G.R. No. 72873. May 28, 1987
CARLOS ALONZO AND CASIMIRA ALONZO, PETITIONERS, VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND TECLA PADUA, RESPONDENTS.
CRUZ, J.:
The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious
conjecture, whether we are a court of law or a court of justice. Do we apply the law even if it is unjust or
do we administer justice even against the law? Thus queried, we do not equivocate. The answer is that we do neither because we are a court both of
law and of justice. We apply the law with
justice for that is our mission and purpose in the scheme of our Republic. This case is an illustration.
Five brothers and sisters
inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land
registered in the name of their deceased parents under OCT No. 10977 of the
Registry of Deeds of Tarlac.[1]
On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his
undivided share to the herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by way of
absolute sale.[2]
One year later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own
share to the same vendees, in an instrument denominated “Con Pacto de
Retro Sale,” for the sum of P440.00.[3]
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after
the said sales, an area corresponding to two?fifths of the said lot,
representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In 1975, with their consent, their son
Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed
area.[4]
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five co-heirs,
sought to redeem the area sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was
dismissed when it appeared that he was an American citizen.[5]
On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua,
another co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption
claimed by her brother.[6]
The trial court* also dismisses this complaint, now
on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within
thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although there was no written notice, it was
held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the
requirement of the law.[7]
In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot
be plausibly denied. The other
co-heirs, including Tecla Padua, lived on the same lot, which consisted of
only 604 square meters, including the portions sold to the petitioners.[8]
Eustaquia herself, who had sold her portion, was staying in the same house with
her sister Tecla, who later claimed redemption.[9]
Moreover, the petitioners and the private respondents were close friends and
neighbors whose children went to school together.[10]
It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of
the sales and that they thought, as they alleged, that the area occupied by the
petitioners had merely been mortgaged
by Celestino and Eustaquia. In the
circumstances just narrated, it was impossible for Tecla not to know that the
area occupied by the petitioners had been purchased by them from the other
co-heirs. Especially significant was
the erection thereon of the permanent semi-concrete structure by the
petitioners’ son, which was done without objection on her part or of any of the
other co-heirs.
The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct
interpretation and application of the pertinent law as invoked, interestingly
enough, by both the petitioners and the private respondents. This is Article 1088 of the Civil Code,
providing as follows:
“Art. 1088. Should any
of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any
or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the price of the sale,
provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were
notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.”
In reversing the trial court, the respondent court*
declared that the notice required by the said article was written notice
and that actual notice would not suffice as a substitute. Citing the same case of De Conejero v. Court of Appeals[11] applied
by the trial court, the respondent court held that that decision,
interpreting a like rule in Article 1623, stressed
the need for written notice although no particular form was required.
Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente
of the Court, furnishing the co-heirs with a copy of the deed of sale of the
property subject to redemption would satisfy the requirement for written
notice. “So long, therefore, as
the latter (i.e., the redemptioner) is informed in writing of the sale and the
particulars thereof,” he declared, “the thirty days for redemption
start running.”
In the earlier decision of Butte v. Uy,[12]
the Court, speaking through the same learned jurist, emphasized that the
written notice should be given by the vendor and not the
vendees, conformably to a similar requirement under Article 1623, reading as
follows:
“Art. 1623. The right
of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty
days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendors,
as the case may be. The deed of sale
shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an
affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
“The right of
redemption of co?owners excludes that of the adjoining
owners.”
As “it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in
Article 1623 deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice, and
that notice must be deemed exclusive,” the Court held that notice given by
the vendees and not the vendor would not toll the running of the
30-day period.
The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the
Holmes dictum that “hard cases make bad laws” as the petitioners
obviously cannot argue against the fact that there was really no written notice
given by the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one
conclusion, to wit, that in view of
such deficiency, the 30-day period for redemption had not begun to run, much
less expired in 1977.
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its
results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law,
the first concern of the judge should be to
discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause
injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in
fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and
justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may
seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar
circumstances. In such a situation, we
are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the
same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that
justice may be done even as the law is
obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. “Courts are apt to
err by sticking too closely to the words of a law,” so we are warned, by
Justice Holmes again, “where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them.”[13]
While we admittedly may not legislate,
we nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect
the will of the legislature. While we
may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless
have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to “the
letter that killeth” but to “the spirit that vivifieth,” to give
effect to the lawmaker’s will.
“The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines
its construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or
intent. For what is within the spirit
is within the statute although it is
not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but not
within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker
is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is
within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent
of the lawmakers.”[14]
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that
the redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of
such notice as the starting time of the
30-day period of redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really necessary, as a
general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin, to
obviate any problem of alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or
two.
The instant case presents no such problem because the right of
redemption was invoked not days but years after the sales were
made in 1963 and 1964. The complaint
was filed by Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen years after the
second sale. The delay invoked by the
petitioners extends to more than a decade,
assuming of course that there was a valid notice that tolled the running of the
period of redemption.
Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be written, would such
notice be necessary in this case? Assuming there was a valid notice although it was not in writing, would
there be any question that the 30-day period for redemption had expired long
before the complaint was filed in 1977?
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the
private respondents’ pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by their
brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By
requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious
truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the
letter of the law over its purpose. The
purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are duly
notified. We are satisfied that in this
case the other brothers and sisters were actually informed, although not in
writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was
sufficient.
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?
While we do not here declare that this period started from the
dates of such sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime between those
years and 1976, when the first complaint for redemption was filed, the other
co-heirs were actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the 30-day
period started running and ultimately expired. This could have happened any time during the interval of thirteen years,
when none of the co-heirs made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla Padua
filed her complaint, the right of redemption had already been extinguished
because the period for its exercise had already expired.
The following doctrine is
also worth noting:
“While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches
in the assertion of an alleged right it is essential that he should have
knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his claim, yet if the circumstances
were such as should have induced
inquiry, and the means of ascertaining the truth were readily available upon
inquiry, but the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable with laches,
the same as if he had known the facts.”[15]
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why
the spouses Alonzo, who were not among them, should enclose a portion of the
inherited lot and build thereon a house of strong materials. This definitely was not the act of a
temporary possessor or a mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act of ownership. Yet, given this unseemly situation, none of
the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least inquire, to ascertain the facts,
which were readily available. It took
all of thirteen years before one of them chose to
claim the right of redemption, but then it was already too late.
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are
deviating from the strict letter of the law, which the respondent court
understandably applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it had no
competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited
cases. In fact, and this should be clearly
stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero and Butte
doctrines. What we are doing simply is
adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar
circumstances of this case.
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales
although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended
during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the
complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right
of redemption. These are the
justifications for this exception.
More than twenty
centuries ago, Justinian defined justice “as the constant and perpetual
wish to render every one his due.”[16] That wish continues to motivate this Court
when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for
decision. Justice is always an
essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will
render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin
with, that the law be dispensed with justice. So we have done in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is
REVERSED and that of the trial court is reinstated, without any pronouncement
as to costs. It is so ordered.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., on leave.
[1]
Rollo, p. 5.
[2]
Ibid., p. 6.
[3]
Id., p. 64.
[4]
id.
[5]
id., p. 21.
[6]
id., p. 21.
*
Presided by Judge Cezar D. Francisco
[7]
id., p. 65.
[8]
id., p. 5.
[9]
id., p. 64
[10]
id., p. 26.
* Gaviola, Jr., P.J., ponente, Caguioa, Quetulio-Losa & Luciano, JJ.
[11]
16 SCRA 775.
[12]
4 SCRA 527.
[13]
Dissenting in Olmstead v. U.S.,
277 U.S. 438.
[14]
Statutory Construction, Ruben E.
Agpalo, pp. 64-65, 1986, citing Manila Race Horse Trainers’ Assn. v. De
la Fuente, 88 Phil. 60; Go Chi v. Go Cho, 96 Phil. 622; Hidalgo v.
Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 105; Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 315;
Villanueva v. City of Iloilo, 26 SCRA 578; People v. Purisima, 86
SCRA 542; US v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128.
[15]
Ater v. Smith, 245 III. 57, 19
Am. Cases
105.
[16]
Institutes 1, 1, pr. as cited in
Handbook for Roman Law, Miravite, Lorenzo F., p. 39, 1981.