ELEUTERIO DOMINGO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ALFREDO A. ROSERO, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XXVI, NAGA CITY; LEONILO BERCASIO AND CANDIDA DELA TORRE, RESPONDENTS.

The correct appreciation and application of the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1508, more commonly known as the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, particularly Section 6 thereof,
which mandate the submission of certain disputes before the barangay
Lupong Tagapayapa for
conciliation and, if possible, amicable settlement between the parties, prior
to the filing of the controversy in the courts of justice, is, again, the
concern of this special civil action for certiorari.  The petitioner assails the public respondent,
Judge Alfredo A. Rosero of the Regional Trial Court
of Naga City, for allegedly acting with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing on
November 23, 1984, the resolution^[1]
ordering the dismissal of his (petitioner’s) complaint in Civil Case No.
84-295, entitled, “Eleuterio Domingo vs. Leonilo Bercasio, et al.,”
then pending in the respondent
judge’s sala.

There is no controversy as to the facts.

On February 7, 1984,
the petitioner, as plaintiff, filed a complaint^[2]
for declaration of ownership with damages against the private respondents, the
spouses Leonilo Bercasio
and Candida dela Torre.  Seventeen days thereafter, or on February 24, 1984, to be exact, the private
respondents-defendants filed their answer (with counterclaim)^[3]
to the complaint.  Still much later, on
November 11, 1984, the private respondents moved for the dismissal of the
complaint against them on the sole ground
that the petitioner allegedly failed to comply with the provisions of Section 6
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1508 which require conciliation proceedings
before the barangay Lupong Tagapayapa as a pre-condition to the filing of a case in
court.^[4]
The petitioner lost no time in submitting an opposition to the private
respondents’ motion to dismiss.  The
respondent judge, to whose sala the case was raffled,
on November 23, 1984,
issued the questioned resolution dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.  A motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s resolution was
filed, the petitioner-movant arguing that the case
does not come within the ambit of P.D. No. 1508 inasmuch as the parties thereto
reside in different provinces. 
Alternatively, the petitioner insisted that even granting that there was
indeed a need to submit the case first before the barangay
court, the private respondents’ failure to seasonably raise that ground in a
motion to dismiss before they filed their answer, or in their answer itself,
constitutes a waiver of the said ground.^[5]
Apparently, the petitioner’s supplications fell on deaf ears because the respondent trial court
judge, on February 6, 1985,
denied the motion for reconsideration for allegedly being “devoid of
merit.”^[6]

From the trial court, the petitioner came straight to us
vigorously maintaining, as earlier adverted to, that the respondent judge acted
with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing his complaint.

We grant the petition.

Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 itself, from which the respondent
judge based his rulings, categorically states that it should be taken in
conjunction with the provisions of Section 2 of the same decree.

SECTION 6.  Conciliation, precondition
to filing of complaint.  – No complaint,
petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court
or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a
confrontation of the parties before the Lupon
Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as
certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat
Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been
repudiated.  However, the parties may go
directly to court in the
following cases:

(1)   Where the accused is
under detention;

(2)   Where a person has otherwise
been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;

(3)   Actions coupled with
provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of
personal property and support pendente lite; and

(4)   Where the action may
otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations.

(Emphasis ours.)

Section 2 of P.D. No. 1508, on the other hand provides:

SECTION 2.  Subject matters
for amicable settlement.  – The Lupon of each
barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for
amicable settlement of all disputes except:

(1)   Where one party is the
government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

(2)   Where one party is a
public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his
official functions;

(3)   Offenses punishable by
imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00;

(4)   Offenses where there is
no private offended party;

(5)   Such other classes of
disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of justice determine upon
recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government.

(Emphasis ours.)

Additionally, Section 3 thereof states that:

SECTION 3.  Venue. – Disputes
between or among persons actually
residing in the same barangay shall be brought for
amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay.  Those
involving actual residents of
different barangays within the same city or
municipality shall be brought in the barangay where
the respondent or any of the respondents actually
resides, at the election of the complainant. 
However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest
therein shall be brought in the barangay where the
real property or any part thereof is situated.

The Lupon shall have no authority over
disputes:

(1)  involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except
where such barangays adjoin each other; and

x x
x

(Emphasis ours.)

From the foregoing provisions of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, it is crystal clear that only
disputes between parties who are actual residents of barangays
located in the same city or municipality, or
residents of adjoining barangays located in two different municipalities,
are within the jurisdiction of the barangay court.

Unfortunately, the respondent judge failed to see the error of
his position divesting himself of jurisdiction and insisting that the complaint
should first be presented before the barangay court.

The petitioner (plaintiff) avers in paragraph 1 of his complaint^[7]
that his residence and postal address is at 660 T. Solit Street, Pateros, Metro Manila, while the defendants (private
respondents) are residents of Barangay Sto. Domingo, Pacasao, Camarines Sur.  This averment is specifically admitted by the
defendants (private respondents) in paragraph 1 of their Answer With
Counterclaim.^[8]
The parties are therefore not only residents of different barangays
and municipalities but are also, in fact, residents of different
provinces.  P.D. No. 1508 only applies to
residents of the same municipalities or at most, under par. 1 of Section 3 thereof, residents of adjoining barangays
situated in two different municipalities.^[9]
It would therefore be absurd if the compulsory conciliation process is made to
apply to residents of different and distant provinces, as the parties herein,
when the law itself is inapplicable to residents of different municipalities
unless they are from adjacent barangays.  Undoubtedly, the dispute between the
petitioner and the private respondent is beyond the jurisdiction of any barangay
court and could immediately be filed in the regular courts of justice as the
petitioner here did.

The private respondents submit that the subject dispute between them
and the petitioner is cognizable by the barangay Lupon.  They premise
their contention on the allegation that at the time the petitioner filed his
complaint, he was temporarily residing in Barangay Sto. Domingo, in Pacasao, Camarines Sur.^[10]
But even if the foregoing allegation were a fact, the private respondents’
argument remains seriously flawed. 
Residence in a barangay within the same
municipality if only transient or temporary is not enough to vest jurisdiction
upon the barangay Lupon.

In the case of Bejer vs.
Court of Appeals, et al.,^[11]
we have had the occasion to rule that residence
as contemplated in P.D. No. 1508 compels not only actual residence but also
membership in the barangay.  Here, it has not been shown that the
petitioner became a member of Barangay Sto. Domingo during his brief sojourn in Pacasao, Camarines Sur.  It follows, lacking in that qualification,
that he could not then be considered, for the purpose of applying the
provisions of P.D. No. 1508, as an actual resident of Barangay
Sto. Domingo. 
There is therefore no need
for the dispute between him and the private respondents to be brought before a barangay Lupon.

At any rate, as correctly pointed out by the petitioner, even
assuming ex gratia argumenti that the dispute
is cognizable by a barangay court, the requirement of
submission or referral to the Lupong Tagapayapa under P.D. 1508 is merely a condition precedent
for the filing of a complaint in
court^[12]
and not jurisdictional.^[13]
It is the Judiciary Revamp Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) and the Judiciary Act of 1948, and not P.D. No.
1508, which vest jurisdiction.^[14]
Accordingly, the failure of the private respondents to raise timely this ground
in a motion to dismiss filed before
their answer to the complaint, or in their answer, constitutes a waiver
thereof.^[15]
We have consistently adhered to that rule and we see no cogent reason to
deviate from it now.

WHEREFORE,
the Resolution dated September 23, 1984 and the Order dated February 6, 1985 of the public respondent, Judge
Alfredo A. Rosero, dismissing the petitioner’s
Complaint, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the trial court is ordered to
REINSTATE Civil Case No. 84-295 thereof. 
No cost.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, 22-23.

^[2]
Id.,
15-17.

^[3]
Id.,
18-19.

^[4]
Id., 20.

^[5]
Id.,
8-9.

^[6]
Id.,
9-10.

^[7]
Rollo, 15.

^[8]
Rollo, 18.

^[9]
Agbayani vs. Belen, No. 65629, November 24, 1986, 145 SCRA 635.

^[10]
Id.,
37.

^[11]
G.R. No. 79404, January 27, 1989.

^[12]
Peregrina vs. Panis,
No. 56011, October 31, 1984, 133 SCRA 72.

^[13]
Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, No.
65072, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 470; Ebol vs. Amin, No. 70237, March 18, 1985, 135
SCRA 438; Millare
vs. Hernando, No. 55480, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 484.

^[14]
Ebol vs. Amin, supra;
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, Nos. 59495-97, June 26, 1987, 151 SCRA 289.

^[15]
Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra;
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, supra.