WARLITO PIEDAD, PETITIONER, VS. LANAO DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., (LANECO), AND ITS GENERAL MANAGER, RUPERTO O. LASPINAS, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition to set aside the decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) promulgated on November 15, 1985,
which reversed the decision of Executive Labor Arbiter Ildefonso
G. Agbuya and dismissed the petitioner’s
complaint.  The legality of the
petitioner’s dismissal is at issue.

The petitioner was employed with the respondent company from December 5,
1974 up to January
4, 1984, first as a housewiring
estimator, then as a bill collector.

On December
20, 1983, Mr. Piedad was found short of P300.00 in his collections in an
audit conducted by Sycip, Gorres
and Velayo, a private auditing firm.  On January 4, 1984, he was suspended from his work on account
of such shortage.  On February
1, 1984 his services
were finally terminated by the private respondents.

On February
10, 1984, the
petitioner filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment in Iligan City
for “Illegal Suspension and
Dismissal with Prayers for
Reinstatement, Payment of Backwages, Allowances,
Benefits and Damages.”

On February 22, 1985, Executive Labor Arbiter Ildefonso
G. Agbuya of the Regional Arbitration Branch No. X of the National Labor Relations Commission
in Cagayan de Oro City,
rendered a decision on the basis
of the respective position papers and other supporting proofs submitted by
the parties.  The dispositive
portion of his decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered ordering Respondent Lanao del Norte Elettric Cooperative, Inc., (LANECO for short) and Atty. Ruperto Laspinas, General Manager
to immediately reinstate Complainant Warlito Piedad to his former position without loss of seniority
right with backwages
and all benefits appurtenant to his position from the time he was illegally dismissed until his reinstatement.

“All the other issues are dismissed for lack of merit.”
(p. 28, Rollo)

On April 29, 1985, the private respondent
appealed the aforequoted ruling.

On November
15, 1985, public
respondent NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s
decision and dismissed the petitioner’s complaint for lack of merit.

Hence,
this petition.

Very simply, the NLRC in
its decision states the crux of the
matter to be “whether or
not complainant herein got short
of his electric bill collections
on December 20, 1983 to warrant his dismissal.”

The records show that on December 20, 1983, a regular audit
of respondent company was made by the firm’s auditor.  As part
of such auditing procedures, a cash count of remittances of the
company’s bill collectors was conducted. 
The count revealed a shortage in
the petitioner’s cash collections in the amount of P299.99 which shortage was acknowledged by
petitioner.  Such fact was brought to the
attention of management and reflected in the auditor’s report with a statement that
“the above shortage was explained by the Collector as used by
him.” The report was certified to and signed by the petitioner.

Sometime later in the same day, the petitioner remitted the
amount of P299.99 to the firm’s
cashier/teller Lorlesela A. Sanchez, who issued Official Receipt No. 011862 for the
amount.

Thereafter, on January 4,
1984, the petitioner was suspended and required to show cause why his employment should not be
terminated.  The order of suspension was
then followed by an order of termination, dated February 1, 1984, on the ground
of petitioner’s “failure to show cause within a
reasonable period why you should
not be terminated for incurring a cash shortage of P300.00 x x x.”

The public respondent, in
its decision, summarizes the contentions of both parties as follows:

“x x x the
alleged cash shortage discovered and reported by a certain Mr. Romeo L. Bato controverted by the Official
Receipts No. 011861 and 011862 all dated December 20, 1983.  These are telling evidences that Complainant
was not short in his December, 1983
collections.  To bolster Complainant’s
defenses he submitted Affidavit of Lorlesela A.
Sanchez admitting that it was she who received Complainant’s remitted
collections and who in turn issued the necessary receipts duly marked as
Annexes ‘A’ and ‘B’ to Complainant’s position. 
In fine, we hold the dismissal of Complainant without just and valid
cause.

“Taking exception to the above findings, respondent averred in
its appeal that:

“At this juncture, it is very vital and significant to mention
that the Honorable Executive Labor Arbiter lost sight of the fact that the kind
of Official Receipts marked as Annexes
‘A’ and ‘B’ in the case at bar is neither evidence for shortages nor basis of
establishing accountability or accountable personnel particularly collections
for the Respondent-Appellant but rather it is an evidence of remittance of any collection or money.  In other
words, possession or issuance of such kind of Official Receipts for the
Respondent-Appellant thru Lorlesela Alquizola does not mean in any way that Warlito Piedad did not incur shortages in the cash count examination conducted on December 20, 1983 by the
SGV and Co., auditor.

“Respondent went on to elucidate its stand:

“To clarify matters on shortages, it is necessary to state
that in order to establish collector’s shortage, our auditor conducts a cash
count examination by requiring the collector to produce all his total collection and count the
same.  The total actual cash counted is
recorded and constitute his total collection.  The auditor/examiner proceeds
to establish the collector’s accountability by adding all the paid official
electric bill receipts (OEBRs) in his custody
or possession.  By the way, the OEBR is an official receipt
entrusted by the Bill Controller to the collector which is entirely different
from the Official Receipt (OR) entrusted to cashier or teller or any person authorized to
issue the same.  The total sum of all the paid Official Electric Bill Receipt constitutes
the whole accountability of the collector. 
The examiner then proceeds to compare the actual total cash counted and
recorded to the total sum of paid OEBR or accountability.  Total cash counted and recorded should equal
to the sum of paid OEBRs.  If the cash is less than the paid OEBRs then shortage is clearly being establish.  (sic)” (pp.
20-21, Rollo)

From the foregoing, it is clear that a shortage was indeed incurred by the petitioner.  The
total cash remitted by
petitioner Piedad was less than the paid electric
bill receipts evidencing the collector’s total liability.  The auditor’s report “certified to”
and signed by the petitioner, states: 
“The above shortage was explained
by the Collector as used by him.” The petitioner neither refutes
nor contests this fact.  The failure to deny the same becomes an admission.  Qui non negat fatetur.  Subsequent remittance by the petitioner of the sum in question can no longer erase as fact the
shortage already incurred.

The petitioner argues,
however, that in view of the absence of loss or damage caused to the respondent
cooperative, by reason of the
immediate return of the amount in question, the petitioner’s dismissal does not
appear warranted under the
circumstances.  Mr. Piedad
cites his “nine (9) years of unblemished service” marked by awards as
“Collector of the Year” for
three consecutive years, 1975,
1976 and 1977.

Perhaps, viewed by itself
as an isolated incident
in the petitioner’s service, a
shortage in the amount of P299.99, appropriated then immediately returned by the erring employee, does not
warrant so severe a penalty as dismissal. 
However, the shortage is not an isolated circumstance in the
petitioner’s career with the cooperative.

Unrebutted evidence on record shows that the petitioner
had been remiss in his duties as collector.  He had been warned and reprimanded for not
visiting all points in his route,
inefficiency, insufficient collections, and cash shortage in the past.  (pp. 104-106, Rollo)
As a matter of fact, in a “frank, honest and determined” admission
against interest, the petitioner
in a written response to Memorandum
Order GM No. 07283, dated September 12, 1983, reprimanding him for shortage of
collection, essayed to explain the matter and we quote:

“1.     Whenever and in any means I remain a
collector, I cannot and can never guarantee that I cannot use some amount of my
collection considering the fact that
surrounds us – the economic crisis thus putting me liable for policy No. 37.

“2.     I feel forced to lax in my work due to the system
manipulated by the billing division, too much bureaucracy, thus putting
collectors away from reporting exact time in the field or area of
responsibility.

“3.     I feel so nervous
to work for the very obvious reason determined by the memorandum for the second
offense of which I am liable thru
accident or just a mere oversight, especially changes of which collectors feel
but natural between collection, yet putting us much liability for Policy
Bulletin No. 37.” (p. 107, Rollo)

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

For the above reason, the
petitioner was requesting a transfer. 
However, in an act of generosity, the respondent cooperative chose to
give him a clean slate and maintained him as collector.

Taking the employer’s
reaction, as a signal that his explanations were sufficient to justify his
acts, the petitioner duplicated the infraction for which his services were
finally terminated.

Clearly, it was neither
without rhyme nor reason that the petitioner was dismissed from
employment.  His acts need not result in material damage or prejudice before his dismissal on
grounds of loss of confidence may
be effected.  Being charged with the handling of company funds, the petitioner’s position, though generally described as menial,
is, nonetheless, a position of trust and confidence.  No company can afford to have dishonest bill collectors.

Loss of confidence is
established as a valid ground for the dismissal of an employee.  The law does not
require proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee’s misconduct to invoke
such a justification.  It is sufficient
that there is some basis for the loss of trust or that the
employer has reasonable grounds to believe
that the employee is responsible for the misconduct and his participation therein renders him
unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of his position (Valladolid v. Inciong, 121 SCRA 2053; see also Dole Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 123 SCRA 673; and San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 115 SCRA 329).

Indeed, an employer may
dismiss an employee for breach of trust in the handling of funds inspite of his having been acquitted in
the course of a criminal prosecution. 
Conviction for a crime involving the loss of such funds is not
necessary before the employee may
be dismissed.  (San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 128 SCRA 180).  There is more
reason for dismissal where
the acts of misconduct and wilfull breach of trust
are repeatedly committed by an employee (Philippine Long
Distance Telephone v. National Labor Relations Commission, 122 SCRA 618).

Fitness for continued employment cannot be compartmentalized into
tight little cubicles of aspects of character, conduct, and ability separate
and independent of each other.  A series
of irregularities when put together may constitute serious misconduct, which
under Article 283 of the Labor Code, is a just cause for dismissal (National Service Corporation v. Leogardo,
Jr., 130 SCRA 502).

The precedents on the issue before us are clear.  Dismissal of a dishonest employee is to the
best interest not only of management but also of labor (International Hardwood
and Veneer Co. of the Phils. v. Leogardo,
Jr., 117 SCRA 967).  As a measure of self-protection against acts
inimical to its interest, a company has the right to dismiss its erring
employees (Dole Phils. Inc., v.
National Labor Relations Commission, supra).  An employer cannot be compelled to continue
in employment an employee guilty of acts inimical to its interest, justifying
loss of confidence in him (International Hardwood and Veneer Co., of the Phils. v. Leogardo, Jr., supra;
National Service Corporation v. Leogardo, Jr. supra;
Engineering Equipment, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, supra). 
The law does not impose unjust situations on either labor or management.

In a further attempt to support his case, the petitioner presents
as evidence the affidavits of Lorlesela J. Alquizola, (now Lorlesela
A. Sanchez) posting clerk and teller
and Eddie Sabayan, bill collector. 
These documents instead bolster the respondent’s cause.  Unrebutted evidence presented by respondent LANECO
effectively impeach the affidavits’ credibility and reveal a concerted scheme
by the respondent’s employees of appropriating company funds for
personal use and covering-up the same until said amounts are paid for or
returned.  The respondent cooperative’s
Annex “13” Memorandum Order GM No. 07183 dated September 12, 1983
to Lorlesela Alquizola
requiring a written explanation for cash shortage incurred by her, Annex “14” (Alquizola’s Answer
to Memorandum GM No. 07183), and Annex
“15” (Memorandum Order No. GM No. 07683 dated September 2, 1983 to Alquizola warning her not to commit the same
offense in the future) are telling evidences of the situation with which
respondent cooperative had to cope.  We
quote Annex “14” in full:

“In compliance with memorandum order #07183 dated 12 September 1983, I am submitting my explanation where my alleged
offenses are concerned.

“1.     That my cash shortage of P256.81 was justified
by those vales of my co-employees specifically those of collectors.  I was always caught between two hot fires during remittances of collectors because oftentimes there were always
shortages in their
collections.  Inasmuch as I have tried to follow closely your order not to grant
personal advances to my co-employees but I just could not refuse them for I believe they could be reimbursed the following payday.

“2.     I also believe
that if I would not grant petty cash to those collectors in lieu of their cash
shortages, and since their collection would remain in their hands, their cash
shortage would accumulate and again, it would be another headache on the part
of the management.  But with the present
system implemented after the audit, these problems are already minimized.

“3.     Prior to the August 3-31, 1983 audit, our practice
is to issue official receipts for the day’s collections the next day or the
next working day.  I have not received
any memorandum or office order requiring me to issue official receipts for the
day’s collections on that very same day.

“4.     According to my
file in Daily Collection Report, the collections of August 29, 1983 amounting to P1,499.38
was deposited on the very next day, August
30, 1983.  Mrs. Chenlen Salimbangon’s collection
on August 27, Saturday, amounting to P5,151.78 was
deposited on that very day.

“5.     Petty cash amounting to P69.80 was
taken in personal money and I was reimbursed after my petty cash replenishment.

“6.     My previous cash
shortage would have been paid immediately from my personal money but I was not able to withdraw from my personal
account for I was not able to bring my savings passbook that day.  It was the advice of the Office Manager at
that time that I pay my shortage at that very day.  I was able to pay Mrs. Salimbangon
on the very next day.

“I hope for your kindest consideration on aforementioned
situation.

“Very sincerely
yours,

(SGD.) LORLESELA
J. ALQUIZOLA”

(p. 115, Rollo)

Anent the alleged
lack of clearance from the Ministry of Labor and Employment to terminate the
petitioner, such a technicality cannot be allowed at this time to prevent the
petitioner’s dismissal in the face of strong and compelling reasons to warrant the same.  The National Labor Relations Commission,
the arbitration branch of the Ministry of
Labor and Employment, has granted the clearance to terminate the petitioner’s
employment and we concur. 
It is important to take note of the intent behind such provision of the Labor Code.  It was designed
to insure that the employer’s prerogative to
dismiss or lay-off an employee is exercised without abuse of discretion or
arbitrariness.  The proceedings before
the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission have upheld this
guarantee.  The petitioner’s rights have
been effectively safeguarded.  We have
given him no less, even as we uphold
the private respondent’s cause.

There has been no denial
of due process.  Generously,
respondent LANECO has given the petitioner the benefit of the doubt, allowing him several opportunities to correct himself and to prove his worth.  Sadly, the records show that the petitioner
failed.  We can do no more for him.

WHEREFORE in view of the foregoing, the petition
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.  The decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.