CITY OF MANILA, AND EVANGELINE SUVA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, IRENE STO. DOMINGO AND FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN, VIVENCIO, JR., IRIS, VER…

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to
reverse and set aside:  (a) the Decision
of the Intermediate Appellate Court now Court of Appeals^[1]
promulgated on May 31, 1984 in AC-G.R. CV No. 00613-R entitled Irene Sto. Domingo et al. v. City Court of Manila et al.,
modifying the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
VIII^[2]
in Civil Case No. 121921 ordering the defendants (herein petitioners) to give
plaintiffs (herein private respondents) the right to use a burial lot in the
North Cemetery corresponding to the unexpired term of the fully paid lease sued
upon, to search the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. and to bury the same in a substitute lot
to be chosen by the plaintiffs; and (b) the Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated May 28, 1985 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

As found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court, the
undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

“Brought on February 22, 1979 by the widow and children of the late Vivencio
Sto. Domingo, Sr. was this action for damages
against the City of Manila; Evangelina Suva of the City Health Office; Sergio Mallari, officer-in-charge of the North
Cemetery; and Joseph Helmuth, the latter’s predecessor as officer-in-charge of
the said burial grounds owned and operated by the City Government of Manila.

“Vivencio Sto.
Domingo, Sr. deceased husband of plaintiff Irene Sto. Domingo and father of the litigating minors, died on June
4, 1971 and buried on June
6, 1971 in Lot No. 159, Block No. 194 of the North
Cemetery which lot was leased by
the city to Irene Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021 per Official Receipt No. 61307 dated June 6, 1971 (see Exh.
A) with an expiry date of June 6, 2021 (see Exh. A-1).  Full payment of
the rental therefor of P50.00 is evidenced by the
said receipt which appears to be regular on its face.  Apart from the aforementioned receipt, no
other document was executed to embody such lease over the burial lot in
question.  In fact, the burial record for
Block No. 194 of Manila North Cemetery (see Exh. 2)
in which subject Lot No. 159 is situated does not reflect the term of duration
of the lease thereover in favor of the Sto. Domingos.

“Believing in good faith that, in accordance
with Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 1975, dated March 6, 1975, of the City of Mayor of Manila (See Exh. 1) prescribing
uniform procedure and guidelines in the processing of documents pertaining to and for the use and disposition of
burial lots and plots within the North
Cemetery, etc., subject Lot No. 159
of Block 194 in which the mortal remains of the late Vivencio
Sto. Domingo were laid to rest, was leased to the
bereaved family for five (5) years only,
subject lot was certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation.

“On the basis of such certification, the authorities of the North
Cemetery then headed by defendant
Joseph Helmuth authorized the exhumation and removal
from subject burial lot the remains of the late Vivencio
Sto. Domingo, Sr., placed the bones and skull in a
bag or sack and kept the same in the depository or bodega of the cemetery.  Subsequently, the same lot in question was
rented out to another lessee so that when the plaintiffs herein went to said
lot on All Souls Day in their shock, consternation and dismay,
that the resting place of their dear departed did not anymore bear the
stone marker which they lovingly placed on the tomb.  Indignant and disgusted
over such a sorrowful finding, Irene Sto.
Domingo lost no time in inquiring from the officer-in-charge of the North
Cemetery, defendant Sergio Mallari, and was told that the remains of her late husband
had been taken from the burial lot in
question which was given to another lessee.

“Irene Sto. Domingo was also
informed that she can look for the bones of her deceased husband in the
warehouse of the cemetery where the exhumed remains from the different burial
lots of the North Cemetery
are being kept until they are retrieved by interested parties.  But to the bereaved widow, what she was
advised to do was simply unacceptable. 
According to her, it was just impossible to locate the remains of her
late husband in a depository containing thousands upon thousands of sacks of
human bones.  She did not want to run the
risk of claiming for the wrong set of bones. 
She was even offered another lot but was never appeased.  She was too aggrieved that she came to court
for relief even before she could formally present her claims and demands to the
city government and to the other defendants named in the present
complaint.” (Decision, Court of Appeals
pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 34-55)

The trial court, on August 4,
1981, rendered its
Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the
defendants to give plaintiffs the right to make use of another single lot
within the North Cemetery for a period of forty-three (43) years, four (4)
months and eleven (11) days, corresponding to the unexpired term of the fully
paid lease sued upon; and to search without let up and with the use of all
means humanly possible, for the remains of the late Vivencio
Sto. Domingo, Sr. and thereafter,
to bury the same in the substitute lot to
be chosen by plaintiffs pursuant to this decision.

“For want of merit, defendant’s counterclaim is DISMISSED.

“No pronouncement as to costs.

“SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, p. 31)

The decision was appealed
to the Court of Appeals which on May 31, 1984 rendered a decision (Rollo, pp. 33-40) modifying the decision appealed from, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is
hereby REVERSED (is hereby modified) and another one is hereby entered:

“1.     Requiring
in full force the defendants to look in earnest for the bones and skull of the
late Vivencio Sto.
Domingo, Sr., and to bury the same in the substitute lot adjudged in favor of
plaintiffs hereunder;

“2.     Ordering
defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants jointly and severally P10,000.00 for breach of contract;

“3.     Ordering
defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, P20,000.00 for moral damages;

“4.     Ordering
defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants jointly and severally, P20,000.00 for exemplary damages;

“5.     Ordering
defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, P10,000.00 as
and for attorney’s fees;

“6.     Ordering
defendants, to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, on the
foregoing amounts legal rate of interest computed from filing hereof until
fully paid; and

“7.     Ordering
defendants, to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, the cost of
suit.

“SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, p. 40)

The petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration was likewise
denied.

Hence, this instant petition (Rollo, pp. 7-27) filed on July 27,
1985.

The grounds relied upon
for this petition are
as follows:

I

THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
DAMAGES AGAINST THE PETITIONERS HEREIN, NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR GOOD FAITH AND
THEIR LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR CONSENT TO THE REMOVAL OF THE SKELETAL REMAINS OF
THE LATE VIVENCIO STO. DOMINGO, SR. FROM THE SUBJECT BURIAL LOT.

II

THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING PETITIONERS
HEREIN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ALLEGED TORTS OF THEIR SUBORDINATE OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES, INSPITE OF THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 4 OF THE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 409
(REVISED CHARTER OF MANILA) AND
OTHER APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE ON THE SUBJECT EXEMPTING THE PETITIONERS FROM
DAMAGES FROM THE MALFEASANCE OR MISFEASANCE
OF THEIR OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, IF
THERE BE ANY IN THIS CASE.

(Brief
for Petitioners, Rollo, pp. 93-94)

In the resolution dated November
13, 1985 (Rollo, p. 84), the petition was given due course.

The pivotal issue of this
case is whether or not the operations and functions of a public cemetery are a governmental, or a corporate or proprietary
function of the City of Manila.  The resolution of this issue
is essential to the determination of the liability for damages of the
petitioner city.

Petitioners alleged in
their petition that the North Cemetery is exclusively devoted for public use or
purpose as stated in Sec. 316 of the Compilation of the Ordinances of the City
of Manila.  They
conclude that since the City is a political subdivision in the performance of
its governmental function, it is immune from tort liability which may be caused
by its public officers and subordinate employees.  Further Section 4, Article I of the Revised
Charter of Manila exempts the city from liability for damages or injuries to
persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board,
or any other city officer, to enforce the provision of its charter or any other
laws, or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board or any
other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.  They allege that the Revised Charter of
Manila being a special law cannot be defeated by the Human Relations provisions
of the Civil Code being a general law.

Private respondents on
the other hand maintain that the City of
Manila entered into a contract of lease which involve the exercise of proprietary functions with private
respondent Irene Sto. Domingo.  The city and its officers therefore can be
sued for any violation of the contract of lease.

Private respondents’
contention is well–taken.

Under Philippine laws,
the City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such
endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and
through its city government in conformity with law, and in its proper corporate
name.  It may sue and be sued, and
contract and be contracted with.  Its
powers are twofold in character-public, governmental or political on the one hand,
and corporate, private and proprietary on the other.  Governmental powers are those exercised in
administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they
include the legislative, judicial, public and political.  Municipal powers on the one hand are
exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include
those which are ministerial, private and corporate.  In Mc Quillin on
Municipal Corporation, the rule is stated thus: 
“A municipal corporation proper has . . . a public character as regards the state at large insofar as
it is its agent in government, and private (so called) insofar as it is to
promote local necessities and conveniences for its own community (Torio v. Fontanilla, 85 SCRA 599
[1978]).  In connection with the powers of a municipal corporation, it may
acquire property in its public or governmental capacity, and private or
proprietary capacity.  The New Civil Code
divides such properties into property for public use and patrimonial properties
(Article 423), and further enumerates the properties for public use as
provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains,
public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said
provinces, cities or municipalities, all other property is patrimonial without
prejudice to the provisions of special laws (Article 424; Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga,
et al., 22 SCRA 1334 [1968]).

Thus in Torio v. Fontanilla, supra, the
Court declared that with respect to proprietary functions the settled rule is
that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu (Municipality of Moncada
v. Cajuigan, et al., 21 Phil. 184 (1912) or ex
delicto (Mendoza v. de Leon, 33 Phil. 508 (1916).

The Court further
stressed:

“Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts
and in tort.  x x
x

x x
x              x
x x                 x x x

“The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must answer civilly for the negligence
or want of skill of its agent or
servant in the course or line of
his employment, by which another, who
is free from contributory fault, is injured.  Municipal corporations under the conditions herein stated, fall within the operation of this rule of law, and are liable accordingly, to civil actions for damages when the requisite elements of liability coexist.  x x x (Underscoring
supplied)

The Court added:

“x x x
while the following are corporate or proprietary in character, viz:  municipal
waterworks, slaughter houses, markets, stables,
bathing establishments, wharves,
ferries and fisheries.  Maintenance
of parks, golf courses, cemeteries and
airports among others, are also recognized
as municipal or city activities of a
proprietary character. 
(Dept. of Treasury v. Coity of Evansvulle, Sup. Ct. of Indiana, 60 N. E. 2nd 952,
954 cited in Torio v. Fontanilla,
supra) (Underscoring supplied)

Under the foregoing
considerations and in the absence of a special law, the North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila which was created by resolution of the
Municipal Board on August 27, 1903 and January 7, 1904 (Petition, Rollo
pp. 20-21 Compilation of the Ordinances of the City of Manila).  The administration and government of the
cemetery are under the City Health Officer (Ibid.,
Sec. 3189), the order and police of the cemetery (Ibid., Sec. 319), the opening
of graves, niches, or tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the purification of
the same (Ibid., Sec. 327) are under the charge and responsibility of the
superintendent of the cemetery.  The City
of Manila furthermore prescribes the procedure and guidelines for the use and
dispositions of burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery through
Administrative Order No. 5, s. 1975 (Rollo, p.
44).  With the acts of dominion, there
is, therefore no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the
City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private
character.  Furthermore, there is no
dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private
respondents.  Hence, obligations arising
from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties.  Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law between them.  (Henson
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA
11 [1987]). 
Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to
damages even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract.  (Boysaw
v. Interphil Promotions, Inc. 148 SCRA 635 [1987]).

Noteworthy are the
findings of the Court of Appeals as to the harrowing
experience of private respondents and their wounded feelings upon discovery
that the remains of their loved one were exhumed without their knowledge and
consent, as said Court declared:

“It has been fully established that the appellants, in spite or perhaps because, of their lowly station in life have found great
consolation in their bereavement from the loss of their family head, by
visiting his grave on special or even ordinary occasions, but particularly on
All Saints Day, in keeping with the deep, beautiful and Catholic Filipino
tradition of revering the memory of their dead. 
It would have been but fair and equitable that they were notified of the
intention of the city government to transfer the skeletal remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo to give
them an opportunity to demand the faithful fulfillment of their contract, or at
least to prepare and make provisions for said transfer in order that they would
not lose track of the remains of their beloved dead, as what has actually
happened on this case.  We understand
fully what the family of the deceased must have felt when on All Saints Day of
1978, they found a new marker on the grave they were to visit, only to be told
to locate their beloved dead among thousands of skeletal remains which to them was desecration and an impossible task.  Even the lower court recognized this when it
stated in its decision thus:

‘All things considered, even as the Court commiserates with
plaintiffs for the unfortunate happening complained of and untimely desecration
of the resting place and remains of their deceased dearly beloved, it finds the
reliefs prayed for by them lacking in legal and
factual basis.  Under the aforementioned
facts and circumstances, the most that plaintiffs can ask for is the replacement of subject lot with
another lot of equal size and similar location in the North Cemetery which substitute lot plaintiffs can
make use of without paying any rental to the city government for a period of
forty-three (43) years, four (4) months and eleven (11) days corresponding to
the unexpired portion of the term of the lease sued upon as of January 25, 1978
when the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. were prematurely
removed from the disputed lot; and to require the defendants to look in earnest
for the bones and skull of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo Sr. and to bury the same in
the substitute lot adjudged in favor of plaintiffs hereunder.’”

(Decision,
Intermediate Appellate Court, p. 7, Rollo, p. 39)

As regards the issue of
the validity of the contract of lease of grave lot No. 159, Block No. 195 of
the North Cemetery for 50 years beginning from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021 as
clearly stated in the receipt duly signed by the deputy treasurer of the City
of Manila and sealed by the city government, there is nothing in the record
that justifies the reversal of the conclusion of both the trial court and the
Intermediate Appellate Court to the effect that the receipt is in itself a
contract of lease.  (Decision,
Intermediate Appellate Court, p. 3, Rollo, pp. 5-6).

Under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, (Torio v. Fontanilla,
supra), petitioner City
of Manila is liable for the tortious act committed by its agents who failed to verify
and check the duration of the contract of lease.  The contention of the petitioner-city that
the lease is covered by Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1975 dated March
6, 1975 of the City of Manila for five (5) years only beginning from June 6,
1971 is not meritorious for the said administrative order covers new
leases.  When subject lot was certified
on January 25, 1978 as
ready for exhumation, the lease contract for fifty (50) years was still in full
force and effect.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), J., on leave.

^[1]
Penned by Justice Ma. Rosario Quetulio-Losa, concurred in by Justices Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr. and Eduardo P. Caguioa.

^[2]
Presided over by Judge Fidel P. Purisima