ELINO ONG REYES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND SEGUNDINO EVANGELISTA, RESPONDENTS.

This is a Petition for Review of the resolution of the
then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, dated March 28, 1985, which
set aside its previous resolution dismissing herein respondent’s appeal for
failure to pay docket fees.

On July 22, 1982, the then Court of First Instance of of Bulacan,
Branch 3, issued a Resolution in AD Case No. 198-V-79, entitled, “RE: In the Matter of Issuance of Writ of
Possession, Elino Ong, Petitioner v. Segundino Evangelista, Oppositor,”
the dispositive portion of which reads in part as follows:

“WHEREFORE, finding this petition to be sufficiently
substantiated, justified and proper (Mabale vs. Apalisok, L-46942, Feb. 6, 1979) and there being no showing of
fraud, let a writ of possession issue in favor of Elino Ong and against spouses
Segundino Evangelista and Consuelo Heraldo with respect to Lot 1-A, Subdivision
Plan (LRC) Psd 229084 of Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-26017 of the
Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District III.” (p. 42, Rollo)

Respondent Evangelista sought to appeal the above quoted
resolution and filed a “Notice of Appeal” and “Record on
Appeal” for the purpose. These were
approved by the trial court and the
records were transmitted to the Court of Appeals. Subsequently, the appellate court sent notice to respondent to pay docket fees within fifteen (15)
days from notice. For failure of
respondent to pay, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution, dated September 7, 1983, dismissing his appeal
pursuant to Section 1 (d), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. This resolution became final on September
28, 1983 and Entry of Judgment was made on November 8, 1983. On November 15, 1983, the records of the
case were remanded to the trial court.

On December 2, 1983, the trial court, on motion of petitioner
Elino Ong (also, Elino Ong Reyes), ordered the issuance of a writ of
possession, which was issued on December 8, 1983 and served on respondent on
even date. Respondent opposed the
implementation of the writ. He further filed with the Court of
Appeals on February 6, 1984 a motion for reconsideration of its resolution
dismissing his appeal alleging that he delivered P800.00 to his former counsel,
Atty. RICARDO G. GALANG, for payment of the docket fees amounting to P58.00 but
which the latter, for reasons of his own, did not pay; that he became aware of
the dismissal of his appeal only when he was served the writ of possession; and
that he hired the services of his present counsel only on January 20, 1984.

On February 9, 1984, the Court of Appeals denied reconsideration
reasoning that the dismissal of the appeal had become final and entry of
judgment made, and thus, it had lost jurisdiction over the matter. Undaunted, respondent filed another motion
for reconsideration with the appellate court who, this time, required
petitioner to comment. Petitioner complied
with the resolution. Atty. Galang, who
was also required to comment on Evangelista’s allegation against him, denied
receiving any money from the latter and surmised that the imputation “is
an afterthought in an attempt to resurrect what appears to have been a lost
remedy.”

Meanwhile, on March 9, 1984, the trial court denied respondent’s
opposition to the execution of the writ of possession. Petitioner was placed in possession of the
subject realty on March 19, 1984 as shown by the receipt issued by him on the
same date and the Sheriff’s Return, dated March 20, 1984. In the evening of March 19, 1984, however,
respondent regained possession of the subject realty allegedly by forcing his
way in with the aid of several persons and by intimidating the two security
guards assigned in the premises. For
this reason, the trial court issued on April 13, 1984 an order directing the
issuance of an alias writ of possession without prejudice to whatever action it
may take against respondent. The writ,
however, remains unsatisfied up to this time.

On March 28, 1985, the Court of Appeals, without any
pronouncement with regard the allegation of respondent against Atty. Galang,
reconsidered its previous resolutions and ordered the reinstatement of
respondent’s appeal. Said the appellate
court:

“After a careful review of the pleadings, and of the original
records of AD Case No. 198-V-79, the Court has come to the conclusion that
procedural technicalities should be relegated to secondary importance, in order
to allow proper resolution of the issues on their merit. Only a full ventilation of the issues will
definitively resolve this controversy and this will ultimately result in
justice to both parties.” (p. 26, Rollo)

We agree with petitioner that the Court of Appeals can no longer
resuscitate respondent’s appeal as it had lost jurisdiction over the case. Having dismissed the appeal in a resolution
dated September 7, 1983 for non-payment of docket fees and having entered
judgment on November 8, 1983 after its resolution became final and executory on
September 28, 1983, it no longer had any power to revoke, vacate or amend the
same except to correct clerical errors. The records of the case had, in fact, been remanded to the trial court
on November 15, 1983 and further, the judgment sought to be appealed had been
executed on March 19, 1984 when petitioner was placed in possession of the
subject realty. The effect of the
satisfaction of the judgment was to place the decision beyond review. While respondent, through force, had
regained possession of the subject realty, this does not alter the final nature
of the judgment. If at all, the
judgment merely reverted from an executed judgment to an executory judgment and the act of dispossession could
hold respondent liable for contempt under Section 3 (b), Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court (see Quizon v. Philippine National Bank, 85 Phil. 459).

The Court of Appeals therefore departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings when it entertained private respondent’s
second motion for reconsideration dated February 17, 1984, which was not only
too late but also premised only on the negligence of his former counsel. Our jurisprudence on the matter is to the
effect that this allegation does not detract from private respondent’s own
negligence because it is the duty of a party litigant to make inquiries to
counsel on matters concerning
his case (Florendo v. Florendo, L-24982, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 432). He is duty bound to contact his lawyer from
time to time in order that he
may be informed of the progress of his case. Thus, a party is bound by the mistake and may suffer for the negligence
of his lawyer.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
March 25, 1985 reinstating Segundino Evangelista’s appeal is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the resolution dated September 7, 1983 dismissing the appeal is
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

* The questioned resolution is
entitled “Elino Ong v. Segundino Evangelista.”