SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER LOLITO C. FULLEROS AND ANTONIO MANGAMPO, RESPONDENTS.

On January 5, 1981,
petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC, for short) filed an application for
clearance to terminate the services of private respondent Antonio Mangampo with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment
Regional Office No. 5 in Naga
City.  At that time, private respondent had been
working as warehouseman-cashier at petitioner’s sales office in Daet, Camarines Norte for about
six (6) months.  The application was
anchored on private respondent’s alleged violation of company rules and the
Labor Code consisting of “misappropriation of company funds deposited in
their (sic) custody.”^[1]
In the meantime, private respondent was placed on preventive suspension and the application therefor,
leading to termination, was received by said respondent on January 7, 1981.^[2]

An opposition having been filed by private respondent on January 17, 1981, the case was
certified to the Labor
Arbitration Branch of Regional Office V of respondent commission and docketed
therein as RAB Case No. 102-81. 
Respondent Executive Labor Arbiter Lolito C. Fulleros, to whom the case was assigned, required the
parties to submit their position papers. 
Private respondent complied by filing his position paper on March 12,
1981 registering his opposition to the application for want of evidence to
prove his responsibility.^[3]

For purposes of reception of evidence, the case was assigned to the senior labor
analyst as hearing officer.  Efforts were
exerted to arrive at an amicable settlement but, proving fruitless, hearing was scheduled on June 9, 1982 but was reset to June 27, 1983 for failure of
petitioner’s counsel to appear on the first scheduled date.^[4]
Again, petitioner and its counsel failed to appear, prompting private
respondent to orally move for
the adoption of his position paper as direct testimony and to declare the
petitioner in default.  Both prayers were
granted by the hearing officer.

Nevertheless, “in order to serve the ends of labor
justice,” petitioner was later allowed to file its position paper which
served as direct testimony.  In its said
position paper, dated July 18, 1983,^[5]
petitioner justified private respondent’s termination by contending that he
breached the trust and confidence reposed in him.  Petitioner further moved to dismiss the case
on the ground that the application for clearance to terminate which it had
earlier filed was a “mere report.” It was claimed that clearance to
terminate was applicable only to employees with at least one (1) year of
service, hence private respondent should file another complaint that would be
the basis of a resolution by the
commission with respect to his termination.

A report was submitted by the hearing officer to Executive Labor
Arbiter Fulleros recommending the reinstatement of
private respondent.  The factual findings
and the conclusions of law in said recommendation were adopted by said arbiter
in his decision ordering SMC “to reinstate Antonio Mangampo
to his former position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits
granted by law, or to any other position of similar rank:  to pay Antonio Mangampo
the sum of P21,420.00 corresponding to his backwages
and, to pay the sum of P2,142.00 as attorney’s fee.”^[6]

After petitioner received the said decision of the labor arbiter
on July 18, 1984, it
appealed to respondent commission, reiterating its position that the
termination of private
respondent’s service by reason of loss of trust and confidence was
warranted.  Said appeal was docketed as
Case No. RAB-V-162-81.

Respondent Mangampo moved to dismiss
the appeal on the ground that it was filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period under then Article 223 of the Labor
Code.  It was claimed that “said
appeal was mailed by the applicant on August
6, 1984 as borne out in the rubberstamp (sic), received by Philcomcen post office, Ortigas Avenue, Pasig, Metro-Manila.”^[7]

In its resolution of March
8, 1985, respondent commission dismissed the appeal, agreeing with
the private respondent that it was not filed seasonably.^[8]
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner insisting that the appeal
was sent by registered mail on July
27, 1984.  To prove its said
allegation, petitioner attached a zerox copy of
Registry Receipt No. 866 bearing a handwritten date, July 27, 1984, as the supposed date of mailing.

Said motion for reconsideration was denied by the commission on
September 20, 1985, with the ratiocination that “(a)s between the
handwritten date of mailing appearing on a mere zerox
copy of a registry receipt, without more, and the date of posting indicated by
the post office stamp on the envelope, attached to the records of the case
pursuant to the Rules of Court, the latter must be given more weight and
belief.”^[9]

In the present petition, the dismissal of said appeal is challenged and stigmatized as
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 
Petitioner claims that the respondent commission erred in (1) ruling
that the appeal was filed out of time, and (2) dismissing the appeal without
determining the merits of the case.  In
our resolution of November 13, 1985,
we issued a temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the
resolutions dated March 8, 1985
and September 20, 1985 of
respondent commission.^[10]

We find, however, that petitioner’s present recourse is devoid of
merit and cannot justify the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

Under Section 1, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, where the filing
of pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders and other papers with the
court are made by sending them by registered mail, the date of mailing as shown by the post office stamp on the
envelope or the registry receipt shall be considered as the date of filing.

Thus, such date of filing is determinable from two sources, that
is, from the post office stamp
on the envelope or from the registry receipt, either of which may suffice to prove
the timeliness of the filing of the pleadings. 
If the date stamped on one is earlier than the other, the former may be
accepted as the date of filing.  This
presupposes, however, that the envelope or registry receipt and the dates
appearing thereon are duly authenticated before the tribunal where they are
presented.

The appeal to respondent commission in Case No. RAB-V-162-81 was
dismissed for having been filed out of time, that is, nineteen (19) days after
receipt by petitioner of the decision of the labor arbiter.  Respondent commission’s finding is that the
appeal was filed on August 6, 1984,
the date stamped on the envelope which was part of the records of the
case.  Petitioner’s contrary stance, on
the other hand, is based on the handwritten date appearing in a zerox copy of the purported registry receipt.  It is to be noted that such submission of a
mere zerox copy of the registry receipt was not even
accompanied or supplemented by proof that said receipt pertains to the appeal
mailed by petitioner.  Neither did
petitioner present the original of said receipt, which in the natural course of
things would be in its possession or available to it, in spite of the doubt
cast on the authenticity of said zerox copy and the
issue raised thereon.  We hold that
respondent commission correctly relied on the date appearing in the post office
stamp on the mailing envelope and in consequently holding that petitioner’s
appeal was time-barred.

Of compelling significance is the fact that the date stamped on
the mailing envelope containing the copy of petitioner’s appeal which was
furnished to private respondent bears the same date, August 6, 1984, as the date of mailing^[11]
and bears registry stamp No. 865 thereon. 
To recall, the zerox copy of the registry
receipt with the handwritten date of July
27, 1984, which petitioner presented, is Registry Receipt No.
866.  Petitioner did not question these
facts.

The accepted procedure is that a copy of the pleading is first or
simultaneously furnished the opposing party and proof of such service is
indicated on the original of the pleading filed in court or with the
adjudicative agency, such indication being either a handwritten acknowledgment
by the adverse party or the registry receipt of the copy mailed to him.  In other words, since the service of the copy
to private respondent could not have been made subsequent to the filing by mail
of the original pleading to respondent commission, it was correctly held that
the appeal was made,  at the earliest, on
August 6, 1985.

The decision having become final and executory,
the dismissal of the appeal without determining the merits of the case was
proper.  But, even if the appeal was
seasonably filed, it is irremissible that
petitioner’s application for clearance to terminate private respondent’s
services must fail.  Not only is there no showing of grave abuse of
discretion but petitioner also failed to support its claim that such
termination was warranted.

A conclusion contrary to what petitioner contends for appears
from the facts and circumstances established by evidence painstakingly
unearthed in a thorough investigation of the case, the lengthy results whereof
are detailed in the decision of the labor arbiter.  These are factual findings which we cannot
reject, not only because we are generally bound thereby but because they are
convincingly logical and sustainable.  In
its application, the reason advanced by petitioner was the alleged
misappropriation of company funds by private respondent.  However, there was a marked paucity of proof which could plausibly connect
respondent Mangampo to the loss of said funds.  The police investigators even failed to
establish a case against anybody and merely observed that there was a strong
indication of an inside job.  No criminal
complaint was filed because no such complaint is warranted.  We cannot, in justice, have private
respondent’s fate hinge upon conjectures and surmises.

The loss of trust and confidence that petitioner relied upon in
its position paper is likewise unsupported by substantial evidence.  As observed by the hearing officer, the loss
of the company funds, even if true, cannot just be attributed to private
respondent because it clearly appears from the records that it was not only
said private respondent who had access to the safe where the funds were kept.^[12]

We are convinced that the respondent employee’s dismissal cannot
justifiably be sustained since the findings in this case and whatever
investigations may have been made by petitioner miserably fail to establish
either complicity or culpability on his part. 
While dishonesty or disloyalty of an employee is not to be condoned,
neither should a condemnation on that ground be tolerated on the basis of
suspicions spawned by speculative inferences.

WHEREFORE, the dismissal of petitioner’s appeal
is AFFIRMED and the temporary
restraining order heretofore issued by us is lifted.  The decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter,
dated June 26, 1984, which
in effect is affirmed, is hereby modified in the sense that, in accordance with
present jurisprudential policy, the backwages to be
paid to private respondent should not exceed three (3) years computed at his salary rate when his services
were suspended or terminated, without any deduction or qualification.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), and Paras, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., no part, because of equity interest in petitioner-corporation.

Sarmiento, J., no part, was former Director and legal consultant and
also because of equity interest.

^[1]
Rollo, 22.

^[2]
Ibid., 177.

^[3]
Ibid., 25-32.

^[4]
Ibid., 40.

^[5]
Ibid., 33-39.

^[6]
Ibid., 47.

^[7]
Ibid., 57.

^[8]
Ibid., 60-62.

^[9]
Ibid., 143-144.

^[10]
Ibid., 75-77.

^[11]
Rollo, 90.

^[12]
Ibid., 45.