PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ANTONIO ENRILE Y VILLAROMAN AND ROGELIO ABUGATAL Y MARQUEZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

Sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P30,000.00 for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, Antonio Enrile faults the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City for convicting him.^[1] His
co-accused, Rogelio Abugatal, was killed in an attempted jailbreak and this
appeal is dismissed as to him.^[2] We
deal here only with Enrile.

The evidence for the prosecution showed that at about half past
six in the evening of October 25, 1985, a
buy-bust team composed of Pat. Jaime Flores and Pat. Wilson Rances of
the Quezon City Police Anti-Narcotics Unit was dispatched to entrap Rogelio
Abugatal at Roosevelt Avenue in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. The plan was made on the strength of a tip given by Renato Polines, a
police informer, who was himself to pose as
the buyer.^[3]

In their separate testimonies,^[4] both
policemen said that on that occasion they saw Polines hand over to Abugatal the
marked money representing payment for the mock transaction. Abugatal left with the money and returned
ten minutes later with a wrapped object which he gave Polines. The two policemen then approached Abugatal
and placed him under arrest, at the same time confiscating the wrapped object. Subsequent laboratory examination revealed this to be marijuana
with flowering tops weighing 22 grams.^[5]

The prosecution also showed that, upon prodding, Abugatal led the
policemen to a house at 20 De
Vera Street, also in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, where he called out
for Antonio Enrile. Enrile came out and
met them at the gate. Abugatal pointed
to Enrile as the source of the
marijuana, whereupon the policemen immediately arrested and frisked him. They found in the right front pocket of his
trousers the marked money earlier delivered to Abugatal, with Serial No.
PJ966425.^[6]

At the police headquarters, Abugatal signed a sworn confession affirming
the above narration.^[7] Enrile refused to make any statement pending
consultation with a lawyer.

In his defense, Enrile testified that the marked money was
“planted” on him by the police officers, who he said simply barged
into his house without a warrant and arrested
him. He stoutly denied any knowledge of
the marijuana. He claimed that at the
time of the alleged incident, he was attending, as a dental technician, to a patient whom he was fitting for dentures.^[8] The supposed patient, Alicia Tiempo,
corroborated him.^[9]

Enrile admitted that he had earlier been convicted of selling
marijuana and that he had a pending application for probation. He suggested that this could be the reason
the policemen sought to implicate him in the new charge and thus weaken his application.^[10]

Abugatal contradicted his earlier sworn statement and declared on
the stand that he had not sold any marijuana to Polines. What really happened, he said, was that two
male teenagers approached him that evening and told him to buy marijuana,
giving him P50.00 for the purpose. When he said he did not have any marijuana and did not know where
to buy it, they forced him to go to Enrile’s house and to give him the
marked money. He did so because they
had a knife. Enrile handed him a plastic
bag which was later found to contain dried marijuana fruiting tops.^[11]

Judge Willelmo C. Fortun erred when he gave credence to the sworn
statement of Abugatal, considering that it was made without compliance with the
requisites of a
custodial investigation, including the right to the assistance of
counsel. The confession was clearly
inadmissible. It did not follow the
ruling of this Court in Morales v. Enrile,^[12] promulgated on April 26, 1983, as
reiterated in People v. Galit,^[13] promulgated on March 20, 1985,
where Justice Hermogenes Concepcion laid down the correct procedure, thus:

“7.     At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the
duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he
must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and
to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer,
a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means–by telephone if
possible–or by letter or messenger. It
shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by
the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the
waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the
procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in
part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.”

The challenged decision of the trial court was promulgated on
February 14, 1986, long after the above-cited decisions had become effective.

Even under the old doctrine, in fact, it is doubtful if
Abugatal’s confession without the assistance of counsel could have been
sustained. It was not enough then to
inform the suspect of his constitutional rights. The trial court had to ascertain for itself that the accused
clearly understood the import and consequences of his confession and had the
intelligence and mental capacity to do so.^[14]
There is no showing in the record that this was done, short of the statement in
the decision that Abugatal had been informed of his rights and had validly
waived the assistance of counsel.

If the sworn statement of Abugatal was inadmissible against him,
much less was it admissible against Enrile.

The prosecution rejected Abugatal’s testimony that he was forced
to go to Enrile’s house and buy marijuana from him, insisting instead on the
extrajudicial confession. With that confession outlawed and the
testimony disowned by the prosecution itself, there is no evidence at all
against Enrile to tie him with Abugatal.

It was Abugatal who was allegedly caught red-handed by the
policemen as he sold the marijuana to Polines. Enrile was not even at the scene of the entrapment at that time. Abugatal said he did lead the policemen to
Enrile’s house where he pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana. Even assuming this to be true, that circumstance alone did not
justify Enrile’s warrantless arrest and search.

Under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, a peace officer
or a private
person may make a warrantless arrest only under any of the following
circumstances:

(a) When, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in
fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

Paragraphs (a) and (b) are clearly inapplicable. Paragraph (b) is also not in point because
the policemen who later arrested Enrile at his house had no personal knowledge
that he was the source of the marijuana.

According to the policemen themselves, what happened was that
they asked Abugatal who gave him the marijuana and were told it was Enrile. It was for this reason that they proceeded
to Enrile’s house and immediately arrested him.^[15]

What the policemen should have done was secure a search warrant
on the basis of the information supplied by Abugatal and then, with such
authority, proceeded to search and, if the search was fruitful, arrest
Enrile. They had no right to simply force themselves
into his house on the bare (and subsequently disallowed) allegations of
Abugatal and bundle Enrile off to the police station as if he had been caught in
flagrante delicto.

The discovery of the marked money on him did not mean he was
caught in the act of selling marijuana. The marked money was not prohibited per se. Even if it were, that fact alone would not retroactively
validate the warrantless search and seizure.

The principle has been honored through the ages in all
liberty-loving regimes that a man’s house is his castle that not even the
mighty monarch, with all his forces, may violate. There were measures available under the law to enable the
authorities to search Enrile’s house and to arrest him if he was found in
possession of prohibited articles. The
police did not employ these measures.

What they did was simply intrude into Enrile’s house and arrest
him without the slightest heed to the injunctions of the Bill of Rights. By so doing, they were using the tactics of
the police state, where the minions of the government place little value on
human rights and individual liberties and are obsessed only with the
maintenance of peace and the punishment of crime.

These are laudable objectives in any well-ordered society. But it should never be pursued at the cost
of dismantling the intricate apparatus for the protection of the individual
from overzealous law-enforcers who mistakenly believe that suspected criminals
have forfeited the safeguards afforded them by the Constitution. Law-enforcers are not licensed to themselves
break the law to apprehend and punish law-breakers. Such a practice only leads to further defiance of the law by
those who have been denied its protection.

In light of the proven circumstances of this case, the Court is
not convinced that there is enough evidence to establish Enrile’s guilt beyond
the shadow of a doubt. The paucity of
such evidence only strengthens the suspicion that the marked money was really
“planted” on Enrile by the police officers who were probably worried
that their earlier efforts in securing Enrile’s conviction as a drug pusher would be thwarted by
his application for probation.

Whatever their motives, the fact is that Abugatal’s sworn
statement implicating Enrile is inadmissible against Enrile, and so is the
marked money allegedly found on him as
a result of the illegal search. The only remaining evidence against the appellant is Abugatal’s
testimony, but this has been questioned and discredited by the prosecution
itself. Its case against Enrile is thus
left without a leg to stand on and must therefore be dismissed.

Law-enforcement authorities are admonished that mere enthusiasm
in the discharge of their duties is not enough to build a case against a person charged with a crime. They should build it with painstaking care,
stone by stone of provable fact, and with constant regard for the rights of the
accused, before they can hope to secure a conviction that can be sustained in a
court of justice.

WHEREFORE, the conviction of Antonio Enrile in the
challenged decision is hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and shall be released immediately. It is so ordered.

Griño-Aquino, Bellosillo, and
Quiason, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Appellant’s Brief, Rollo pp. 72-92.

^[2]
Rollo, p. 48.

^[3]
TSN, Nov. 25, 1985, pp. 2-3.

^[4]
Ibid, pp. 3-6, 18-19.

^[5]Exh.
D, Original Records, p. 5.

^[6]
TSN, Nov. 25, 1985, pp. 1-4.

^[7]
Original Records, pp. 1-4.

^[8]
TSN, Jan. 10, 1986, p. 51.

^[9]
TSN, Jan. 29, 1986, pp. 71-72.

^[10]
TSN, Jan. 10, 1986, p. 54.

^[11]
TSN, Jan. 13, 1986, pp. 60-63, 67-68.

^[12]
121 SCRA 538.

^[13]
135 SCRA 465.

^[14]
People vs Buscato, 74 SCRA 30;
People vs Ramos, 122 SCRA 312; People vs Zea, 130 SCRA 75 citing
Us. vs De los Santos, 54 Phil. 329.

^[15]
TSN, Nov. 25, 1985, pp. 6-8.