VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, RESPONDENT.

The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public
concern is invoked in this special civil action for Mandamus instituted
by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi’s
request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons
employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil
service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of
Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that
he has no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance
of the extraordinary writ of Mandamus to compel the respondent
Commission to disclose said information.

This is not the first time that the writ of Mandamus is
sought to enforce the fundamental right to information. The same remedy was resorted to in the case
of Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera et. al.,
(G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27) wherein the people’s right to
be informed under the 1973 Constitution (Article IV, Section 6) was invoked in
order to compel the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions and other presidential issuances. Prior to the recognition of the right in
said Constitution, the statutory right to information provided for in the Land
Registration Act (Section 56, Act 496, as amended) was claimed by a newspaper
editor in another Mandamus proceeding, this time to demand access to the
records of the Register of Deeds for the purpose of gathering data on real
estate transactions involving aliens. (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383 [1948]).

The constitutional right
to information on matters of public concern first gained recognition in the
Bill of Rights, Article IV, of the 1973 Constitution, which states:

Sec. 6. The right of the
people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents
and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.

The foregoing provision has been retained
and the right therein provided amplified in Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987
Constitution with the addition of the phrase, “as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development.”
The new provision reads:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.

These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which the
right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional
Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to
afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein
recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the
constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature. (Id. at, p. 165) What may be provided
for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon
the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the
declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving
public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may
be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III, Sec. 7
have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New
Charter. Therefore, the right may be
properly invoked in a Mandamus proceeding such as this one.

The Solicitor General
interposes procedural objections to Our giving due course to this
Petition. He challenges the
petitioner’s standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess
any clear legal right to be informed of
the civil service eligibilities
of the government employees concerned. He calls attention to the alleged failure of the petitioner to show his
actual interest in securing this particular information. He further argues that there is no
ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with
the information he seeks.

1. To be given due course, a Petition for Mandamus must
have been instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any
tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes said party
from the enjoyment of a legal
right. (Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines
vs. Felix, 77, Phil. 1012
[1947]). The petitioner in every case
must therefore be an “aggrieved party” in the sense that he possesses
a clear legal right to be enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act to
be performed.

In the case before Us, the respondent takes issue on the
personality of the petitioner to bring this suit. It is asserted that, the instant Petition is bereft of any
allegation of Legaspi’s actual interest
in the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas. At most there is a vague reference to an
unnamed client in whose behalf he had allegedly acted when he made inquiries on
the subject (Petition, Rollo, p. 3).

But what is clear upon the face of the Petition is that the
petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public
right. It has been held that:

* * * when the question is one of public right and the object of
the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people
are regarded as the real party in interest
and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not
show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being
sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution
of the laws * * * (Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera, et. al., G.R. No. 1-63915, April
24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27, 36).

From the foregoing, it becomes apparent
that when a Mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that
the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general
“public” which possesses the right.

The Court had opportunity to define the word “public”
in the Subido case, supra, when it held that even those who have no
direct or tangible interest in any real estate transaction are part of the
“public” to whom “(a)ll records relating to registered lands in
the Office of the Register of Deeds shall
be open * * *” (Sec. 56, Act No. 496, as amended). In the words of the Court:

* * *”Public” is a comprehensive, all­-inclusive
term. Properly construed, it embraces
every person. To say that only those
who have a present and existing interest of a pecuniary character in the particular
information sought are given the right of inspection is to make an unwarranted
distinction. * * * (Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra at p. 387).

The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such
is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the
exercise of the public right. We find
no cogent reason to deny his standing to bring the present suit.

2.  For every right of the
people recognized as fundamental, there lies a corresponding duty on the part
of those who govern, to respect and protect that right. That is the very essence of the Bill of
Rights in a constitutional
regime. Only governments operating
under fundamental rules defining the
limits of their power so as to shield individual rights against its arbitrary
exercise can properly claim to be constitutional (Cooley, supra, at p.
5). Without a government’s acceptance
of the limitations imposed upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold
individual liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties
exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a
sophistry, and liberty, the ultimate illusion.

In recognizing the people’s right to be informed, both the 1973
Constitution and the New Charter expressly mandate the duty of the State and
its agents to afford access to official records, documents, papers and in
addition, government research data used as basis for policy development,
subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law. The guarantee has been further enhanced in
the New Constitution with the adoption of a policy of full public disclosure,
this time “subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,” in
Article II, Section 28 thereof, to wit:

Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest. (Art. II, Sec. 28).

In the Tanada case, supra, the constitutional
guarantee was bolstered by what
this Court declared as an imperative duty of the government officials concerned
to publish all important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature as
well as all executive orders and proclamations of general applicability. We granted Mandamus in said case, and
in the process, We found occasion to expound briefly on the nature of said
duty:

* * * That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the
people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and
reality. The law itself makes a list of
what should be published in the
Official Gazette. Such listing, to our
mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as
to what must be included or excluded
from such publication. (Tanada v. Tuvera, supra, at 39). (Underscoring supplied).

The absence of discretion on the part of
government agencies in allowing the examination of public records,
specifically, the records in the Office of the Register of Deeds, is emphasized
in Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra:

Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the
examination is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the
duty under the law of registration
officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the
person seeking access to the records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information which the
records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not made
of it. If it be wrong
to publish the contents of the
records, it is the legislature and not
the officials having custody thereof
which is called upon to devise a
remedy. * * * (Subido v. Ozaeta,
supra at 388). (Underscoring supplied).

It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this Court that
government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access
to, information of public concern. This
is not to lose sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said
agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the right to information may be exercised by the
public. In the Subido case, We
recognized the authority of the Register of Deeds to regulate the manner in
which persons desiring to do so, may
inspect, examine or copy records
relating to registered lands. However,
the regulations which the Register of Deeds may promulgate are confined to:

* * * prescribing the manner and hours of
examination to the end that damage to or loss of, the records may be avoided,
that undue inteference with the duties of the custodian of the books and
documents and other employees may be
prevented, that the right of other persons entitled to make inspection may be
insured * * * (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387)

Applying the Subido ruling by analogy, We recognized a
similar authority in a municipal judge, to regulate the manner of inspection by
the public of criminal docket records in the case of Baldoza vs. Dimaano
(Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Said administrative case was filed against the respondent judge
for his alleged refusal to allow examination of the criminal docket records in
his sala. Upon a finding by the
Investigating Judge that the respondent had allowed the complainant to open and
view the subject records, We absolved the respondent. In effect, We have also held that the rules and conditions
imposed by him upon the manner of examining the public records were
reasonable.

In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We were
emphatic in Our statement that the authority to regulate the manner of
examining public records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be made between the discretion to refuse outright the
disclosure of or access to a particular information and the authority to
regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded. The first is a limitation upon the
availability of access to the information sought, which only the Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987
Constitution). The second pertains to
the government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to regulate access is to be
exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records may be
avoided, undue interference with the duties of said agencies may be prevented,
and more importantly, that the exercise of the same constitutional right by
other persons shall be assured (Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra).

Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject
to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty
to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public
records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made
contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be
rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being
discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus in
a proper case.

But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to
be enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth
in the Constitution. The decisive
question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of Mandamus in
this case is, whether the information sought by the petitioner is within the
ambit of the constitutional guarantee.

3. The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access
to information of public concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the free
flow of ideas and information in a democracy (Baldoza v. Dimaano, Adm. Matter
No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 17 SCRA 14). In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope
with the exigencies of their time (Thornhill vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102
[1939]), access to information of general interest aids the people in
democratic decision-making (87 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1974] by giving them a
better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation.

But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of
public concerns not absolute. It does
not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc.,
are “subject to limitations as may
be provided by law” (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types
of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security
(Journal No. 90, September 23, 1986, p. 10; and Journal No. 91, September 24,
1986, p. 32, 1986 Constitutional Commission). It follows that, in every
case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be
circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of
public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted
by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee. The threshold
question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public
interest or public concern.

a. This question is first addressed to the government agency
having custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned
any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not
of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been
exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, “… the government
is in an advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against
release …” (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every
denial of access by the government agency concerned is subject
to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled
by a writ of Mandamus.

In determining whether or not a particular information is of
public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. “Public concern” like “public
interest” is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the
interest of an ordinary citizen. In the
final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis
whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or
affects the public.

The public concern invoked in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera, supra, was the need for
adequate notice to the public of the various laws which are to regulate the
actions and conduct of citizens. In Subido
vs. Ozaeta, supra, the public concern deemed covered by
the statutory right was the knowledge of those real estate transactions which
some believed to have been registered in violation of the Constitution.

The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the
truth of the claim of certain government employees that they are civil service
eligibles for the positions to which they were appointed. The Constitution expressly declares as a
State policy that:

Appointments in the civil service
shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as
practicable, and except as to positions which
are policy determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, by
competitive examination. (Art. IX, B,
Sec. 2, [2]).

Public office being a public trust,
[Const., Art. XI, Sec. 1) it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure
that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only
by persons who are eligibles. Public
officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective
positions.

b. But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of
public interest. For Mandamus to lie in a given
case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law from the
operation of the constitutional guarantee.

In the instant, case while refusing to
confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any
provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner’s right to
know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the
names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations
and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the
public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one’s civil service eligibility,
if actually possessed. Petitioner’s
request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government
employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through
any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil
Service Commission.

The civil service
eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of
express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service
eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service
eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.

WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open
its register of eligibles for the position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility
of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas for said position in the Health
Department of Cebu City, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.