SPOUSES RICKY WONG AND ANITA CHAN, LEONARDO JOSON, JUANITO SANTOS, EMERITO SICAT AND CONRADO LAGMAN, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND ROMARICO HENSON, RESP…

Submitted for adjudication in the instant petition for review on certiorari
is the issue of whether or not the execution of a decision in an action for
collection of a sum of money may be nullified on the ground that the real
properties levied upon and sold at public auction are the alleged exclusive
properties of a husband who did not participate in his wife’s business
transaction from which said action stemmed.

Private respondent Romarico Henson
married Katrina Pineda on January 6,
1964.^[1]
They have three children but even during the early years of their marriage, Romarico and Katrina had been most of the time living separately. 
The former stayed in Angeles
City while the latter lived in Manila.  During the marriage or on January 6, 1971, Romarico
bought a 1,787-square-meter parcel of land in Angeles
City for P11,492 from his father,
Dr. Celestino L. Henson^[2]
with money borrowed from an officemate. 
His father needed the amount for investments in Angeles
City and Palawan.^[3]

Meanwhile, in Hongkong sometime in June
1972, Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan whereby the latter
consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale valued at 199,895 Hongkong dollars or P321,830.95.^[4]
When Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within the 20-day period
agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their value.

On September 18, 1972,
Katrina issued in favor of Anita Chan a check for P55,000 which, however, was
dishonored for lack of funds.  Hence,
Katrina was charged with estafa before the then Court
of First Instance of Pampanga and Angeles
City, Branch IV.^[5]
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case on the
ground that Katrina’s liability was not criminal but civil in nature as no estafa was committed by the issuance of the check in
payment of a pre-existing obligation.^[6]

In view of said decision, Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong
filed against Katrina and her husband Romarico
Henson, an action for collection of a sum of money also in the same branch of
the aforesaid court.^[7]
The records of the case show that Atty. Gregorio Albino, Jr. filed an answer
with counterclaim but only in behalf of Katrina.  When the case was called for pre-trial, Atty.
Albino once again appeared as counsel for Katrina only.  While it is true that during subsequent
hearings, Atty. Expedito Yumul,
who collaborated with Atty. Albino, appeared for the defendants, it is not
shown on record that said counsel also represented Romarico.  In fact, a power of attorney which Atty.
Albino produced during the trial, showed that the same was executed solely by
Katrina.^[8]

After trial, the court promulgated a decision^[9]
in favor of the Wongs.  It ordered Katrina and Romarico
Henson to pay the Wongs HK$199,895.00 or P321,830.95
with legal interest from May 27, 1975, the date of filing of the complaint,
until fully paid; P20,000 as expenses for litigation; P15,000 as attorney’s
fees, and the costs of the suit.

A writ of execution was thereafter issued.  Levied upon were four lots in Angeles City
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 30950, 30951, 30952 and 30953
all in the name of “Romarico Henson x x x married to Katrina
Henson.”^[10]

The public auction sale was first set for October 30, 1977 but since said date was
declared a public holiday, Deputy Sheriff Emerito Sicat reset the sale to November 11, 1977. 
On said date, the following properties registered in the name of Romarico Henson “married to Katrina Henson” were
sold at public auction:  (a) two parcels
of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 30950 and 30951 with respective areas of 293 and 289 square
meters at P145,000 each to Juanito L. Santos,^[11]
and (b) two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
30952 and 30953 with respective areas of 289 and 916 square meters in the
amount of P119,000.00 to Leonardo B. Joson.^[12]

After the inscription on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 30951
of the levy on execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 2224, the property
covered by said title was extrajudicially foreclosed
by the Rural Bank of Porac, Pampanga
on account of the mortgage loan of P8,000 which Romarico
and Katrina had obtained from said bank. 
The property was sold by the sheriff to the highest bidder for P57,000
on September 9, 1977.  On September
14, 1978, Juanito Santos, who had earlier
bought the same property at public auction on November 11, 1977, redeemed it by paying the sum of
P57,000 plus the legal interest of P6,840.00 or a total amount of P63,840.00.^[13]

About a month before such redemption or on August 8, 1978, Romarico
filed an action for the annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. 2224 as
well as the writ of execution, levy on execution and the auction sale therein
in the same Court of First Instance.^[14]
Romarico alleged that he was “not given his day
in court” because he was not represented by counsel as Attys. Albino and Yumul appeared solely for Katrina; that although he did not
file an answer to the complaint he was not declared in default in the case;
that while Atty. Albino received a copy of the decision, he and his wife were
never personally served a copy thereof; that he had nothing to do with the
business transactions of Katrina as he did not authorize her to enter into such
trans­actions; and that the properties levied on execution and sold at public auction
by the sheriff were his capital properties and therefore, as to him, all the
proceedings had in the case were null and void.

On November 10, 1978,
the lower court issued an order restraining the Register of Deeds of Angeles
City from issuing the final bill of sale of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
30950 and 30951 in favor of Juanito Santos and
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 30952 and 30953 in favor of Leonardo Joson until further orders of the court.^[15]
On January 22, 1979, upon motion of Romarico, the
court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the sheriff from
approving the final bill of sale of the land covered by the aforementioned
certificates of title and the Register of Deeds of Angeles City from
registering said certificates of title in the names of Santos and Joson until the final outcome of the case subject to Romarico’s posting of a bond in the amount of P321,831.00.^[16]

After trial on the merits, the lower court^[17]
rendered a decision holding that Romarico was indeed
not given his day in court as he was not represented by counsel nor was he
notified of the hearings therein although he was never declared in
default.  Noting that the complaint in
Civil Case No. 2224 as well as the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced
at the trial in said case do not show that Romarico
had anything to do with the transactions between Katrina and Anita Chan, the
court ruled that the judgment in Civil Case No. 2224 “is devoid of legal
or factual basis which is not even supported by a finding of fact or ratio
decidendi in the body of the decision, and may
be declared null and void x x x
pursuant to a doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court to the effect that ‘the
Court of First Instance or a branch thereof, has authority and jurisdiction to
try and decide an action for annulment of a final and executory
judgment or order rendered by another court of first instance or of a branch
thereof’ (Gianan vs. Imperial, 55 SCRA 755).”^[18]

On whether or not the properties levied upon and sold at public
auction may be reconveyed to Romarico,
the court, finding that there was no basis for holding the conjugal partnership
liable for the personal indebtedness of Katrina, ruled in favor of reconveyance in view of the jurisprudence that the interest
of the wife in the conjugal partnership property being inchoate and therefore
merely an expectancy, the same may not be sold or disposed of for value until
after the liquidation and settlement of the community assets.  The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against all the defendants, as follows:

“(a)    The Decision of the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga and Angeles City, Branch IV, rendered in
Civil Case No. 2224, entitled “RICKY WONG, ET AL. vs. KATRINA PINEDA
HENSON and ROMARICO HENSON”, is hereby declared null and void, only as far
as it affects plain­tiff herein Romarico Henson;

“(b)    The Writ of Execution, levy in execution and
auction sale of the conjugal property of the spouses Romarico
Henson and Katrina Pineda Henson which were sold at public auction on November
11, 1977, without notice to plaintiff
herein, by Deputy Sheriff Emerito Sicat,
are likewise declared null and void and of no force and effect;

“(c)    Defendants Emerito
Sicat and Conrado Lagman, in their official capacity as Sheriff and Register
of Deeds, respectively, are enjoined permanently from issuing and/or
registering the corresponding deeds of sale affecting the property;

“(d)    The aforementioned buyers are directed to reconvey the property they have thus purchased at public
auction to plaintiff Romarico Henson;

“(e)    As far as the claim for reimbursement filed
by Juanito Santos concerning the redemption of the
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 30951 from the Rural Bank of Porac, which
foreclosed the same extrajudicially, is concerned,
plaintiff Romarico Henson may redeem the same within
the period and in the manner prescribed
by law, after the corresponding
deed of redemption shall have been registered in the
Office of the Registry of Deeds for Angeles City;

“(f)     Defendants Spouses Ricky Wong and Anita
Chan are, with the exception of the defendants Juanito
Santos, Leonardo Joson, Sheriff and Register of Deeds, are ordered jointly
and severally, to pay the plaintiff Romarico Henson
the sum of P10,000.00, corresponding to the expenses of litigation, with legal
interest thereon from the time this suit was filed up to the time the same
shall have been paid, plus P5,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees, and the costs
of suit; and

“(g)    The counterclaims respectively filed on
behalf of all the defendants in the above-entitled case are hereby DISMISSED.

“SO ORDERED.”

The defendants appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate
Court.  In its decision of January
22, 1985^[19]
the said court affirmed in toto the
decision of the lower court.  It added
that as to Romarico, the judgment in Civil Case No.
2224 had not attained finality as the decision therein was not served on him
and that he was not represented by counsel. 
Therefore, estoppel may not be applied against
him as, not having been served with the decision, Romarico
did not know anything about it.  Corollarily, there can be no valid writ of execution
inasmuch as the decision had not become final as far as Romarico
is concerned.

On whether the properties may be levied upon as conjugal
properties, the appellate court ruled in the negative.  It noted that the properties are Romarico’s exclusive capital having been bought by him with
his own funds.  But granting that the
proper­ties are conjugal, they cannot answer for Katrina’s obligations as the
latter were exclusively hers because they were incurred without the consent of
her husband, they were not for the daily expenses of the family and they did
not redound to the benefit of the family. 
The court underscored the fact that no evidence has been submitted that
the administration of the conjugal partner­ship had been transferred to Katrina
either by Romarico or by the court before said obligations
were incurred.

The appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
of the appellate court but the same was denied for lack of merit on February 6, 1985.^[20]

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.  Petitioners contend that, inasmuch as the
Henson spouses were duly represented by Atty. Albino as shown by their
affidavit of August 25, 1977 wherein they admitted that they were represented
by said counsel until Atty. Yumul took over the
actual management and conduct of the case and that Atty. Albino had not
withdrawn as their counsel, the lower court “did not commit an error” in
serving a copy of the decision in Civil Case No. 2224 only on Atty.
Albino.  Moreover, during the 2-year
period between the filing of the complaint in Civil Case No. 2224 and the
public auction sale on November 11, 1977, Romarico
remained silent thereby making him in estoppel and
guilty of laches.

Petitioners further aver that there being sufficient evi­dence
that the auction sale was conducted in accordance with law, the acts of the
sheriffs concerned are presumed to be regular and valid.  But granting that an irregularity consisting
of the non-notification of Romarico attended the
conduct of the auction sale, the rights of Santos
and Joson who were “mere strangers who
participated as the highest bidders” therein, may not be prejudiced.  Santos
and Joson bought the properties sincerely believing
that the sheriff was regularly performing his duties and no evidence was
presented to the effect that they acted with fraud or that they connived with
the sheriff.  However, should the auction
sale be nullified, petitioners assert that Romarico
should not be unduly enriched at the expense of Santos
and Joson.

The petitioners’ theory is that Romarico
Henson was guilty of laches and may not now belatedly
assert his rights over the properties because he and Katrina were represented
by counsel in Civil Case No. 2224.  Said
theory is allegedly founded on the perception that the Hensons
were like any other ordinary couple wherein a spouse knows or should know the
transactions of the other spouse which necessarily must be in interest of the
family.  The factual background of this
case, however, takes it out of said ideal situation.

Romarico and Katrina had in fact been
separated when Katrina entered into a business deal with Anita Wong.  Thus, where that business transaction
eventually resulted in the filing of Civil Case No. 2224, Romarico
acted, or, as charged by peti­tioners, failed to act, in the belief that he was
not involved in the personal dealings of his estranged wife.  That belief was buttressed by the fact that
the complaint itself did not mention or implicate him other than as the husband
of Katrina.  On whether Romarico was also represented by Atty. Albino, Katrina’s
counsel, the courts below found that:

“x x x Atty.
Albino filed an Answer with Counter­claims dated July 25, 1975 solely on behalf of defendant Katrina
Henson.  The salutary statement in that
Answer categorically reads:  ‘x x x COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT KATRINA HENSON by and through
undersigned counsel, in answer to plaintiffs’ complaint respectfully
alleges:  x x x.’

“That Answer was signed by GREGORIO ALBINO, JR., over the
phrase ‘COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT KATRINA HENSON.’

“Again, when Civil Case No. 2224 was called for pre-trial on November 27, 1975, before then
Presiding Judge Bienvenido Ejercito,
it is clearly stated on page 2 of the day’s stenographic notes, under
‘APPEARANCES’ that Atty. Albino, Jr. appeared as ‘COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT KATRINA
HENSON.’ And when the case was called, Atty. Jose Baltazar,
Sr. appeared for the plaintiffs while Atty. Albino categorically appeared ‘FOR
DEFENDANT KATRINA HENSON.’

“It might be true that in subsequent hearings, Atty. Expedito Yumul ‘appeared as
counsel for the defendants’, but the whole trouble is that he never expressly
manifested to the Court that he was likewise actually representing defendant
‘ROMARICO HENSON’, for it cannot be disputed that Atty. Yumul
only entered his appearance in collaboration with Atty. Albino (see p. 2 tsn, January 26, 1976, Espinosa), who in turn entered his
initial appearance during the pre-trial, and through the filing of an Answer,
for defendant KATRINA HENSON.  As a
matter of fact the Power of Attorney which Atty. Albino produced during the
pre-trial was executed solely by defendant KATRINA HENSON.  Accordingly, as collaborating counsel, Atty. Yumul cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be
considered as duly authorized to formally appear likewise on behalf of
defendant ROMARICO HENSON for whom principal counsel of record Atty. Gregorio
Albino, Jr. never made any formal appearance. 
On this score, it is not amiss to state that ‘A spring cannot rise
higher than its source.’

“Now, what about that statement in the aforementioned joint
affidavit of the spouses KATRINA HENSON and ROMARICO HENSON, to the effect that
‘our first lawyer in said case was Atty. Gregorio Albino, Jr., and sometime
later Atty. Expedito B. Yumul
took over x x
x.’

“That statement which plaintiff ROMARICO HENSON was made to
sign by Atty. Yumul on August 25, 1977, after the
filing of this case, allegedly for the purpose of dissolving the writ of
execution, as claimed in paragraph XIV of the complaint herein, and is satisfac­torily
explained by both plaintiff herein and his wife, while on cross-examination by
Atty. Baltazar, Sr., and We quote:

‘Q.   So,
the summons directed your filing of your Answer for both of you, your wife and
your good self?

‘A.   Yes,
sir but may I add, I received the
summons but I did not file an answer because my wife took a lawyer and that
lawyer I think will protect her interest and my interest being so I did not
have nothing to do in the transaction which is attached to the complaint.’
(TSN, Jan. 14, 1980, pp. 52-53).

“That plaintiff never appeared in Civil Case No. 2224, nor was
he therein represented by counsel was impliedly admitted by defendants’ counsel
of records thru a question he propounded on cross, and the answer given by
Katrina Pineda, to wit:

‘Q.   How
about your husband, do you remember if he
physically appeared in that Civil Case
No. 2224, will you tell us if he was represented by counsel as a party
defendant?

‘A.   No, sir, he did not appear.

‘Q    You
are husband and wife, please tell us the reason
why you have your own counsel in that case whereas Romarico
Henson did not appear nor a counsel did not appear in that pro­ceedings?’ (TSN,
Feb. 25, 1980, pp. 6-7).

xxx                        xxx                   xxx.

‘A.
  Because that case is my exclusive and personal
case, he has nothing to do with that, sir.’ (TSN, Feb. 25, 1980, p. 9).” (Rollo, pp. 17-20)

Hence, laches
may not be charged against Romarico because, aside
from the fact that he had no knowledge of the transactions of his estranged
wife, he was also not afforded an opportunity to defend himself in Civil Case
No. 2224.^[21]
There is no laches or even finality of decision to speak
of with respect to Romarico since the decision in
Civil Case No. 2224 is null and void for having been rendered without
jurisdiction for failure to observe the notice requirements prescribed by law.^[22]
Failure to notify Romarico may not be attributed to
the fact that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2224 acted on the presumption
that the Hensons were still happily married because the complaint itself shows
that they did not consider Romarico as a party to the
transaction which Katrina undertook with Anita Wong.  In all likelihood, the plaintiffs merely impleaded Romarico as a nominal
party in the case pursuant to
the provisions of Rule 3, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.

Consequently, the writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico as he has not yet had his day in court^[23]
and, necessarily, the public auction sale is null and void.^[24]
Moreover, the power of the court in the execution of judgments extends only
over properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor.^[25]

On the matter of ownership of the properties involved, however,
the Court disagrees with the appellate court that the said properties are
exclusively owned by Romarico.  Having been acquired during the marriage,
they are still presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership^[26]
even though Romarico and Katrina had been living
separately.^[27]

The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists
in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said
presumption or to prove that the properties are exclusively owned by Romarico.^[28]
While there is proof that Romarico acquired the
properties with money he had borrowed from an officemate, it is unclear where
he obtained the money to repay the loan. 
If he paid it out of his salaries, then the money is part of the
conjugal assets^[29]
and not exclusively his.  Proof on this
matter is of paramount importance considering that in the determination of the
nature of a property acquired by a
person during coverture, the controlling factor is
the source of the money utilized
in the purchase.

The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, Katrina’s
indebtedness may not be paid for with them her obligation not having been shown
by the petitioners to be one of the charges against the conjugal partnership.^[30]
In addition to the fact that her rights over the properties are merely inchoate
prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the consent of her
husband and her authority to incur such indebted­ness had not been alleged in
the complaint and proven at the trial.^[31]
Furthermore, under the Civil Code (before the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988), a wife may bind the conjugal partnership
only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family or when
she borrows money for the purpose of purchasing things necessary for the
support of the family if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum;^[32]
when the administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife
by the courts^[33]
or by the husband,^[34]
and when the wife gives moderate donations for charity.^[35]
Having failed to establish that any of these circumstances occurred, the Wongs may not bind the conjugal assets to answer for
Katrina’s per­sonal obligation to them.

Petitioners’ contention that the rights of Santos
and Joson as innocent buyers at the public auction
sale may not be prejudiced, is, to a certain extent, valid.  After all, in the absence of proof that
irregularities attended the sale, the same must be presumed to have been
conducted in accordance with law.  There
is, however, a peculiar factual circumstance that goes against the grain of
that general presumption – the properties levied upon and sold at the public
auction do not exclusively belong to the judgment debtor.  Thus, the guiding jurisprudence is as
follows:

“The rule in execution sales is that an execution creditor
acquires no higher or better right than what the execution debtor has in the
property levied upon.  The purchaser of
property on sale under execution and levy takes as assignee only, as the
judicial seller possesses no title other than that which would pass by an
assignment by the owner.  ‘An execution
purchaser generally acquires such
estate or interest as was vested in the execution debtor at the time of the
seizure on execution, and only such interest, taking merely a quit-claim of the
execution debtor’s title, without warranty on the part of either the execution
officer or of the parties, whether the property is realty or personality.  This rule prevails even if a larger interest
in the property was intended to be sold. 
Accordingly, if the judgment debtor had no interest in the property, the
execution purchaser acquires no interest therein.’” (Pacheco vs. Court of
Appeals, L-48689, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 382, 388-389 quoting Laureano vs. Stevenson, 45 Phil. 252; Cabuhat
vs. Ansery, 42 Phil. 170; Fore v. Manove,
18 Cal. 436 and 21 Am. Jur., 140-141.  Underscoring supplied.)

Applying this jurisprudence, execution purchasers Santos
and Joson possess no rights which may rise above
judgment debtor Katrina’s inchoate proprietary rights over the
properties sold at public auction.  After
all, a person can sell only what he owns or is authorized to sell and the buyer
can, as a consequence, acquire no more than what the seller can legally
transfer.^[36]
But, inasmuch as the decision in Civil Case No. 2224 is void only as far as Romarico and the conjugal proper­ties are concerned, the
same may still be executed by the Spouses Wong against Katrina Henson
personally and exclusively.  The Spouses
Wong must return to Juanito Santos and Leonardo Joson the purchase prices of P145,000 and P119,000
respectively, received by said spouses from the public auction sale.

The redemption made by Santos in the foreclosure proceeding
against Romarico and Katrina Henson filed by the
Rural Bank of Porac should, however, be respected
unless Romarico exercises his right of redemption
over the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 30951 in
accordance with law.

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the appellate court and the
lower court in Civil Case No. 2859 are hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modifications above-stated.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin, and Davide, Jr.,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
TSN, January 14, 1980, p.
54.

^[2]
Exh. I.

^[3]
TSN, January 14, 1980, p.
14.

^[4]
Decision in Civil Case No. 2224, Exh. K, pp. 1-2.

^[5]
Presided by Judge Bienvenido Ejercito.

^[6]
Decision in Criminal Case No. 3205, Exh. J, p. 11.

^[7]
Civil Case No. 2224.

^[8]
Decision in Civil Case No. 2859, pp. 12-15.

^[9]
Penned by Judge Felisa de la Fuente-Samson.

^[10]
Exhs. Nos. A to D.

^[11]
Exh. 5- Juanito Santos.

^[12]
Exh. 6- Joson.

^[13]
Exh. 4- Santos.

^[14]
Civil Case No. 2859.

^[15]
Record on Appeal, p. 25.

^[16]
Ibid., p. 54.

^[17]
Presided by Judge Ignacio M. Capulong.  The presiding judge of Branch IV had earlier
inhibited himself from taking cognizance of the case.  Hence, Civil Case No. 2859 was trans­ferred
to Branch V of the same court.

^[18]
Pursuant to Section 9 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the
Court of Appeals now exercises exclusive original juris­diction over actions
for annulment of judgments of the Regional Trial Courts (Islamic Da Wah Council of the Philippines
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80892, September 29, 1989, 178 SCRA 178; Liwag vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86094, December
20, 1989, 180 SCRA 420).

^[19]
Penned by Justice Eduardo P. Caguioa and concurred in
by Justices Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., Ma. Rosario Quetulio-Losa
and Leonor Ines Luciano.

^[20]
Rollo, p. 56.

^[21]
Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
78178, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 738, 747.

^[22]
Portugal v. Reantasa, L-46078, November 24,
1988, 167 SCRA 712.

^[23]
New Owners/Management of TML Garments, Inc. v. Zaragoza,
G.R. No. 75866, February 23, 1989, 170 SCRA 563; Vda.
de Medina v. Cruz, L-39272, May 4, 1988, 161 SCRA 36.

^[24]
Ver v. Quetulio,
G.R. No. 77526, June 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 80.

^[25]
Escovilla, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
84497, November 6, 1989, 179 SCRA 109; Ong v. Tating, G.R. No. 61042, April 15, 1987, 149 SCRA 265.

^[26]
Art. 160, Civil Code; Cuenca v. Cuenca, G.R. No. 72321, December 8, 1988, 168 SCRA 335.

^[27]
Art. 178, Ibid., Flores v. Escudero,
92 Phil. 786.

^[28]
Ahern v. Julian, 39 Phil. 607.

^[29]
Art. 153 (2), Civil Code.

^[30]
Art. 161, Ibid.; Lacson v. Diaz,
L-19346, May 31, 1965, 14 SCRA 183.

^[31]
Art. 172, Ibid.; Manaois-Salonga v. Natividad, 107 Phil. 268.

^[32]
Art. 115.

^[33]
Arts. 196, 167 & 178.

^[34]
Art. 168.

^[35]
Art. 174.

^[36]
See:  Segura
v. Segura, L-29320, September 19, 1988, 165 SCRA 368, 374.