ROMAN R. VILLALON, JR., ROMAN R. C. III, ROMAN F. C. IV, ROMAN A. C. V, JOSE CLARO C. AND ARSENIO ROY C., ALL SURNAMED VILLALON, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COU…

Villalon versus Intermediate Appellate Court

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Attorney Roman Villalon, Junior and his sons against the Intermediate Appellate Court and the Ebuiza family. The Villalons were defendants in a civil case for annulment of a deed of absolute sale, recovery of possession, and damages over a parcel of land in Urbiztondo, San Juan, La Union. The trial court struck from the records all references to a pending disbarment case against Attorney Villalon, and the appellate court refused to disturb that order. The case matters because it fixes two rules a practitioner must know: that the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings is a waivable privilege vested in the lawyer, and that an interlocutory order issued in patent abuse of discretion may be corrected by certiorari.

Procedural History

The civil case was filed in May 1979 before the then Court of First Instance of La Union. During trial, the Villalons offered the testimonies given by the Ebuizas in a separate disbarment case, for the purpose of impeachment. The Ebuizas moved to strike those matters from the records. Over the Villalons' opposition, the trial court granted the motion in an order dated September 20, 1985, and denied reconsideration on October 17, 1985.

The Villalons then went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. The appellate court denied due course and dismissed the petition on February 3, 1986, holding that rulings on procedural questions and admissibility of evidence during trial are interlocutory and may not be the subject of a separate appeal or review on certiorari. It added that the proper recourse was a formal offer of evidence. Reconsideration was denied on February 19, 1986. The Villalons then filed this petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Facts

The land in dispute was also the subject of a disbarment case filed with the Supreme Court in July 1975 by Francisco Ebuiza. He charged Attorney Villalon with falsifying a deed of absolute sale of the property in favor of himself and his sons. Attorney Villalon answered that the property was his contingent fee for professional services rendered to Ebuiza's parents, whom he had successfully represented in an earlier civil case before the Court of First Instance of La Union. The disbarment case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and recommendation, where testimonial evidence was received, and it remained pending there.

In the civil case for annulment of the same deed, the Villalons introduced in evidence the testimonies of Catalina Neval Vda. de Ebuiza, Francisco Ebuiza, and Justina Ebuiza San Juan given in the disbarment case. Their purpose was to impeach the credibility of these witnesses, who, the Villalons claimed, had given conflicting testimonies on important factual matters.

The Ebuizas moved to strike all matters relating to the disbarment proceedings. The trial court granted the motion, reasoning that admission of the evidence would violate the rule that proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential. It held that Attorney Villalon could not waive that confidentiality because of the public interest involved, and that the rule provides no exception.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court's order striking the impeaching evidence, though interlocutory, may be corrected by certiorari on the ground of patent abuse of discretion.
• Whether or not the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings may be waived by the lawyer in whose favor the privilege is vested, so as to allow the use of testimonies taken in those proceedings as impeaching evidence in a civil case.

Applicable Provisions

Section 15 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 15. Impeachment of adverse party's witness. A witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witnesses, or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense.

This is the defense tool the Villalons sought to use, and the trial court's order deprived them of it.

Section 16 of Rule 132 provides:

Section 16. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them.

This lays down the foundation required for impeachment by prior inconsistent statements, which the Villalons were prepared to establish.

Section 10 of Rule 139 provides:

Section 10. Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential, except that the final order of the court shall be made public.

This is the confidentiality rule the trial court relied on, and which the Supreme Court construed as a waivable privilege.

Article 6 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

This is the general principle on waiver on which the Court rested its ruling.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled that certiorari lies. The order was admittedly interlocutory, but it was issued in patent abuse of discretion, and certiorari may be availed of to contest an interlocutory order to correct such abuse. It may also be applied for when the broader interests of justice so require or when ordinary appeal is not an adequate remedy. The Court found that the offer of evidence suggested by the appellate court, while procedurally correct, would be inadequate and ineffective for purposes of impeachment. The broader interests of justice required that the Villalons be given sufficient latitude to present and prove their impeaching evidence.

On the second issue, the Court ruled that the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings is a privilege that may be waived by the very lawyer in whom and for the protection of whose personal and professional reputation it is vested. The Court invoked the general principle that rights may be waived unless the waiver is contrary to public policy. It also noted that even the Ebuizas' counsel had touched on some matters testified to by Neval in the disbarment proceedings, which were the subject of cross examination.

The Court further held that by issuing the order to strike, the trial court deprived the Villalons of their right to impeach the credibility of the adverse parties' witnesses by proving prior inconsistent statements, despite the fact that those statements are material to the issues in the civil case. The subject matter of the disbarment proceedings, the alleged falsification of the deed of absolute sale, is the same issue raised in the civil case.

Doctrine

First, the confidentiality of proceedings against attorneys under Section 10 of Rule 139 is a privilege vested in the lawyer for the protection of his personal and professional reputation, and it may be waived by him under Article 6 of the Civil Code, since the waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs.

Second, an interlocutory order issued in patent abuse of discretion may be corrected by certiorari, especially where the broader interests of justice so require or where ordinary appeal is not an adequate remedy.

Third, a party may impeach an adverse witness by evidence of prior inconsistent statements under Sections 15 and 16 of Rule 132, and an order that strips the records of such impeaching evidence deprives the party of a sanctioned defense tool.

Disposition

The Court set aside the appellate court's decision and resolution and directed the Regional Trial Court of La Union, at San Fernando, to allow the testimonies of Catalina Neval Vda. de Ebuiza, Francisco Ebuiza, and Justina Ebuiza San Juan given in the disbarment case, and all references thereto, to remain in the records of the civil case; the temporary restraining order was lifted.

Remember This

The single line to memorize: the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings is a waivable privilege vested in the lawyer, not an absolute bar. Examiners use this case to test the waivability of the confidentiality rule under Section 10 of Rule 139 and the availability of certiorari against interlocutory orders issued in patent abuse of discretion.