.
No. 74223 being patently time-barred.  Of
course, the aforesaid heirs of John and Maria Guilles
did file a timely appeal but they likewise failed to prosecute the same.  It is obvious and indisputable, therefore,
that respondent Minister Peña gravely abused his
discretion in reversing his original decision which precisely prompted June Prill Brett to forthwith invoke the jurisdiction of the
courts.

The circumstance that the
June 25, 1984
decision was rendered without jurisdiction is itself confirmed by respondent
court in CA-G.R. SP No. 09349 which is the subject of our review in G.R. No.
77098, to wit:

“The decision dated October 6, 1982 of
the Minister of Natural Resources in MNR Case No. 5096 which the Heirs of Guilles received on October 25, 1982, became final on
October 30, 1982 since it was not appealed to the Office of the President
pursuant to Section 50 of P.D. No. 463, which provides:

‘Sec. 50.  Any party not
satisfied with the decision or order of the Director may, within five (5) days
from receipt thereof, appeal to the Secretary. 
Decisions of the Secretary are likewise appealable
within five (5) days from receipt thereof by the affected party to the
President of the Philippines
whose decision shall be final and executory.  (P.D. 463)’

“Instead of pursuing their appeal in
the Office of the President, the petitioners filed a belated motion for
reconsideration in the Ministry after Minister Peña
had lost jurisdiction to review, revise, or reverse his decision because it had
already become final.  Consequently, his
amended decision of June 25, 1984
was void for lack of jurisdiction.”^[9]

Indeed, as therein
petitioner June Prill Brett pointed out, the
necessity of giving finality to judgments that are not void is
self-evident.  The interests of society
impose it.  The opposing view might make litigation more
unendurable than the wrongs it is
intended to redress.  It would create
doubt, real or imaginary, and controversy would constantly arise as to what the
judgment or order was.  Public policy and
sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of
courts should become final and executory at some
definite time fixed by law;^[10] and this rule holds true over decisions
rendered by administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial powers.^[11]

It is noteworthy that none
of the private respondents in G.R. No. 74223 ever mentioned anything in their
pleadings filed with this Court nor squarely met June Prill Brett’s allegation that Minister Peña’s
decision of October 6, 1982
had become final and executory.  They were
obviously avoiding the issue, mindful that the same would be detrimental to
their case.  That allegation of the
decision being final and executory was, however,
established as a fact by respondent court.  We certainly cannot gloss over such finding
which has remained uncontroverted and undisputed by
said private respondents.

Going back to the subject
of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, June Prill
Brett’s failure to appeal to the Office of the President from the decision of
Minister Peña cannot also be considered a violation
of the rule as the latter is the alter ego
of the President and, under the doctrine of qualified political agency, his
action is deemed to be that of the President.^[12]

Parenthetically, while
the original action for certiorari cannot be made a substitute for
appeal,^[13] Minister Peña’s
lack of jurisdiction to render the questioned decision,^[14] as well as the nullity of the decision
itself,^[15] constitute the exceptions which would
justify June Prill Brett’s resort to the special
civil action for certiorari in lieu of the appeal provided for by
Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 463.  We may also add to these considerations the
urgency for judicial intervention^[16]
called for by the fact that, as specifically
provided in said provision itself, the decision of respondent Minister of
Natural Resources becomes executory despite an
appeal to the Office of the President.

We shall not, for the
nonce, pass judgment on respondent court’s refusal to restrain the execution of
respondent Minister Peña’s decision under the
authority of Presidential Decree No. 605 since the resolution of the issue
raised by June Prill Brett on the matter, i.e., that
it does not authorize the court to divest itself of its inherent judicial
authority, would entail an inquiry into
the constitutional validity of
the decree which we are not disposed to do in the present case since the
controversy can be resolved on grounds other than constitutional.^[17] For that matter, under our disposition of
these cases there is no necessity for resolving this issue.

All told, we hold that respondent court erred in dismissing June Prill Brett’s action for certiorari for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.

IV. We are, on the other hand, constrained to reject and deny the
petition in G.R. No. 77098 for being devoid of merit.

Even conceding that the pleading filed by the heirs of John Guilles, Sr. with this Court was only a manifestation and
not a petition to annul the order of Minister Maceda,
it is of record that said heirs have a perfected and pending appeal with the
Office of the President.  Whether the
appeal was perfected by filing a formal notice of appeal or a mere unsworn and unsubscribed personal letter is of no
moment.  The fact is that the Office of
the President has taken cognizance of the case as one for its appellate review and has in fact ordered the parties to file
their respective memoranda therein.

Under the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, courts cannot and will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative
tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact and where a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with
the purposes of the regulatory statute administered.^[18]

Applying the principle in
the case at bar, respondent court correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari
of the heirs of John Guilles, Sr. on the ground that
there is a pending appeal filed by said heirs in the Office of the
President.  Indeed, the award of mining
claims is more of an executive, and less of a judicial, function.  Also, the issue as to the validity of the authority
under which then respondent Minister Ernesto Maceda
issued the order of June 10, 1986, which reversed the void decision of June 25,
1984, can be
competently determined by the executive department at the initial stage of the
quasi-judicial proceeding therein.

While it may plausibly be
contended that the case for the heirs of John Guilles,
Sr. could also fall under the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, just like that of June Prill
Brett in G.R. No. 74223 and thereby justify their
immediate coming to court, there is a marked difference in their respective
positions.  Petitioner June Prill Brett, in G.R. No. 74223, never appealed to
the Office of the President, unlike the heirs of John Guilles, Sr. in G.R. No. 77098.  This
spelled the difference.

In any event, the order
of respondent Minister Maceda is only
confirmatory of the decision of October
6, 1982.  It in fact reinstated the said decision and noted
that it had become final and executory for which reason the June 25, 1984 decision was void and of no force and effect.

WHEREFORE, judgment
is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the assailed decision of respondent Court of
Appeals in G.R. No. 77098 and ANNULLING
its decision in G.R. No. 74223. 
The decision of respondent Minister Teodoro Peña, dated
October 6, 1982,
is also hereby REINSTATED without prejudice to the appeal in the Office of the President taking its due course and the consequent adjudication thereof.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman),
Padilla, and Sarmiento,
JJ., concur.

Paras, J., no part. Son is with Sycip.

^[1]
Penned by Justice Luis A. Javellana, with Justices Edgardo L. Paras and Vicente V. Mendoza
concurring.

^[2]
Penned by Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, with
Justices Leonor Ines-Luciano
and Emeterio C. Cui, concurring.

^[3]
G.R. No. 74223, Rollo, 19-20; G.R. No. 77098, Rollo, 15-17.

^[4]
Ibid., 5.

^[5]
Ibid., 11.

^[6]
Miguel, et al. vs. Vda. de Reyes, et al., 93
Phil. 542 (1953); Pestañas, et al. vs. Dyogi, et al., 81 SCRA 574 (1978).

^[7]
Fernandez, et al. vs. Cuneta, etc., et. al., 108 Phil. 427 (1960); National
Development Company, et al. vs. Collector of Customs of Manila, 118 Phil. 1265 (1963).

^[8]
Visca vs. Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, et al., 173 SCRA 222 (1989).

^[9]
Rollo, G.R. No. 77098, 18.

^[10]
Dy Cay, etc. vs. Crossfield
& O’Brien, 38 Phil. 521 (1918); Layda, et al. vs.
Legazpi, et al., 39 Phil. 83 (1918); Contreras, et
al. vs. Felix, et al., 78
Phil. 570 (1947).

^[11]
San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 174 SCRA 258 (1989).

^[12]
Gonzales vs. Hechanova, etc., et al., 9 SCRA
230 (1963); Santos, etc., et al. vs.
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 19 SCRA 637 (1967); Almine vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 80719,
September 26, 1989.

^[13]
Lobete vs. Sundiam,
etc., et al., 123 SCRA 95 (1983).

^[14]
Aguilar vs. Tan, et al., 31 SCRA 205 (1970); Bautista, et al. vs. Sarmiento, etc., et al., 138 SCRA
587 (1985).

^[15]
Marcelo vs. De Guzman, et al., 114 SCRA 657 (1982).

^[16]
Vda. de Saludes vs. Pajarillo, et al., 78 Phil. 754 (1947).

^[17]
Alger Electric, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 135 SCRA 37 (1985);
Filipinas Marble Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,
142 SCRA 180 (1986).

^[18]
Qualitrans Limousine Service, Inc. vs. Royal
Class Limousine Service, et al., G.R. Nos. 79886-87, November 22, 1989.