CRESENCIO LIBI AND AMELIA YAP LIBI, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG AND SHIRLEY GOTIONG, RESPONDENTS.

One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that
sorrow is sometimes a touchstone of love. A tragic illustration is provided by the instant case, wherein two
lovers died while still in the prime of their years, a bitter episode for those
whose lives they have touched. While we
cannot expect to award complete assuagement to their families through seemingly
prosaic legal verbiage, this disposition should at least terminate the acrimony
and rancor of an extended judicial
contest resulting from the unfortunate occurrence.

In this final denouement of the judicial recourse the stages
whereof were alternately initiated by the parties, petitioners are now before
us seeking the reversal of the judgment of respondent court promulgated on
January 2, 1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69060 with the following decretal portion:

“WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dismissing
plaintiff’s complaint is hereby reversed; and instead, judgment is hereby rendered
sentencing defendants, jointly and solidarily, to pay to plaintiffs the
following amounts:

1.  Moral damages, P30,000.00;

2.  Exemplary damages, P10,000.00;

3.  Attorney’s fees, P20,000.00, and costs.

However, denial of defendants-appellees’ counterclaims is affirmed.”^[1]

Synthesized
from the findings of the lower courts, it appears that respondent
spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie
Ann Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from which she died on January
14, 1979, was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the University of
San Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and
19 years of age living with his aforesaid
parents, and who also died in the same event on the same date.

For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December, 1978 when
Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly
found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and second weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept
pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the latter persisted in
her refusal, prompting the former
to resort to threats against her. In
order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou
Alfonso, at the corner of Maria
Cristina and Juana Osmeña Streets, Cebu City, from January 7 to 13, 1978.

On January 14,
1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith
and Wesson revolver licensed in the
name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from the scene of the
crime inside the residence of private respondents at the corner of General
Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets of the same city.

Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances
surrounding the death of both minors, their parents, who are the contending
parties herein, posited their respective theories drawn from their
interpretation of circumstantial evidence, available reports, documents and
evidence of physical facts.

Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter,
submitted that Wendell caused her death by shooting her with the aforesaid
firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit suicide. On the other hand, petitioners, puzzled and
likewise distressed over the death of their son, rejected the imputation and
contended that an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or
antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary
Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendell’s death and then shot
Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification.

As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil
Case No. R-17774 in the then Court of First Instance of Cebu against the
parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s vicarious
liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. After trial, the court below rendered judgment on October 20,
1980 as follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing
plaintiffs’ complaint for insufficiency of the evidence. Defendants’ counterclaim is likewise denied
for lack of sufficient merit.”^[2]

On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court
dismissing the complaint of therein plaintiffs-appellants was set aside and
another judgment was rendered against defendants-appellees who, as petitioners
in the present appeal by certiorari, now submit for resolution the following
issues in this case:

1.  Whether or not respondent court correctly
reversed the trial court in accordance with established decisional laws; and

2.  Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code
was correctly interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners liable for
vicarious liability.^[3]

In the proceedings before
the trial court, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, Police Medico-Legal Officer of Cebu,
submitted his findings and opinions on some postulates for determining
whether or not the gunshot wound was inflicted on Wendell Libi by his own
suicidal act. However, undue emphasis
was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing around
the wound at the point of entry of the bullet. It should be emphasized, however, that this is not the only circumstance
to be taken into account in the determination of whether it was suicide or not.

It is true that said witness declared that he found no evidence of
contact or close-contact of an explosive discharge in the entrance wound. However, as pointed out by private
respondents, the body of deceased Wendell Libi must have been washed at the funeral parlor, considering the
hasty interment
thereof a little after eight (8) hours from the occurrence wherein he died. Dr. Cerna himself could not categorically
state that the body of Wendell Libi was left untouched at the funeral parlor before
he was able to conduct his autopsy. It
will also be noted that Dr. Cerna was negligent in not conducting a paraffin
test on Wendell Libi, hence possible evidence of gunpowder residue on Wendell’s hands
was forever lost when Wendell was hastily buried.

More specifically, Dr. Cerna testified that he conducted an autopsy
on the body of Wendell Libi about eight (8) hours after the incident or, to be
exact, eight (8) hours and twenty (20) minutes based on the record of death;
that when he arrived at the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, the body of the
deceased was already on the autopsy table and in the stage of rigor mortis; and that said body was not washed, but it was dried.^[4] However, on redirect examination, he admitted
that during the 8-hour interval, he never saw the body nor did he see whether
said body was wiped or washed in the area of the wound on the head which he
examined because the deceased was inside the morgue.^[5] In fact, on cross?examination, he had
earlier admitted that as far as
the entrance of the wound, the
trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the wound are concerned, it is
possible that Wendell Libi shot himself.^[6]

He further testified that the muzzle of the gun was not pressed on
the head of the victim and that he found no burning or singeing of the hair or
extensive laceration on the gunshot wound of entrance which are general
characteris­tics of contact or near-contact fire. On direct examination, Dr. Cerna nonetheless made these
clarification:

“Q   Is
it not a fact
that there are certain guns which are so made that there would be no black
residue or tattooing that could result from these guns because they are what we
call clean?

A    Yes, sir. I know that there are what we call smokeless
powder.

ATTY.
ORTIZ:

Q   Yes. So, in cases, therefore, of guns where the powder is smokeless, those
indications that you said may not rule out the possibility that the gun was
closer than 24 inches, is that correct?

A    If the … assuming that the gun used was …
the bullet used was a smokeless powder.

Q   At
any rate, doctor, from . . . disregarding those other matters that you have
noticed, the singeing, etc., from the trajectory, based on the trajectory of
the bullets as shown in your own
sketch, is it not a fact that the gun
could have been fired by the
person himself, the victim himself, Wendell Libi, because it shows a point of
entry a little above the right ear and point of exit a little above that, to be
very fair and on your oath?

A    As
far as the
point of entrance is concerned and as far as the trajectory of the bullet is concerned and as far as the angle or the
manner of fire is concerned, it could have been fired by the victim.”^[7]

As shown by the evidence, there were only two used bullets^[8]
found at the scene of the crime, each of which were the bullets that hit Julie
Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi, respectively. Also, the sketch prepared by the Medico-Legal Division of the National Bureau of Investigation,^[9]
shows that there is only one gunshot wound of entrance located at the right
temple of Wendell Libi. The necropsy
report prepared by Dr. Cerna states:

x x x

“Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4 cm., with contusion collar
widest inferiorly by 0.2 cm., edges inverted, oriented upward, located at the
head, temporal region, right, 2.8 cms. Behind and 5.5 cms. above right external auditory meatus, directed
slightly forward, upward and to the left, involving skin and soft tissues,
making a punch-in
fracture on the temporal bone, right, penetrating cranial cavity, lacerating extensively along
its course the brain tissues,
fracturing parietal bone, left, and finally making an EXIT wound, irregular, 2.0 x 1.8 cms., edges (e)verted, parietal
region, left, 2.0 cms. behind and 12.9 cms. above left external auditory
meatus.

x x x

“Evidence of contact
or close-contact fire, such as burning around the gunshot wound of
entrance, gunpowder tattooing (sic), smudging, singeing of hair, extensive
laceration or bursting of the gunshot wound of entrance, or separation of the skin from the underlying tissue are
absent.”^[10]

On cross-examination, Dr. Cerna demonstrated his theory which was
made of record, thus:

“Q   Now,
will you please use yourself as Wendell Libi, and following the entrance of the
wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the wound, and measuring
yourself 24 inches, will you please indicate to the Honorable Court how would
it have been possible for Wendell Libi to kill himself? Will you please indicate the 24 inches?

WITNESS:

A    Actually, sir, the 24
inches is approximately one
arm’s length . . .

ATTY.
SENINING:

I would like to make of
record that the witness has demonstrated
by extending his right arm almost straight towards his head.”^[11]

Private respondents assail the fact that the trial court gave credence
to the testimonies of defendants’ witnesses Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan,
the first being a resident of an apartment across the street from the Gotiongs and the second, a resident of the
house adjacent to the Gotiong residence, who declared having seen a
“shadow” of a person at the
gate of the Gotiong house after hearing shots therefrom.

On cross-examination, Lydia Ang testified that the apartment where she was staying faces
the gas station; that it is the second apartment; that from her window she can
see directly the gate of the
Gotiongs; and, that there is a firewall between her apartment and
the gas station.^[12]
After seeing a man jump from the gate of the Gotiongs to the rooftop of the
Tans, she called the police station but the telephone lines were busy. Later on, she talked with James Enrique Tan
and told him that she saw a man leap from the gate towards his rooftop.^[13]

However, James Enrique Tan testified that he saw a
“shadow” on top of the gate of the Gotiongs, but denied having talked
with anyone regarding what he saw. He
explained that he lives in a duplex house with a garden in front of it; that
his house is next to Felipe Gotiong’s house; and he further gave the following
answers to these questions:

“ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS).

Q   What is the height of the wall of the
Gotiong’s in relation to your house?

WITNESS:

A    It is about 8 feet.

ATTY.
ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS)

Q   And where were you looking from?

WITNESS:

A    From upstairs in my living room.

ATTY.
ORTIZ (TO WITNESS)

Q   From your living room window, is that
correct?

WITNESS:

A    Yes, but not very clear because the wall is
high.”^[14]

Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, we agree with respondent
court that the same do not inspire credence as to the reliability and accuracy
of the witnesses’ observations, since the visual perceptions of both were
obstructed by high walls in their respective houses in relation to the house of herein private
respondents. On the other hand, witness
Manolo Alfonso, testifying on rebuttal, attested without contradiction that he
and his sister, Malou Alfonso, were waiting for Julie Ann Gotiong when they
heard her scream; that when Manolo climbed the fence to see what was going on inside the Gotiong house, he heard the first
shot; and, not more than five (5) seconds later, he heard another shot. Consequently, he went down from the fence
and drove to the police station to report the incident.^[15]
Manolo’s direct and candid testimony establishes and explains the fact that it
was he whom Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan saw as the “shadow” of a
man at the gate of the Gotiong house.

We have perforce to reject petitioners’ effete and
unsubstantiated pretension that it was another man who shot Wendell and Julie
Ann. It is significant that the Libi
family did not even point to or present any suspect in the crime nor did they
file any case against any alleged “John Doe.” Nor can we sustain the
trial court’s dubious theory that Wendell Libi did not die by his own hand
because of the overwhelming evidence — testimonial, documentary and pictorial —
the confluence of which point to Wendell as the assailant of Julie Ann, his
motive being revenge for her rejection of his persistent pleas for a
reconciliation.

Petitioners’ defense that they had exercised the due diligence of
a good father of a family, hence they should not be civilly liable for the
crime committed by their minor son, is
not borne out by the evidence on record either.

Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that
her husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box
inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each
of these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita’s key is
always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell. They have never been their son Wendell taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful
night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box.^[16]
We, accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses
had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys
to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free
access to the bag of his mother where the other key was.

The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a
parent and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction
and supervision of the child. Petitioners
were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising
the activities of their son, despite his minority and immaturity, so much so
that it was only at the time of
Wendell’s death that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent and
that Cresencio’s gun was missing from the safety deposit box. Both parents were sadly wanting in their
duty and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their
children who, for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous work such as being
drug informers,^[17]
or even drug users. Neither was a
plausible explanation given for the photograph of Wendell, with a handwritten
dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof,^[18]
holding uptight what clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why he was in
possession of that firearm.

In setting aside the judgment of the court a quo and holding petitioners civilly liable, as explained at the
start of this opinion, respondent court waved aside the protesta­tions of
diligence on the part of petitioners and had this to say:

“x x x It is still the duty of parents
to know the activity of their children who may be engaged in this dangerous
activity involving the menace of drugs. Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities
of their son, Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his reach, they could have
prevented Wendell from killing, Julie Ann Gotiong. Therefore, appellants are liable under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code which provides:

‘The father, and in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by their minor children who live in their company.’

“Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell Libi from
having access to said gun which was allegedly kept in a safety deposit box,
defendants-appellees are subsidiarily liable for the natural consequence of
the criminal act of said minor who was living in their company. This various liability herein
defendants-appellees has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in many cases, prominent
of which is the case of Fuellas vs. Cadano, et. al. (L-14409, Oct. 31, 1961, 3 SCRA
361-367), which held that:

‘The subsidiary liability of parents for damages
caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts
and criminal offenses.’

‘The subsidiary liability of parent’s arising from the
criminal acts of their minor children who acted with discernment is determined
under the provisions of Article 2180, N.C.C. and under Article 101 of the
Revised Penal Code, because to hold that the former only covers obligations
which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal
offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable
for the damages caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the
damage is caused with criminal intent.’ (3 SCRA 361-362).

“x
x x In the instant case, minor son of herein defendants-appellees,
Wendell Libi somehow got hold of the key to the drawer where said gun was kept
under lock without
defendant-spouses ever knowing that said gun had been missing from that safety
box since 1978 when Wendell Libi ha(d) a picture taken wherein he proudly
displayed said gun and dedicated this picture to his sweetheart, Julie Ann Gotiong; also since then, Wendell
Libi was said to have kept said gun in his car, in keeping up with his supposed
role of a CANU
agent. x x x.”

x x x

“Based on the foregoing discussions of the assigned errors,
this Court holds that the lower court was not correct in dismissing herein
plaintiffs-appellants’ complaint because as preponderantly shown by evidence,
defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise all the diligence of a good
father of the family in preventing their minor son from committing this crime
by means of the gun of defendants-appellees which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi for they have not
regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock, but learned that it
was missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime had been
committed.” (Emphases ours.)^[19]

We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners
should be held liable for the civil liability based on what appears from all
indications was a crime committed by
their minor son. We take this
opportunity, however, to digress and discuss its ratiocination therefor on
jurisprudential dicta which we feel require clarification.

In imposing sanctions for the so-called, vicarious liability of
petitioners, respondent court cites Fuellas vs. Cadano, et al.^[20]
which supposedly holds that “(t)he subsidiary liability of parents for
damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses,”
followed by an extended quotation ostensibly
from the same case explaining why under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code parents should assume subsidiary
liability for damages caused by their minor children. The quoted passages are set out two paragraphs back, with
pertinent underscoring for purposes of the discussion hereunder.

Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding
the parents liable, but the categorization of their liability as being
subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard second look considering previous decisions of this court
on the matter which warrant comparative analyses. Our concern stems from our readings that if the liability of the
parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is subsidiary, then
the parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the
defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damages. On the other hand, if
such liability imputed to the parents
is considered direct and primary, that diligence would constitute a valid and
substantial defense.

We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts
of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is
primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if
we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of
joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and the father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability is
primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides
that “(t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.”

We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for
felonies committed by their minor children is likewise primary, not
subsidiary. Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code provides:

“Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in
certain cases. ?

x x x

First. In cases of
subdivisions x
x x 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed
by x x x a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under
fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal
authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence
on their part.” (Emphases
supplied.)^[21]

Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, under the foregoing provision the civil liability of the parents for
crimes committed by their minor children is
likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of fault
or negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good
father of a family.

That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily
respond for such damages is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both
codes that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond with his own
property only in the absence or in case of insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi
delicto of minors, Article 2182
of the Civil Code states that “(i)f the minor causing damage has no
parents or guardian, the minor x x x shall be answerable with his own property
in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed.” For civil liability ex delicto
of minors, an equivalent provision is
found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

“Should there be no person having such x x x minor under his
authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said
x x x minor shall respond with (his) own property, excepting property exempt
from execution, in accordance with civil law.”

The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their
minor children contemplated in the aforesaid rule in Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code has, aside from the
aforecited case of FueIlas, been
the subject of a number of cases adjudicated by this Court, viz.: Exconde vs. Capuno, et al.,^[22]
Araneta vs. Arreglado,^[23] Salen,
et al. vs. Balce,^[24] Paleyan,
etc., et al. vs. Bangkili, et al.,^[25]
and Elcano, et al. vs. Hill, et al.^[26]
Parenthetically, the aforesaid cases were basically on the issue of the civil
liability of parents for crimes committed by their minor children over 9 but
under 15 years of age, who acted with discernment, and also of minors 15
years of age or over, since these situations are not covered by Article 101,
Revised Penal Code. In both instances,
this Court held that the issue of parental civil liability should be resolved
in accordance with the provisions of Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the
reasons well expressed in Salen and adopted in the cases hereinbefore
enumerated that to hold that the civil liability under Article 2180 would apply
only to quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses would result in the
absurdity that in an act involving mere negligence the parents would be liable
but not where the damage is caused with criminal intent. In said cases, however, there are
unfortunate variances resulting in a regrettable inconsistency in the Court’s
determination of whether the liability of the parents, in cases involving
either crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children, is primary or
subsidiary.

In Exconde, where the 15-year old minor was convicted of
double homicide through reckless imprudence, in a separate civil action arising from the crime the minor and his
father were held jointly and severally liable for failure of the latter to
prove the diligence Of a good
father of a family. The same liability in
solidum and, therefore, primary liability was imposed in a separate civil action in Araneta on the parents and their 14-year old son who was found guilty
of frustrated homicide, but on the authority of Article 2194 of the Civil Code
providing for solidary responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for
a quasi-delict.

However, in Salen, the father was declared subsidiarily
liable for damages arising from the conviction of his son, who was over 15 but less than 18 years of age, by applying Article 2180 but,
this time, disregarding Article 2194 of the Civil Code. In the present case, as already explained,
the petitioners herein were also held liable but supposedly in line with Fuellas which purportedly declared the parents subsidiarily liable for
the civil liability for serious
physical injuries committed by their 13-year old son. On the other hand, in Paleyan, the
mother and her 19-year old son were adjudged solidarity liable for damages
arising from his conviction for homicide by the application of Article 2180 of
the Civil Code since this is likewise not covered by Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code. Finally, in Elcano,
although the son was acquitted in a homicide charge due to “lack of
intent, coupled with mistake,” it was ruled that while under Article 2180
of the Civil Code there should be solidary liability for damages, since the
son, “although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence
from him at the time of the occurrence,” but “is now of age, as a matter of equity” the father was only held subsidiarily liable.

It bears stressing,
however, that the Revised Penal Code provides for subsidiary liability only for
persons causing damages under the compulsion of irresistible force or
under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear;^[27]
innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments;^[28]
employers, teachers, persons and corporations engaged in industry;^[29]
and principals, accomplices and accessories for the unpaid civil liability of
their co-accused in the other classes.^[30]

Also, coming back to respondent court’s reliance on Fuellas in its decision in the present case, it is not exactly accurate to say that Fuellas provided for subsidiary liability of the
parents therein. A careful scrutiny shows
that what respondent court quoted
verbatim in its decision now on appeal in the present case, and which it
attributed to Fuellas, was the syllabus on the law report of said case which spoke of
“subsidiary” liability. However, such categorization
does not specifically appear in the text of the decision in Fuellas. In fact, after reviewing therein the cases
of Exconde, Araneta and Salen and the discussions in
said cases of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180
of the Civil Code, this Court concluded its decision in this wise.

“Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals
on the basis of evidence submitted therein by both parties, independent of the
criminal case. And responsibility for
fault or negligence under Article 2176
upon which the present action was instituted, is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from fault or negligence under the Penal Code
(Art. 2177), and having in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore
stated, any discussion as to the
minor’s criminal responsibility is of no moment.”

Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule
that the parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal
offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or
control, or who live in their
company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the
provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex
delicto caused
by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15
years of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard to their children
over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or
over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.^[31]

Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall
be effected against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother. This was amplified by the Child
and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the
father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the
guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily
assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender.^[32] However, under the Family Code, this civil
liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of
the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender.^[33] For civil liability arising from
quasi-delicts committed by minors,
the same rules shall apply in
accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so
modified.

In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann
Gotiong was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi,
respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages arising
therefrom. Subject to the preceding
modifications of the premises relied upon by it therefor and on the bases of
the legal imperatives herein explained, we conjoin in its findings that said
petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris
familias to prevent such damages.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Romero, Nocon, and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.

Davide, Jr., and Campos,
Jr., JJ., no part.

Melo, J., no part, on leave.

---

*
This petitioner is indicated or referred to in some pleadings as “Cresencio alias William Libi.”

^[1]
Penned by Justice Bienvenido C. Ejercito, with the concurrence of Justices
Jorge R. Coquia, Mariano A. Zosa and Floreliana Castro-Bartolome; Rollo,
17-34.

^[2]
Per Judge Mario D. Ortiz; Record on Appeal, AC-G.R. CV No. 69060, 29.

^[3]
Rollo, 59.

^[4]
TSN, November 9, 1979, 7-8.

^[5]
Ibid., id.,19-20.

^[6]
Ibid., id., 10.

^[7]
Ibid., id., 16-17.

^[8]
Exh. EB-1 and EB-2.

^[9]
Exh. X; Folder of Exhibits, Civil Case No. R-17774, 38.

^[10]
EXh, W; ibid., id., 37.

^[11]
TSN, November 9, 1979, 22.

^[12]
TSN, December 27, 1979, 56-61.

^[13]
Ibid., id., 62-68.

^[14]
Ibid., id., 82-83.

^[15]
TSN, June 4, 1980, 4-6, 8-15.

^[16]
TSN, April 11, 1980, 22-28; April 28, 1980, 6-7.

^[17]
TSN, April 11, 1980 27-28.

^[18]
Exh. J and J-1, Folder of Exhibits, Civil Case No. R-17774, 29.

^[19]
Rollo, 31-33.

^[20]
3 SCRA 361 (1961).

^[21]
Par. 2 of Art. 12 refers to “a person under nine years of age,” which
should more accurately read “nine years of age or under” since Par. 3
thereof speaks of one “over
nine x x x.” See also the complementary provisions of Art. 201,
P.D. No. 603 and Art. 221, E.O. No. 209, as amended, infra, Fn 32
and 33.

^[22]
101 Phil. 843 (1957).

^[23]
104 Phil. 529 (1958).

^[24]
107 Phil. 748 (1960).

^[25]
40 SCRA 132 (1971).

^[26]
77 SCRA 98 (1977).

^[27]
Third rule, Art. 101, in relation
to pars. 5 and 6 of Art. 12.

^[28]
Art. 102.

^[29]
Art. 103.

^[30]
Art. 110.

^[31]
While R.A. No 6809 amended Art. 234 of the Family Code to provide that majority
commences at the age of 18 years, Art. 236 thereof, as likewise amended, states
that “(n)othing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty
or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below
twenty-one years of age mentioned in the
second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.”

^[32]
Art. 201, P.D. No. 603.

^[33]
Art. 221 of E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No 227, provides: “Parents and other persons exercising
parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused
by the act or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company
and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided
by law.”