🎧 Case Brief Lecture

BRAULIO CONDE, RUFINA CONDE, GERARDO CONDE, CONCHITA C. LUNDANG, AND ALFREDO VENTURA, PETITIONERS, VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. CESAR C. PERALEJO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS P…

G.R. No. 70443. September 15, 1986 September 15, 1986

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Conde versus Intermediate Appellate Court

The Case

This is a petition brought by Braulio Conde, Rufina Conde, Gerardo Conde, Conchita Lundang, and Alfredo Ventura against the Intermediate Appellate Court and its justices, together with the private respondent Marcelo Gutierrez. The petitioners had lost a land case on appeal, and they then went to the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, to annul that appellate judgment on the ground that Gutierrez had committed fraud by making it appear that he was the son and heir of the registered owners. The case matters because it settles two things every reviewee must know: which court may entertain an action to annul a judgment, and the settled distinction between extrinsic fraud, which can annul a judgment, and intrinsic fraud, which cannot.

Procedural History

The original complaint for recovery of possession of a parcel of land was filed in February 1950 before the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, later the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, of Tarlac. After a full trial, that court dismissed the complaint in May 1976 and ordered Marcelo Gutierrez to pay the costs. Gutierrez appealed. In September 1981, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered the defendants, now the petitioners, and their successors in interest to deliver ownership and possession of the property to Gutierrez. That judgment became final and executory in December 1982.

In January 1984, the petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, of Capas, Tarlac an action to annul that appellate judgment, alleging fraud in the establishment of Gutierrez's filiation. In February 1984, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction to annul a judgment of the Court of Appeals. The motion for reconsideration was denied, so the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and injunction before the Intermediate Appellate Court. That court dismissed the petition outright, holding that only the Supreme Court may review a judgment of the appellate court.

The petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court. In August 1984, the Supreme Court issued a resolution remanding the case to the Intermediate Appellate Court for decision on the merits, pointing out that Section 9 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, gives the Intermediate Appellate Court exclusive jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of regional trial courts. In January 1985, the appellate court nonetheless rendered a decision dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction and for lack of merit, reasoning that it could not annul its own decision absent an express grant, and that the fraud alleged was only intrinsic. The petitioners again elevated the decision to the Supreme Court, which required the respondents to comment. No comment was filed despite proof of service on counsel, and the Court proceeded to decide the petition.

Facts

In February 1950, Marcelo Gutierrez sued to recover possession of a parcel of land before the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. The complaint was amended in March 1951. After a full trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint in May 1976 and ordered Gutierrez to pay the costs of suit.

Gutierrez appealed. In September 1981, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered the defendants and their successors in interest to deliver immediately the ownership and possession of the property to Gutierrez. The judgment became final and executory in December 1982.

In January 1984, the petitioners filed an action to annul that judgment, alleging that through fraud Gutierrez had made it appear that he was the son of Esteban Gutierrez and Fermina Ramos and, by succession, the absolute owner of the property. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, and the appellate court likewise dismissed, adding that the fraud alleged was in the nature of documents allegedly manufactured to make Gutierrez appear the rightful heir, which is intrinsic fraud and not a ground to annul a judgment.

Issues

  • Whether or not the Intermediate Appellate Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide an action to annul a judgment rendered by it on appeal from a regional trial court.
  • Whether or not the fraud alleged by the petitioners, consisting of manufactured documents and false testimony on filiation, is extrinsic fraud that can be the ground for annulment of judgment.

Applicable Provisions

Section 9 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, provides:

The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of regional trial courts.

This provision is the basis for the ruling that the action to annul the appellate judgment, which was rendered on review of a regional trial court decision, belongs to the Intermediate Appellate Court and not to the regional trial court.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Intermediate Appellate Court erred in refusing jurisdiction. The Court stressed that it had already remanded the case for decision on the merits, and that the appellate court should have limited itself to that mandate. The Court explained that the appellate court stands between the trial courts and the Supreme Court precisely to take over much of the work formerly done by the High Court, synthesizing facts, issues, and rulings and identifying errors that might otherwise escape detection. Once the Supreme Court has spoken, the lower court's duty is to obey. The Court quoted its own earlier admonition:

Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It could not have ruled in any other way on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey. It is as simple as that.

On the second issue, the Court held that even assuming the facts alleged were true, the petition must fail on the merits because the fraud alleged was only intrinsic. Fraud is extrinsic or collateral where it has prevented a party from having a trial or from presenting all of his case to the court. Here, the fraud consisted of documents allegedly manufactured by Gutierrez to make it appear that he was the rightful heir of the disputed property. That is intrinsic fraud, which is not sufficient to attack a judgment. The Court quoted the governing distinction:

Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, where the defeated party has been prevented from presenting fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent.

The Court also noted that the appellate court's fault was mitigated because it still decided the remanded case on the merits.

Doctrine

First, under Section 9 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the Intermediate Appellate Court has exclusive jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of regional trial courts. A judgment rendered by the appellate court on review of a regional trial court decision is annulled through an action filed with the appellate court itself, not with the regional trial court and not originally with the Supreme Court.

Second, only extrinsic fraud can be a ground for annulment of judgment. Extrinsic fraud is a fraudulent act of the prevailing party committed outside the trial of the case, which prevents the defeated party from having his day in court or from presenting fully his side of the case. Intrinsic fraud, such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony during the trial, does not affect the presentation of the case and is not sufficient to attack a judgment.

Third, a decision of the Supreme Court is definitive and authoritative, binding on the lower courts, which must defer and submit to it.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit, and the respondents' counsel, Atty. Adelaido G. Rivera, was fined Five Hundred Pesos for his failure to act on the order to file comment.

Remember This

Memorize this line: only extrinsic fraud, which prevents a party from having his day in court, can annul a judgment; intrinsic fraud, such as manufactured documents or false testimony used during the trial, cannot. Examiners use this case to test the extrinsic and intrinsic fraud distinction and the rule that the Intermediate Appellate Court has exclusive jurisdiction over actions to annul regional trial court judgments.