LUCIA EUROPA (MOTHER OF DECEASED LUCRECIA EUROPA), PETITIONER, VS. HUNTER GARMENTS MFG. (PHIL.) INC. AND INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari to annul the Court of Appeals
decision which set aside the order of default and judgment by default rendered
by the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XIII
in Civil Case No. 37848 for Damages.

The facts of the case are briefly as follows:

In 1973, the petitioner’s daughter, Lucrecia
Europa, was employed as sample maker by the private
respondent Hunter Garments Manufacturing (Philippines)
Incorporated.  Sometime during the course
of her employment, or on March 9, 1978,
Lucrecia got electrocuted by the high speed sewing
machine which had been assigned to her by the private respondent.

Thus, on July 18, 1980,
the petitioner filed an action for damages against private respondent based on
quasi-delict. 
Summons, together with a copy
of the complaint, was served on its production manager, Mr. Simplicio
A. Garcia.

No answer to the complaint was ever filed.  Thus, private respondent was declared in
default and the petitioner was allowed to
present evidence ex parte.

 On April 8, 1981, the trial court rendered judgment,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the plaintiff having established her cause of
action, judgment is rendered against the defendant corporation ordering the
latter to pay the plaintiff the following:

a)  for the death of Lucrecia, the sum of P12,000.00;

b)  for actual expenses
for the wake, the funeral and burial expenses, and other miscellaneous
expenses, the sum of P5,580.00;

c)  for loss of income
the sum of P30,000.00;

d)  for moral damages,
the sum of P10,000.00;

e)  for attorney’s fees,
the sum of P5,000.00;

and pay the
costs.” (p. 39, Rollo)

Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid decision and a motion to admit answer, alleging its failure to
seasonably file an answer was due to
the excusable negligence of Ms. Lilia Jimenez, the production manager’s secretary, who failed to forward the summons
and the copy of the complaint to the company president, despite instructions to
do so by her superior.  The trial court
denied both motions.

Thus, private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals,
assigning the following errors:

“The Honorable Court, a quo, erred in not
ruling that defendant-appellant’s failure to seasonably file its Answer was due
to excusable negligence;”

“The Honorable Court, a quo, erred in declaring
defendant-appellant in default and in allowing plaintiff-appellee to present her evidence ex parte despite the fact that summons had
not been properly served;” and

“Assuming, arguendo, that
the Honorable Court, a quo, had validly acquired jurisdiction
over the person of defendant-appellant, it erred in rendering a decision
which is not supported by law and the facts of the case.” (p. 42, Rollo)

Finding that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the person of private respondent
as summons was improperly served (the production manager not being the
same “manager” referred to in
Section 13 Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court for purposes of service of
summons upon a domestic private corporation), the Court of Appeals
set aside the default order and judgment by default and directed the trial
court to conduct further proceedings for the adjudication of the case.  (p. 22, Rollo)

The petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision but the same was denied.

Hence, the instant petition for
certiorari.

There is merit in this
petition.  Assuming arguendo that the court below originally did not acquire
jurisdiction over the private respondent, the latter certainly submitted to it
when private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the judgment by default and a
motion to admit answer on the ground of excusable
negligence.  Therefore, the lower court’s
denial of both motions is binding on private respondent.  (Soriano vs. Palacio, 12 SCRA 449)

Private respondent likewise appealed from the judgment by
default, thus, We shall proceed to review the evidence presented and the
propriety of damages awarded by the lower court.

The evidence on record discloses that on March 9, 1978, Lucrecia Europa was electrocuted by the sewing machine owned by
private respondent.  The autopsy
conducted by Dr. Nieto M. Salvador confirmed that Lucrecia
died from “shock probably secondary to electrocution” (Annex “A”
of the complaint).

The facts and circumstances of the case point to the
reasonableness of the damages awarded. 
There is an express finding of gross negligence on the part of private
respondent in the judgment of the lower court, thus:

“xxx There are at least two
incidents, according to De la Cruz, where high speed sewing machines of the
defendant corporation were grounded. 
These incidents were brought to the attention of the management of the
defendant corporation.  Apparently,
nothing was done by way of checking
these grounded machines.

“At one time, Fornoza claimed that
when her machine was grounded and she complained about it, she was told by
the management ‘to get out of there.’ The defendant corporation does not employ
a duly-licensed
electrical engineer but only has three (3) electricians whose services clearly
proved inadequate for maintaining the safety of the machines in the factory.

“There is no indication that the management had ever shown any
serious concern for the safety of those operating said machines.  As it was, the defendant corporation even
tended to be apathetic to the
plight of its employees manning the factory sewing machines.  xxx

“If the machines were frequently and regularly checked or
properly maintained, the death of Lucrecia by
electrocution would surely not have
come to pass.  xxx
(p. 2, Decision).

In actions based on quasi-delict as in
this case, all damages for the natural and probable consequences of the act or
omission complained of are recoverable. 
(Article 2202 of the New Civil Code)

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
set aside and the decision of the lower court is hereby reinstated except that
the indemnity for the death itself is increased to Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman),
Padilla, Sarmiento, and
Regalado, JJ., concur.