🎧 Case Brief Lecture

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, VS. SEVERINO CATUBIG Y GOTIB @ “BOY”, ALBERTO RAGUINDIN Y GARCIA @ “AMBET”, CRISPIN SARMIENTO Y ROLLODA @ “ANGOT” AND JOHN DOE @ “…

G.R. No. 71626. March 22, 1991 March 22, 1991

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People versus Catubig

The Case

This is a criminal appeal by three men convicted of robbery with homicide — the killing of two brothers, a lawyer and an engineer, beside their parked taxicab in Quezon City in the early hours of a February morning in 1981. The People prosecuted Severino Catubig, Alberto Raguindin, and Crispin Sarmiento, together with a fourth man never caught. The case matters to a reviewee for two reasons: it shows that a conviction can stand on the testimony of a single credible eyewitness even where the extrajudicial confessions are put aside, and it shows how conspiracy and alibi are weighed, and how the Court declined to treat the killing of two victims rather than one as an aggravating circumstance.

Procedural History

The three appellants and one John Doe were charged with robbery with homicide before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventeenth Judicial District, Quezon City, Branch Fifty-Two. Upon arraignment, Catubig, Raguindin, and Sarmiento pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision dated twenty-eight November 1984 finding all three guilty beyond reasonable doubt, sentencing them to life imprisonment, and ordering them to pay damages. On the same day, the trial court issued a Supplemental Decision adding an award for the value of the personal property taken. The case went directly to the Supreme Court on appeal. Counsel de oficio filed briefs for the appellants, and the Solicitor General filed the People's briefs. When the first counsel for Raguindin and Sarmiento failed to file a brief and could not be served, the Court appointed new counsel de oficio, who filed in due time.

Facts

Around half past one in the morning of second February 1981, the three appellants and a fourth man known only as Felipe posted themselves along Scout Tobias in Quezon City. A taxicab parked at the corner of Scout Tobias and Roces Avenue, and two brothers alighted — Atty. Renato Flores and Engineer Ernesto Flores, the owners of the taxicab. The group approached and announced a hold-up. The brothers refused to surrender their valuables and fought back, then tried to run, but were overtaken. Ernesto was stabbed repeatedly and fell fatally wounded. The group then turned on Renato; Catubig ran to his house nearby, fetched a knife, returned, and inflicted multiple stab wounds on Renato.

Conrado Perez, a barangay tanod and neighbor, was awakened by shouts of "Magnanakaw! Magnanakaw!" He went out, met Reynaldo Balbarosa, and stopped at the corner of Scout Tobias and Padre Martinez Street, from where he saw four men beating two men. He saw Renato, in a white shirt, stabbed and fall. With both brothers sprawled on the ground, the four men took their watches, gold rings, and money, then fled. Catubig went to his house; Sarmiento and Raguindin fled to Bulacan. Perez reported to the barangay captain, who called the police. The bodies were autopsied by the National Bureau of Investigation, which found multiple stab wounds and death by severe hemorrhage.

Catubig was arrested that same night in his house, where he pretended to have been asleep. Sarmiento and Raguindin were arrested the next day in Bulacan. Felipe was never captured. At the police station, Perez and Balbarosa identified the three as among the four men. Each appellant was investigated and gave an extrajudicial statement subscribed before a fiscal. At trial, the appellants put up alibi: Sarmiento and Raguindin claimed they were in Bulacan, and Catubig claimed he was asleep at home.

Issues

  • Whether or not the guilt of the appellants was proved beyond reasonable doubt, considering that their extrajudicial confessions were allegedly taken without the assistance of counsel.
  • Whether or not the testimony of a single eyewitness, Conrado Perez, is sufficient to sustain the conviction.
  • Whether or not conspiracy was established among the appellants.
  • Whether or not the defense of alibi should be credited.
  • Whether or not the killing of two victims rather than one on the occasion of the robbery constitutes an aggravating circumstance.

Applicable Provisions

Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as quoted in the decision, provides:

Article 294. Robbery with Violence Against or Intimidation of Persons — Penalties. — Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence or intimidation of any person shall suffer: the penalty of from reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed.

This is the provision under which the appellants were convicted and sentenced, and it fixes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for robbery with homicide.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether the taking of the extrajudicial statements violated the constitutional rights of the accused, because the evidence of record, quite apart from those statements, was sufficient to support the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

On the second issue, the Court held that the testimony of a single eyewitness, if found convincing and trustworthy by the trial court, is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court found Perez credible and firm; he knew the appellants as neighbors, and he and Catubig were compadres. There was no evidence of ulterior motive. The Court also refused to consider Balbarosa's sworn statement, since he was not presented and the appellants had no opportunity to cross-examine him.

On the third issue, the Court found conspiracy clear: the appellants were all present at the scene, acted in concert in attacking, chasing, stabbing, and divesting the victims, then fled separately. Where conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all, and it is not essential that each appellant actually stabbed each victim.

On the fourth issue, the Court held alibi unavailing against positive identification. Alibi is generally a weak defense, easy to fabricate, and must be proved by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence; it is not enough to show the accused was elsewhere — it must be shown that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene. The appellants lived close by, so no such impossibility existed.

On the fifth issue, the Court declined to declare that the killing of two victims rather than one was an aggravating circumstance, noting that Mabilangan and Español had not discussed the statutory basis at length, and that in any event the point would be academic given the non-enforceability of the death penalty under the 1987 Constitution.

Doctrine

  • The testimony of a single eyewitness, if convincing and trustworthy, is sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
  • Findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest respect of the appellate court.
  • Where conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all; it is not essential that each conspirator personally inflicted the fatal wounds.
  • Alibi must be proved by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence, and must show that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene.
  • Robbery with homicide under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

Disposition

The Court affirmed the conviction and sentence of reclusion perpetua for each appellant, but increased the indemnity to fifty thousand pesos for each victim, in addition to moral damages, actual damages, and the aggregate value of the property taken.

Remember This

One credible eyewitness can convict, and conspiracy makes the act of one the act of all. Examiners use this case to test the sufficiency of a lone eyewitness, the weakness of alibi, and the elements of robbery with homicide.