THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BRIGIDO ENCIPIDO, CHARLITO MANATAD, JESUS RUBIO, RUDY LUMARDA, JOSE CABAGERAN, EDDIE DE LA PEÑA, CRIS RAMIREZ, AND JESUS O…

People versus Encipido

The Case

This is a criminal case in which the People of the Philippines prosecuted eight persons for the killing of Jose Lacumbes, a resident of Barangay Mabini in the Municipality of Tubajon, Surigao del Norte. Only three of the eight accused were tried and convicted: Brigido Encipido, Charlito Manatad, and Eddie de la Peña. The other five remained at large. The case matters to a reviewee because it gathers in one decision the rules on eyewitness credibility, oral admissions, interlocking confessions, the judicial admission of a co-accused, and the defense of alibi. It is a working illustration of how the Rules of Court on admissions and confessions operate in a joint trial for murder.

Procedural History

The three accused were charged with murder in the Regional Trial Court of the Tenth Judicial Region, Branch 32. After trial, the court rendered its decision on December 5, 1984, finding them guilty of murder, sentencing them to reclusion perpetua, ordering them to pay damages to the heirs of the deceased in the amount of 12,000 pesos, and to pay three eighths of the costs. Counsel de officio filed a motion for reconsideration on December 26, 1984, which the trial court denied for having been filed more than fifteen days after promulgation. A notice of appeal was filed before the then Intermediate Appellate Court, which was allowed as an appeal not from the judgment but from the order denying the motion for reconsideration. Because the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua, the appeal was indorsed to the Supreme Court, which accepted it in the interest of substantial justice.

Facts

On March 30, 1982, Jose Lacumbes was found killed by his wife and children near the hut in their farm in Sitio Capacohan. The post mortem examination performed the following morning showed an incised wound of the neck, eight multiple stab wounds at the back, the removal of the right external ear, contusions on the left lumbar region, and both hands tied at the back with rattan. The cause of death was severe hemorrhage secondary to the incised wounds of the neck and the multiple stab wounds at the back.

Felicisimo Alciso testified that in the afternoon of that day he went to the hut of the deceased to get some chickens. Before reaching the hut he heard a gunshot, stopped, and saw the deceased being tied and subjected to fist blows. He saw three persons mauling the deceased while others stayed at a distance. Someone struck the deceased with the butt of a gun, causing him to fall. The hands of the deceased were tied at the back, Encipido was behind him, and Manatad and de la Peña were on the sides. On the orders of Encipido, also known as Commander Tanga, de la Peña struck the neck of the deceased with a bolo which almost severed the head. Frightened, Alciso fled. Later, after learning that the suspects were detained, he went to the jail to verify their identity, explaining that he feared he would be the next one killed. De la Peña told him they were in jail because they had beheaded the deceased.

Two other prosecution witnesses supported Alciso. Jorge Ortega, the station commander of Loreto, Agusan del Norte, testified that Encipido and de la Peña disclosed to him that they had beheaded the deceased and were responsible for the killings in Dinagat Island. Mariano Espina, the municipal mayor of Loreto, testified that Encipido told him he had killed many people, including the deceased, so that the latter could no longer harm others with his witchcraft, and that de la Peña admitted cutting the neck of the deceased and showed the dried ear. De la Peña himself testified in open court that he was present when Commander Tanga and Manatad killed the deceased, though he claimed he was merely forced to join the group and was standing by. Encipido and Manatad denied the killing and interposed alibi.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly the eyewitness account of Felicisimo Alciso.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting the oral admissions of Encipido and de la Peña made to the station commander, the mayor, and Alciso.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in appreciating the judicial admission of de la Peña against his co-accused Encipido and Manatad.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting Encipido and Manatad despite their defense of alibi.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in refusing to give due course to the motion for reconsideration on the ground that the judgment had become final.

Applicable Provisions

Section 22 of the Rules of Court on admissions of a party provides:

Section 22. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.

This provision is the basis for admitting the verbal acknowledgments of guilt made by Encipido and de la Peña against themselves.

Section 29 of the Rules of Court on confession provides:

Section 29. Confession. The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him.

This provision governs the evidentiary value of the extrajudicial confessions of the declarants.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the evidence taken together justifies a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Alciso positively identified the accused as among the group who led the deceased out of his hut with his hands tied, mauled him, and hacked his neck. The autopsy findings confirmed his description. The Court ruled that the credibility of a witness is not affected by minor inconsistencies if, as to the main incident and the identities of the malefactors, the testimony is consistent. The distance estimates were merely approximations, and the fact that it was the first time Alciso saw the malefactors did not prevent recognition, since persons observing a startling occurrence strive to know those involved.

On the second issue, the Court held that the oral confessions are admissible. Any competent witness who heard the confession may testify as to its substance. The admissions were made against the declarants' own interest, which gives them evidentiary value. The Court also held that the extrajudicial confessions were independently made without collusion, identical in their material respects, and confirmatory of one another, and are therefore admissible as circumstantial evidence against the co-accused implicated therein. They are what is commonly known as interlocking confessions and constitute an exception to the general rule that extrajudicial confessions are admissible only against the declarants.

On the third issue, the Court held that the judicial admission of de la Peña is admissible not only against him but against his co-accused as well. The general rule that the confession of an accused is not competent evidence against his co-accused admits of exceptions. Where several accused are tried together for the same complaint, the testimony lawfully given by one during the trial implicating the others is competent evidence against the latter, who had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The Court noted that counsel de officio had the opportunity to cross-examine de la Peña but did not avail of it.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the defense of alibi cannot prevail against positive identification by the eyewitness, the verbal acknowledgments of guilt, and the interlocking confessions. Neither accused proved that they were at some place for such a period of time that it was impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime. The Court also held that the trial court's findings on credibility are entitled to great weight because it was in a vantage position to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses.

On the fifth issue, the Court held that the refusal to give due course to the motion for reconsideration is no longer of any consequence since all the grounds therefor were elevated to and considered by the Court on appeal.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate must retain these rules. First, the credibility of a witness is not affected by minor inconsistencies if the testimony is consistent as to the main incident and the identities of the malefactors. Second, oral confessions may be proved by any competent witness who heard and understood them, and may be given in substance. Third, interlocking confessions, independently made without collusion and identical in their material respects, are admissible as circumstantial evidence against the co-accused implicated therein, as an exception to the general rule. Fourth, the judicial admission of a co-accused given during trial is admissible against the other accused, who had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Fifth, alibi cannot prevail against positive identification and must be supported by proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime.

Disposition

The judgment appealed from was affirmed, except that the civil indemnity was increased to 30,000 pesos in accordance with recent jurisprudence, with proportionate costs.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that interlocking confessions and the judicial admission of a co-accused given in open court are admissible against the other accused, who had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Examiners like to use this case on the hearsay rule, on the admissibility of oral confessions, and on the defense of alibi against positive identification.