A.M. ORETA & CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND SIXTO GRULLA, JR., RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the Resolution of the respondent
National Labor Relations Commission dated January 17, 1986 (p. 24, Rollo) in BES Case No. 81-1371 entitled,
“SIXTO GRULLA, JR., Complainant, versus A.M. ORETA & COMPANY, INC.
and/or ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CO. (ENDECO),
Respondents”, affirming the decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) awarding to private respondent herein Sixto
Grulla the salaries corresponding to the unexpired
portion of his employment contract.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Private respondent Grulla was engaged
by Engineering Construction and
Industrial Development Company (ENDECO) through A.M. Oreta
and Co., Inc. as a carpenter in its project in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.  The
contract of employment, which was entered into on June 11,
1980 was for a
period of twelve (12) months.  Respondent
Grulla left the Philippines for Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on August 5, 1980.

On August 15, 1980,
Grulla met an accident which fractured his lumbar
vertebrae while working at the jobsite. 
He was rushed to the New Jeddah Clinic and was confined there for twelve
(12) days.  On August 27, 1980, Grulla
was discharged from the hospital and was told that he could resume his normal
duties after undergoing physical therapy for two weeks.

On September 18, 1980,
respondent Grulla reported back to his Project
Manager and presented to the latter a medical certificate declaring the former
already physically fit for work.  Since
then, he started working again until he received a notice of termination of his
employment on October 9, 1980.

In December, 1981, respondent Grulla
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, recovery of medical benefits, unpaid
wages for the unexpired ten (10) months of his contract and the sum of
P1,000.00 as reimbursement of medical expenses against A.M. Oreta
and Company, Inc. and Engineering Construction and Industrial Development Co.
(ENDECO) with the Philippine Overseas and Employment Administration (POEA).

The petitioner A.M. Oreta and Company, Inc. and ENDECO filed their answer and
alleged that the contract of employment entered into between petitioners and Grulla provides, as one of the grounds for termination of
employment, violation of the rules and regulations promulgated by the
contractor; and that Grulla was dismissed because he
has not performed his duties satisfactorily within the probationary period of
three months.

On August 8,
1985, the POEA
rendered a decision (pp. 97-107, Rollo), the dispositive portion of which states, inter alia:

“In view of the foregoing, this Office finds and so holds that
complainant’s dismissal was illegal and warrants the award of his wages for the
unexpired portion of the contract.

“2. 
Anent the complainant’s claim for medical expenses, this Office
finds the same to be well-taken. 
Respondent did not deny either specifically or generally said claim.  Hence, it is deemed admitted.

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents
A.M. Oreta and Company, Inc. and its foreign
principal Engineering Construction and Industrial Development Company (ENDECO)
jointly and severally to pay complainant within ten (10) days from receipt of
this Order the sum of THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED US DOLLARS  (US $3,700.00) or its peso equivalent at the time of payment
representing complainant’s salaries for the unexpired portions of his contract
for ten (10) months and the sum of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00)
representing reimbursement of medical expenses.

“Respondent is likewise ordered to pay attorney’s fees
equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total award.

“SO
ORDERED.”

Petitioner appealed from
the adverse decision to the respondent Commission.  On January 17, 1986, respondent Commission dismissed the appeal
for lack of merit and affirmed in toto
the decision of the POEA.

On April 1, 1986,
the instant petition was filed on the ground that the respondent Commission
committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the POEA.  A temporary restraining order was issued by
this Court on April 23, 1986,
enjoining the respondents from enforcing the questioned resolution of the
respondent Commission.

The issues to be resolved in the instant case are whether or not
the employment of respondent Grulla was illegally
terminated by the petitioner; and whether or not the respondent Grulla is entitled to salaries corresponding to the
unexpired portion of his employment contract.

Petitioner contends that the respondent Grulla
was validly dismissed because the latter was still a probationary employee; and
that his dismissal was justified on the basis of his unsatisfactory performance
of his job during the probationary period. 
This contention has no merit.

Article 280 (formerly Article 281) of the Labor Code, as amended,
provides:

“Article 280. Regular
and Casual Employment.
– The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreements of the
parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has
been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in
the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employment or where the work or
service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the
duration of the season.

“An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not
covered by the preceding paragraph:  Provided,
that any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such
service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with
respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall
continue while such actually exists.”

It may be well to cite at this point Policy Instructions No. 12
of the then Minister of Labor (now Secretary of Labor and Employment) which provides:

“PD 850 has defined the concept of regular and casual
employment.  What determines regularity
or casualness is not the employment contract, written or otherwise, but the
nature of the job.  If the job is usually
necessary or desirable to the main business of the employer, then employment is
regular.  x x x.”

Petitioner admitted that respondent Grulla
was employed in the company as a carpenter for a period of twelve months before
he was dismissed on October 9, 1980.  A perusal of the employment contract reveals
that although the period of employment of respondent Grulla
is twelve (12) months, the contract period is renewable subject to future
agreement of the parties.  It is clear
from the employment contract that the respondent Grulla
was hired by the company as a regular employee and not just a mere probationary
employee.

On the matter of probationary employment, the law in point is
Article 281 (formerly Article 282) of the Labor Code which provides in part:

“Art. 281.
Probationary Employment. – x x x.  The services
of an employee who has been
engaged on a probationary basis
may be terminated for a just cause or
when he fails
to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with reasonable standards
made known by the
employer to the employee at the time of his engagement.  An
employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.”
(Emphasis ours)

The law is clear to the
effect that in all cases involving employees engaged on probationary basis, the
employer shall make known to the employee at the time he is hired, the standards
by which he will qualify as a regular employee. 
Nowhere in the employment contract executed between petitioner
company and respondent Grulla is there a
stipulation that the latter shall undergo a probationary period for three
months before he can qualify as a regular employee.  There is also no evidence on record showing
that the respondent Grulla had been apprised of his
probationary status and the requirements which he should comply in order to be
a regular employee.  In the absence of
these requisites, there is justification in concluding that respondent Grulla was a regular employee at the time he was dismissed
by petitioner.  As such, he is entitled
to security of tenure during his period of employment and his services cannot
be terminated except for just and authorized causes enumerated under the Labor
Code and under the employment contract.

Granting, in gratia argumenti,
that respondent is a probationary employee, he cannot, likewise, be removed
except for cause during the period of probation.  Although a probationary or temporary employee
has limited tenure, he still enjoys security of tenure.  During his tenure of employment or before his
contract expires, he cannot be removed except for cause as provided for by law
(Euro-Linea Phils., Inc. v.
NLRC, No. L-75782, December
1, 1987, 156 SCRA 78; Manila Hotel Corporation v. NLRC, No. L-53453, January 22, 1986, 141 SCRA 169).

Article 282 of the Labor Code sets forth the following just
causes for which an employer may terminate an employment, namely:

“(a)  
Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful
orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;

“(b)   Gross and habitual
neglect by the employee of his duties;

“(c)   Fraud or willful
breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative;

“(d)   Commission of a crime
or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate
member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and

“(e)   Other causes analogous
to the foregoing.”

The alleged ground of unsatisfactory performance relied upon by
petitioner for dismissing respondent Grulla is not
one of the just causes for dismissal provided in the Labor Code.  Neither is it included among the grounds for
termination of employment under Article VII of the contract of employment
executed by petitioner company and respondent Grulla (p. 18, Rollo).  Moreover, petitioner has failed to show proof
of the particular acts or omissions constituting the unsatisfactory performance
of Grulla of his duties, which was allegedly due to
his poor physical state after the accident. 
Contrary to petitioner’s claims, records show that the medical
certificate issued by the hospital where respondent Grulla
was confined as a result of the accident, clearly and positively stated that Grulla was already physically fit for work after he was
released from the hospital (p. 102, Rollo).

Anent the respondent
Commission’s finding of lack of due process in the dismissal of Grulla, the petitioner claims that notice and hearing are
important only if the employee is not
aware of the problems affecting
his employment; that the same is not true in the instant case where respondent Grulla knew all along that he could no longer effectively
perform his job due to his physical condition. 
We find that this contention has no legal basis.

The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute essential
elements of due process in cases of employee dismissal:  the requirement of notice is intended to
inform the employee concerned of the employer’s intent to dismiss and the
reason for the proposed dismissal, while the requirement of hearing affords the
employee an opportunity to answer his employer’s charges against him and
accordingly to defend himself therefrom before
dismissal is effected.  Neither of these
requirements can be dispensed with without running afoul of the due process
requirement of the constitution (Century Textile Mills, Inc., et al. v. NLRC,
et al., G.R. No. 77859, May 25, 1988).

In the case at bar, respondent Grulla
was not, in any manner, notified of the charges against him before he was outrightly dismissed. 
Neither was any hearing or investigation conducted by the company to
give the respondent a chance to be heard concerning the alleged unsatisfactory
performance of his work.

In view of the foregoing, the dismissal of respondent Grulla violated the security of tenure under the contract
of employment which specifically provides that the contract term shall be for a
period of twelve (12) calendar months. 
Consequently, the respondent Grulla should be
paid his salary for the unexpired portion of his contract of employment which
is ten (10) months (See Cuales v. NLRC, et al., No. L-57379, April 28, 1983, 121 SCRA 812).

The findings of the POEA and the respondent Commission that the
respondent Grulla is entitled to salaries in the
amount of US $3,700.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency for the
unexpired portion of his contract and the sum of P1,000.00
as reimbursement of medical expenses bear great weight.  Well-established is the principle that
findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only
respect but even finality.  Judicial
review by this Court on labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the
sufficiency of the evidence upon which the labor officer or office based his or
its determination but are limited to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion (Special Events and Central Shipping Office Workers Union v. San
Miguel Corporation, Nos. L-51002-06, May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 557).  In
the instant case, the assailed Resolution of the respondent Commission is not
tainted with arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion or
lack of jurisdiction and therefore, We find no reason
to disturb the same.

ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, the instant petition is
dismissed for lack of merit and the resolution of the respondent Commission
dated January 17, 1986 is
hereby AFFIRMED.  The temporary
restraining order issued on April 23,
1986 is lifted.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Grino-Aquino, JJ., concur.