HADJI IBRAHIM SOLAY PANGANDAMAN, MAGAMBAAN PANGANDAMAN, MACARIAN PANGANDAMAN, MAMINTAL PANGANDAMAN, PACALUNDO PANGANDAMAN, MANGORAMAS PANGANDAMAN, MACADAOB P. PANGORANGAN, KILAT…

Pangandaman versus Casar

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Hadji Ibrahim Solay Pangandaman and thirteen others against Judge Dimaporo T. Casar of the Municipal Circuit Court of Masiu, Lanao del Sur. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to annul the warrant of arrest issued against them in a multiple murder case, to prohibit the judge from further taking cognizance of that case, and to compel him to forward the entire record to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur. The case matters because it fixes the precise moment when a warrant of arrest may lawfully issue in a preliminary investigation: the Court holds that the full two-stage procedure need not be completed before the warrant is issued, but it also voids the same warrant as against fifty unnamed persons, because a warrant must particularly describe the persons to be seized.

Procedural History

On August 10, 1985, a criminal complaint for multiple murder was filed before the respondent Judge by a Philippine Constabulary sergeant. On the same day, the judge examined the complainant's three witnesses under oath, approved the complaint, and issued a warrant of arrest against the fourteen petitioners and fifty John Does. On August 14, 1985, counsel for the widow of one of the victims filed an ex parte motion for reconsideration, asking that the warrant be recalled and a thorough investigation held, on the ground that the initial investigation had been hasty and haphazard. The respondent Judge denied the motion for lack of basis. The petitioners then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari and prohibition, and the Solicitor General agreed that the petition should be granted and the warrant voided.

Facts

On July 27, 1985, a shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur, leaving at least five persons dead and two others wounded. One version says armed men attacked a residence; another says a group on its way to Lalabuan was ambushed. On the following day, a lawyer claiming to represent the widow of one of the victims wrote the Provincial Fiscal at Marawi City, asking for a full blast preliminary investigation. The Fiscal immediately indorsed the letter to the respondent Judge, requesting that all cases relating to the incident be forwarded to his office, which had first taken cognizance of them.

No case was presented to the respondent Judge until Saturday, August 10, 1985, when the sergeant filed the complaint for multiple murder. That same day, the judge examined personally all three witnesses under oath, under his close and direct supervision, reducing the questions and answers to writing. He then approved the complaint and issued a warrant of arrest against the fourteen petitioners, who were named by the witnesses, and fifty John Does.

The three witnesses gave mutually corroborative accounts. They testified that they were passing by Pantao on their way to Lalabuan when they were ambushed and fired upon by an armed group that included the petitioners and about fifty unidentified persons; that five of their party were killed and two of the witnesses themselves were wounded; that the ambushers kept firing even at the dead bodies; and that the ambush was an offshoot of a family grudge. All three identified each of the fourteen petitioners by name as members of the ambush group.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant of arrest without first completing the entire procedure for preliminary investigation prescribed by Section 3 of Rule 112.
• Whether or not the respondent Judge had sufficient time on a Saturday to determine probable cause against sixty-four persons and issue the warrant the same day.
• Whether or not the respondent Judge could lawfully conduct his own investigation despite the Provincial Fiscal's prior cognizance of the matter.
• Whether or not the warrant of arrest against fifty John Does is valid.

Applicable Provisions

Section 6 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, on when a municipal trial judge may issue a warrant of arrest, provides:

Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. -- (b) By the Municipal Trial Court. -- If the municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant of arrest.

This is the provision the Court reads as authorizing arrest even before the second phase of the investigation is opened.

The former Section 6 of Rule 112, quoted by the Court to show that the power existed equally under the old rules, provides:

SEC. 6. Warrant of arrest, when issued. -- If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the offense complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.

This confirms that the warrant has always awaited only a finding of probable cause, not the completion of the whole procedure.

Section 3 of Article Four of the Constitution, on the particularity of warrants, provides:

Section 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

This is the standard against which the Court voids the warrant as to the fifty unnamed John Does.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court holds that there is no requirement that the entire procedure for preliminary investigation be completed before a warrant of arrest may issue. What the Rule provides is that no complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court may be filed without completing that procedure; nowhere is it provided that the procedure must be completed before a warrant may issue. Indeed, the contrary is true, for Section 6 of Rule 112 clearly authorizes the municipal trial court to order the respondent's arrest even before opening the second phase, if it is satisfied that probable cause exists and that immediate custody is necessary so as not to frustrate the ends of justice. The Court explains that the mandated procedure has two stages: an ex parte inquiry into the sufficiency of the complaint and its supporting documents, and a second phase giving the respondent notice, access to the complainant's evidence, and an opportunity to submit counter-affidavits. Since no information had yet been filed and the judge did not disclaim an intention to undertake the second phase, he had not failed to observe the prescribed procedure.

On the second issue, the Court rejects the argument that there was scarcely time to determine probable cause against sixty-four persons within a Saturday's office hours. The argument founders on the judge's positive affirmations that he had personally and closely examined the three witnesses under oath, which nothing in the record discredits and which enjoy the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. The claim that the witnesses merely swore to statements prepared beforehand by a military investigator is dismissed as speculation. The Court also notes that nothing shows the proceedings could not have been completed within that time frame, and finds nothing unusual in questioning three witnesses within a three-hour period.

On the third issue, the Court holds that the Provincial Fiscal's announced intention to investigate did not legally inhibit the judge from conducting his own inquiry, since the matter was regularly brought before him and no formal complaint was filed before the Fiscal. Courtesy may have dictated that he leave the investigation to the Fiscal, but duty did not. Still, practical considerations of expediency and the avoidance of duplication of work dictate that the Fiscal be permitted to take over the investigation even at its present stage.

On the fourth issue, the Court holds that the warrant is void as against the fifty John Does, not one of whom the witnesses could or would identify. It is of the nature of a general warrant, a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional, and clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized.

Doctrine

First, the completion of the entire procedure for preliminary investigation is not a condition sine qua non, that is, not an indispensable precondition, for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The warrant need only await a finding of probable cause, made after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers.

Second, what the Rule forbids is the filing of the complaint or information in the Regional Trial Court without completing the preliminary investigation; it does not forbid the earlier issuance of the warrant.

Third, searching questions and answers are such questions as have a tendency to show the commission of a crime and the perpetrator thereof, and what is searching depends on what is sought to be inquired into; the Court will not substitute its judgment for the judge's on what questions to put.

Fourth, a warrant of arrest against unnamed John Does is a general warrant, void for want of particularity under Section 3 of Article Four of the Constitution.

Disposition

The warrant of arrest is upheld and declared valid insofar as it orders the arrest of the petitioners, but is voided to the extent that it is issued against fifty John Does, and the respondent Judge is directed to forward to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the record of the preliminary investigation for further appropriate action, without pronouncement as to costs.

Remember This

Memorize the line: the issuance of a warrant of arrest need only await a finding of probable cause, not the completion of the entire procedure of preliminary investigation. Examiners use this case to test the two stages of preliminary investigation and the constitutional particularity requirement that voids a warrant against John Does.