MANUELA S. CATAN/M.S. CATAN PLACEMENT AGENCY, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, AMELIA DE PEREIRA AND EDUARDO DE PEREIRA, RESPONDENTS.

Eduardo de Pereira was recruited by M.S. Catan Placement Agency
on September 4, 1979 to work as an electrical maintenance operator for Al Gihaz
Establishment Power Plant in Saudi Arabia.^[1]
His employment contract (and the supplement thereto) provided inter alia
that:

1.  his term of employment was for two (2) years
or twenty-four (24) months;

2.  he was entitled to a thirty-day paid vacation
leave upon completion of twelve (12) months of continuous service, but the
precise time of enjoyment of the leave would be determined by Al Gihaz in
“accordance with work convenience.”

He claims that after
completing a year’s continuous service at the Al Gihaz Power Plant, he requested
for his thirty-day paid vacation leave pursuant to his contract,3 but the response of his employer, a Mr. Abusame,
was utterly unexpected and grossly oppressive, for what Abusame did was, in
Pereira’s own words, to go to “the site of operation (accompanied by
police officers) to discuss the matter with the people manning the power plant,
(and then to require) ** Pereira together with his companions ** who were on
duty ** to board the police
van” after which they were jailed without any reason whatever; “**
(that) Mr. Abusame told the police that ** Pereira and his two companions
sabotaged the operations of the power plant (and) ** at this juncture ** Mr.
Abusame told them to sign another two (2) year contract written in Arabic”
and that “(they) refused and/or objected because they could not understand
the contents” but “had no choice but to sign the ** contract as a
condition of their release from jail.” Forthwith, Pereira sought the
assistance of the Philippine Embassy for his repatriation but was only able to
return to the Philippines after paying the sum of US $950.00 for his plane fare
and other processing fees to M.S. Catan, who was then in Saudi Arabia.4

Once back in Manila,
Pereira lost no time in lodging a complaint with the Bureau of Employment
Services of the Ministry of Labor and Employment against M.S. Catan Placement
Agency and/or Manuela S. Catan, for recovery of damages arising from breach of
contract.5 After due proceedings, the POEA-Worker’s Assistance and Adjudication
Office rendered a decision in Pereira’s favor, ordering Manuela S. Catan to pay
him the following:

a)  his salary for the unserved and/or unexpired
portion of his employment contract: 
twelve (12) months;

b)  his allowance for said twelve (12) months;

c)  his unpaid wages for one and a half (1 1/2)
months;

d)  reimbursement of the actual cost of one-way
plane fare, exit visa and passporting and processing fees; and

e)  attorney’s fees.6

Catan filed a motion for
reconsideration and when this was denied, appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission.  The NLRC however
affirmed the decision appealed from, and subsequently denied Catan’s motion for
reconsideration of that affirmance.

Catan is now before this
Court on a petition for certiorari7 alleging that the NLRC acted in excess of
its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that:

1. the denial of Pereira’s request for vacation
leave with pay constituted breach of the employment contract;

2.  she (Catan) is liable to Pereira for salaries
and allowances accruing during the unexpired portion of the employment
contract;

3.  Pereira’s income earned during the unexpired
portion of his contract should not be deducted from the awards adjudicated;

4.  Catan is liable to Pereira for unpaid wages
despite abandonment of work;

5.  Pereira is entitled to receive from Catan
reimbursement of the actual cost of one-way plane fare as well as exit visa fee
and passporting and processing fees although he had himself admitted having
paid these to his foreign employer.

An analysis of Pereira’s
sworn declarations generates perplexing questions.  If Pereira could not understand the document
that he was being forced to sign because it was written in Arabic, how could he
assert that it was in truth another two-year employment contract?  No answer can be given on the face of the
record.  Again, if Pereira and his
companions had indeed sabotaged the operations of the power plant — as was the
belief, according to Pereira, entertained by his employer, Abusame — why would
Abusame be so eager and so insistent to sign them up for another two-year
employment contract?  This simply makes
no sense, specially if it be considered that their original contract still had
one year to run, as is the uncontroverted fact.

“Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from a credible
witness but must be logical in itself such as the common experience of mankind
can approve as probable under the circumstances.  We have no test of the truth of human
testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience. 
Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous, and is outside
of juridical cognizance.”8

The patently illogical
and unnatural features of Pereira’s evidence make it undeserving of credence;
and that they were apparently ignored and not taken into account in the general
assessment of the proofs presented by the parties indicates capriciousness and
whimsicality, constituting grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC.  These
unprepossessing features infest and taint the very facts which form the
foundation of Pereira’s cause of action; hence, the conclusions of the POEA
based on those facts must be set aside. 
Unfortunately, this leaves Pereira with no other evidence to adequately
make out a cause of action against petitioner Catan.  Having arrived at this conclusion, i.e., that
Pereira’s evidence does not satisfactorily establish any cause of action
against petitioner Catan, it becomes unnecessary to address the other
errors imputed by her to the POEA and the National Labor Relations Commission.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted, the writ of certiorari
prayed for is hereby issued nullifying the decisions of the POEA and the
National Labor Relations Commission complained of, and the complaint of the
private respondent is hereby dismissed. 
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Cruz, Paras, and
Gancayco, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 61-62.

2 Rollo, pp. 34-35

3 Rollo, p. 12.

4 Rollo, pp. 25-26.

5 Rollo, p. 6.

6 Rollo, pp. 22-23.

7 Under Rule 65, not Rule 45, San
Miguel v. Secretary of Labor, 64 SCRA 56.

8 People v. Ben Dayag, 56
SCRA 439, citing Vreeland v. Vreeland, 21 A 627, 631; People v.
Lacson, 53 O.G. 1823, 1838, and People vs. Alvarez, 55 SCRA 81; People vs.
Macatangay, 107 Phil. 188; People v. Beltran, 61 SCRA 246; People v.
Santos, 94 SCRA 277; People v. Romero, 117 SCRA 897; People v.
Sunga, 123 SCRA 327; People v. Flores, 125 SCRA 244; People v.
Torio, 126 SCRA 265; Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 318; and
People v. Mendoza, 137 SCRA 492.