SPOUSES JOVITO REBULDELA AND CRISTINA MAPUE, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, RICARDO P. TENSUAN, JUDGE, RTC BR. 83, QUEZON CITY, MM, ATTY. JULIAN R. VITUG, R…

This is a petition for review on certiorari of:  (1) the decision* of the
Intermediate Appellate Court dated September 26, 1984, dismissing the petition
for certiorari with prohibition or preliminary injunction, to set aside
the orders** of respondent Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch LXXXIII, Quezon City,
(a) dated September 2, 1983 denying petitioner’s motion to quash the writ of
execution and (b) dated November 12, 1982, amending the decision of October 22,
1982, both issued in connection with Civil Case No. Q-34445 and for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo
and (2) the resolution of the same Appellate Court denying the motion for
reconsideration of said decision.

The undisputed facts of this case, as found by the then Court of
First Instance of Rizal and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals), are as follows:

“From the evidence adduced, it appears that the plaintiffs
secured a loan from the defendants in the amount of P19,500.00
on February 16, 1981 and as
security thereof executed a Real Estate Mortgage dated February 16, 1981 over a parcel of land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275140 (Exh. 1); that the said loan of P19, 500.00 was
increased to P32,000.00 in an Amendment to Mort­gage dated December 22, 1981 (Exh. 1-A); that the plaintiffs failed to pay the loans
within the period specified and defendants filed with the Office of the Sheriff
of Quezon City a request for extra-judicial
foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage and for which the Notice of Sheriff’s
sale (Exh. 2) was issued by the Sheriff; that the Notice of Sheriff’s sale was duly published in the newspaper “New
Record” (Exhs. 3, 4, 5 & 6); that during the
auctions sale of the mortgaged property there were no other bidders and defendants submitted their Formal Bid Price
in the total sum of P46,835.00 (Exh. 7) and the corresponding
Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale (Exh. 8) was issued by
the Sheriff in favor of defendants; that after the sale of the mortgaged
property has been accomplished and the Sheriff’s Certi­ficate of Sale was annotated
on the title, the plaintiffs instituted
this present case, x  x  x.” (Original
Records, p. 20)

On February 12,
1982, petitioners-mortgagors
filed an action before respondent
Judge in Civil Case No. Q-34445, for setting
aside the extra-judicial
foreclosure and sheriff’s sale, and redemption with consignation of P24,000.00 on the ground of alleged fraud.

Herein respondent, before
filing his answer with counterclaim for sum of money and damages, filed a
motion to Withdraw Deposit (Ibid., p. 29), which was granted by the
Court.

On October 22, 1982, judgment was rendered, the dispo­sitive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering the latter to pay the former, the following amounts:

a)  P22,835.00, plus 14%
interest per annum

from
the filing of the

complaint,
until fully paid;

b)  P10,000.00, as
reasonable moral and

exemplary
damages, and

c)  The costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

On November 8, 1982,
herein private respondent, being the defendant and the mortgagee while herein
petitioners are the plaintiffs and mortgagors, filed a Manifestation with
Motion to correct the dispositive portion of the
October 22, 1982 Decision to the effect that petitioners (plaintiffs) should be
the one adjudged to pay private respondents (defendants) and not the other way
around.  On November 12, 1982 before the decision became final, an Order
correcting the said decision was issued, to wit:

“Acting upon the ‘manifestation and mo­tion’ dated November 8, 1982 filed by the
defendants and finding the same well-taken.

“AS PRAYED FOR, the 1st three (3) lines of the dispositive portion of the decision rendered herein dated
October 22, 1982 are hereby corrected
to read as follows:

‘WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of defendants and
against plaintiffs, ordering the latter to pay the former, the following
amounts:’

Likewise lines 1 & 2 of par. 4 of the same decision should
read:

‘From the evidence adduced, it appears that plaintiffs secured a
loan from the defendant in the a-‘

“In all other respects, the decision dated October 22, 1982 stands.

“SO ORDERED”

On January
16, 1983, private
respondents moved for the issuance of a writ of execution.  Petitioners moved to quash the writ but the
motion was denied by the trial court in its Order of September
2, 1983.

Hence, on November 7, 1983, petitioners filed with the then
Intermediate Appellate Court a Petition for Review by Certiorari with
Prohibition or Preliminary Injunction, wherein it was asserted that respondent
trial court, pre­sided over by Judge Ricardo Tensuan,
committed grave abuse of discretion when it corrected the Decision of October 22, 1982 ex-parte.

The then Intermediate Appellate Court, in a Decision promulgated on
September 26, 1984,
dismissed the aforesaid petition (Ibid., pp. 20-23).

On October 24,1984, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but in a Resolution***
promulgated on April 5, 1985,
the same was denied (Ibid., pp. 18-19).

Hence, the instant petition.

The First Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated May 29, 1985, resolved to require
respondents to comment and to let a temporary restraining order issue enjoining
the respondents from issuing writs or orders
to enforce the judgment of the trial court (Ibid., p. 36).  On June
10, 1985, in compliance therewith, private respondent filed his
Comment (Ibid., pp. 39-50).  In a
Resolution dated June 26, 1985,
the First Division of this Court resolved to give due course to the petition
and to require the parties to submit simultaneous memoran­da (Ibid., p.
58).  Private respondent filed his
Memoran­dum on August 5, 1985
(Ibid., pp. 62-68), while
petition­ers filed their memorandum on August
12, 1985 (Ibid., pp.
69-82).

Herein petitioners raised three (3) alleged errors, to wit:

I

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE OF THE TRIAL COURT DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD BUT DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO AND AT WAR WITH
LAW OR WITH APPLICABLE PRECEDENTS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT:  WHEN HE (RESPONDENT JUDGE) REVERSED HIMSELF
AS HE EXCHANGED THE RIGHTS EARNED BY THE PARTIES MAKING THE WINNING PARTY, IN
HIS ORIGINAL DECISION AS THE
LOSING PARTY AND THE DEFEN­DANTS, THE LOSERS IN THE ORIGINAL DECISION AS THE
WINNERS.  THERE WAS NO SHOWING THAT THE
PLAINTIFFS OR THEIR COUNSEL WERE INFORMED THAT THERE WAS SUCH A MOTION, A
HEARING AND THE CHANGE OR REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT. 
THE PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS ONLY LEARNED OF THE REVERSED OR ALTERED
JUDGMENT WHEN A NOTICE OF
FORECLOSURE AND SALE WAS SERVED ON
THE PLAINTIFFS.

THE ERROR OR GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT LIES IN THE FACT THAT IT DID NOT
ONLY AFFIRM THE ERRONEOUS DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT BUT ARGUED IN FAVOR OF
THE RESPONDENTS THAT THE LATTER COURT
HAS THE RIGHT TO CHANGE ITS DECISION EX PARTE BECAUSE THERE WAS MERELY A
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR WHICH IS NOT SUPPORTED BY FACTS AND LAW;

II

THE HONORABLE
APPELLATE TRIBUNAL GRAVELY ERRED
AND MALEVOLENTLY AND WHIMSICALLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN ITS JUDGMENT IN
THIS CASE HAS SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS AND/OR SANCTIONED SUCH A DEPARTURE BY THE TRIAL COURT, WHEN IT
AFFIRMED AND DESPERATELY ARGUED WITH PARTIALITY AND BIAS FOR RESPONDENT
(PRIVATE DEFENDANT) ORDERING PETITIONERS (PLAINTIFFS) TO PAY THE MORTGAGE WHEN
PETITIONERS TIMELY CONSIGNED THE FULL MORTGAGE OBLIGATION OF P24,000.00 AND
WITHIN THREE (3) DAYS THE PRI­VATE RESPONDENT (DEFENDANTS) MOVED TO WITHDRAW
THE CONSIGNED AMOUNT AND THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRANTED THE MOTION THUS RECEIVING
THE FULL PAYMENT OF THE MORTGAGED AMOUNT OVER THE OB­JECTION OF
PLAINTIFFS.  JUSTICE WAS SACRIFICED IN
FAVOR OF TECHNICALITY OF PROCEDURE DUE TO THE GRAVE ERROR AND WHIMSICAL ABUSE
OF DISCRETION BY THE RESPONDENTS;

III

THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS BY AND THRU RES­PONDENT JULIAN R. VITUG,
JR., HIMSELF AS COUN­SEL HAVE MISLED THE COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT) BY FALSE
STATEMENTS, SPECIOUS OF HYPOCRITICALLY TREACHEROUS REASONING AND FRAUDULENT
MISREPRESENTATION TO UNDULY DEPRIVE THE PETITIONERS
TO TIMELY FILE THEIR OPPOSITION
TO EARN THEIR DAY IN COURT.  WHILE SOME OF THESE FALSE STATEMENTS AND
MISREPRESENTATION REVOLVE ON FINDING OF FACTS THE CAUSES PERMITS ON QUESTIONS OF LAW, OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRE­TION EQUIVALENT TO LACK OR ABSENCE OF JURISDICTION.

This petition is devoid
of merit.

I.

Petitioners assert that
the trial court gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, when it amended its Decision of October 22, 1982 ex-parte, and in
so doing, they were not given their day in court; and that the then
Intermediate Appellate Court erred or gravely abused its discretion when it did
not only affirm the decision of the trial court, but argued in favor of the
respondents that the trial court has the right to change its decision ex-parte because
there was merely a typographical error which is not supported by facts and the
law.

Such assertion is
untenable.  The court has inherent power
to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to
law and justice (Par. g, Section 5, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court), and when
it finds that the ends of justice would be better served, the court may
disregard technicalities and amend its order or process that has not
become final (Manuel v. Manuel, 2
SCRA 155; Austria v. Reyes, 31 SCRA 754; and Villanueva
v. CFI of Oriental Mindoro, 119 SCRA 288).  And even if the decision has become
final, it is already settled that
clerical errors or mistakes or omissions plainly due to inadvertence or
negligence may be corrected or supplied after the judg­ment has been entered (Ang Lin Chi v. Castelo, 83 Phil.
263).  In the case at bar it will be observed that the trial court, as prayed
for, corrected the dispositive portion as to the
designation of the parties therein to make
it conform with the body of the decision, which was not yet final.

Such correction obviously made to rectify clerical errors, which
interchanged the mortgagors and the mortgagee is beyond dispute within the
power of the court in accordance with established jurisprudence above-cited.

II.

Petitioners, in the second assignment of error, al­lege, that
there was only one deed of Real Estate Mortgage, where they mortgaged their lot
and house for P24,000.00; that there was no contract for the increase of the
loan to P32,000.00; that in the notice of foreclosure and auc­tion sale, they
consigned their payment of P24,000.00 for the full amount of the mortgage
although they received only P19,500.00 and the P4,500.00 was for six (6) months
interest which was already deducted on the date of the mortgage; and that private respondent’s motion to withdraw
the consigned amount of P24,000.00 was immediately allowed by respondent judge
before an opposition thereto could be filed and received by the court.  Accordingly, petitioners argue that the trial
court, after being appraised of the full payment of the obligation plus
unconscionable interest exacted from them, should have reversed itself since
there was a change of situation which will render the judgment unjust.

III.

In the third or last assignment
of error, petitioners claim that private respondent made a serious
misrepresenta­tion of fact – that after receiving full payment of the mortgage
obligation of P24,000.00, private respondent made it appear that the full
obligation was P46,835.00, but
the rest was usurious interest at exhorbitant rate;
and when this misrepresentation of fact was affirmed by the then Intermediate
Appellate Court, the same does not only constitute an error of law but grave
and malevolent abuse of discretion equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

IV.

The second and third assigned errors being interrelated,
will be discussed simultaneously.

The records show that petitioners obtained a loan from private
respondents in the amount of P19,500.00, evidenced by a promisorry
note and secured by an original real estate mortgage, ratified by Francisco P. Taala, Notary Public for Quezon City and entered in his notarial register as Document No. 172; Page No. 36; Book
No. 32; Series of 1981.

Subsequently, petitioners obtained an additional loan of P12,500.00 from private respondent, thereby increasing the loan
to P32,000.00, resulting in an amended real estate mortgage which was ratified
by Danilo B. Marfil, Notary
Public for Quezon City
and entered in his notarial register as Document No.
104; Page No. 25; Book No. 11; Series of 1981.

Under the law they are entitled to full faith and credit upon
their face (Ramirez v. Ner, 21 SCRA 207 [1967]). 
In fact, it has long been settled that a public document executed and
attested through the intervention of the notary public is evidence of the facts in clear, unequi­vocal manner therein
expressed.  It has in its favor the
presumption of regularity.  To contradict
all these, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than
merely preponderant (Gonzales v. C.A., 90 SCRA 185 [1979]; Carandang-Collantes
v. Capuno, 123 SCRA 652 [1983]).  The evidentiary value of a notarial document guaranteed by public attestation in
accordance with law must be sus­tained in full force and effect unless impugned
by strong, complete and conclusive proof (Chilianchin
v. Coquinco,
84 Phil. 714; El Hogar Filipino v. Olviga, 60 Phil. 17; De Jesus v. Grey, 59 Phil. 834; Sy Tiangco v. Pablo, 59 Phil.
119).

A careful review of the records shows that the issues raised by
the petitioners in their petition and in their memorandum were all directly
refuted by the terms of the mortgage contracts themselves.

Indeed, it is a well accepted principle of law that while parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to
explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of
incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are
not mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake (De
la Rama v. Ledesma, 143
SCRA 6 [1986].  The excep­tions to the
rule do not apply to the case at bar, the terms of the mortgage contracts being
clear and unambiguous and there is no showing of any fraud, mistake or failure
to express the true agreement of the parties. 
As ruled by the Court in Del Rosario v. Santos
(108 SCRA 43 [1981] the parol evidence rule forbids any addition to or contra­diction
of the terms of a written instrument. 
Oral testi­mony cannot prevail over a written agreement of the parties, the purpose of the parol evidence rule being to give stability to written
agreements and to remove the temptation and possibility of perjury, which would
be afforded if parol evidence were admissible (Conde v. Court
of Appeals, 119 SCRA 245 [1981]).

Moreover, the misrepresentation of facts allegedly committed by
private respondents in claiming that petition­ers’ full obligation is in the
amount of P46,835.00 appears to have no basis. 
Private respondents convincingly ex­plained that the principal mortgage obligation amounted to P32,000.00 but in
view of the expenses incurred in
the extra-judicial foreclosure sale representing
cost of publication, interest and attorney’s fees, the amount summed up to
P46,835.00 inclusive (Rollo, p. 48).

Under the foregoing considerations, the trial court correctly
gave full faith and credence to the mortgage contracts in dispute as against
testimonial evidence in contradiction thereto.

Finally, it is a fundamental and settled rule that conclusions
and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal
and should not be dis­turbed unless for strong and cogent reasons because the
trial court is in a better position to examine real evi­dence, as well as to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case (Chase v. Buencamino, Sr., 136 SCRA 365); and the fact that the then
Intermediate Appellate Court adopted the findings of fact of the trial court
make the same binding upon this Court. 
As a rule, the factual
findings of the appellate court are generally binding on the Supreme Court
(Collector of Customs of Manila vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 137 SCRA 3
[1985]).  The findings of the Court of
Appeals when supported by substantial evidence are almost always beyond the
power of review by the Supreme Court (Rizal Cement
Co., Inc. v. Villareal, 135 SCRA 15).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is DENIED for
lack of merit and the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa,
Cruz, and Gancayco,
JJ., concur.

* PENNED by Justice Simeon M. Gopengco (ponente) and concurred
in by Justices Lino M. Patajo, Jose F. Racela, Jr.
& Fidel Purisima.

** PENNED by Judge Ricardo P. Tensuan

*** PENNED by Justice Simeon M. Gopengco
and concurred in by Justices Lino M. Patajo,
Jose F. Racela, Jr. & Fidel Puri­sima.