REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. PABLO FELICIANO AND INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS.

Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court dated April 30, 1985 reversing the order of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, Branch VI, dated August 21, 1980, which dismissed the complaint
of respondent Pablo Feliciano for recovery of ownership and possession of a
parcel of land on the ground of non-suability of the State.

The
background of the present controversy may be briefly summarized as
follows:

On January 22, 1970, respondent Feliciano filed a complaint with
the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership
and possession of a parcel of land, consisting of four (4) lots with an
aggregate area of 1,364.4177 hectares, situated in the Barrio of Salvacion,
Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.  Plaintiff alleged that he bought the
property in question from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a Contract of Sale dated
May 31, 1952, followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30, 1954; that
Gardiola had acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of Francisco
Abrazado whose title to the said property was evidenced by an
informacion posesoria; that upon plaintiff’s purchase of the
property, he took actual possession of the same, introduced various improvements
therein and caused it to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was approved by
the Director of Lands on October 24, 1954; that on November 1, 1954, President
Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for settlement purposes,
under the administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of
Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which the NARRA and its successor
agency, the Land Authority, started subdividing and distributing the land to the
settlers; that the property in question, while located within the reservation
established under Proclamation No. 90, was the private property of plaintiff and
should therefore be excluded therefrom.  Plaintiff prayed that he be declared
the rightful and true owner of the property in question consisting of 1,364.4177
hectares; that his title of ownership based on informacion
posesoria of his predecessorin-interest be declared legal, valid and
subsisting and that defendant be ordered to cancel and nullify all awards to the
settlers.

The defendant, represented by the Land Authority, filed an
answer, raising by way of affirmative defenses lack of sufficient cause of
action and prescription.

On August 29, 1970, the trial court, through
Judge Rafael S. Sison, rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1, with an area of
701.9064 hectares, to be the private property of the plaintiff, “being covered
by a possessory information title in the name of his predecessor-in-interest”
and declaring said lot excluded from the NARRA settlement reservation.  The
court declared the rest of the property claimed by plaintiff, i.e. Lots
2, 3 and 4, reverted to the public domain.

A motion to intervene and to
set aside the decision of August 29, 1970 was filed by eighty-six (86) settlers,
together with the barrio council of Pag-asay, alleging among other things that
intervenors had been in possession of the land in question for more than twenty
(20) years under claim of ownership.

On January 25, 1971, the court
a quo reconsidered its decision, reopened the case and
directed the intervenors to file their corresponding pleadings and present their
evidence; all evidence already presented were to remain but plaintiff, as well
as the Republic of the Philippines, could present additional evidence if they so
desire.  The plaintiff presented additional evidence on July 30, 1971, and the
case was set for hearing for the reception of intervenors’ evidence on August 30
and August 31, 1971.

On August 30, 1971, the date set for the
presentation of the evidence for intervenors, the latter did not appear but
submitted a motion for postponement and resetting of the hearing on the next
day, August 31, 1971.  The trial court denied the motion for postponement and
allowed plaintiff to offer his evidence “en ausencia“, after which the
case would be deemed submitted for decision.  On the following day, August 31,
1971, Judge Sison rendered a decision reiterating his decision of August 29,
1970.

A motion for reconsideration was immediately filed by the
intervenors.  But before this motion was acted upon, plaintiff filed a motion
for execution, dated November 18, 1971.  On December 10, 1971, the lower court,
this time through Judge Miguel Navarro, issued an order denying the motion for
execution and setting aside the order denying intervenors’ motion for
postponement.  The case was reopened to allow intervenors to present their
evidence.  Unable to secure a reconsideration of Judge Navarro’s order, the
plaintiff went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on a petition for
certiorari.  Said petition was, however, denied by the
Intermediate Appellate Court, and petitioners brought the matter to this Court
in G.R. No. 36163, which was denied on May 3, 1973.  Consequently, the case was
remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.

On
August 31, 1970, intervenors filed a motion to dismiss, principally on the
ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its consent
and hence the action cannot prosper.  The motion was opposed by the
plaintiff.

On August 21, 1980, the trial court, through Judge Esteban
Lising, issued the questioned order dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction.  Respondent moved for reconsideration, while the Solicitor
General, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines filed its opposition
thereto, maintaining that the dismissal was proper on the ground of
non-suability of the State and also on the ground that the existence and/or
authenticity of the purported possessory information title of the respondents’
predecessor-in-interest had not been demonstrated and that at any rate, the same
is not evidence of title, or if it is, its efficacy has been lost by
prescription and laches.

Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration,
plaintiff again went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on petition for
certiorari.  On April 30, 1985, the respondent appellate court
rendered its decision reversing the order of Judge Lising and remanding the case
to the court a quo for further proceedings.  Hence this
petition.

We find the petition meritorious.  The doctrine of
non-suability of the State has proper application in this case.  The plaintiff
has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to
court just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of
property.  A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem,
but an action in personam.^[1] It
is an action directed against a specific party or parties, and any judgment
therein binds only such party or parties.  The complaint filed by plaintiff, the
private respondent herein, is directed against the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Land Authority, a governmental agency created by Republic Act
No. 3844.

By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is
clearly a suit against the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not
permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either
expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to
be misinterpreted.^[2] There is no such
showing in the instant case.  Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the
existence of such consent.  This is a fatal defect,^[3] and on this basis alone, the complaint
should have been dismissed.

The failure of the petitioner to assert the
defense of immunity from suit when the case was tried before the court a
quo, as alleged by private respondent, is not fatal.  It is now
settled that such defense “may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage
of the proceedings.”^[4]

Private
respondent contends that the consent of petitioner may be read from the
Proclamation itself, when it established the reservation “subject to private
rights, if any there be.” We do not agree.  No such consent can be drawn from
the language of the Proclamation.  The exclusion of existing private rights from
the reservation established by Proclamation No. 90 can not be construed as a
waiver of the immunity of the State from suit.  Waiver of immunity, being a
derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly, but must be construed
in strictissimi juris.^[5]
Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act.  The consent of the State
to be sued must emanate from statutory authority.  Waiver of State immunity can
only be made by an act of the legislative body.

Neither is there merit in
respondent’s submission, which the respondent appellate court sustained, on the
basis of our decision in the Begosa case,^[6] that the present action is not a suit
against the State within the rule of State immunity from suit, because plaintiff
does not seek to divest the Government of any of its lands or its funds.  It is
contended that the complaint involves land not owned by the State, but private
land belonging to the plaintiff, hence the Government is not being divested of
any of its properties.  There is some sophistry involved in this argument, since
the character of the land sought to be recovered still remains to be
established, and the plaintiff’s action is directed against the State precisely
to compel the latter to litigate the ownership and possession of the property. 
In other words, the plaintiff is out to establish that he is the owner of the
land in question based, incidentally, on an informacion
posesoria of dubious value, and he seeks to establish his claim of
ownership by suing the Republic of the Philippines in an action in
personam.

The inscription in the property registry of an
informacion posesoria under the Spanish Mortgage Law was a means
provided by the law then in force in the Philippines prior to the transfer of
sovereignty from Spain to the United States of America, to record a claimant’s
actual possession of a piece of land, established through an ex parte
proceeding conducted in accordance with prescribed rules.^[7] Such inscription merely furnishes, at
best, prima facie evidence of the fact that at the time the proceeding
was held, the claimant was in possession of the land under a claim of right as
set forth in his application.^[8] The
possessory information could ripen into a record of ownership after the lapse of
20 years (later reduced to 10 years), upon the fulfillment of the requisites
prescribed in Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law.^[9]

There is no showing in the case at
bar that the informacion posesoria held by the respondent had been
converted into a record of ownership.  Such possessory information, therefore,
remained at best mere prima facie evidence of possession.  Using this possessory
information, the respondent could have applied for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under the Public Land Act, which is an action in rem. 
However, having failed to do so, it is rather late for him to pursue this avenue
at this time.  Respondent must also contend, as the records disclose, with the
fact admitted by him and stated in the decision of the Court a
quo, that settlers have been occupying and cultivating the land in
question since even before the outbreak of the war, which puts in grave doubt
his own claim of possession.

Worthy of note is the fact, as pointed out
by the Solicitor General, that the informacion posesoria registered in
the Office of the Register of Deed of Camarines Sur on September 23, 1952 was a
“reconstituted” possessory information; it was “reconstituted from the duplicate
presented to this office (Register of Deeds) by Dr. Pablo Feliciano,” without
the submission of proof that the alleged duplicate was authentic or that the
original thereof was lost.  Reconstitution can be validly made only in case of
loss of the original.^[10] These
circumstances raise grave doubts as to the authenticity and validity of the
“informacion posesoria” relied upon by respondent Feliciano.  Adding to
the dubiousness of said document is the fact that “possessory information calls
for an area of only 100 hectares,”^[11]
whereas the land claimed by respondent Feliciano comprises 1,364.4177 hectares,
later reduced to 701.9064 hectares.  Courts should be wary in accepting
“possessory information” documents, as well as other purportedly old Spanish
titles, as proof of alleged ownership of
lands.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered reversing
and setting aside the appealed decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court,
dated April 30, 1985, and affirming the order of the court a
quo, dated August 21, 1980, dismissing the complaint filed by
respondent Pablo Feliciano against the Republic of the Philippines.  No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, and Sarmiento, JJ.,
concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., on leave.

^[2] Providence
Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, 29 SCRA 598,
601.

^[3] Insurance Company of
North America v. Republic of the Philippines, 20 SCRA 627.

^[4] Insurance Company of North America v.
Osaka Shosen Kaisha, 27 SCRA 780.

^[5] Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v.
Customs Arrastre Service, 18 SCRA 1120; Insurance Company of North America
v. Warner, 21 SCRA 765.

^[6]
Begosa v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 32 SCRA 466.

^[7] Alfonso v. Commanding General, 7
Phil. 600, 615.

^[8] Bishop of
Segovia v. Mun. of Bantay, 28 Phil. 347, 351.

^[9] Querol and Flores v. Querol, 48
Phil. 90, 98-99.

^[10] Republic
of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA 865.

^[11] Government of the Philippines v.
Heirs of Abella, 49 Phil. 374, 379.