HUGO EVANGELISTA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. LUIS PEDREÑOS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This action was instituted for the purpose of securing peaceable possession
of a considerable quantity of rice of which plaintiff alleges the defendant took
forcible and unlawful possession. Upon “the case made by the complaint and
supported by the evidence” the trial judge found that plaintiff was entitled to
the possession of the rice and damages in the sum of P3.50.

The plaintiff (although the allegations of his complaint clearly set forth a
cause of action for which the proper remedy was a judgment for possession and
damages for the unlawful detention) prayed for a preliminary injunction to
restrain the defendant from interfering with the rice, and further that the
preliminary injunction be made permanent upon proof of the allegations set forth
in his complaint. The trial judge in conformity with the prayer of the complaint
granted the preliminary injunction which was made permanent in his final
judgment, and in the course of the proceedings issued a special order in favor
of the plaintiff for the possession of the rice.

Counsel for the defendant and appellant vigorously contend: First, that the
evidence introduced at the trial in the court below did not sustain plaintiff’s
allegations as to his right of possession; second, that even if the evidence be
held to sustain the allegations in the complaint, nevertheless the remedy prayed
for was not the proper remedy for the cause of action set forth in the
allegations of the complaint; and third, that the judgment of the trial court
granting a permanent injunction should be reversed and the complaint dismissed
with the costs against the plaintiff.

After a careful review of the whole record we are satisfied that the finding
of the trial judge in favor of the right of possession of the plaintiff should
not be disturbed, and the only question left for consideration is the
disposition which should be made of the case as it now stands, in view of the
manifest error of the trial judge in granting the remedy by injunction prayed
for in the complaint, in addition to the special order for the possession of the
property.

In the case of Devesa vs. Arbes (13 Phil. Rep., 273), we said,
quoting the syllabus: “Injunctions, as a rule, will not be granted to take
property out of the possession and control of one party and to place it into
that of another whose title has not been clearly established by law.” And in
that case we further held that the American doctrine limiting the use of
injunctions should be applied in this jurisdiction, and that injunctions should
only be allowed where there is no other adequate remedy. In the present case the
plaintiff upon his own allegations would appear to have had an adequate remedy
in a judgment for possession and for damages for the unlawful taking and
detention of the property.

In the former case we held as follows: “We
are of opinion, however, that the remedy by injunction sought by the plaintiff
and allowed by the trial court was not the proper remedy for the cause of action
set out in the pleadings and established by the evidence, and that, in
accordance with the provisions of section 126 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
the court should have granted ‘relief consistent with the case made by the
complaint and supported by the evidence and embraced within the issue,’ And to
that end should have required an amendment of the complaint by striking out the
prayer for an injunction and substituting therefor a prayer for judgment for
possession of the land described in the complaint, and upon the complaint thus
amended, judgment should have been rendered in favor of the plaintiff.”

In the case at bar there can be no doubt that the question clearly embraced
within the issue in the proceedings had in the court below, and in substance and
effect the question decided by the trial court, was the right of the plaintiff
to possession; so that if the trial judge, instead of making the preliminary
injunction permanent and securing the possession of the rice to the plaintiff in
that form, had rendered judgment for possession after requiring an amendment of
the complaint, it would have been our duty to affirm the judgment thus rendered.
We are unable to discover any practical purpose which would be gained by
reversing the judgment and dismissing the complaint, the real issue between the
plaintiff and defendant having been properly adjudicated in the court below.
Following the procedure adopted in the case of Devesa vs. Arbes (supra), we
think that an amendment to the complaint should be allowed as in the former
case, and that the judgment of the trial court should therefore be amended so as
to substitute a judgment for possession and damages in the sum of P3.50 for so
much thereof as undertakes to make permanent the preliminary injunction; and
thus amended we think the judgment of the court below should be affirmed. It
does not seem necessary in this case as in the former case to return the record
to the court below for this purpose, and unless some sufficient objection be
made within ten days from the date of the filing of this opinion, the complaint
will be deemed amended and judgment will be entered in this court in favor of
the plaintiff for the possession of the rice described in the complaint, and for
damages in the sum of P3.50 as found by the trial judge.

Arellano, C. J., Moreland, Trent, and Araullo, JJ.,
concur.