G.R. No. 73656. October 05, 1989
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROGELIO VILLAPANDO Y BUNSOL, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
The accused-appellant, Rogelio Villapando
y Bunsol was charged before the Regional
Trial Court of
Batangas City[1] with
the crimes of murder in CCC-VIII-823(79) and of attempted homicide in Criminal
Cases Nos. 770 and 771. The informations filed in the said cases read as follows:
CCC-VIII-823
(79)
“That on or about the 14th day of January, 1979, at around
6:10 o’clock in the evening at P. Genato St., Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a fan knife,
with intent to kill and with the qualifying circumstance of either treachery or
evident premeditation, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab suddenly and without
warning, one Saturno Romulo
Manalo y Gabia, thereby
inflicting upon the latter wounds on the different parts of his body which
directly caused the victim’s instantaneous death.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.” (Records of CCC-VIII-823 (79), p. 1)
Criminal Case
No. 770:
“That on or about the 14th day of January, 1979, at around
6:10 o’clock in the evening at P. Genato St., Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a fan knife,
with intent to kill and without any justifiable cause, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the
commission of the crime of homicide directly by overt acts, that is, by then
and there, attacking, assaulting and stabbing with said fan knife one Alicia Beron y Panganiban, thereby
inflicting upon the latter physical injuries, to wit: ‘incised wound 1 cm. long posterior aspect
distal 3rd forearm right,’ which injuries had required medical attendance and
prevented her from performing her customary work for a period of not more than
nine (9) days, and if said accused did not perform all the acts of execution
which should have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, it was not
due to his spontaneous desistence but because Saturno
Romulo Manalo y Gabia was able to push the offended party.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.” (Records of CC No. 770, p. 1)
Criminal Case
No. 771:
“That on or about the 14th day of January, 1979, at around
6:10 o’clock in the evening at P. Genato St., Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a fan knife,
with intent to kill and without any justifiable cause, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the
commission of the crime of homicide directly by overt acts, that is, by then
and there, attacking, assaulting and stabbing with said fan knife one Ramon Tolentino y Delgado, thereby inflicting upon the latter
physical injuries, to wit: ‘1. Sutured
wound 23 cms. long extending from distal half of arm
to proximal 3rd of forearm, anterior aspect right; and 2. Sutured wound 14 cms.
long anterior aspect right forearm,’ which injuries had required medical
attendance and prevented him from performing his customary work for a period of
more than one (1) month, and if said accused did not perform all the acts of
execution which should have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, it
was not due to his spontaneous desistance.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.” (Records of CC No. 771, p. 1)
Upon being arraigned, the accused entered a plea of not guilty to
the offenses charged. After trial on the
merits, the lower court rendered its decisions in CCC-VIII-823 (79) on October 9, 1984, and in Criminal
Cases Nos. 770 and 771 on July 12,
1985, the dispositive portions of which
read:
CCC-VIII-823(79)
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused ROGELIO VILLAPANDO Y
BUNSOL is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA (life
imprisonment), to indemnify the lawful heirs of the deceased in the sum of
TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS, plus FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS as
actual damages and TWENTY FIVE (sic) (P25,000.00) PESOS as moral and exemplary
damages and to pay the costs.
“IT IS SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, p.
92)
CC Nos.
770 and 771
“PREMISES CONSIDERED, in Criminal Case No. 770, accused
Rogelio Villapando is hereby sentenced to a straight
penalty of TWENTY (20) DAYS imprisonment and to pay the costs.
“In Criminal Case No. 771, accused Rogelio Villapando
is hereby sentenced to an imprisonment of SIX (6) MONTHS of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to TWO (2) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional,
as maximum, together with the accessory penalties and to pay the costs.
“The accused in the said two cases shall be credited with the
full term of his preventive imprisonment if he has any, and to serve first the
most severe penalty imposed against him in these two cases, pursuant to Art. 70
of the Revised Penal Code.
“SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, p. 70)
Not satisfied with the aforesaid decisions, the accused appealed.
The antecedent facts as summarized in the People’s brief are as
follows:
“On January 14, 1979
at about 6:00 o’clock in the evening,
Ramon Tolentino, Nelia Panganiban and Alicia Beron went
to the BLTBCo. bus terminal in Batangas City
to take a bus bound for Manila (pp.
10-11, tsn., July
28, 1983). Romulo Manalo, who was Alicia’s
boyfriend, went with them to see Alicia off (p. 11, Ibid.). Upon reaching the terminal, Nelia, Alicia and Romulo
immediately boarded a parked bus while Ramon went to the terminal counter to
secure student fare discounts for themselves (pp. 12-13, Ibid.). The trio proceeded to the back of the bus
where Nelia and Alicia were able to seat themselves
(p. 13, Ibid.). While inside the
bus, it appears that Romulo got into an argument with
the accused who was seated infront (sic) of the
girl’s (sic) seats (p. 5, tsn., Dec. 9, 1983). Subsequently, Romulo
turned to the direction of the bus door to alight from the bus (p. 13, Ibid.,
July 28, 1983). He was followed by the
accused (Id.). Near the door of the bus, Romulo
and the accused began to exchange fist blows (pp. 5-6, Ibid., Dec. 9, 1983). They continued to trade fist blows on the
ground (Id.). Suddenly, the accused pulled out a fan knife
and stabbed Romulo (pp. 8-9, tsn.,
May 13, 1983). Upon seeing Romulo
being stabbed by the accused, both Alicia and Ramon approached the duo to break
up the fight (p. 10, Ibid.). As
Alicia embraced Romulo, the accused lunged at her
three times with the knife (Id.). The first two blows landed near the base of
her handbag and at the bottom of her handbag.
The third blow struck her right forearm (Id.). Ramon, on the other hand, who was also
pulling Romulo away from the accused, was likewise
stabbed by the accused with the knife, hitting the former twice on the right
arm (pp. 10-11, ibid.). The
accused then ran away towards the public market (pp. 11-12, Ibid.). Ramon chased the accused but gave up the
pursuit at the entrance of the market as it was already dark (p. 12, Ibid.). Romulo died as a
result of the stab wound inflicted by the accused on his chest which penetrated
his chest wall and caused him to suffer cardiac arrest (pp. 7-9, tsn., Aug. 31,
1983; Exh. U). Ramon sustained 2 stab wounds on his right
forearm which incapacitated him from performing his regular work for a period
of more than 1 month (Exhibit A). Alicia
suffered a stab wound on her right arm which prevented her from doing her
customary duties for nine (9) days (Exhibit B).” (Appellee’s
Brief, pp. 4-6; Rollo, p. 105)
The accused, on the other hand,
interposed the defense of alibi. He
claimed that he and his kumpadre, Romy
Acedillo, were at the cockpit in San
Pablo City at the
time of the incident; and that thereafter, on their way to Acedillo’s
house, accused purchased a Seiko watch from out of his winnings and the store
issued to him a guarantee book dated January
14, 1979. In addition, he presented
an eyewitness to the crime, Paquito Sorizo, who testified that the accused was not the victims’
assailant.
The lower court discredited the appellant’s defense of alibi as
weak and the testimony of the defense witness as biased and without probative
value.
In this appeal, the accused
assigned the following errors:
“The Trial Court grossly became
dishonest to itself when it did not take into consideration the defense of
ALIBI put up by the accused perfected collaborated (sic) by two credible
witnesses;
“The Trial Court blinded itself by not
taking against the prosecution the inconsistencies in the testimonies given by
the witnesses against the accused.” (Appellant’s Brief, p. 3; Rollo, p. 57)
The appeal is devoid of merit.
We have already ruled that for alibi to serve as a basis for
acquittal, it must be established by clear and convincing evidence (People v.
Cruz, G.R. No. 68805, July 9, 1986; 142 SCRA 576). Appellant must not only prove that he was
elsewhere at the time the crime was committed but also that it was impossible
for him to have been at the scene of the crime.
This appellant failed to do. The
distance between San Pablo City
and Batangas
City does not render it impossible
for appellant to be present at the place and time of the incident taking into
account the modern means of transportation.
Further, the Seiko guarantee booklet is to Us an unconvincing piece of
evidence. It does not assure Us that the
purchase was really done in San Pablo
City and not in Batangas City. It is also possible that the watch was
purchased in the morning or in the afternoon of the said date. The conflicting testimonies of appellant and
his witness regarding the circumstances attendant to the purchase of the watch,
likewise, weakens the defense of alibi.
Appellant contends that upon his purchase of the Seiko watch, the
jewelry store just handed him a guarantee booklet but did not give him any
receipt (TSN, February 10, 1984, p. 7; Records, p. 296). On the other hand, his witness, Romy Acedillo, testified that the
store issued to appellant a receipt and a guarantee booklet (TSN, February 10,
1984, pp. 71-72; Records, pp. 360-361).
If the two were indeed together in purchasing the watch, how come their
testimonies as to the circumstances of the purchase do not jibe?
Moreover, appellant was clearly and positively identified by the
prosecution witnesses as the assailant.
Witness Ramon Tolentino testified:
“FISCAL ATIENZA:
Q
Now, Mr. Tolentino,
after you were stabbed twice by that particular man, what else happened if
anything else happened?
A He turned again on Romulo
Manalo, sir.
Q
And what did he do again if he did
anything else?
A Maybe he delivered another stab blow but I
did not see where it landed, sir.
Q
What else happened if anything else
happened?
A I spoke these following words: ‘Tama na naman.’ And then we faced each other and then he ran away,
sir.
Q
You have been referring to this
particular man who stabbed Romulo, who stabbed you
and likewise stabbed Alicia, if that man is present in court, will you be able
to point to him?
A I could, sir.
Q
Please do so.
A (Witness pointing to a person and when that
person pointed to was asked of (sic) his name, identified himself as Rogelio Villapando)
Q
Now, when you mentioned that that man
whom you identified now as Rogelio Villapando ran
away, what did you do if you did anything?
A I chased him up to the point he was able to
gain entrance to the old public market of Batangas City,
sir.
x x x x x
x x
x x
“ATTY.
CABILING (counsel for the accused):
Q
When you saw for the first time that Romulo was being stabbed, Mr. Romulo
was facing you, is that correct?
A Yes, sir, but Romulo
was holding the neck around his left arm (kilik)
while that person being “kilik” stabbed
him, sir.
Q And the
person who was stabbing Romulo whom you had just
described as “kilik,” embraced by the neck
by Romulo, has his back in front of you, is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q So that at that precise moment when you saw
for the first time Romulo being stabbed by that man,
you were not able to see his face at all?
A It was this way, sir. When Romulo was
stabbed first by the accused, Romulo was facing me
and Romulo was holding the accused by the neck and
his back was facing me, and I approached Romulo and
pulled him back and that was the time when the accused turned on me and stabbed
me twice and I was able to hold his hand and thereafter since Romulo was already wounded, he turned again on Romulo.
x x x.” (TSN,
May 13, 1983, pp. 11-13, 27-28; Records, pp. 65-67, 81-82)
and witness Nelia
A. Panganiban also declared:
“FISCAL ATIENZA:
Q And when you heard
the shouting outside the BLTBCo. bus, what else
transpired, if anything else transpired?
A Alicia also alighted and I remained at the
bus, sir.
Q And then what did you
do thereafter?
A I approached the right side of the BLTBCo. bus and I moved to a seat for two (2) persons and
by the side of the window, I looked out of that window, sir.
Q Looking out from
that window, what did you witness, if you witnessed anything?
A I saw Villapando
stabbing Romulo Manalo,
sir.
Q If this Villapando is inside the courtroom, will you be able to
point to him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please do so.
A There he is, sir. (Witness pointing to a person and when that
person pointed to was asked of (sic) his name, identified himself as Rogelio Villapando)
Q And you mentioned
that Villapando was stabbing Romulo
Manalo at that time that you looked out from the
window of that BLTBCo. bus, will you please
demonstrate to us their respective positions on (sic) that time you saw Villapando striking stab blows on the person of Romulo Manalo? May I request, if Your Honor please, for any
female person here?
(The
witness representing herself as Romulo Manalo and the old woman representing Villapando,
standing face to face while the left hand of Romulo
was embracing the neck of Villapando while Villapando’s right hand was delivering stab blows from the
left side of his head downward)
Q At that particular
time when you saw Villapando stabbing Romulo Manalo, who among them
were facing you, if anybody of them were facing you?
A Romulo was facing
me, sir.
Q If Romulo was the one facing you, how were you able to say
with clarity here it was Villapando who was stabbing Romulo at the time?
ATTY. BAYANI:
Objection, Your Honor. It is fiscal who is cross-examining this
witness.
FISCAL ATIENZA:
Precisely that is just to clarify.
COURT:
That is very favorable to the
defense. He is helping you.
WITNESS:
A They made a turn,
sir.
FISCAL ATIENZA:
Q And during that
turn, who were then facing you?
ATTY. BAYANI:
Leading, Your Honor.
COURT:
Villapando was
facing after the turn.
FISCAL ATIENZA:
Q And then thereafter,
what else did you do, if you did anything?
A I took my things and alighted from the bus,
sir.
Q And then after
alighting from the bus, what else transpired, if anything else transpired?
A When I had already
alighted from the bus, I saw Ramon Tolentino chasing Villapando towards the south, sir.
x x x.”
(TSN, July 28, 1983, pp. 14-17; Records, pp. 116-119)
We find nothing in the records of the
case which would show that these witnesses were actuated by improper motives in
pointing to the appellant as the person responsible for their injuries and for
the death of their companion. Their
testimonies are, therefore, credible and worthy of belief.
Appellant’s avowal of innocence also cannot be sustained on the
basis of the testimony of his witness, Paquito Sorizo. A careful
reading of Sorizo’s entire testimony fails to
convince Us of its veracity. Sorizo appears to be more of a coached witness. The following findings of the trial court
demonstrate clearly the unreliability of Sorizo’s
testimony:
“As to the testimony of defense witness Paquito
Sorizo stating that he witnessed the said stabbing
incident that resulted to the death of Romulo Manalo, this court could not believe him when he said that
Rogelio Villapando is not the assailant of Romulo Manalo. This particular witness of the defense is a
bias witness due to the special relationship and/or treatment given by the
accused, his wife and the lawyer of the defense, under the following
circumstances, to wit:
“1. That he was
always present during the hearing of this case and the other two (2) attempted
homicide cases filed against herein accused, as evidenced by his testimony
earlier stated in this findings;
“2. That he attended
at the Letty’s Restaurant to have a conference with
the lawyer for the defense upon the request of the wife of the herein accused.
“If really said witness was (sic) present when the deceased
was assaulted and stabbed to death and that he was only two (2) brazas away from the crime-scene, why is it that there is
(sic) no showing that he at least attempted to prevent the victim and the accused
from the (sic) struggling with each other, if really true (sic) as janitor of
the BLTBCo, that he was then only two brazas away from them, why did he not help when Alicia Beron embraced the victim in order to prevent the (sic)
further assault of the accused and likewise did not prevent the said accused
from inflicting injury to said Alicia Beron and Ramon
Tolentino? and
(sic), finally, why did he fail and/or refuse to execute any written statement
similar in substance on what he said in court immediately after the stabbing
incident or immediately after the apprehension of the accused, considering that
the said incident was properly attended to for investigation by the police
authorities of Batangas City who were then personally
present immediately after the incident took place?
“To the best analysis and findings of this court, witness Paquito Sorizo was coached by
someone to testify in favor of the accused and his testimony given in court is
(sic) concocted or fabricated one and, therefore, without credence and
probative value in the instant case.
“It is a well-settled rule that if a man remains silent when
he ought to speak (like in the present case) he will be barred from speaking
later (Gabriel vs. Bans, 56 Phil. 314).
“Further, the court has observed the demeanor or manner of
said witness Paquito Sorizo
while on the witness stand and while testifying, said witness usually responded
to the questions propounded by the defense counsel on direct-examination in a
manner as if the answers were already inside his mouth or just at the tip of
his tongue and, when asked if the assailant was inside the courtroom, said
witness answered that the accused was not present, although said witness did
not bother himself to look around the court premises and gave his answer while
his face was little bit downward and facing directly to the Presiding
Judge.” (Rollo, (pp. 33-34)
Appellant, furthermore, assails the credibility of some
prosecution witnesses. He claims that
the prosecution witnesses’ second, rather than their first, statements before
the police were submitted to the court; that the given description of the
assailant in their first statements matched the description given by defense
witness Sorizo; that the second statements’
description of the assailant did not match appellant’s physical appearance
especially as to height since he is short while the given height was 5’7″;
that witness Panganiban’s identification of appellant
is questionable since it was not done in a police line-up and appellant was in
front of Panganiban ready to be identified; that,
also, she did not see the actual stabbing of her companions, Tolentino and Beron; that
witnesses Alicia Beron and Dr. Celso
Bulanhagui, the attending physician, were not
presented in court; that the mother of the victim, Lucia Manalo,
did not identify the accused; and that Miss Rosario Panaligan,
Head, Medical Records Section of the Batangas
Regional Hospital, who was presented in lieu of Dr. Bulanhagui,
could not testify as to the correctness of the death and medical certificates
signed by Dr. Bulanhagui (Appellant’s Brief, pp.
6-10; Rollo, p. 57).
We are not persuaded. The
fact that Panganiban did not see the actual stabbing
of Ramon Tolentino and Alicia Beron
and that Lucia Manalo did not identify the appellant
as the assailant is of no moment. The
important thing is that the victims themselves identified their assailant as
the appellant.
Moreover, identification of an accused need not be done in a
police line-up. It may also be made by
just pointing to the accused directly as what was done in this case. We find, too, that contrary to the
appellant’s claim, witness Panganiban was aware of
appellant’s near presence, thus:
“COURT:
Q
Upon arrival at the police
headquarters, what did you do?
A
I pin-pointed at the person of Villapando and there were many persons inside when I
pin-pointed to him, Your Honor.
Q
Why did you pin-point to him upon
your arrival at the police station?
A
Because I was asked by the police if
I could possible (sic) point the assailant of Romulo Manalo, Your Honor.
x x x x x x x x x
ATTY. BAYANI (counsel for the accused):
Q When your statement was being taken by the
police, where was Villapando? How far was Villapando
from you?
A
Very near, sir.
Q
How many meters, inches or feet?
A
About less than two (2) meters
distance at the time my statement was taken, sir.
Q
And Villapando
was also seated?
A
No, sir.
Q
He was standing?
A Yes, sir.
Q
And when you were being investigated,
you already knew that Villapando was the one standing
approximately one and one-half (1 1/2) meters from you?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
How about the other persons whom you
claimed to be present at the investigating room, how far were they from you?
A
They were also equi-distant
from one another. They moved one after
the other, sir.
Q
But Villapando
was all the while standing infront (sic) of you?
A
He was somewhat on my left side,
sir.
Q
He was all the while standing on your
left side during the investigation?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
While the others were walking from
one direction to another?
A
Yes, sir.
x x x.”
(TSN, July 28, 1983, pp. 36-37, 42-43; Records, pp. 138-139, 144-145)
As regards the medical and death certificates signed by Dr. Bulanhagui, We hold that the testimony of Miss Panganiban is admissible to prove the authenticity of Dr. Bulanhagui’s signatures on the said documents. The circumstance of Dr. Bulanhagui
being abroad and thus, could not verify the contents of the documents is not
fatal to the prosecution’s case. Neither
is the unavailability of Alicia Beron to testify as
she is now in the United States
weaken the prosecution’s cause. The fact
of the death of the victim and the injuries sustained by the other victims
could be established by testimonial evidence as was done in this case (TSNs, May 13, 1983, pp. 14-15, 20-22; Records, pp. 68-69,
74-75; August 14, 1983, pp. 6-10; Records, pp. 168-170; July 28, 1983, pp.
17-20; Records, pp. 119-122).
Contrary to appellant’s assertion, all the statements executed by
the prosecution witnesses were submitted and now formed part of the records of
the case (Records of CCC-VIII-825, pp. 3-9, 11). The alleged inconsistency regarding the
description of the height of the assailant compared to appellant’s actual
height is trivial. It must be noted that
the description given by Alicia Beron was merely the
approximate height of the assailant which des not militate against her
credibility.
The over-all evidence presented in these cases has fully
established the culpability of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. However, We do not agree with the trial court
that treachery is present in CCC-VIII?823 (79). For treachery to be present, it must be shown
that the offender employed means, methods or forms of execution which tend
directly and specifically to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make (Art. 14, par. 16,
Revised Penal Code). In the case at bar,
the testimonies of the eyewitnesses were limited to the actual stabbing of the
victims by the accused. There were no
details as to how the stabbing incident commenced and developed. The death certificate presented by the
prosecution also did not disclose the nature of the stab wound which killed the
victim so as to infer therefrom how he was
killed. It merely recited the
following: “death due to cardiac
arrest, stab wound, chest, left, penetrating chest cavity” (Exhibit U,
Records of CCC-VIII-823 (79), p. 133).
There being no circumstance which would qualify the killing to murder, the
crime committed is simple homicide.
Neither do We agree that reiteracion or
habitually should be appreciated in this case.
The appellant was found by the trial court to have committed offenses
prior to and after the incident of January 14, 1979, as follows: “(1) prior to January, 1979, he was
arrested and accused of the crime of theft, in Criminal Case No. 172 before the
Municipal Court of Mendez, Cavite; (2) that on May
15, 1973, he was likewise charged for physical injuries in Lipa
City but said case was amicably settled; (3) that on January 15, 1973, he was
likewise charged in Criminal Case No. 1343 in Lemery,
Batangas for the crime of theft and he was convicted
of the said offense; (4) that he was likewise charged and convicted before the
City Court of Batangas City in Criminal Case No.
9517; (5) that he was also charged in Criminal Case No. 842-B for theft, before
the Court of First Instance of Binan, Laguna, but
said case was settled amicably; (6) finally, accused was charged and convicted
for the crime of theft before the Court of First Instance of Manila in Criminal
Case No. 82-12791 per Judgment of said court on October 30, 1982″
(Decision, p. 19; Rollo, p. 89). In reiteracion
or habituality, it is essential that the offender be
previously punished, that is, he has served the sentence, for an offense in
which the law attaches, or provides for an equal or greater penalty than that
attached by law to the second offense, or for two or more offenses, in which
the law attaches a lighter penalty (People v. Layson,
et al., G.R. No. L-25177, October 31,
1969, 30 SCRA 92). Here, the
records do not disclose that the appellant has been previously punished by an
offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or
more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty. Considering therefore, the absence of either
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty for homicide, which is reclusion
temporal, should be imposed in its medium period (Article 249, in
relation to Article 64, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum penalty is twelve (12) years of prision
mayor and the maximum penalty is seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal. The indemnity for death
imposed by the trial court is increased to thirty thousand (P30,000.00) pesos
in addition to the award of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos as actual damages
and twenty five thousand (P25,000.00) pesos as moral and exemplary damages.
As to Criminal Case No. 770, We uphold the trial court’s finding
that the appellant is guilty of slight physical injuries only, it not being
shown by any clear and convincing evidence that appellant intended to kill
Alicia Beron.
In Criminal Case No. 771, We find the appellant guilty only of
less serious physical injuries. We
gathered from the testimony of Ramon Tolentino that
appellant stabbed him and Alicia Beron because they
intervened in his fight against the deceased.
In fact, when Tolentino was held back
momentarily by his wounds, appellant attacked the deceased again and then, ran
away (TSN, May 13, 1983, pp. 10-11; Records, pp. 64?65). There was no injury to any vital part of Tolentino and Beron. Clearly from the foregoing, We could not see
any intention on the part of appellant to kill Tolentino
and Beron (see United
States v. Maghirang,
28 Phil. 655). He merely wanted to
incapacitate these two people so he could turn his ire once more to his real
and intended victim, the deceased Romulo Manalo. Absent the
intent to kill, appellant should be liable only for less serious physical
injuries. He should, therefore, be
sentenced to an imprisonment of four (4) months.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgments appealed from (1) in Criminal
Cases Nos. CCC-VIII-823(79) and 771, are hereby modified as above indicated;
and (2) in Criminal Case No. 770, is hereby affirmed. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
[1]
Presided over by Judge Jose M. Aguila.