EUTIQUIO MARQUINO AND MARIA TERENAL-MARQUINO SURVIVED BY: LUZ T. MARQUINO, ANA T. MARQUINO AND EVA T. MARQUINO, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FIRST CIV…
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Marquino versus Intermediate Appellate Court
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Eutiquio Marquino and his legitimate family against the Intermediate Appellate Court, now the Court of Appeals. The real contest is between the heirs of Bibiana Romano, who claimed to be the acknowledged natural child of Eutiquio, and the legitimate wife and children of Eutiquio. The case asks two questions of enduring importance: whether the right to compel recognition of natural filiation is transmissible to the child's heirs, and whether an action for recognition already filed survives the death of the putative parent. It matters because it fixes the personal and intransmissible character of the action for recognition under the old Civil Code, and because it explains why the more liberal rule of the Family Code cannot be applied backward to disturb vested rights.
Procedural History
Bibiana Romano filed an action for judicial declaration of filiation, annulment of partition, support, and damages against Eutiquio Marquino before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, impleading Eutiquio's wife Maria and their legitimate children Luz, Ana, and Eva. Bibiana died during trial, before she could finish presenting her evidence, and her heirs were substituted for her. The Marquinos then moved to dismiss on the ground that the action for recognition is a personal act and cannot be transmitted to heirs. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case.
Bibiana's heirs appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. While the appeal was pending, Eutiquio himself died. The appellate court reversed the trial court, holding that while the heirs of a deceased natural child cannot bring an action to compel recognition, they may continue an action already filed, and that the death of the putative parent does not extinguish a pending recognition case but allows substitution by his heirs. The Marquinos' motion for reconsideration was denied, and they came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.
Facts
Bibiana Romano was born on December 2, 1926 in Piapi, Dumaguete City, to Gregoria Romano, and allegedly to Eutiquio Marquino, who was then still single. Bibiana later became known to the Marquino family when she was hired as a domestic helper in their household in Dumaguete City, and she claimed to have received financial assistance from them. On these facts she asserted continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged natural child through the direct and unequivocal acts of her alleged father and his family. The Marquinos strongly denied her allegations.
On January 10, 1971, Bibiana sued Eutiquio for compulsory recognition, impleading his wife and legitimate children. During the pendency of the case, and before she could finish presenting her evidence, Bibiana died on March 17, 1979. Her heirs were ordered substituted for her as plaintiffs. On May 17, 1983, the Marquinos moved to dismiss, arguing that the action for recognition is a personal act and is intransmissible to heirs. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case.
Bibiana's heirs appealed. On August 20, 1983, while the case was pending on appeal, Eutiquio Marquino died. The Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the dismissal, ruling that the action could be continued by the child's heirs against the putative parent's heirs. Reconsideration was denied, and the Marquinos elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.
Issues
- Whether or not the right of action to compel recognition of a natural child is intransmissible in character, such that it cannot be brought by the child's heirs after the child's death.
- Whether or not, after the death of the putative father, an action for recognition of a natural child already filed may be continued against the heirs of the putative father.
Applicable Provisions
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides:
An action for recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; (2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child. In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from discovery of the document.
This provision governs the case because it limits the action to the lifetime of the presumed parents and allows only two exceptions, neither of which is present here.
Article 173 of the Family Code provides:
The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five (5) years within which to institute the action. The action commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
The Court discusses this provision to show that the law has since changed, but holds that it cannot be applied retroactively to this case.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the right of action to compel recognition is intransmissible. Under Article 285 of the Civil Code, the action may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, subject to only two exceptions, and the Court, following its earlier ruling in Conde versus Abaya, held that the right of action for acknowledgment of natural children can never be transmitted. The rationale is to give the alleged parents the opportunity to be heard, while the exceptions exist to protect the heirs. Since Bibiana sued while Eutiquio was alive but died before completing her proof, her death tolled the action because of its personal and intransmissible nature. The Court quoted its earlier ruling that the right is purely personal to the natural child and is not transmitted to the child's heirs.
On the second issue, the Court ruled against the continuance of the action against the putative father's heirs. In an action for compulsory recognition, the party in the best position to oppose the claim is the putative parent himself, and the need to hear his side is an overwhelming consideration because of the unsettling effects of such an action on the peace and harmony of his family. Article 285 allows only two exceptions where the action transcends the death of the putative parent, and neither obtains here: Eutiquio's death did not occur during Bibiana's minority, since she was already forty-five years old when she filed the case in 1971, and no previously unknown document expressly acknowledging her as a natural child was discovered. The Court also invoked public policy, quoting that before an illegitimate child is admitted into a legitimate family, every requisite of the law must be completely and fully complied with, and that no one should be permitted upon doubtful evidence to take from legitimate children the property they and their parents have acquired.
The Court acknowledged that Article 173 of the Family Code has superseded the old rule, allowing the child to bring the action during his or her entire lifetime and even after the parents' death, so that the action does not prescribe as long as the child lives. But it held that Article 173 cannot be given retroactive effect here, because doing so would prejudice the vested rights transmitted to the petitioners at the time of Eutiquio's death. A vested right is a right in property which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Doctrine
Under Article 285 of the Civil Code, the action to compel recognition of a natural child is personal to the child and intransmissible to the child's heirs; it may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except when the parent died during the child's minority or when a previously unknown document of recognition appears. The death of the natural child during the pendency of the action tolls it, and the death of the putative parent does not permit its continuation against his heirs, because the putative parent is the party best situated to oppose the claim and the law provides only the two stated exceptions. Article 173 of the Family Code, which allows the action during the child's entire lifetime and provides that a commenced action survives the death of either or both parties, cannot be applied retroactively to prejudice vested rights that had already become fixed.
Disposition
The Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals, and dismissed the complaint, with no pronouncement as to costs. The Marquinos prevailed.
Remember This
Memorize this line: the action for recognition of a natural child is purely personal and intransmissible, and it dies with the child or with the putative parent, subject only to the two exceptions of Article 285 of the Civil Code. Examiners use this case to test the transmissibility of the recognition action and the non-retroactivity of Article 173 of the Family Code as against vested rights.