SPOUSES MARCIANO IPAPO AND BENITA SORIANO IPAPO, PETITIONERS, VS. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND CLAUDIA P. SUAREZ, RESPONDENTS.

 Subject of the petition in this case is the decision, dated
September 11, 1985, of the
then Intermediate Appellate Court, in AC-G.R. No. 08296, entitled Claudia P.
Suarez, versus Hon. Felipe Villajuan, Jr., et al.  Petitioners seek from
this Court, by way of Certiorari, the review, annulment and setting aside
of:

(a) The decision of said Intermediate Appellate Court in the
aforementioned case, remanding the subject ejectment
case to the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, for reopening of trial and introduction of
additional evidence by both parties; and

(b) The resolution dated October 10, 1985, denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration for having been allegedly filed out of time and for lack of
merit.

In this Court’s resolution of January 29, 1986, the aforestated
petition was given due course and the parties were required to file their
respective Memoranda.

There is no dispute as to the factual and procedural antecedents
which led to the institution of this case.  From the records, it
appears that on September 1, 1975, the petitioners herein leased their property
with an area of 3,303 square meters, located at Libtong, Meycauayan, Bulacan to the private respondent Claudia P. Suarez and her
late husband for a monthly rental of P150.00; that private respondent faithfully
paid the rentals for the first two years, that is from September, 1975 to
September, 1977, but thereafter, private respondent desisted from continuing
such payments; that on January 19, 1982, petitioners sent a letter of demand to
private respondent pressing for the payment of the rentals in arrears and also
the surrender to the lessors of the said property;
that private respondent refused to comply with petitioners’ demands.

Consequently, petitioners-lessors filed
an ejectment case in the Municipal Trial Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan against
the private respondent on account of the alleged non-payment of rentals by the
latter.  Answering the complaint, private respondent alleged that
her non-payment of rentals is justified because petitioners refused to execute a
contract of lease which would include therein and grant to the lessee an option
to buy the leased property to be exercised by the respondent within five (5)
years from the inception of said lease.  Petitioners, however, deny
having agreed to or granted such alleged option to buy to private
respondent.  In fact, petitioners aver that their understanding was
that private respondents would vacate the premises in case
petitioners would need the leased premises.

During the ejectment
proceedings in the Municipal Trial Court, the children of the defendant Claudia
Vda. de Suarez were made defendants-intervenors in the case.  It is, however,
significant to note that after judgment was rendered by the Regional Trial Court
affirming the decision of the Municipal Trial Court, the defendants-intervenors no longer joined the defendant Claudia Suarez in
the latter’s petition for review filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court in
AC-G.R. SP No. 05296.

On September 27,
1985, petitioners filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court a
motion praying therein for an extension of twenty (20) days time from October 1, 1985, within which to file
a Motion for Reconsideration and on October 14, 1985, filed their Motion for Reconsideration
without awaiting the resolution of their motion for extension.

On October 12,
1985, petitioners’ counsel received a copy of the resolution of the
respondent court, dated October 10,
1985, denying petitioners’ motion for extension of time based on the
earlier pronouncements of this Court in the case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japson, L-70895,
August 8,
1985.  On October 23, 1985, petitioners filed a “Motion for
Reconsideration of the Denial of the Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion
for Reconsideration”.  On November 4, 1985, petitioners’ counsel received respondent
court’s October 25, 1985
order, denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration for having been
filed out of time and for lack of merit.

The issues raised by petitioners in the instant case pertain to
the respondent appellate court’s denial of petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration on the ground that it was filed out of time and its decision
remanding the case to the lower court for further proceedings.

The initial ruling of this Court in the
mentioned case of Habaluyas vs. Japson, G.R. No. L-70895, dated
August 5, 1985 (138 SCRA 46), which was relied upon by the Intermediate
Appellate Court has, however, now been clarified and/or modified by our
subsequent resolution in the very same Habaluyas case.  In a clarificatory resolution, dated May 30, 1986, this Court
decreed in the same aforestated case (142 SCRA 208),
that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration may be filed in the Metropolitan and Municipal Courts,
Regional Trial Courts, and Intermediate Appellate Court, except in cases pending
in the Supreme Court, and that this rule would be strictly enforced only after
one month from May 30, 1986, or effective June 30, 1986. 
This Court stated that, “the interest of justice would be better served
if the ruling in the original decision were applied prospectively from the time
herein stated.  The reason is that it would be unfair to deprive
parties of their right to appeal simply because they availed themselves of a
procedure which was not expressly prohibited or allowed by the law or the
rules.” (Habaluyas
Enterprises, Inc. vs. Judge Japson, Resolution, May 30, 1986,
Ibid, pp. 211-212).

As the herein petitioner’s motion for extension of time to
file their motion for reconsideration was filed on
September 27, 1985, to sustain the denial thereof made by respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court, will not be proper.  There should be
no drastic application of a judicial ruling which had not yet become final and
even later clarified and modified.

The remaining issue in the instant case is centered on the
respondent appellate court’s decision remanding the case to the trial court for
introduction of evidence by both parties regarding the alleged verbal option to
buy the leased property which private respondent claims was granted to her by
the petitioners-lessors.  This issue
arose because of the continuous objections of petitioners to the introduction by
the private respondent of parol evidence intended to
establish the alleged option to purchase the leased property. 
Petitioners base their opposition on the ground that admission of parol evidence to prove such option is not allowed by the
Statute of Frauds.  The municipal trial court, in Civil Case No.
997 for ejectment, sustained the petitioners and ruled
that the alleged agreement to purchase could not be utilized as a ground to
resist the suit filed against the private respondent herein who was the
principal defendant in the aforestated case. 
The trial court stressed the absence of any written agreement, note or
memorandum to support the alleged agreement to buy.  The trial
court further considered the fact that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, in Civil Case No. 1693-V-32, where the
same issue was previously raised in an action for specific performance involving
the same parties and the same subject matter, in its Order dated July 4, 1983,
already resolved this issue in favor of the petitioners herein. 
The portion of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Civil Case
No. 1693-V-32, which was quoted by the Municipal Trial Court, reads as
follows:

“Defendants further raised the defense of non-compliance with the
Statute of Frauds.  The point is well taken.  To
compel defendants to execute in plaintiffs favor a deed of sale over real
property admittedly on the basis of an oral contract cannot be judicially
enforced.  An agreement for the sale of real property or of an
interest therein must be evidenced by some kind of writing or memorandum (Art.
1403 (2-e), Civil Code).  Absent the requisite note or memorandum,
the claim on which this action is founded is unenforceable under the Statute of
Frauds (Yuvienco, et al vs. Hon. A.
Dacuycuy, L-55048, May 27, 1981)”.  (Rollo, p. 57)

Regarding the claim of partial performance which private
respondent herein argues take the case out of the coverage of the Statute of
Frauds, the trial court in its decision ruled that “…. the construction of the
buildings was made by virtue of the oral lease agreement and not as partial
execution on the alleged option to buy. 
Said construction was made after the plaintiffs (petitioners herein)
offer to lease to the defendant and her deceased spouse, if they are interested
in engaging in poultry and piggery business.  Defendant thereafter
merely asked plaintiffs for a contract, the latter have at that point in time,
not agreed to give defendant any option to buy.  (p. 5, TSN, October 17, 1983).” [Rollo, pp. 57-58; parenthesis supplied].

It would thus seem that even assuming that private
respondent had verbally asked for an option to buy, nevertheless,
petitioners-lessors had not signified their agreement
to the same and there is no evidence in writing that such option or privilege
was ever granted to the private respondent herein.

Regardless of the issue of whether private respondent is entitled
to prove an alleged option to buy, it is evident from the manifestations of
herein petitioners that the private respondent ceased paying the rentals after
September 1977, but still continue to be in possession of the
premises.  Such non-payment provides sufficient cause for the ejectment of the lessee.  Private respondent
herein cannot be justified in unilaterally withholding payment of the rentals
due.  If she was acting in good faith, she should have
tendered payment of the rentals accrued and accruing and if such are refused by
petitioners, private respondent should have made a consignation thereof or at
least deposited the rentals due during the pendency of
the ejectment case, with notice to petitioners. 
But what appears is that private respondent instituted an unsuccessful
case for specific performance, which was Civil Case No. 1693-V-32, to compel
petitioners to execute in private respondent’s favor a deed of sale over the
same real property involved in the instant case (Rollo, p. 57), and yet refused to pay the rentals
for the property occupied by her for the poultry business.

The respondent appellate court gravely erred and abused its
discretion by directing the remand to the trial court of the ejectment case for further reception of additional evidence
on an issue which apparently has already been foreclosed in the aforementioned
related Civil Case No. 1693-V-82.

The remand of the instant ejectment case
is, in the considered view of the court, not proper nor
justified.  Ejectment cases should be
expeditiously resolved and terminated.  Since the commencement of
this case in 1982, many years have already elapsed.  The municipal
trial court and the regional trial court which acted on the case all ruled in
favor of the lessors-petitioners.  There
is lack of any legal basis justifying the remand of the case to the municipal
trial court for further proceedings in order to resolve anew an issue which, as
indicated, was already ruled upon in favor of the petitioners in a previous
civil case before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.

To remand the case therefore, to the Meycauayan Municipal Court for further proceedings will
undoubtedly be only a waste of effort and time and to the continuing prejudice
of the petitioners.  It will only prolong the already unjustified
stay of the private respondent and provide her an unwarranted excuse to remain
in the leased premises, notwithstanding her non-payment of the corresponding
rentals for the past several years.  This Court should not
countenance and allow such an unjust and unfair situation to continue.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted.  The
decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.  The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Malolos, Bulacan, in Civil Case
No. 997, affirming the decision of the Municipal Trial Court, but with
modification, as to the award for attorney’s fees, is reinstated and made the
judgment in this case.  Costs against the private
respondent, Claudia P. Suarez.  This decision is immediately
executory.

SO
ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Padilla, and
Bidin, JJ., concur.