G.R. No. 72936. June 18, 1987
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROLANDO PICARDAL Y DEL MONTE AND ROMEO PICARDAL Y DEL MONTE, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court* of Quezon City, Branch XCVIII, promulgated on
October 8, 1985 (Rollo, p. 36) convicting the accused-appellants of the crime
of murder, the decretal part of said decision reading:
“WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, ROLANDO PICARDAL y
DEL MONTE and ROMEO PICARDAL y DEL MONTE, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder as charged in the information and hereby sentences each to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Both
accused are ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Jose
Santiago y Quiapo in the sum of
P11,500.00 as actual or compensatory damages and P30,000.00 as moral damages,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the
proportionate costs”. (Rollo, p.
41).
Accused-appellants were indicted for Murder at the
above-mentioned court in an information (Rollo, p. 5) filed by the Assistant
City Fiscal, alleging:
“That on or about the 30th day of December, 1982, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, did,
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ
personal violence upon the person of one JOSE SANTIAGO y QUIAPO, by then and
there stabbing with one (1) double-bladed deadly weapon in the different parts
of the body, inflicting upon him eight (8) serious and mortal wounds which was
the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the victim in such amount as maybe awarded to them under the
provisions of the Civil Code.”
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
In the evening of December 30, 1982 Diosdada Francisco and her
husband Jose Santiago y Quiapo went to the residence of the Barangay Captain of
Baesa, Quezon City to ask him to settle a domestic squabble between the
spouses. After the Barangay Captain
succeeded in ironing out their differences, they decided to go home but since
the barangay tanods were having a sort of merrymaking at the residence of the
Barangay Captain because of the induction of the newly elected officers of the
barangay, they stayed for a while to converse with the barangay tanods. Jose Santiago was prevailed upon to take some
beer. Thereafter, they left the place to
go home, walking along Howmart Road, but on their way, almost near their
house, three men – Rolando Picardal, Romeo Picardal and Alfredo Picardal alias
Romeo del Monte – without any provocation blocked their way. Rolando Picardal immediately put an arm on
the shoulder of Jose Santiago and at the same time stabbed him. Romeo Picardal, on the other hand, went around
Jose Santiago and held the latter’s hands behind, forcing the latter to face
Rolando Picardal who continued to stab the victim several times with a
double-bladed weapon measuring about one (1) foot, including the handle. In her confusion Diosdada Francisco kept on
shouting for help while she ran back to the house of the Barrio Captain, about
200 meters away from the scene of the stabbing incident. Barangay tanods responded to her call for
assistance but when they arrived at the scene of the crime, both Romeo Picardal
and Rolando Picardal were no longer there.
They gave chase to the two suspects and caught Rolando Picardal still
holding the knife and shouting to his brother Romeo, to continue running and
escape. Romeo Picardal was apprehended
at his house. Both men were brought to
the police precinct by the apprehending barangay men where they gave their
separate statements. (Decision, Criminal
Case No. Q-23052, Rollo, pp. 54-59; Appellee’s Brief, pp. 1-4).
The victim’s death was attributed to Hemorrhage acute, severe,
secondary to stab wounds (Autopsy Report; Exhibits, p. 7).
Among other things, the evidence presented by the prosecution at
the hearing include: (1) the testimonies
of: (a) Diosdada Francisco-Santiago, the
sole eye witness of the prosecution; (b) Patrolman Melencio Lim; (c) Benjamin
de Castro, a barangay tanod; (d) Domingo Sus, team leader of the barangay
tanod; and (e) Dr. Nieto Salvador, a medico-legal officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation; (2) documentary evidence such as: (a) autopsy report; (b) diagram showing where
the stab wounds were located; (c)
salaysay of Diosdada Francisco-Santiago; (d) Pinagsamang Salaysay ni Benjamin
de Castro and Manuel K. de la
Cruz; and (3) Physical evidence
– the fatal weapon used in stabbing the victim.
The trial court finding
that the prosecution has established with moral certainty that the deceased
was a victim of conspiracy between brothers Rolando and Romeo Picardal who
stabbed the former to death, convicted both accused of murder as charged and
sentenced them to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. (Decision,
Criminal Case No. Q-23052; Rollo, p.
41).
Both of them
appealed. In an Order dated October 9,
1985, the appeal was approved by the trial court and the entire record of the
case was forwarded and received by the Court on December 4, 1985 (Rollo, p. 1).
In the resolution of
January 22, 1986 the Court ACCEPTED the appeal (Rollo, p. 42).
The brief for the
Appellants was filed with the Court on June 26, 1986 (Rollo, p. 53) and
admitted by the Court in its Resolution dated August 4, 1986 (Rollo, p. 60). The Brief
for the Appellee was filed with the Court on October 9, 1986 (Rollo, p. 64).
As of this date the Reply
Brief has not yet been received by this Court.
No Reply Brief was filed.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAVORABLY
CONSIDERING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
THE SAME ARE NOT CREDIBLE AND NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE ORDINARY COURSE OF THINGS.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THEIR GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
The appeal is devoid of merit.
The accused Rolando Picardal pleaded self-defense. It is a well-established principle that where
the accused has admitted that he is the author of the death of the deceased,
it is incumbent upon the appellant, to avoid criminal liability, to prove this
justifying circumstance claimed by him – self-defense – to the satisfaction of
the court. To do so he must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for
even if that were weak it cannot be disbelieved after the accused himself has
admitted the killing. (People v.
Ansoyon, 75 Phil. 772 /1946/; People v. Silang Cruz, 53 Phil. 635 /1929/). Otherwise stated, the burden of proof is
shifted from the prosecution to the accused and it is the duty of the latter to establish self-defense by evidence
clear and convincing. (People v.
Valencia, 133 SCRA 82 /1984/; People v. Urbistondo, et al., 132 SCRA 268
/1984/; People v. Pasco, Jr., 137 SCRA 137 /1985/).
Thus, self-defense, being an affirmative allegation, it is
incumbent upon the accused to prove clearly and sufficiently its elements,
otherwise the conviction of the accused is imperative. (People v. Plandez, 132 SCRA 69 /1984/).
The three requisites of self-defense and defense of relatives
and strangers as stated in par. 1 of Article II of the Revised Penal Code are
as follows: (1) unlawful-aggression; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repeal it; and (3)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
In the case at bar, the
theory of self-defense will not prosper where clearly, the first
requisite thereof which is unlawful aggression (People v. Valencia, supra)
is not even present.
For one thing, the
prosecution witness testified that appellant Rolando without any provocation,
stabbed the victim with a double-bladed knife (Hearing, June 29, 1983, pp.
3-5). In contrast, the accused would
have the court believe that it was the victim who was the unlawful
aggressor. He testified that when he
went out to buy viand at Cecil Canteen, he was hit on the head by the victim
with a piece of wood but he was able to escape from the latter and his
group. However, thirty (30) minutes later,
he returned to get the viand from his friend.
It was then that he met again the victim and his group who were about
to hit him again. As the victim was
about to stab him, he allegedly got hold of a sharp object and hit the victim
instead.
The absence of unlawful
aggression is readily apparent from the fact that Rolando by his own testimony
had already escaped from the supposed aggression when thirty minutes
later, he returned. The incredibility of
Rolando’s testimony was correctly observed by the trial court which refused to
give credence to the fact that the accused would return to the scene of the
incident unless he was really looking for trouble. (Decision, Criminal Case No. 23052, Rollo, p.
57).
No less important is the
absence of evidence that the deceased was in fact armed at the time of the
incident, except for the uncorroborated version of the accused Rolando Picardal
that the victim had a double-bladed weapon which he was able to wrest away and
used in continuously stabbing the latter eight (8) times. (Hearing, January 17, 1985; TSN pp. 11-12).
However, as to how it was possible for him to do so with four (4)
other companions of the victim allegedly encircling him, appears incredible
especially considering the fact that the accused who claims to be the victim of
an aggression was unscathed while his adversary sustained serious wounds whose
nature and location belie the claim of self-defense. (People v. Garachico, 113 SCRA 131 /1982/;
People v. Ganut, 118 SCRA 35 /1982/).
On the other hand, the defense put up by appellant Romeo Picardal
is alibi, claiming that it was impossible for him to participate in the
commission of the offense because at or about the time of the incident in
question he was inside his house sleeping.
(Hearing of February 20, 1985, TSN, p. 2).
Appellant Romeo Picardal and his co-appellant were positively
identified by the wife of the victim, Mrs. Diosdada Francisco Santiago as the
assailants (Hearing of June 29, 1983, TSN, pp. 3-4).
In a long line of precedents, it has been established that alibi
is worthless in the face of positive identification by the prosecution
witness. (People v. Martinez, 127 SCRA
260; People v. Pueblas, 127 SCRA 746; People v. Mesias, Jr., 127 SCRA 792; People
v. Davies, 131 SCRA 286; People v. Tajon, 128 SCRA 656; People v. Laganzon, 129
SCRA 333; People v. Munar, 131 SCRA 44; People v. Campesino, 131 SCRA 56). In fact the Supreme Court strongly stated in
People v. Plandez (132 SCRA 70 /1984/ that it is generally accepted “that
alibi – the much abused sanctuary of felons and which is considered as an
argument with a bad reputation, cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses. It is, to say
the least, the weakest defense and must be taken with caution being easily fabricated.”
In the case at bar where it was established at the hearing that
the scene of the crime was within the vicinity of the residence of both the
appellants and the victim who lived in the same house in Howmart Road, Baesa,
Quezon City (Hearing of June 29, 1983, TSN, p. 5) in adjacent rooms with only a
partition between them (Hearing of February 20, 1985, TSN pp. 9-10), there is
even less likelihood that alibi can overcome
the testimony of the prosecution witness who under the circumstances
knew the accused personally and who had no reason nor evil motive to falsely
impute to the accused the commission of such a serious offense as murder. (People v. Tiengo, 133 SCRA 291 /1984/;
People v. Arbois, 138 SCRA 24 /1985/).
In the same manner, it has been repeatedly held that alibi is not
a proper defense where it was not impossible for the accused to be at the scene
of the crime. (People v. Atanacio, 128
SCRA 22; People v. Pizarro, 131 SCRA 286 /1984/; People v. Urgel, 134 SCRA 483
/1985/).
Finally, there appears to be no reason to discredit the testimony
of Diosdada Santiago, the victim’s wife which as found by the trial court was a
clear, positive and affirmative declaration, depicting a full account of what
actually transpired. Her narration is
fully corroborated by the medical findings of the NBI doctor who conducted the autopsy on the corpse of the
victim. (Hearing of October 31, 1984,
TSN pp. 262-266).
She was consistent in her statement to the police (Exhibit “A”) and in her testimony in
court (Hearing of June 29, 1983, TSN pp. 3-11) as to how her husband was
stabbed to death and how she shouted and ran back to the house of the barangay
captain for help. Her testimony here was
corroborated by the testimony of barangay
tanod Benjamin de Castro who with the barangay tanods went after the accused
Rolando Picardal whom they found being mauled by the barrio people for having
stabbed the victim. They found him
prostrate on the ground with a double bladed weapon six inches long including
the handle beside him (Hearing of January 25, 1984, TSN pp. 3-5). The description of that weapon fits the
description of the weapon described by the victim’s wife which was used in the
stabbing of her husband by the accused.
As above stated Diosdada Santiago identified the assailants of
her husband as Rolando and Romeo Picardal (Hearing of June 29, 1983, TSN p. 4). Her
identification was positive and categorical and there can be no doubt as to her
ability and opportunity to make the correct identification as the place of the
incident was well lighted by an electric bulb in an electric post 4 to 5 meters
away and by the lights of the houses along the road 2 meters away. (Ibid., p. 5).
Likewise, Diosdada Santiago could not have been mistaken as to
the identity of both appellants who lived in the same house occupied by her
husband and herself with only a partition to separate the quarters.
It is also to be noted that Diosdada Santiago immediately
revealed her husband’s assailants to the barangay tanods to whom she ran for help
and on the same night of the incident she immediately executed a sworn
statement before Pat. Melencio Lim of the La Loma Substation, Quezon City
Police where she identified both appellants as the persons responsible for the
death of her husband. (Hearing of June
29, 1983, RSN pp. 8-9; Hearing of October 25, 1983, TSN pp. 3-4). Under such circumstances, the Court has
ruled that said actuations of the wife make her testimony credible. (People v. Pueblas, 127 SCRA 754 /1984/).
It is claimed that prosecution witness Santiago’s testimony that
appellant Romeo Picardal was apprehended in the latter‘s house after the
stabbing incident is not in “consonance with human experience.” The
defense contends that if appellant Romeo Picardal had also participated in the
commission of the offense, it would be more logical for him to take flight to
avoid arrest instead of taking refuge in his own home (Appellant’s Brief, p.
5).
It will be recalled that the scene of the crime is in the
vicinity of his house, so that when he was being pursued by the barangay tanods
he had no other alternative but to take refuge therein. In fact, when he was found by the barangay
tanods in his room, he was not sleeping peacefully but was perspiring and
gasping for breath “hingal kabayo”, (Hearing of April 11, 1984, TSN
p. 5). Had he been innocent, his normal
reaction would have been not to flee from the scene of the crime but to offer
assistance to the victim.
The rule is well settled that the conclusions of fact of the
trial judge are entitled to great weight.
(People v. Atanacio, 128 SCRA 22 /1984/) and that his findings on the
credibility of witnesses cannot be disturbed on appeal for he was in a position
to ascertain which of the witnesses were more credible. (People v. De Leon, 128 SCRA 121; People v.
Olalia, 128 SCRA 139; People v. Mesias, Jr., 127 SCRA 746; People v. Cabanlig,
128 SCRA 230).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.
* Penned by Judge Remigio E. Zari.